Wall Street QE vs. Main Street Lending*

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Abstract

Monetary and fiscal authorities reacted swiftly to the COVID-19 pandemic by purchasing assets (or “Wall Street QE”) and lending directly to non-financial firms (or “Main Street Lending”). Our paper develops a new framework to compare and contrast these different policies. For the Great Recession, characterized by impaired balance sheets of financial intermediaries, Main Street lending and Wall Street QE are perfect substitutes and both stimulate aggregate demand. In contrast, for the COVID-19 recession, where non-financial firms faced significant cash flow shortages, Wall Street QE is almost completely ineffective, whereas Main Street lending can be highly stimulative.

Keywords: Main Street Lending Program, Paycheck Protection Program, COVID-19, Great Recession, quantitative easing, DSGE

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1 Introduction

The US government has acted swiftly and dramatically to support the US economy in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the Federal Reserve’s recent actions represent a resuscitation or extension of facilities and tools it deployed to combat the Financial Crisis and Great Recession of 2007-2009, which involved purchasing assets from financial markets. In addition, both the Fed and the Treasury made a similar effort to lend directly to non-financial firms. In March 2020, the Fed announced a sequence of Main Street Lending Programs. Around the same time, the Treasury, in conjunction with the Small Business Administration, implemented the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).

This paper represents a first attempt to assess the efficacy of the government directly lending to non-financial firms as opposed to interacting only with financial markets. We do so in a macroeconomic model that contains the minimum number of necessary frictions to study these types of policies; the rest of the model is fairly standard. Financial intermediaries are modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Sims and Wu (2020). These intermediaries hold long-term bonds issued by non-financial firms, who are required to float debt to finance their expenditure on new physical capital. The bond market is segmented in that households cannot directly hold these long-term bonds. Intermediaries face an endogenous leverage constraint that results in excess returns of long-term bonds over the short-term policy rate. The monetary authority can purchase long-term bonds directly from intermediaries, which eases their leverage constraint. This allows intermediaries to purchase more long-term bonds, which in equilibrium results in higher bond prices and more aggregate demand. We refer to this type of asset purchase by the central bank from financial markets as “Wall Street QE.”

The main modeling contribution of this paper is to allow the government to directly lend to non-financial firms. We refer to such direct purchases/lending as “Main Street lending.” Without additional constraints relative to those described in the paragraph above, Main Street lending turns out to be isomorphic to Wall Street QE. To account for the unique features of the ongoing crisis, we introduce an additional constraint that restricts the
amount of credit a non-financial firm can secure as a function of its cash flows. This seems particularly relevant in the current environment, where government-mandated lockdowns and significant changes in consumer behavior have resulted in the near-evaporation of cash flows for many non-financial firms, particularly in the early stages of the pandemic. When this “cash flow constraint” is binding, Main Street lending can be a highly effective way to stimulate economic activity because it loosens the constraint facing non-financial firms and allows them to continue to issue debt to finance investment. Conversely, Wall Street QE becomes almost completely ineffective in this situation. Even though asset purchases from financial markets free up space on intermediary balance sheets, intermediaries remain unwilling to purchase bonds issued by firms with low cash flows.

In a quantitative version of our model, we compare and contrast the two policies against the backdrop of the Great Recession as well as COVID-19. We model the Great Recession of 2007-2009 as a situation in which intermediaries were constrained, but non-financial firms were not. We show that Main Street lending and Wall Street QE are equivalent ways to stimulate aggregate demand in such a scenario. For the current COVID-19 crisis, we assume that both intermediaries and firms face binding constraints. In this situation, Wall Street QE is almost completely ineffective at stimulating variables like output, labor, and consumption. In contrast, Main Street lending becomes far more stimulative. Viewed through the lens of our model, and in light of the circumstances the economy has been facing for much of 2020, the government’s recent actions to lend directly to non-financial firms could have a substantial positive impact on aggregate demand. More generally, our analysis provides a simple yet powerful message. It is not sufficient for the government to lend freely to combat an economic crisis. It is just as important for the government to lend freely to where constraints are most binding. In the Great Recession, this was the financial system. In 2020, it is non-financial firms.

Section 2 presents the key ingredients of our model and discusses the potential differences between Wall Street QE and Main Street lending. Section 3 presents quantitative results
from our model. Section 4 concludes.

2 Model

In this section, we lay out the principal ingredients of our model. We begin by laying out the standard model in which there is no Main Street lending. Along most dimensions, the model is similar to Sims and Wu (2020). We show how, in normal times, government asset purchases (Wall Street QE) can be an effective demand stimulus. But when production firms are subject to a cash flow constraint, Wall Street QE becomes completely ineffective. We then show how direct lending from the government to firms (Main Street Lending) can be highly effective in such a situation.

Before proceeding with details, we begin with a broad, high-level overview of the model. The production side of the economy consists of a representative wholesale firm, a representative new capital goods firm, a continuum of retailers, and a representative final goods firm. A representative household consumes, saves via a one period deposits, and supplies labor to labor unions. A continuum of labor unions repackage household labor for resale to a competitive labor packer. The wholesale firm purchases labor from the labor packer and accumulates its own capital, purchasing new capital from the representative new capital goods firm. The wholesale producer sells its output to retailers, who repackage wholesale output for resale to the final goods firm. Price and wage stickiness are introduced at the retail firm and labor union levels, respectively, which allows us to work with a representative household and a representative wholesale producer.

Financial intermediaries engage in maturity transformation between the one-period deposits of the household and the long-term bonds issued by the wholesale firm; they are structured as in Gertler and Karadi (2013). Markets are segmented in that the household does not have access to these long-term bonds; they can only be purchased by financial intermediaries. To the extent to which intermediaries are balance sheet constrained, a spread between yields
on long-term bonds and short-term deposits will emerge. Similarly to Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2017), we assume that the wholesale producer must issue long-term bonds to finance a fraction of its investment. Both this constraint, as well as the balance sheet constraint on intermediaries, are key features in Sims and Wu’s (2020) model.

In addition to setting the short-term nominal interest rate, the government in our model can purchase long-term bonds in open markets. We label such asset purchases as “Wall Street QE.” As in Sims and Wu (2020, 2019), “Wall Street QE” can be effective by relaxing the endogenous leverage constraint facing financial intermediaries – by purchasing long-term bonds, the government frees up space on intermediary balance sheets to purchase private bonds, which results in more investment.

We introduce another constraint, similarly to Drechsel (2019), that limits the amount of debt the wholesale firm can issue as a function of its current cash flows. We think such a cash flow constraint is a reasonable description of the state of affairs facing many non-financial firms at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. When firms are cash flow constrained, we show that open market asset purchases – i.e. Wall Street QE – are completely ineffective. We then show how direct lending from the government, what we call Main Street QE, can nevertheless be a highly effective demand stimulus.

In the main text, we describe only those aspects of the model that are most relevant for studying Wall Street QE and Main Street lending. The rest of the model details are relegated to the Online Appendix.

