**Abstract:** This study argues that John 12 is a precise rhetorical conclusio/peroratio. Rhetoricians identify two purposes in a conclusion: 1) recapitulation of topics discussed, albeit selectively and 2) arousal of emotions toward topics or persons. Emotions in rhetoric are binary, love vs hate, confidence vs fear, emulation vs envy, etc. John 12 is recognized as repeating judgment materials from John 3, the critical behavior urged in the John 12. Many other topics are also recapitulated. Moreover most of the Johannine characters reappear before the audience whose judgment asked to render in virtue of the emotion evoked, either love or hate.

**Introduction, Topic and Hypothesis**

Most commentators on John 12:37-50 label it a “conclusion” or “epilogue.” By this they mean that this part of John 12 contains two differing sets of information: a “summary” of 1. the ministry of Jesus and its non-reception or 2. review of major motifs and themes. Commentators, moreover, tend to distinguish 12:37-43 from 44-50. The former verses indicate that the story of Jesus’s ministry “which he set forth as a series of semeia, or significant actions, is a story of man’s refusal of divine life and light. Those who saw and heard did not respond with faith, or, if in their hearts they were convinced, they would not confess it for fear of the consequences, and so were self-condemned.”

The remaining verses (12:44-50) serve as a resume of leading themes of the discourse in
John 2-12. “No new theme is introduced; yet the passage is no mere cento of phrases from
the earlier chapters. It rings the changes afresh upon the themes of life, light and
judgment, restating the central purpose of what has already been said on these themes.”
In this regard, the “summary” spoken about refers both to the explicit parallels between
3:16-19 and 12:37-50 or more widely to the discourses in the Book of Signs. Back when
scholars were wrestling with Bultmann’s displacement theory, 12:44-50 was detached
from 12:37-43 as misplaced remarks. But it is time to bring fresh thinking to the
assessment of John 12:37-50. We think that John Ashton got it right when he remarked
that it is an epilogue in the proper sense, rounding off and summing up the preceding
revelation. Moreover, we will argue that the conversation in John 12:37-50 be taken as a
rhetorical unit, that is, as a genuine conclusion. Therefore, much more can be said about
this material.

First, the labels “conclusion” and “epilogue” have been used in casual, non-
technical ways. Rare is the commentator who mentions the formal rhetorical “conclusion”
(peroratio or ἐπίλογος, about which classical rhetoricians have much to say.
Furthermore, what about John 12:1-36? Is it also part of the “conclusion”? It depends on
how one understands “conclusion” in ancient rhetoric. Must 12:37-43 be separated from
44-50? Again, it depends on what one knows about classical “conclusions.”

The thesis argued here is that we must become familiar with the discourse of
ancient rhetoric on the shape and function of the “conclusion” (peroratio or ἐπίλογος).
Rules for a “conclusion” instruct students to do much more than summarize an argument; more importantly, they instruct a speaker to play to the emotions of the audience, ascribing praise and blame to the characters and thus persuading the audience to do likewise. This formal theory, then, serves as an appropriate template to follow the argument in John 12:1-50, not just 37-50. The result will be a richer, more detailed, and more accurate interpretation of the argument at the end of the Book of Signs. It should be pointed out that scholars have no trouble labeling 1:1-18 as a prologue (προοίμιον), meaning that it contains a studied presentation of major themes and topics to be developed in the rest of the narrative. Similarly, the same courtesy should be given to the peroratio or ἔπιλογος which concludes what the prologue began.

What is a Conclusion?

Put simply, it ends or terminates a discourse. In terms of what makes an effective conclusion, ancient rhetoricians present a broad consensus on its main components. Aristotle’s definition of the conclusion shaped the understanding of it for centuries to come and so deserves consideration.

The epilogue is composed of four parts: 1. to dispose the hearer favorably towards oneself and unfavorably towards the adversary; 2. to amplify and depreciate (to praise and to blame), 3. to excite the emotions of the hearers, 4. to recapitulate (Rhet. 3.19.1).

The first three items (dispose hearer favorably/unfavorably; amplify/depreciate; and excite emotions) are all of a package. Characters are paraded before the audience for the purpose of judging them, which is achieved by the author’s evocation of emotional
reactions to them. “Disposing” and “amplifying” rest not just on an intellectual evaluation of characters, but on creating an argument from πάθος. Aristotle earlier spoke of what makes for a favorable/unfavorable assessment of speaker or adversary (Rhet. 1.9) and for amplification or depreciation (i.e., “praise and blame,” Rhet. 2.19) and which emotions to excite (pity, indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, quarrelsomeness, Rhet. 2.1-11).

In Aristotle, “recapitulation” seems like a step-child to the argument from emotions, which is given extended attention. In subsequent tradition, the “four” parts eventually become “two,” arousal of emotions and recapitulation.

Before Cicero, an anonymous compendium of rhetoric appeared, Rhetorica ad Herennium, in which Aristotle’s four elements of a conclusion are simplified to three.