\subsection{Wholesale Firm}

The wholesale firm produces output according to:

\begin{equation}
Y_{w,t} = A_t K_t^\alpha L_d^{1-\alpha}.
\end{equation}

$A_t$ is an exogenous aggregate productivity shifter, $K_t$ is the stock of physical capital.
chosen the previous period, and $L_{d,t}$ is labor input. The parameter $\alpha \in (0,1)$ captures capital’s share of income. The wholesale firm accumulates its own physical capital, which obeys the law of motion:

$$K_{t+1} = \hat{I}_t + (1 - \delta)K_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.2)

New physical capital, $\hat{I}_t$, is purchased from an investment goods firm at $P^k_t$. Labor is hired at nominal wage $W_t$ from the labor packing firm. Output is sold to retailers at $P^w_t$.

The wholesale firm faces two constraints. First, it must finance a fraction, $\psi$, of its expenditure on new capital goods by floating long-term bonds. These long-term bonds are modeled as perpetuities with decaying coupon payments as in Woodford (2001). One unit of bonds issued today obliges the firm to a coupon payment of one dollar in the next period, $\kappa$ dollars in two periods, $\kappa^2$ dollars in three periods, and so on, where $\kappa \in [0,1]$. New bond issuances trade at market price $Q_t$. Let $F_{w,t-1}$ denote the total coupon liability due today from past issuances. It is straightforward to show that, at time $t$, the total value of all outstanding bonds is $Q_tF_{w,t}$, while the quantity of new issuances can be written as $F_{w,t} - \kappa F_{w,t-1}$. What we call the investment constraint is therefore:

$$\psi P^k_t \hat{I}_t \leq Q_t(F_{w,t} - \kappa F_{w,t-1}),$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.3)

and is the same as in Sims and Wu (2020).

The second constraint facing the wholesale firm is that the amount of bonds that it can issue, $Q_t(F_{w,t} - \kappa F_{w,t-1})$, is constrained by current cash flows, defined as revenue less payments to labor. This definition follows Drechsel (2019). We refer to this constraint as a cash flow constraint:

$$Q_t(F_{w,t} - \kappa F_{w,t-1}) \leq \varphi \left(P^w_t A_t K_t^{\alpha} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} - W_t L_{d,t} \right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.4)

where $\varphi$ is an exogenous parameter.
We assume that the “investment constraint,” (2.3), is binding in both of the scenarios we study: the Great Recession and COVID-19. In contrast, we think about the cash flow constraint, (2.4), as only binding in extreme circumstances. In particular, the cash flow constraint was arguably not relevant in the 2007-2009 crisis, which had its origins in the banking system. But in the environment characterizing much of the last year, with mandated lockdowns and extreme changes in consumer behavior, a cash flow constraint like (2.4) is likely to bind.

Nominal dividends for the wholesale firm are:

\[ D_{w,t} = p_{w}^{w} A_{t} K_{t}^{\alpha} L_{d,t}^{-\alpha} - W_{t} L_{t} - P_{t}^{k} \hat{I}_{t} - F_{w,t-1} + Q_{t}(F_{w,t} - \kappa F_{w,t-1}). \]  

(2.5)

The firm’s objective is to maximize the present discounted value of real dividends, \( d_{w,t} = D_{w,t}/P_{t} \), discounted by \( \Lambda_{0,t} = \frac{\beta u'(C_{t})}{u'(C_{0})} \), the stochastic discount factor of the household, subject to the law of motion for capital, (2.2), the investment constraint, (2.3), and the cash flow constraint, (2.4). The first order conditions are:

\[ w_{t} = (1 - \alpha)p_{w}^{w} A_{t} K_{t}^{\alpha} L_{d,t}^{-\alpha} \]  

(2.6)

\[ \lambda_{1,t} = p_{t}^{k}(1 + \psi \lambda_{2,t}) \]  

(2.7)

\[ \lambda_{1,t} = \mathbb{E}_{t} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 + \varphi \lambda_{3,t+1})\alpha p_{t+1}^{w} A_{t+1} K_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} L_{d,t+1}^{-\alpha} + \lambda_{1,t+1}(1 - \delta) \right] \]  

(2.8)

\[ (1 + \lambda_{2,t} - \lambda_{3,t}) Q_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{t} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \left[ 1 + \kappa Q_{t+1}(1 + \lambda_{2,t+1} - \lambda_{3,t+1}) \right] \]  

(2.9)

where \( p_{t}^{w} = P_{t}^{w}/P_{t} \) is the inverse price markup, \( w_{t} = W_{t}/P_{t} \) is the real wage, and \( p_{t}^{k} = P_{t}^{k}/P_{t} \) is the relative price of capital measured in consumption goods. In these expressions, \( \lambda_{1,t} \) is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital accumulation equation, \( \lambda_{2,t} \geq 0 \) is the multiplier on the investment constraint, and \( \lambda_{3,t} \geq 0 \) is the multiplier on the cash flow constraint. \( \Pi_{t} \) is the gross inflation rate between \( t - 1 \) and \( t \). (2.6) is the labor demand expression; this condition is standard. (2.7) is the first order condition for investment and relates the price of
new capital goods to the multiplier on the capital accumulation constraint. \( \lambda_{2,t} \geq 0 \) throws a wedge into the usual relationship that the multiplier and the price of capital would be the same. (2.8) is the first order condition for physical capital. \( \lambda_{3,t+1} \geq 0 \) functions like a subsidy to the return on physical capital; having more capital eases the cash flow constraint in subsequent periods. (2.9) is the optimality condition for the choice of \( F_{w,t} \), how many long-term bonds to issue. \( \lambda_{2,t} \) and \( \lambda_{3,t} \) enter this optimality condition in the same way but with opposite signs. When the cash flow constraint is not binding, then \( \lambda_{3,t} = 0 \) and the optimality conditions for bond issuance are the same as in Sims and Wu (2020).

### 2.2 Financial Intermediaries

Financial intermediaries are structured as in Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Sims and Wu (2020). Here, we sketch out the principal ingredients.

In the background, there are a mass of intermediaries indexed by \( i \). Intermediaries stochastically exit with probability \( 1 - \sigma \) at the end of each period. Exiting intermediaries are replaced each period by an equal number of newly-formed intermediaries who begin with startup real net worth of \( X \). Intermediaries will differ in terms of the level of net worth, depending on how long since they were formed. But assumptions in the model guarantee that the value of an intermediary is linear in net worth – so these intermediaries are simply scaled versions of one another. This ensures that intermediaries behave identically with respect to their choices of assets to hold. For the purposes of the exposition in the text, we therefore drop \( i \) indexes and think about there being a representative intermediary.

Intermediaries fund themselves with deposits from the household \( D_t \) and accumulated net worth \( N_t \). On the asset side of the balance sheet, they can hold bonds issued by the wholesale firm \( F_t \), bonds issued by the government \( B_t \) (these take the same form as bonds issued by the wholesale firm, trading at market price \( Q_{B,t} \)), and reserve balances with the
government $RE_t$. The balance sheet condition is:

$$Q_t F_t + Q_{B,t} B_t + RE_t = D_t + N_t. \quad (2.10)$$

Assuming an intermediary survives across periods, its net worth evolves according to:

$$N_t = \left( R^F_t - R^d_{t-1} \right) Q_{t-1} F_{t-1} + \left( R^B_t - R^d_{t-1} \right) Q_{B,t-1} B_{t-1} + \left( R^{re}_{t-1} - R^d_{t-1} \right) RE_{t-1} + R^d_{t-1} N_{t-1}, \quad (2.11)$$

where $R^F_t$ and $R^B_t$ are the holding period returns on private and government bonds, respectively, and $R^{re}_t$ is the gross interest rate on reserves, set by the government. The holding period returns satisfy:

$$R^F_t = 1 + \kappa Q_t Q_{t-1}, \quad (2.12)$$

$$R^B_t = 1 + \kappa Q_{B,t} Q_{B,t-1}. \quad (2.13)$$

So long as there exist excess returns (e.g. $R^F_t - R^d_{t-1} > 0$), a financial intermediary’s objective is to maximize its terminal real net worth. Discounting is by the stochastic discount factor of the household adjusted to reflect the probability of future exit. Let $V_t$ be the value of an intermediary in period $t$ that is continuing to period $t+1$. This value satisfies:

$$V_t = \max_{F_t, B_t, RE_t} \left( 1 - \sigma \right) E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} n_{t+1} + \sigma E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} V_{t+1}. \quad (2.14)$$

where $n_t = N_t/P_t$ is real net worth (similarly, $d_t = D_t/P_t$, $f_t = F_t/P_t$, $b_t = B_t/P_t$, and $re_t = RE_t/P_t$ are real quantities of deposits, bonds, government bonds, and reserves). If there were no constraints, an intermediary would purchase assets up to the point of eliminating excess returns. We introduce a costly enforcement constraint to prevent that. In particular, we assume that, at the end of a period, an intermediary can default and abscond with a
stochastic fraction, $\theta_t$, of its corporate bonds and a fraction, $\theta_t \Delta$, of its government bonds, where $0 \leq \Delta \leq 1$. Creditors recover the rest of the intermediary’s assets in default, including all of its reserves. To prevent default from occurring, creditors impose an endogenous leverage constraint on intermediaries of the form:

$$V_t \geq \theta_t \left( Q_t f_t + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_t \right). \quad (2.15)$$

This constraint ensures that it is more valuable for an intermediary to continue on as an intermediary as opposed to defaulting and absconding with assets. Let $\lambda_t$ be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. The first order conditions for the intermediary are:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_t^e - R_t^d \right) = 0, \quad (2.16)$$

$$\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_t^F - R_t^d \right) = \frac{\lambda_t}{1 + \lambda_t} \theta_t, \quad (2.17)$$

$$\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_t^B - R_t^d \right) = \frac{\lambda_t}{1 + \lambda_t} \Delta \theta_t, \quad (2.18)$$

where $\Omega_t$ satisfies:

$$\Omega_t = 1 - \sigma + \sigma \theta_t \phi_t, \quad (2.19)$$

and $\phi_t$ is a modified leverage ratio and satisfies:

$$\phi_t = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} R_t^d}{\theta_t - \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_t^F - R_t^d \right)}. \quad (2.20)$$

One can show that $V_t = \theta_t \phi_t n_t$. When the constraint binds, the modified leverage ratio equals:

$$\phi_t = \frac{Q_t f_t + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_t}{n_t}. \quad (2.21)$$

(2.16) reveals that, in equilibrium, $R_t^e = R_t^d$. This arises because an intermediary is
unconstrained in the amount of reserves it can hold. In contrast, if $\lambda_t > 0$, there will be excess returns on corporate and government bonds. The magnitude of these excess returns will differ by the factor $\Delta$, which is an exogenous parameter.

2.3 Government

We do not draw a distinction between the monetary and fiscal authority, and instead refer only to the government. The government consumes an exogenous level of output each period, $G_t$. It finances this spending through a combination of lump sum taxes, debt issuance, and revenue from its monetary operations. In nominal terms, its flow budget constraint is:

$$P_t G_t + B_{G,t-1} = P_t T_t + P_t T_{G,t} + Q_{B,t}(B_{G,t} - \kappa B_{G,t-1}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.22)

Government bonds are perpetuities with decaying coupon payments and are structured identically to the bonds issued by the wholesale firm. They trade at price $Q_{B,t}$. $T_{G,t}$ represents revenue from monetary operations, which we discuss below. Given $G_t$, $B_{G,t}$, $Q_{B,t}$, and $T_{G,t}$, lump sum taxes on the household, $T_t$, adjust to make (2.22) always hold.

The government can hold privately-issued bonds on its balance sheet. These assets are financed via reserves, which the government can freely set. The government’s balance sheet is

$$Q_t F_{G,t} = RE_t.$$ \hspace{1cm} (2.23)

The government sets the interest rate on reserves according to a traditional Taylor-type
\[
\ln R_t^{re} = (1 - \rho_R) \ln R_t^{re} + \rho_R \ln R_{t-1}^{re} + \\
(1 - \rho_R) \left[ \phi_x (\ln \Pi_t - \ln \Pi) + \phi_y (\ln Y_t - \ln Y_{t-1}) \right] + \sigma_R \varepsilon_{R,t}. \tag{2.24}
\]

As shown above, in equilibrium \( R_t^{re} = R_t^d \), so we could equivalently model the government as directly setting the short-term deposit rate.

The government earns revenues from its monetary operations to the extent to which the return on private bonds exceeds the interest rate on reserves. The nominal revenue from monetary operations satisfies:

\[
P_t T_{G,t} = R_t^F Q_{t-1} F_{G,t-1} - R_{t-1}^{re} R_{E,t-1}. \tag{2.25}
\]

Changes in government private bond holdings are what we call “Wall Street QE.” Changes in such holdings involve asset purchases on an open market. We assume that \( f_{G,t} = F_{G,t} / P_t \), or the real quantity of private bonds held by the government, follows an exogenous AR(1) process:

\[
f_{G,t} = (1 - \rho_f) f_G + \rho_f f_{G,t-1} + s_f \varepsilon_{f,t}. \tag{2.26}
\]

In practice, QE purchases in the US have mostly involved central bank purchases of long-term government bonds or agency-guaranteed mortgage backed securities, though in 2020 the Federal Reserve announced facilities to purchase corporate bonds carrying credit risk. It is straightforward to modify our analysis to instead think of QE as purchases of long-term government debt; see Sims and Wu (2020) for example.

\footnote{We ignore constraints imposed by the ZLB in this paper for brevity. See an analysis of QE with the ZLB in Sims and Wu (2020), for example.}
2.4 Wall Street QE vs. Main Street Lending

If the cash flow constraint on intermediaries does not bind, i.e. (2.4) does not hold with equality and \( \lambda_{3,t} \) consequently equals zero, then our model is essentially the same as Sims and Wu (2020). Wall Street QE, or asset purchases by the government, work by loosening the enforcement constraint on intermediaries, (2.15). Asset purchases involve a swap of assets where a constraint applies (corporate bonds) for another asset, reserves, which is irrelevant for the enforcement constraint facing an intermediary. This swap thus loosens the constraint facing an intermediary, allowing it to purchase more private bonds. In equilibrium, this results in higher bond prices, \( Q_t \) and \( Q_{B,t} \), and correspondingly lower yields. Since we assume that the wholesale firm must float debt to finance investment, a higher bond price and larger quantity both imply more investment. This works to stimulate overall aggregate demand.