Conclusions, among the Greeks called (epilogi) are tripartite, consisting of the Summing Up, Amplification, and Appeal to Pity. . .The Summing Up gathers together and recalls the points we have made – briefly, that the speech may not be repeated in entirety, but that the memory of it may be refreshed. . .Amplification is the principle of using Commonplaces to stir the hearers. . .We shall stir Pity in our hearers by recalling the vicissitudes of fortune; by comparing the prosperity we once enjoyed with our present adversity, by enumerating and explaining the results that will follow for us if we lose the case; by entreating those whose pity we seek to win. . .by disclosing the kindness, humanity, and sympathy we have dispensed to other.. . The Appeal to Pity must be brief, for nothing dries more quickly than a tear (2.47-50).

In Aristotle recapitulation stood last, but here, first. In Aristotle “amplification was” joined with “depreciation” and referred to honor and shame, but here all is reduced to “amplify an accusation.” Aristotle’s appeal to the emotions specifies that one should arouse hearers to “certain emotions” (pity, indignation, anger, hate, envy, and
quarrelsome), indeed very conflict-promoting emotions, whereas here the emotions are softer in kind and designed to bring “a tear” to the eye.

Cicero repeats much of what was seen in the Rhetorica ad Herennium about a conclusion, in particular an enumeration of its three parts: “The conclusion is the end and termination of the whole oration. It has three parts, the summing up, the indignatio or exciting indignation or ill-will against the opponents, and the conquestio or the arousing of pity and sympathy” (De Inventione 1.52.98). Immediately we recognize new labels for the second and third parts. “Amplificatio” is now “indignatio,” and appeal to emotions becomes “conquestio.” This is no mere quibble over words, for the character of the second and third parts has changed. As regards “summing up,” we find nothing out of the ordinary: “As a general principle for summing up, it is laid down that since the whole of any argument cannot be given a second time, the most important point of each be selected, and that every argument be touched on as briefly as possible, so that it may appear to be a refreshing of the memory of the audience, rather than a repetition of the speech” (De Inventione 1.52.98). “Indignation” aims to arouse “great hatred against a man, or great dislike of some proceeding” (De Inventione 1.53.100). Like turning a valve, Cicero proscribes restraint; rather, “it is possible to give vent to indignation from all those topics which we have suggested.” Finally, his conquestio closely resembles Herennius’ appeal to pity: “The conquestio (lament or complaint) is a passage seeking to arouse the pity of the audience. In this, the first necessity is to make the auditor’s spirit gentle and
merciful, that others may be more easily moved by the *conquestio*” (De Inventione 1.55.106).

Quintilian’s code of rhetoric tailors the common notion of a conclusion even further. It has two, not three or four parts: “The next subject that I was going to discuss was the *peroratio* which some call the completion and others the conclusion. There are two kinds of peroration, for it may deal either with facts or with the emotional aspects of the case” (Inst. Orat. 6.1.1). “Facts” have to do with repetition, and “emotions” with accusation/defense. His understanding of repetition (i.e., “facts”) seems broader than anything previously seen: “The repetition and grouping of the facts, which the Greeks call ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, and some of our own writers call enumeration, serves both to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the whole case before his eyes (6.1.2).” At first Quintilian seems cautious about appeal to the emotions, noting that this strategy was “forbidden to Athenian orators.” But he takes up the topic, noting that the prosecution and the defense “appeal to different emotions.” “The accuser has to rouse the judge, while the defender has to soften him.” In principle, “it is the duty of both parties to seek to win the judge’s goodwill and to divert it from their opponent, as also to excite or assuage his emotions” (6.1.11). The emotions proper to exciting shame and condemnation are “envy, hatred and anger.” Conversely, an accused person appropriately appeals to his honor, that is, to “his worth, his manly pursuits, the scars from wounds received in battle, his rank and the services rendered by his ancestors” (6.1.21).
What, then, do we know when we know this? First, a “conclusion” is indeed a recapitulation, a crisp and succinct enumeration of major points of the speech. Second, it is also the occasion to arouse emotions appropriate to either accuser or defendant. An accuser, who seeks to bring the judge to make a decision about the accused, arouses strong emotions such as anger, hatred, and envy in an effort to put the accused in as unfavorable light as possible. Conversely a defendant speaks in such a way as to make the judge favorably disposed to him, and so he appeals to “pity,” which he will arouse by enumerating his own honorable deeds, or as Herennius remarked, “by disclosing the kindness, humanity, and sympathy we have dispensed to other.” Thus an accuser will write a strong indignatio, but a defendant, a conquistio. It is the consideration of the πάθος⁶ or the exciting of the emotions that we particularly bring to a more rhetorical interpretation of John 12:1-50.

Recapitulation and Enumeration in John 12

As we saw, scholars occasionally describe the end of John 12 is a “conclusion,” that is, a summing up of the previous narrative. But there is little agreement about the specific content of the “conclusion,” i.e., what is recapitulated or enumerated. Some make a firm distinction between 12:36-43 and 44-50, identifying the former as a comment on the mission to Israel or on the blindness of Israel, but considering the latter as a resume of themes, a precis of what has been revealed or “an anthology of representative sayings.” Thus 12:36-43 is a summary of the story, and 12:44-50 equals a resume of sayings,
particularly about judgment. We think such distinctions to be overly subtle, which further consideration of the rhetorical peroratio can better explain how the whole of 12:36-50 is a unified argument. What, then, is being recapitulated or summarized in 12:36-50? A fuller assessment of the parallels and links between 12:36-50 and material in John 2-11 provide the data needed to judge this issue.