However, when the cash flow constraint binds, Wall Street QE becomes ineffective. To see this, combine (2.4) with (2.3):

\[
\psi P^k \hat{T}_t \leq \varphi \left( P^w A_t K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}_{d,t} - W_t L_{d,t} \right),
\]

(2.27)

Private investment is simply restricted by current cash flows. The mechanism through which Wall Street QE works is therefore not present, and absent general equilibrium effects, it would be completely ineffectual. Indeed, in quantitative simulations in the next section, we show that Wall Street QE is almost completely ineffective at stimulating output when firms are cash flow constrained.

In the late-spring of 2020, through a variety of fiscal and monetary programs, the US government introduced several programs to lend directly to non-financial firms. We show analytically how such programs might make sense in a world in which non-financial firms are cash flow constrained and traditional QE programs are ineffective. Suppose that the government can lend directly to non-financial firms. For convenience, we assume that these
loans take the same form as corporate bonds, with a decaying coupon payout of \( \kappa \). Let \( M_{w,t} \) denote the coupon payments the wholesale firm owes to the government in period \( t + 1 \) due to past issuances of bonds. These bonds trade at price \( Q_{M,t} \), with corresponding return \( R_{t}^{M} \). The funds generated by new issuance are therefore \( Q_{M,t}(M_{w,t} - \kappa M_{w,t-1}) \).

We assume that these loans from the government can be used to alleviate the investment constraint, (2.3), which is always binding. In particular:

\[
\psi P_{t}^{k} I_{t} \leq Q_{t}(F_{w,t} - \kappa F_{w,t-1}) + Q_{M,t}(M_{w,t} - \kappa M_{w,t-1}). \tag{2.28}
\]

In contrast, the cash flow constraint applies only to bonds issued into the open market, \( F_{w,t} \). It is consequently the same as above, (2.4). Without a cash flow constraint, main street lending would have very similar effects as Wall Street QE because they both loosen this investment constraint.\(^2\)

Unlike Wall Street QE, Main Street Lending can be highly effective when non-financial firms are cash flow constrained. To see this, combine (2.4) with (2.28):

\[
\psi P_{t}^{k} I_{t} \leq \varphi \left( P_{t}^{w} A_{t} K_{t}^{\alpha} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} - W_{t} L_{d,t} \right) + Q_{M,t}(M_{w,t} - \kappa M_{w,t-1}). \tag{2.29}
\]

Increases in \( M_{w,t} \) directly loosen the cash flow constraint, and allow firms to do more investment.

To incorporate Main Street Lending, we modify the government’s budget constraint, (2.22), as follows:

\[
P_{t}G_{t} + B_{G,t-1} + Q_{M,t}(M_{G,t} - \kappa M_{G,t-1}) = P_{t}T_{t}^{G} + P_{t}T_{G,t} + Q_{B,t}(B_{G,t} - \kappa B_{G,t-1}) + M_{G,t-1}. \tag{2.30}
\]

\( M_{G,t-1} \) denotes interest payments to the government from existing loans, and therefore enters on the right hand side of the constraint. \( Q_{M,t}(M_{G,t} - \kappa M_{G,t-1}) \) represents new loans issued

\(^2\)As we discuss below, the effects of Main Street Lending and Wall Street QE absent a cash flow constraint would be exactly the same if \( Q_{M,t} = Q_{t} \); i.e. if loans from the government have the same expected return as privately issued bonds.
by the government, and therefore enters on the expenditure side of the constraint.

Consistent with what was actually proposed and implemented in the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession and the pandemic recession, Wall Street QE is modeled as a monetary operation, while we collectively model Main Street Lending programs of both the Fed and Treasury (e.g. PPP) as fiscal operations. The line between traditional monetary policy and fiscal intervention has been blurry in the last year. The consolidated government balance sheet in our model reflects this feature.

For Main Street Lending, we assume that the government fixes both the available quantity of direct loans and the price (equivalently the return). This is essentially how Main Street Lending programs were implemented in practice. In particular, we assume that the real quantity of loans, $m_{G,t} = M_{G,t}/P_t$, follows an exogenous AR(1) process, similar to (2.26):

$$m_{G,t} = (1 - \rho_m)m_{G,t-1} + \rho_m \epsilon_{m,t} + s_m \varepsilon_{m,t}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.31)

We refer to shocks to the real quantity, $\epsilon_{m,t}$, as Main Street Lending shocks.

The government fixes the price of Main Street Lending at $Q_{M,t} = \tau Q_t$, where $\tau \leq 1$. This implies that Main Street Loans trade at a (weakly) higher implied interest rate than corporate bonds, i.e. $R_t^M \geq R_t^F$. Because the government is fixing both the price and setting an exogenous quantity, in equilibrium the wholesale firm will simply take all Main Street lending, i.e. $M_{w,t} = M_{G,t}$. In fact, when the cash flow constraint binds, the wholesale firm would desire to borrow far more from the government than the supply of government lending, so long as $\tau$ is not too small.

3 COVID-19 vs. the Great Recession

In this section, we quantitatively analyze the effects of Wall Street QE and Main Street lending in the two environments: the most recent COVID-19 crisis and the previous Great Recession.
3.1 Calibration

Many of the parameters in the model are chosen based on consensus values from the extant literature. We highlight a few that are relatively unique to our model. Parameters governing preferences and technology are fairly standard. The unit of time in the model is a quarter.

We follow Sims and Wu (2020) in calibrating parameters related to financial intermediaries, with one exception. In particular, we set the decay parameter for bond coupon payments to

$$\kappa = 1 - 16^{-1}.$$  

This implies a four year duration of long-term bonds in the model, which aligns with the maturity lengths associated with the different facilities that are part of the Main Street Lending Program. We set the AR(1) parameter for both Main Street lending and Wall Street QE to 0.97. The size of the QE/lending shocks we consider amount to 1% of annual GDP. For the situation in which the cash flow constraint on production firms is binding, we set $$\varphi = 0.60$$. We assume a constant stock of outstanding government debt.

We also assume the Main Street loans have the same price/return as corporate bonds; i.e. $$\tau = 1.$$ See more details in the Online Appendix.

3.2 Great Recession

We begin by using our model to think about the experience of the US during the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Since that crisis had its origins in the financial sector, we think of the Great Recession as being characterized by intermediaries being constrained, but non-financial firms as not being subject to a cash flow constraint. In other words, we assume that (2.4) is not binding, and accordingly solve the model dropping that equation as well as the Lagrange multiplier $$\lambda_{3,t}$$. Because of the linear solution to the model, we do not need to take a stand on what kind of shock contributed to the Great Recession. A natural candidate, however, as emphasized in Sims and Wu (2020), is a sequence of adverse credit shocks, captured by the exogenous variable $$\theta_t$$. Due to concerns surrounding subprime mortgages, creditors became less willing

\footnote{Our results are qualitatively the same when $$\tau < 1.$$}
to fund financial intermediaries, resulting in a tightening of balance sheet constraints. In the model, this would lead to a widening of credit spreads and a contraction in aggregate demand, roughly in-line with observed patterns in the data.