**Recapitulation of Judgments.** We begin with the most frequently cited parallel to 12:36-50, namely the judgment materials in 3:16-19 vis-à-vis 12:31-36 and 3:17-19 vis-à-vis 12:45-50. The judgmental language in 12:36-50, which appeared much earlier in the discourse with Nicodemus, is clearly repeated in the conclusion to the Book of Signs. In 12:36-50 the author brings back the following items from the dynamic of the previous narrative: 1. Jesus, 2. the light, 3. comes, 4. to provoke a judgment by those who see him, 5. but many fail to come to the light or walk in darkness, 6. and so bring judgment on themselves. It matters that 3:16-21 occur after a failure of a ruler of the Jews (ἁρχων τῶν Ἰουδαίων, 3:1) to understand Jesus, whereas 12:26-50 concludes Jesus’ labors in Jerusalem where elites plot to dishonor him. Thus from the prologue of the narrative (1:11) to its conclusion in John 12, people have rejected the light. This, we suggest, provides the lens for evaluating all of the materials in 12:36-50.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3:19-21</th>
<th>12:31-36</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. This is the judgment (3:19)</td>
<td>1. Now is the judgment (12:31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The light has come into the world (3:19b)</td>
<td>2. The light is with you for a little longer. (12:35a)</td>
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This comparison argues that Jesus himself occasions the judgment, even a schism of contrasting judgments about him (7:40-43; 9:16; 10:19-21; 11:36 and 12:29). Some accept him, his agency and his word, but most do not. For the former there is praise, for the latter, dishonor. But the judgment rests in the hands of those to whom Jesus spoke; for, “as you sow, so shall you reap” – for better or worse.

The subsequent passage, 12:45-50, repeats much of the judgmental material seen earlier in John 3, but highlights different aspects of judgment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3:17-19, 34-36</th>
<th>12:45-50</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. God sent the Son into the world (3:17)</td>
<td>1. Whoever believes, believes not in me but in him who sent me. Whoever sees me sees him who sent me (12:44-45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. This is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and people loved darkness rather than light (3:19)</td>
<td>2. I have come as light into the world, so that everyone who believes in me should not remain in the darkness (12:46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. God did not send the Son into the world to condemn the world, but in order that the world might be saved through him (3:17)</td>
<td>3. I do not judge anyone. I came not to judge the world, but to save the world (12:47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Whom God has sent speaks the words of God (3:34)</td>
<td>4. I have not spoken on my own; the Father who sent me has himself given me about what to say and what to speak (12:49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If John 3:19-21/12:31-36 focused on “judgment,” i.e., whether people choose darkness over light, then 3:17-19, 34-36/12:45-50 recapitulate who is to be judged. The reward for right judgment is eternal life. Thus, the conclusion in 12:36-50 is a recapitulation of the fundamental dynamic of the narrative: judgment depends upon reaction to Jesus, the light, who speaks God’s word. As we shall shortly see, when judgment is described, certain emotions necessarily arise in the hearts of the audience. Those judged are to be scorned, even hated. In the Fourth Gospel there is “zero tolerance” for those who choose darkness over light.

Recapitulation of Those Who Judge. Both 12:35-6 and 45-50 repeat materials characteristic of an early pattern in the gospel, that those who hear and see Jesus are judging him. Whether they declare him a saint or a sinner, they make a momentous judgment. For, when judges judge, they are themselves subject to judgment depending on whether they judge justly and not according to appearances. For “with the judgment you make you will be judged, and the measure you give will be the measure you get” (Matt 7:2). Moreover, this chapter contains an extensive range of judgments about Jesus. Judgment, moreover, is an apt conclusion to John 1-12 because it summarizes the role and status of Jesus as “light of the world,” concludes the trial of the Word which had been formally conducted since John 5, and articulates the criteria for praise and blame. But
something more is found here, namely, the claim that God has sent Jesus, so that rejecting Jesus means rejecting God – a most serious affair (12:44-45). “Eternal life” emerges as the reward for believers, implying that “eternal death” will be the sanction for those who refuse belief.

From a rhetorical point of view, the author has placed bookends around the Book of Signs which first establish the topic of belief/judgment in the prologue of the narrative (1:5, 11) and then resume it after numerous characters have had their opportunities to make their judgments. This is a summary statement of the on-going process which each character has passed through, now with a concluding judgment on the judges.

If 12:36-50 qualifies as a recapitulation of narrative and argument, we are convinced that the extraordinary parade of Johannine *dramatis personae* who make a final appearance here functions in the conclusion as a rhetorical enumeration. They make a strategic re-appearance illustrating varying type of “judgments” about Jesus, hence their presence serves the recapitulation by viewing and evaluating their relationship to him. To appreciate why these characters are highlighted, we must link them with their former appearance – another aspect of recapitulation. 1. *The Beloved of Bethany* were the object of Jesus’ catechesis and his greatest sign (11:1-44). Now Mary’s kindness exposes Judas the traitor (12:3-6), whom we already know to be a liar (6:64-65, 70-71). Lazarus provokes a new wave of envy against Jesus (12:9-11), for which he, alas, will die (again). 2. *Judas Iscariot* has constantly appeared as the most sinister person around Jesus; not
only is he the one who will betray Jesus (6:64, 71), he is on the side of the Evil One: “One of you is a devil” (7:70). Now we learn that he is not only a liar, a thief and a dissembler (12:5-6). 3. The Chief Priests continue the role they assumed in 11:45-52 when they tried Jesus and sentenced him to death out of envy (12:19). Here, their envy of Jesus becomes violence against Lazarus because of the sign value of his return to life (12:9-11); they too are murderers (8:44). 4. The crowds, now mentioned in 12:9, 12, 17, 18, 29 and 34, play diverse and conflicting roles as far back as the Bread of Life Discourse. Some “follow” Jesus (6:2, 24), but not as disciples; others are impressed by his signs (7:31). Mostly, the crowds are portrayed as divided in their judgment of Jesus, some praising him and others judging him (7:40-43; 9:16; 10:19-21; 11:36) the same pattern found in 12:29. Most of these are hostile outsiders (7:20), fixated on signs; others give no indication that they want to become disciples. 5. Pharisees have been Jesus’ enemies from the start. Nicodemus, a Pharisee, came to Jesus at night and ridiculed Jesus’ remarks (3:3, 5), only to be ridiculed in turn (3:10-12). Pharisees sought to arrest Jesus (7:32); they tried Jesus in absentia (7:47-52), the same pattern repeated in 11:45-52 and 12:19. Hence, along with the chief priests, they have become murderers. 6. Philip, Andrew and the Greeks. This episode resembles the recruitment of disciples in 1:36-51, but with some twists. Initially Andrew recruited his brother, Simon, and Philip brought Nathanael. In this sequence of the narrative, their recruitment was most praiseworthy. But here Greeks, who are not recruited, come forward on their own; yet they need brokers, such as Andrew and Philip,
to get to Jesus. Normally volunteers are set in their place by Jesus (Luke 9:57-62), the same strategy found in 12:23-25. 7. Father-God. Jesus just prayed to his Father at Lazarus’ tomb (11:41-42), and prays again in 12:27-28. These two prayers, which differ in type and content, also tell us about the Father of Jesus. At Lazarus’ tomb, Jesus’ prayer contains thanksgiving (“I thank you for you have heard me”), is self-focused (“I knew that you hear me always”) and petitionary (“I have said this on behalf of the people standing by, that they may believe that you sent me”). But in 12:27-28 Jesus prays two different types of prayer: petitionary (“Father, save me from this hour”) and acknowledgment (“Father, glorify your name”). The first prayer occurs in the circle of those standing at Lazarus’ tomb, but the latter one speaks directly to God about the voluntary character of Jesus’s death (10:17-18). Thus Father-God authorizes Jesus’ works of power, even as it is his will that Jesus undergo a life-producing death (12:24-25). 8. Many, even of the Authorities. From Nicodemus’ appearance, they either come to Jesus at night or fear to acclaim him Christ in public. Among these we include the parents of the man born blind (9:22) and many, even of the authorities (12:42-43).

We have surveyed these characters within the framework of a judgment scenario which in 3:16-19 and 34-36 and 12:36-50 brackets the Book of Signs. Did people come into the light or remain in the darkness; what kind of acknowledgment did they show to Jesus, what adherence to him? Thus in a recapitulation both of their reaction to Jesus, we learn a classification system for evaluating what judgments people make and how they are
rated by the Jesus group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgment: Insiders</th>
<th>Judgment: Outsiders</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walking into the Light</td>
<td>Walking away from the Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Beloved of Bethany</td>
<td>1. People Dominated by Shame and Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Hard core” disciples; Lazarus favored with the premier sign; Martha, with extraordinary revelation from Jesus; Mary touches Jesus</td>
<td>Parents of the man born blind; many even of the authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Philip and Andrew</td>
<td>2. Crowds Critical of Jesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue their earlier role of recruitment; significant roles in the Multiplication of the Loaves</td>
<td>When the mass divides, some criticize Jesus, judge him unfavorably, report gossip about Jesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Crowds Acclaiming Jesus</td>
<td>3. Judas, the Iscariot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At a schism, some speak well of Jesus, give a favorable interpretation to his actions in the face of criticism</td>
<td>From the beginning Jesus knew who would betray him; exposed as thief, liar and soon, as murderer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This canvas of the dramatis personae argues that much, much more is being recapitulated in John 12 than just 3:16-19, 34-36. This in turn suggests that we are mistaken to split 12:36-43 from 43-50, because both blocks of material together summarize the judgment process dramatized in John 3-11.