Figure 1 plots impulse responses of selected variables to a Wall Street QE shock during the Great Recession in the model (when the cash flow constraint does not bind). The QE shock is a shock to purchases of privately issued debt from intermediaries. For the responses shown, we do not impose a ZLB constraint on the short-term interest rate. Doing so would amplify the effects of the QE shock; see Sims and Wu (2020), for example. Responses of inflation and the policy rate are expressed in annualized percentage points. Responses of government bond holdings, as well as the multiplier on the leverage constraint, are expressed in absolute deviations from steady state. Inflation and the policy rates are changes in annualized percentage points. All other responses are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state.

The Wall Street QE shock results in hump-shaped expansions in output, investment, labor input, and inflation. Output reaches a peak response after about a year. The path of investment is similar, albeit about four times larger. Consumption initially declines before eventually rising. Focusing on the lower right-hand part of the figure, one sees the key mechanisms through which Wall Street QE transmits to the economy. When the government purchases bonds from intermediaries, it swaps these bonds for reserves. Reserves do not factor into the leverage constraint facing intermediaries. As a consequence, the leverage constraint becomes looser, as evidenced by the decline in the Lagrange multiplier facing intermediaries, denoted in the model by $\lambda_t$. Less constrained, intermediaries purchase more bonds. This pushes the price of these bonds up. The higher bond price, in turn, eases the investment constraint facing the wholesale firm. This allows them to do more investment and stimulates aggregate demand.

In an environment in which the cash flow constraint is not binding, such as the Great Recession, Main Street lending and Wall Street QE are equivalent to one another. As
discussed in Subsection 2.4, it does not matter whether a government issues credit directly to firms or indirectly through easing balance sheet constraints on intermediaries.

### 3.3 COVID-19

We next use our model to discuss the difference between Main Street lending and Wall Street QE during the COVID-19 pandemic, a situation in which the cash flow constraint on non-financial firms is binding. We do not formally model why this constraint is binding, but nevertheless think this captures in a convenient way the situation facing firms over much of the pandemic. A combination of government-mandated lockdowns, unwillingness of households to go to work, and changes in consumption patterns have resulted in a near evaporation of cash flows for many firms. One could think of this as a massive reduction in \( Y_t - w_t L_{d,t} \) in response to some combination of shocks. Alternatively, given serious concerns about the profitability of these firms, one could also think of this constraint as being binding due to a reduction in \( \phi \) — i.e. an unwillingness of banks to extend credit.

Figure 2 shows impulse responses to a Wall Street QE shock when both the balance sheet constraint on intermediaries and the cash flow constraint on firms are binding. One observes that Wall Street QE is *approximately* neutral for the real economy. The Fed purchasing bonds from intermediaries pushes bond prices up, but with no cash flows, the lower cost of borrowing is of no use to firms, who nevertheless can still not issue debt to support their ongoing activities. The very small effects of Wall Street QE (note the units on the vertical axes in the impulse response graph) emerge due to small general equilibrium effects.

Next, consider the impulse responses to a Main Street lending shock in a situation in which firms are cash flow constrained. These responses are depicted in Figure 3. We consider a shock to Main Street lending of exactly the same magnitude as the Wall Street QE shock in Figure 2. Here one observes that Main Street lending is even *more* stimulative than in Figure 1. The immediate impact of the shock is a large reduction in the multiplier on the cash flow constraint. This allows firms to sell more bonds to finance investment, which
results in a decline (rather than an increase) in bond prices and a large increase in aggregate
demand, with output, investment, labor input, and inflation all rising.

The large increase in investment unleashed because of the immediate relaxing of the cash
flow constraint allows firms to quickly accumulate more capital. On its own, this serves as a
propagation mechanism for output, but there is an additional channel at play. Higher future
capital stocks further loosen the cash flow constraint facing firms far off into the future,
which works to reinforce the beneficial effects of Main Street lending.

In comparing the impulse responses in Figure 3 to Figure 1, one notices that in the
COVID-19 scenario output and investment respond maximally on impact and then revert
rather quickly. This is because Main Street lending works through a flow channel to relax
the cash flow constraint (2.4): new bond issuances are constrained by the firm’s cash flows.
To relax this constraint, the government needs to absorb new debt. In contrast, Wall Street
QE works through a stock channel to relax the leverage constraint facing intermediaries,
which applies to their stock of assets and not to the flow.

The take-home message from these exercises is that, to simulate economic activity, it is
not simply important for the government to purchase assets and lend freely, it is important
that they allocate funds to where constraints are most binding. In a “balance-sheet” recession
like the one induced by the Financial Crisis in 2007-2009, purchasing assets from banks makes
sense. But if the key constraint is facing firms, no amount of easing bank balance sheets will
stimulate the economy. In a situation like this, which we think is a reasonable description of
the state of affairs over much of 2020, direct lending to firms can be a powerful stimulative
tool.

While the responses revert quickly, they nevertheless remain well above their pre-shock values for some
time due to propagation from increases in the capital stock and subsequent easing of the cash flow constraint.
4 Conclusion

This paper represents a first attempt at formally modeling direct lending by the central bank and fiscal authority to non-financial firms as measures to combat the COVID-19 crisis. We construct a macro model with two key frictions relevant for these policies. The first is an endogenous leverage constraint on intermediaries. The second is a cash flow constraint on how much debt non-financial firms can issue. When only the first constraint on financial intermediaries binds, Wall Street QE and Main Street lending are isomorphic to one another. We think of a situation in which intermediaries are constrained but firms are not as roughly characterizing the US economy at the time of the Great Recession. In contrast, when the cash flow constraint on non-financial firms is also binding (which we think of as a defining characteristic of the COVID-19 crisis), Wall Street QE becomes ineffective. Main Street lending, however, becomes even more effective. By directly lending to firms, the government can loosen the constraint facing them and trigger an increase in investment and aggregate demand.
References


Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi, “QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 . . . : A Framework for Analyzing Large-Scale Asset Purchases as a Monetary Policy Tool,” *International Journal of Central Banking*, 2013, 9(S1), 5–53.


Exhibits

Figure 1: Great Recession: Wall Street QE

Notes: A shock to government private bond holdings, $f_{G,t}$, with a size of 1% of annual GDP, when the cash-flow constraint on the wholesale firm is not binding. Units of variables: government bond holding and the multiplier on the leverage constraint are in absolute deviations. Inflation and the policy rate are changes in annualized percentage points. All other variables are in percentage deviation from the steady state.
Notes: A shock to government private bond holdings, $f_{G,t}$, with a size of 1% of annual GDP, when the cash-flow constraint on the wholesale firm is binding. Units of variables: government bond holding and the multiplier on the leverage constraint are in absolute deviations. Inflation and the policy rate are changes in annualized percentage points. All other variables are in percentage deviation from the steady state.
Figure 3: COVID: Main Street Lending

Notes: A shock to government lending, $m_{G,t}$, with a size of 1% of annual GDP, when the cash-flow constraint on the wholesale firm is binding. Units of variables: government lending and the multiplier on the cash flow constraint are in absolute deviations. Inflation and the policy rate are changes in annualized percentage points. All other variables are in percentage deviation from the steady state.
Online Appendix to “Wall Street QE vs. Main Street lending”

Eric Sims and Jing Cynthia Wu

This appendix lays out the more standard parts of the model presented in Section 2.