**Appeal to the Emotions**

Typically “appeal to the emotions” serves as a second, equally important element of a conclusion. “Appeal to emotions” serves as a significant rhetorical element in the conclusion, for it solidifies our judgment of the characters in John 12 in three ways. First, the audience has already been instructed on the correct emotional evaluation of the Trio from Bethany, whom Jesus labels “beloved.” He even defends Mary against criticism. We
are expected to evaluate them according to basic emotions such as love and hate. Second, balancing the praise given to the Beloved of Bethany, the theme of judgment returns in John 12:31-50 which leads us to hold in contempt certain villains, such as, “ruler of this world” (12:31), hypocritical believers (12:42-43), and those who “do not receive my sayings” (12:47-48). The judgment, moreover, extends to the “murderers” who appear on stage: Judas, the chief priests, and the Pharisees. Third, the narrative presents characters in contrasting pairs, inviting us to praise one and blame the other: 1. Judas criticizes Mary; 2. the chief priests determine to kill Lazarus; 3. the crowds acclaming Jesus drive the Pharisees to further envy of Jesus; 4. some declare that an angel spoke to Jesus, but others dismiss the noise as thunder; 5. Jesus says one thing about his death, but “crowds” use his reference to his death as grounds to dismiss him as the Christ (12:32-34); and finally 6. hostile unbelievers exercise control over hypocritical believers too fearful to acknowledge Jesus publicly (12:42-43). Andrew and Philip may be juxtaposed to the Greeks seeking Jesus; they were recruited, but the Greeks seem to be volunteering, not an honorable thing. And because “judgment” dominates John 12, the audience is urged to judge all of the persons in the six pair of contrasting characters. In this case, the author seeks to evoke in the audience an appropriate emotional response about them.

Rhetorical Theory about the Emotions. In order to see this in John 12, we need to know what “emotions” could and should be aroused. Thus our task requires us to make a brief investigation of emotions in antiquity, but especially those most likely to be aroused
here. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle, our primary informant, instructed speakers to build an argument by attending to pathos (2.2-11), ethos (2.12-17) and logos (2.18-26). “The emotions (πάθη),” he states, “are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear and other such things and their opposites” (2.1.8). Emotions, he continues, come in pairs, i.e., binary opposition. The following catalogue, drawn from Aristotle, Rhet.2.2-9, is repeated in Cicero, Orator 131 and de Orat 2.185.

| Anger (ὀργή) | Mildness (πραότης) |
| Hate (μῆιςος, ἔχθρος) | Love (φιλία) |
| Fear (φόβος) | Confidence (θάρσος) |
| Shame (αἰσύχνη) | Benevolent (χαρίζεσθαι) |
| Indignation (νέμεσις) | Pity (ἐλεος) |
| Envy (φθόνος) | Emulation (ζηλος) |

Later, Quintilian distilled Aristotelian catalogue into two classes of emotions:

Emotions fall into classes; the one is called πάθος by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by affectus (emotion): the other is called ἡθος, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent; it is however rendered by mores (morals) and consequently the branch of philosophy known as ethics is styled moral philosophy (Inst. Orat. 6.2.8, italics added).

Although Quintilian labels his two classes of emotions πάθος and ἡθος, he repeats the ancient system of classification by opposing violent and benevolent emotions:

They explain πάθος as describing the more violent emotions and ἡθος as designating those which are calm and gentle: in one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill (Inst. Orat. 6.2.9-12).

Therefore we are advised to view the emotions as binary opposites, that is, as “violent or
calm/gentle,” which traditionally consists of six violent emotions (anger, hate, fear, shame, indignation, and envy) juxtaposed to six calm ones (mildness, love, confidence, benevolence, pity and emulation).

Yet we must still overcome a modern problem by learning what cultural meanings the ancients gave these emotions. We cannot presume that our meaning matches those of the ancients. Finally, it would unwise to expect to find all of these emotions evoked in John 12. We take what we are given. What then are these emotions? What arouses them? To what kind of person are they directed? The following definition and commentary come directly from Aristotle’s exposition in Rhet. 2.2-11.

Positive Emotions, Especially “Love.” What, then, are the meanings given by the ancients to the positive emotions: mildness, love, benevolence, and pity. Aristotle provides us with crisp, native meanings to these benevolent emotions.

1. Love (φιλία) means “wanting for someone what one thinks are good things for him, not what benefits oneself.” Ideally, love is mutual: it may also be the emotion one shows to those who have benefitted them. Love, moreover, means that they share the same loves and hates. My friend’s enemies are my enemies.

2. Benevolence (χαρίζ). Having χαρίν means offering a service to one in need for no other reason than as a boon to the recipient. The person receiving the χαρίν is either greatly in need or in need of what is great and difficult.

3. Pity (έλεος) means pain at an apparently destructive or unpleasant evil
happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might expect either himself or his own to suffer. Pity is directed toward those closely related to one’s household.

Because we hypothesize that “love” will be the dominant positive emotion aroused in the presentation of insiders, we should give it special attention, especially as the antithesis of “hate.” “Love” is by no means the romantic love so recently found in Euroamerican cultures, but has a strong element of commitment, loyalty and faithfulness in it. In attempting to see how the audience of the Fourth Gospel is expected to respond to characters in John 12, we should look quickly at “love” in the Fourth Gospel to see in what situations love is the appropriate reaction. We can profitably recover John’s understanding of “love” by asking three questions: 1. Who loves whom? 2. What is the basis for this? 3. Who does not love whom?

1. **Who loves whom?** The gospel emphasizes that Jesus loved Lazarus (11:3) and the sisters (11:5). Jesus also loves the inner core of the disciples, loving them just as the Father has loved him (13:1; 15:9). The Father, too, is a great lover, for he loves Jesus (15:9) and those who love his Son (14:21). Finally, the core disciples are commanded to love one another (13:34-35; 15:12-13).

2. **What is the basis for love?** “Love” relationships are based on and expressed by several criteria, such as “Those who love me will keep my word” (14:23) or “If you love me you will keep my commandments” (14:15; see 15:10, 12, 14, 17). Love admits of
degrees: “No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends” (15:13).

3. Who does not love whom? “Love” characterizes the Jesus circle, but in two places we learn of people who emphatically do not belong to it, because they have no love for the Father (5:42), and because God is not their Father, they do not love Jesus (8:42; see 14:24). Love, then, reflects acceptance of Jesus’ relationship to God.

“Love” serves as a marker for insider relationships, (the Father, Jesus and the disciples). Only in the Farewell Address does Jesus issues commands, such as to “love,” “keep on believing,” (14:1) and “abide” (15:4-9). In fact, he commands the disciples to “abide in my love” (15:9-10). In a sense, all three commands blend into each other, such that together they suggest loyalty, faithfulness, and constancy. Let us now consider the positive emotions appropriate to the characters in John 12.

The author would surely have us feel the emotion of love or “friendly feeling” for the Beloved at Bethany. When first we learn of them, we are schooled as to the appropriate emotion to have toward them: they are “beloved by Jesus” (11:3, 5). If Jesus “loved” them, so too should the disciples. In 12:1-7, the same emotion is appropriate for them because of the friendship they show to Jesus: a meal served by Martha, exquisite etiquette by Mary, and Jesus seated next to Lazarus. No doubt the author wants us to react to them with “love” or “friendly feeling.” They received a χαρία both when they were greatly in need and when in need of what is great and difficult (Aristotle, Rhet. 2.3.4).
Lazarus is targeted for assassination (9-11), at which news we are expected to show “pity” for him. He does not deserve this; moreover, the animus against him is directed at Jesus as well. Finally, inasmuch as Lazarus is targeted to die because of Jesus, his fate is pitiable in the eyes of disciples, just as they will be told of their on death (16:1-2; 21:19). Perhaps Lazarus also models the criterion for would-be disciples who are told formally that if they love their lives, they will die; but if they hate their lives, they will live (12:24-25). The audience, then, should experience “pity” for him because of his undeserved misfortune.

Crowds who go out to meet Jesus (12:12-18) are ambivalently portrayed. Yes, they publicly acknowledge Jesus: “Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord, even the King of Israel!” (12:13-15). Yet that is tempered by the observation that part of them consists of people who were present when Jesus raised Lazarus and who, like spies or informers, bring news of this to Jesus enemies (11:45-46). Nevertheless their public acknowledgment of Jesus stands in opposition to the silence of others who fear to confess him lest they be thrown out of synagogue (12:42-43). We suggest that a mild positive emotion is aroused toward them by the author, but no “friendly feeling.” They are fringe people, not genuine insiders; although not blamed, they receive modest praise.

The appropriate emotions toward Philip, Andrew and the Greeks are difficult to assess. The scene in 12:20-26 appears to be positive: Greeks want to see Jesus, but is this “recruitment” or “volunteering”? Earlier when Andrew recruited Peter and Philip
recruited Nathanael, the expected reaction was thoroughgoing praise. But Philip and Andrew are not recruiting these Greeks, only facilitating their access Jesus. This is a different role, Jesus’ reaction to which is not praise at all. If we are intended to remember that “no one can come to me unless the Father draws him (6:44), then we are left with the assessment that the Greeks are not recruited (by God or the disciples) but are volunteering. But is volunteering a praiseworthy and honorable thing? Volunteering, along with gifts, compliments, and requests are considered positive challenges in the scenario of honor and shame. All such put Jesus on the spot. He may not want such volunteers; moreover, if he takes them, he risks being indebted to them for their services.

As he did with the volunteers in Matt 8:19-22 and Luke 9:57-62, he discourages them by making severe demands on them or by delivering a severe warning: “Unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains just a single grain; but if it dies, it bears much fruit. Those who love their life lose it, and those who hate their life in this world will keep it for eternal life” (12:24-25). We are not told if they accepted this, so the audience is left without data to conclude that they are genuine followers. But if Jesus’ word indeed caused fear in them, then they are not genuine candidates for discipleship.

What emotion does the author want us to have toward them? Nothing positive is being praised. Not foes, but yet not friends either. No news is probably bad news.

**Negative Emotions, Especially “Hate.”** If “love” is aroused toward noble characters, we should investigate if “hate” is the emotion aroused for other characters in
John 12. We recall that the tradition about emotions understood them as binary opposites.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, “love” balances “hate” and “mildness” contrasts with “anger.” Again, what did the ancients mean by the negative emotions “anger,” “hate,” “indignation” and “envy”? 

1. **Anger** (ὀργή) means a desire for revenge for a real or imagined slight. “Slight” (ὀλγωρία), the display that someone appears valueness, has three kinds: disdain (καταφρόνησις), spitefulness (ἐπηρεασμός) and insult (ὑβρίς).

2. **Hate/Enmity** (μῆνας, ἔχορος) goes much further than anger.\textsuperscript{19} Anger, a response to injury which seeks retaliation or vengeance, is curable by time because retaliation may lead to mildness (πραότης). But no possible means exists to moderate or erase hatred. It endures! Instead of retaliation, hatred seeks to cause only evil to the offender.\textsuperscript{20}

3. **Indignation** (νέμεσις) describes the pain someone feels at the undeserved good fortune of another, and so differs from envy which is pain at another deserved good fortune.