A Household

The household consumes, supplies labor at nominal wage $W_t^H$ to labor unions, and saves via one period deposits, $D_t$, with financial intermediaries. These deposits offer gross nominal return $R_d^t$. In nominal terms, the household’s flow budget constraint is:

$$P_t C_t + D_t \leq W_t^H + R_d^t D_{t-1} + PROF_t - P_t X - P_t T_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.1)

$PROF_t$ is nominal profit distributed lump sum to the household each period. It is inclusive of profit from both non-financial firms as well as exiting financial intermediaries. As discussed in the text, $X$ is a fixed real equity transfer to newly-born financial intermediaries. $T_t$ is a lump sum transfer/tax from the government. $P_t$ is the price level.

The household has standard preferences. Its problem, with the budget constraint written in real terms, is:

$$\max_{C_t,L_t,D_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \ln \left( C_t - b C_{t-1} \right) - \chi L_t^{1+\eta} \right\}$$

s.t.  

$$C_t + \frac{D_t}{P_t} \leq w_t^H L_t + \frac{R_d^{t-1} D_{t-1}}{P_t} + prof_t - X + T_t$$

$b \in [0, 1)$ is a measure of internal habit formation, $\chi$ is a scaling parameter on the disutility from labor, and $\eta$ is the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity. $w_t^H$ is the real remuneration the household receives for supplying labor. The optimality conditions are:

$$\mu_t = \frac{1}{C_t - b C_{t-1}} - b \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{C_{t+1} - b C_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.2)

$$\Lambda_{t-1,t} = \beta \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_{t-1}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.3)

$$\chi L_t^{\eta} = \mu_t w_t^H$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.4)

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_d^{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.5)

$\mu_t$ is the multiplier on the flow budget constraint and is given by (2). $\Lambda_{t-1,t}$ is the stochastic discount factor. The labor supply condition, (4), and Euler equation for deposits, (5), are standard.
B Labor Market

There are two layers to the labor market. There are a unit measure of labor unions, indexed by $h \in [0, 1]$, that purchase labor from the household at nominal wage $W^H_t$. These unions simply repackage this labor, call it $L_{d,t}(h)$, and sell it to a competitive labor packer at nominal wage $W_t(h)$. The labor packer transforms union labor into labor available for lease to the wholesale firm at nominal wage $W_t$. This transformation takes place via a CES aggregator:

$$L_{d,t} = \left( \int_0^1 L_{d,t}(h) \frac{\epsilon_w - 1}{\epsilon_w} dh \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}}, \quad (B.1)$$

where $\epsilon_w > 1$. Profit maximization gives a downward-sloping demand for each union’s labor and an aggregate wage index:

$$L_{d,t}(h) = \left( \frac{W_t(h)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} L_{d,t} \quad (B.2)$$

$$W_t^{1-\epsilon_w} = \int_0^1 W_t(h)^{1-\epsilon_w} dh \quad (B.3)$$

Nominal dividends for union $h$ are: $DIV_{L,t}(h) = (W_t(h) - W^H_t) L_{d,t}$. Were they freely able to adjust wages, the optimality condition would be to set $W_t(h)$ as a fixed markup over $W^H_t$, with the markup given by $\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}$. But only a fraction of unions, $1 - \phi_w$, are able to adjust nominal wages in a given period. This makes the problem of a union given the ability to adjust dynamic. Future dividends are discounted by the household’s stochastic discount factor with extra discounting to account for the probability that a wage chosen in the present will remain in effect into the future. The optimal wage-setting condition is common across all updating unions. Let $W_t^#$ denote the optimal reset wage, or $w_t^# = W_t^#/P_t$ in real terms. Optimal wage-setting is characterized by:

$$w_t^# = \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1} \frac{f_{1,t}}{f_{2,t}}, \quad (B.4)$$

$$f_{1,t} = w_t^H w_t^\epsilon_w L_{d,t} + \phi_w E_t \Lambda_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^\epsilon_w f_{1,t+1}, \quad (B.5)$$

$$f_{2,t} = w_t^\epsilon_w L_{d,t} + \phi_w E_t \Lambda_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^\epsilon_w f_{2,t+1}. \quad (B.6)$$

C Production

In addition the wholesale firm discussed in the text, there are three other kinds of production firms – a continuum of retail firms, a final goods firm, and a new capital goods producer.

There are a continuum of retailers indexed by $f \in [0, 1]$. These firms purchase wholesale output at $P_t^w$, repackage it, and sell it to a competitive final goods firm at $P_t(f)$. The competitive final goods firm transforms retail output into final output via a CES aggregator:

$$Y_t = \left( \int_0^1 Y_t(f) \frac{\epsilon_p - 1}{\epsilon_p} df \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1}}, \quad (C.1)$$
where $\epsilon_p > 1$. Profit maximization generates a demand curve for each retailer’s output and an aggregate price index:

$$Y_t(f) = \left( \frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} Y_t,$$

(C.2)

$$P_t^{1-\epsilon_p} = \int_0^1 P_t(f)^{1-\epsilon_p} df.$$  \hspace{1cm} (C.3)

Retailers simply repackage wholesale output, earning dividend $DIV_{t,t}(f) = (P_t(f) - P_t^w) Y_t(f)$. If they could freely adjust price, then given (.13), the optimal price-setting rule would be to set $P_t(f)$ as a fixed markup, $\frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p-1}$, over the price of wholesale output. But each period, only a fraction, $1 - \phi_p$, of retailers can adjust their price. This makes the price-setting problem dynamic. Future dividends are discounted by the household’s stochastic discount factor, adjusted for the probability that a price chosen today will remain in effect into the future. All updating retailers adjust to the same price, $P^#_t$. To stationarize this, define the relative reset price as $\Pi^#_t = P^#_t / P_t$. The optimality conditions for the relative reset price are:

$$\Pi^#_t = \frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p-1} \frac{x_1}{x_2},$$

(C.4)

$$x_1 = p_t^w Y_t + \phi_p \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1}^{\epsilon_p} x_1 \Lambda_{t,t+1}^{1},$$

(C.5)

$$x_2 = Y_t + \phi_p \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1}^{\epsilon_p-1} x_2.$$

(C.6)

There is a third firm in the model that produces new physical capital from final output. It used $I_t$ unconsumed final output as an input and produces $\hat{I}_t$ of new physical capital, which is then sold to the wholesale firm at $P^k_t$. The technology relating $I_t$ to $\hat{I}_t$ is:

$$\hat{I}_t = \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \right] I_t,$$

(C.7)

where $S(\cdot)$ has the properties $S(1) = 0$, $S'(1) = 0$, and $S''(1) = \kappa_t \geq 0$. The flow nominal dividend for the capital goods producer is $P^k_t \hat{I}_t - P_t I_t$. The nature of the adjustment cost makes the capital goods producer’s problem dynamic. It discounts future profits by the household’s stochastic discount factor. Its optimality condition, written in real terms, is:

$$1 = P^k_t \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) S' \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right] + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} P^k_{t+1} S' \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right) \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2$$

(C.8)

**D Exogenous Processes and Aggregation**

In addition to policy-related shocks, the model features two additional exogenous states with shocks, productivity, $A_t$, and the credit shock, $\theta_t$. We assume that both follow AR(1) processes in the log, with the former’s non-stochastic mean normalized to unity and the latter’s to $\theta$: 

3
\[ \ln A_t = \rho_A \ln A_{t-1} + s_A \varepsilon_{A,t}. \]  
(D.1)

\[ \ln \theta_t = (1 - \rho_\theta) \ln \theta + \rho_\theta \ln \theta_{t-1} + s_\theta \varepsilon_{\theta,t}. \]  
(D.2)

The aggregate inflation rate evolves according to:

\[ 1 = (1 - \phi_p) \left( \Pi_t^p \right)^{1-\epsilon_p} + \phi_p \Pi_t^p v_{t-1}^{p}. \]  
(D.3)

Similarly, the aggregate real wage evolves according to:

\[ w_t^{1-\epsilon_w} = (1 - \phi_w) \left( \frac{w_t^w}{w_t} \right)^{1-\epsilon_w} + \phi_w \Pi_t^w v_{t-1}^{w}. \]  
(D.4)

Aggregate final output, \( Y_t \), is related to wholesale output, \( Y_{w,t} \), via:

\[ v_t^p Y_t = Y_{w,t}, \]  
(D.5)

where \( v_t^p \) is a measure of price dispersion:

\[ v_t^p = (1 - \phi_p) \left( \Pi_t^p \right)^{-\epsilon_p} + \phi_p \Pi_t^p v_{t-1}^{p}. \]  
(D.6)

In a similar fashion, household supply of labor, \( L_t \), is related to total labor used in production, \( L_{d,t} \), via:

\[ L_t = L_{d,t} v_t^w, \]  
(D.7)

where \( v_t^w \) is a measure of wage dispersion:

\[ v_t^w = (1 - \phi_w) \left( w_t^w \right)^{-\epsilon_w} + \phi_w \left( \frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}} \right)^{\epsilon_w} \Pi_t^w v_{t-1}^{w}. \]  
(D.8)

Bond market-clearing requires that the total stock of bonds issued by the wholesale firm by held either by financial intermediaries or the central bank:

\[ F_{w,t} = F_t + F_{G,t} \]  
(D.9)

Similar, debt issued by the government must be held by intermediaries:

\[ B_{G,t} = B_t \]  
(D.10)

Each period, the fraction \( 1 - \sigma \) of intermediaries exists and returns their accumulated net worth to the household. They are replaced by an equal number of intermediaries, who in aggregate are given real startup net worth of \( X \). Accordingly, aggregate real net worth of intermediaries evolves according to:

\[ n_t = \sigma \Pi_t^{-1} \left[ (R^F_t - R^d_t) Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + (R^B_t - R^d_t) Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + (R^{re}_{t-1} - R^d_{t-1}) r e_{t-1} + R^d_{t-1} n_{t-1} \right] + X \]  
(D.11)

Combining the household’s budget constraint, along with the aggregate balance sheet of intermediaries and the consolidated government balance sheet, yields a standard aggregate
resource constraint:

\[ Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t \]  

\[ (D.12) \]

E Full Set of Equilibrium Conditions

For completeness, below we list the full set of equilibrium conditions in our model. These are all written in real terms (lowercase variables denote real quantities where relevant):

- **Household**
  
  \[
  \mu_t = \frac{1}{C_t - bC_{t-1}} - b\beta \frac{1}{C_{t+1} - bC_t}
  \]

  \[ (E.1) \]

  \[
  \Lambda_{t-1,t} = \beta \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_{t-1}}
  \]

  \[ (E.2) \]

  \[
  \chi L_t^H = \mu_t w_t^H
  \]

  \[ (E.3) \]

  \[
  1 = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\mu} \]

  \[ (E.4) \]

- **Labor unions**:

  \[
  w_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1} \frac{f_{1,t}}{f_{2,t}}
  \]

  \[ (E.5) \]

  \[
  f_{1,t} = w_t^H w_{t-1}^L d_t + \phi_w \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\mu} f_{1,t+1}
  \]

  \[ (E.6) \]

  \[
  f_{2,t} = w_t^L d_t + \phi_w \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\mu} f_{2,t+1}
  \]

  \[ (E.7) \]

- **Wholesale firm**:

  \[
  w_t = (1 - \alpha) p_t^w A_t K_t^\alpha L_{d,t}^{-\alpha}
  \]

  \[ (E.8) \]

  \[
  \lambda_{1,t} = p_t^k (1 + \psi \lambda_{2,t})
  \]

  \[ (E.9) \]

  \[
  \lambda_{1,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 + \varphi \lambda_{3,t+1}) \alpha p_{t+1}^w A_{t+1} K_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} L_{d,t+1}^{-\alpha} + \lambda_{1,t+1} (1 - \delta) \right]
  \]

  \[ (E.10) \]

  \[
  (1 + \lambda_{2,t} - \lambda_{3,t}) Q_t = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1} \left[ 1 + \kappa Q_{t+1} (1 + \lambda_{2,t+1} - \lambda_{3,t+1}) \right]
  \]

  \[ (E.11) \]

  \[
  K_{t+1} = \tilde{I}_t + (1 - \delta) K_t
  \]

  \[ (E.12) \]

  \[
  Q_t \left( f_{w,t} - \kappa \Pi_{t-1}^{-1} f_{w,t-1} \right) + Q_{M,t} \left( m_{w,t} - \kappa \Pi_{t-1}^{-1} m_{w,t-1} \right) \geq \psi p_t^k \tilde{I}_t
  \]

  \[ (E.13) \]

  \[
  \varphi \left( p_t^w A_t K_t^\alpha L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} - w_t L_{d,t} \right) \geq Q_t \left( f_{w,t} - \kappa \Pi_{t-1}^{-1} f_{w,t-1} \right)
  \]

  \[ (E.14) \]

  \[
  Y_{w,t} = A_t K_t^\alpha L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha}
  \]

  \[ (E.15) \]

- **Retail firm**:

  \[
  \Pi_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1} \frac{x_{1,t}}{x_{2,t}}
  \]

  \[ (E.16) \]

  \[
  x_{1,t} = p_t^w Y_t + \phi_p \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\epsilon_p} x_{1,t+1}
  \]

  \[ (E.17) \]

  \[
  x_{2,t} = Y_t + \phi_p \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\epsilon_p} x_{2,t+1}
  \]

  \[ (E.18) \]
- New capital producer:

\[ \hat{I}_t = \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \right] I_t, \quad (E.19) \]

\[ 1 = p^k_t \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \right] - S' \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} p^k_{t+1} S' \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right) \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2 \quad (E.20) \]