4. **Envy** (φθόνος), like indignation, is pain at the sight of another prospering; the one who envies does not seek the fortune or prosperity of another, only desires that the possessor NOT have it.\textsuperscript{21}

As we did with “love” in the Fourth Gospel, let us repeat the process with “hate.”
1. Who hates whom? Some hate the light (3:20); the world hates Jesus (7:7; 15:18, 24) as well as his disciples (15:18). Whoever hates Jesus also hates the Father (15:23-24). Finally, disciples themselves must “hate”: “He who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life” (12:25). Thus “hate” suggests radical animosity between Jesus and company and “the world,” an alarmingly concept.

2. Why do they hate? In some cases, those in darkness refused to come into the light “lest their deeds be exposed” (3:20). Hence we see evil persons fearing loss of face. But in 12:43 we have potential disciples failing because they too are afraid to lose face: “They loved the praise of men more than the praise of God.” Finally, disciples are hated because they “do not belong to the world” (15:18).

3. Who cannot be hated? The brothers of Jesus cannot be hated by the world because they belong to it and try to manipulate Jesus (7:7).

   **Excursus: To Hate or Not to Hate?** Even as we claim that hate is an appropriate emotion toward certain characters in John 12, we are confronted with an immediate problem. Jesus seemed to have precluded “hate” for his disciples when he said, “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, love your enemies” (Matt 5:43-44). Other remarks, however, indicate a less rigid meaning of hate. Jesus himself said “If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and
sisters, he cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26; John 12:25). Jesus, then, commands disciples to “hate” their closest kin. Jesus also tells the Ephesians that he too hates: “You hate the works of the Nickelodeons, which I also hate” (Rev 2:6). Furthermore, God loves and hates: “Jacob I loved, Esau I hated” (Mal 1:2-3; Rom 9:13). Proverbs provides a list of things that God himself hates: “There are six things which the Lord hates: haughty eyes, a lying tongue, and hands that shed blood, a heart that devises wicked plans, feet that make haste to run to evil, a false witness who breathes out lies, and a man who sows discord among brothers” (6:1-19). Furthermore, hate is what the disciples regularly receive from others: hated by outsiders (Matt 10:22; 24:9; Mark 13:13) and by apostates (Matt 24:10). “Hate,” then, is both given and received, but is it part of the repertoire of Christian behavior? What does it mean? The data suggest that hate is by no means a proscribed emotion.

**Old Testament on “Hate.”** A survey of the uses of “hate” in the Scriptures indicates a spectrum of attitudes to it. 1. Hate = voluntary separation from someone or something, as in “I hate the company of the evildoers” (Ps 26:5) and “hating father, mother, wife and children” (Luke 14:26). Conversely, evil people separate themselves from the group: “Those who hate reproof, walk in the sinner’s steps” (Sirach 21:6). 2. Hate =
virtuous choice, as in loving good and hating evil: “The Lord loves those who hate evil” (Ps 97:10; see Ps 45:7) and “Hate what is evil but hold fast to what is good” (Rom 12:9). 3. Hate = the fate of the wicked, often a desire for vengeance: “I will repay those who hate me” (Deut 30:41, 43). “Those who hated me I destroyed” (Ps 18:40; see Ps 21:8).22 “Those who hate me may be put to shame” (Ps 86:17; Ps 68:1). 4. Hate = hostility and enmity received, as in “Consider how many are my foes, and with what hatred they hate me” (Ps 25:19); “Let not those [my foes] wink the eye who hate me without cause” (P 35:17).23 Thus, we discover a spectrum in the understanding of “hate.” 1. Positive meanings: separation and choice: it is good to hate the company of evildoers and to love virtue and hate iniquity. 2. Negative meanings: the fate of those who hate and show hostility/enmity.

“Hate,” then, because it is a positive choice for good, is acceptable behavior. Everyone hates, even God.

**Hate in the Greco-Roman World.** Aristotle offers a rare definition of “hate.” First he describes it from its opposite, “friendliness.” If “friendliness” is “wanting for someone what one thinks is good for him” (Rhet. 2.4.2), then “hate” desires evil for someone.24 Second, Aristotle contrasts it with its close cousin, “anger.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Hate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Curable in time</td>
<td>1. Not curable in time</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Desire that another suffer pain
3. Accompanied by pain
4. May feel pity after retaliation
5. Wants object of anger to suffer

2. Desire that another suffer evil
3. Not accompanied by pain
4. Never feels pity, under any circumstance
5. Wants objects of hate not to exist

Whom, then, do we hate? According to Aristotle, we hate those who belong to a detested class of people, such as “a thief and a spy” or an “enemy” (ἔχθρος), who is both a personal as well as a national enemy, with whom no cessation of hostilities or truce is possible. Yet, as Elaine Fantham notes, “For Aristotle, emotions such as anger and hatred could be ‘reasonable,’ warranted by certain types of provocation and useful in ensuring the defense of innocence and punishment of evil.” Finally, a popular maxim instructs Greek audiences to “help one’s friends and harm one’s enemies,” that is, to seek revenge for a injury suffered.