- Financial intermediaries:

\[ \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^{re}_t - R^d_t \right) = 0, \quad (E.21) \]

\[ \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^{F}_t - R^d_t \right) = \frac{\lambda_t}{1 + \lambda_t} \theta_t, \quad (E.22) \]

\[ \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^{B}_t - R^d_t \right) = \frac{\lambda_t}{1 + \lambda_t} \Delta \theta, \quad (E.23) \]

\[ \Omega_t = 1 - \sigma + \sigma \theta_t \phi_t, \quad (E.24) \]

\[ \phi_t = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} R^d_t}{\theta_t - \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \Omega_{t+1} (R^F_t - R^d_t)} \quad (E.25) \]

\[ \phi_t = \frac{Q_t f_t + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_t}{n_t} \quad (E.26) \]

\[ R^F_t = \frac{1 + \kappa Q_t}{Q_{t-1}} \quad (E.27) \]

\[ R^B_t = \frac{1 + \kappa Q_{B,t}}{Q_{B,t-1}} \quad (E.28) \]

- Government:

\[ G_t + \Pi_t^{-1} b_{g,t-1} + Q_{M,t} \left( m_{G,t} - \kappa \Pi_t^{-1} m_{G,t-1} \right) = T_t + T_{G,t} + Q_{B,t} \left( b_{G,t} - \kappa \Pi_t^{-1} b_{G,t-1} \right) + \Pi_t^{-1} m_{G,t-1} \quad (E.29) \]

\[ \ln R^{re}_t = (1 - \rho_R) \ln R^{re}_{t-1} + \rho_R \ln R^{re}_{t-1} + \]

\[ (1 - \rho_R) \left[ \phi_n (\ln \Pi_n - \ln \Pi) + \phi_y (\ln Y - \ln Y_{t-1}) \right] + s_R \varepsilon_{R,t} \quad (E.30) \]

\[ Q_t f_{G,t} = r e_t \quad (E.31) \]

\[ Q_{M,t} = \tau Q_t \quad (E.32) \]

\[ f_{G,t} = (1 - \rho_f) f_{G} + \rho_f f_{G,t-1} + s_f \varepsilon_{f,t} \quad (E.33) \]

\[ m_{G,t} = (1 - \rho_m) m_{G} + \rho_m m_{G,t-1} + s_m \varepsilon_{m,t} \quad (E.34) \]

\[ T_{G,t} = R^F_t \Pi_t^{-1} Q_{t-1} f_{G,t-1} - R^{re}_{t-1} \Pi_t^{-1} r e_{t-1} \quad (E.35) \]

- Exogenous processes:
\[ \ln A_t = \rho_A \ln A_{t-1} + s_A \varepsilon_{A,t} \quad (E.36) \]
\[ \ln \theta_t = (1 - \rho_\theta) \ln \theta + \rho_\theta \ln \theta_{t-1} + s_\theta \varepsilon_{\theta,t} \quad (E.37) \]

- Aggregate conditions

\[ 1 = (1 - \phi_p) \left( \Pi_t^\# \right)^{1-\epsilon_p} + \phi_p \Pi_t^{\epsilon_p - 1} \quad (E.38) \]
\[ w_t^{1-\epsilon_w} = (1 - \phi_w) \left( w_t^\# \right)^{1-\epsilon_w} + \phi_w \Pi_t^{\epsilon_w - 1} w_t^{1-\epsilon_w} \quad (E.39) \]
\[ v_t^p Y_t = Y_{w,t} \quad (E.40) \]
\[ v_t^p = (1 - \phi_p) \left( \Pi_t^\# \right)^{-\epsilon_p} + \phi_p \Pi_t^{\epsilon_p} v_{t-1}^p \quad (E.41) \]
\[ L_t = L_{d,t} v_t^w \quad (E.42) \]
\[ v_t^w = (1 - \phi_w) \left( \frac{w_t^\#}{w_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} + \phi_w \left( \frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}} \right)^{\epsilon_w} \Pi_t^{\epsilon_w} v_{t-1}^w \quad (E.43) \]
\[ f_{w,t} = f_t + f_{G,t} \quad (E.44) \]
\[ b_{G,t} = b_t \quad (E.45) \]
\[ Q_t f_t + Q_{B,t} b_t + re_t = d_t + n_t \quad (E.46) \]
\[ n_t = \sigma \Pi_t^{-1} \left[ (R_t^c - R_{t-1}^c) Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + (R_t^B - R_{t-1}^B) Q_{B,t} b_t + (R_t^{c,e} - R_{t-1}^{c,e}) re_{t-1} + R_{t-1}^d n_{t-1} \right] + X \quad (E.47) \]
\[ Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t \quad (E.48) \]
\[ \ln G_t = (1 - \rho_G) \ln G + \rho_G \ln G_{t-1} + s_G \varepsilon_{G,t} \quad (E.49) \]
\[ b_{G,t} = b_G \quad (E.50) \]

Equations (.32)-(.81) constitute 50 equations and 50 variables: \( \{ \mu_t, C_t, \Lambda_{t-1,t}, L_t, w_t^H, R_t^d, \Pi_t, w_t^\#, f_{1,t}, f_{2,t}, w_t, L_{d,t}, p_t^w, A_t, K_t, \lambda_{1,t}, \lambda_{2,t}, \lambda_{3,t}, p_t^p, Q_t, \hat{I}_t, f_{w,t}, Y_{w,t}, \Pi_t^\#, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, Y_t, I_t, \Omega_t, R_t^{e,c}, R_t^F, R_t^B, \lambda_t, \theta_t, T_t, T_{G,t}, Q_{B,t}, f_{G,t}, re_t, m_{G,t}, Q_{M,t}, v_t^p, v_t^w, f_t, b_t, d_t, n_t, G_t, b_{G,t} \} \).

When solving the model without the cash-flow constraint, we set \( \lambda_{3,t} = 0 \) and drop (.45).

F Calibration

Table .1 lists the parameter values, or targets used to calibrate parameters, that we assume in solving the model. Because we only focus on impulse responses to Wall Street QE and Main Street Lending shocks, and do so in a first-order solution about the steady state, other than steady state values, we do not need to specify parameter values for other exogenous processes.
Table F.1: Parameter Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value or Target</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>Discount factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Habit formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inverse Frisch elasticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>$L = 1$</td>
<td>Labor disutility scaling parameter / steady state labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>$1/3$</td>
<td>Production function exponent on capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_I$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Investment adjustment cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Steady state (gross) inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_p$</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Elasticity of substitution goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_w$</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Elasticity of substitution labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_p$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Price rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_w$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Wage rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b_G$</td>
<td>$\frac{b_G}{Q_B} = 0.35$</td>
<td>Government debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G$</td>
<td>$\frac{G}{Y} = 0.2$</td>
<td>Steady state government spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_r$</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Taylor rule smoothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_\pi$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Taylor rule inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_y$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>Taylor rule output growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>$1 - 16^{-1}$</td>
<td>Bond duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Fraction of investment from debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Intermediary survival probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>$400(R^F - R^d) = 3$</td>
<td>Recoverability parameter / steady state spread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>Leverage = 4</td>
<td>Transfer to new intermediaries / steady state leverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>Government bond recoverability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_G$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Steady state government bond holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_G$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Steady state loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_f$</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>AR QE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_m$</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>AR lending</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varphi$</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>Cash flow constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Relative price between loans and bonds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: this table lists the values of calibrated parameters or the target used in the calibration.