Plutarch’s “Envy and Hatred” provides an analysis of hate closer to meaning to that found in early Christian literature. As regards its origin, “Hate arrives when a person is bad either in general or toward oneself. It is men’s nature to hate when they think they have been wronged. Men view with disgust all who in any other way are given to wrong doing or to wickedness” (2). Thus, we hate those who have wronged us. Hatred, moreover, may in fact be virtuous: “Many are hated with justice, as those we call ‘deserving of
hatred of wickedness is among the things we praise” (5). Plutarch provides an interesting example of virtuous hating.

Those who brought false charges against Socrates, being held to have reached the limit of baseness, were so hated and shunned by their countrymen that no one would lend them light for a fire, answer their questions, or bathe in the same water, but poured it out as polluted, until the men hanged themselves, finding the hatred unendurable (6). He approves of the hatred by the polis, which not only separates the good from the wicked, but is assuaged only by the death of the wicked (for the death of Socrates).

**Summary.** What have we learned about “hate”? 1. Who hates? All persons, including Jesus and God, hate. 2. What is hate? Hate enjoys a wide spectrum of meaning: from the mild “love less,” to a taste for vengeance and then to a desire for evil. When juxtaposed with “love,” “hate” suggests a refusal to show loyalty, faithfulness and allegiance. 3. Can hate be virtuous? Yes, for it serves to make a voluntary separation from wickedness and from one’s family who block one’s allegiance to Jesus. It encourages the detestation of types and classes of people, such as thieves and the like. We hypothesize that in John 12 the author seeks to arouse “hate” in a meaning closest to Aristotle’s definition of it noted above. Strong, robust, give-no-
Quarter “hate.”

Hate and the Fourth Gospel. The verb “to hate” is not found in John 12, but that does not mean that hatred is absent. Except for “beloved,” none of the other emotions we surveyed are identified, but that does not mean that others are not operative. When assessing each character in John 12, readers ancient and modern are required to judge what kind of character each is, that is, whether they belong to the world below or to the world of Jesus, what actions have been done or not done by them, what relationship they have to Jesus or do not have. On the basis of this the author want his audience to react. The premier questions is “Are they friends or foes?” Let us now begin assessing what emotions the author wants to arouse in us in regard to various characters who come before us in John 12. Paraded before us are Judas, the chief priests, Pharisees, those who intimidate believers. What is urged? Hate? Anger? Indignation?

Judas Iscariot We are told in 12:4-6 that Judas was a liar and a thief. While claiming concern for the poor, as keeper of the purse he “used to take what was put into it.” This comes on top of an earlier revelation that Judas belongs to the world of devils (“one of you is a devil,” 6:70), an identification repeated in 13:2 (“the devil had already put it into the heart of Judas Iscariot to betray him”). Already identified as Jesus’ “betrayer” (6:64, 71), he will shortly demonstrate that by working for those who wish to kill Jesus. He is, then, a liar, a thief, and a murderer (8:44). The appropriate emotional reaction to Judas is hate (μῆσος) not anger (ὀργή). Anger seeks conspicuous retaliation,
which can change into “mildness” (“Let mildness be defined as a settling down and quieting of anger” Rhet. 2.3.2). No possible satisfaction can be gotten from Judas for his behavior because he belongs to the world of Satan, whom one should hate. No calming of anger is possible. Hate, moreover, comes from perceiving another as being a certain type of person: “everyone hates the thief and the sycophant” (2.4.31). Judas is clearly a liar, a thief, and a murderer. Anger is curable and of limited duration, but not hate, which admits no cure and which rages indefinitely. Anger wants the offender to feel pain, i.e. retaliation or vengeance, but hatred that he experience evil. Indeed hatred of Judas would be a virtue.

Chief Priests What emotions drive the Chief Priests in 11:47-48? They sentenced Jesus to death out of indignation (νέμεσις), not envy (φόνος). Envy is aroused against someone, a peer, who legitimately has some good or fortune, which pains the one envying to see; the one envying labors to cut that success down to size. An indignant person, however, is pained at seeing someone, generally a social inferior, enjoy unworthy success. The chief priests certainly do not acknowledge that Jesus deserves legitimate respect, thus act out of envy; for in their eyes he is a deceiver, a law-breaker and a blasphemer. Indignation drives actions against Jesus, as well as their plot to kill Lazarus, and so destroy the chief source of Jesus’ rising honor (12:9-11, 19).

Turning to the audience considering John 12, what emotion(s) are being aroused in them? What emotions are appropriate to the audience who perceive the High Priests as
murderers? At first, “anger” appears to be the appropriate emotion aroused because of their plans to murder Jesus and Lazarus; since anger = retaliation, this may be suggested ironically in the remark they make about Jesus’ success: “The Romans will come and destroy both our holy place and our nation” (11:48). The very think they seek to forestall will come about by their very actions. But the Johannine audience seems never to consider revenge in its conflicts with the Jerusalem elites, but rather complete and permanent separation. “Anger,” then is not what is aroused. However, they represent a class of persons that all should hate, namely, murderers, such as Ishmael, Cain and his father, and those who plot to stone Jesus (8:44). They are, then, evil characters, of whom Jesus says, “They have hated me without cause” (15:25). No revenge or retaliation will ever moderate the anger directed toward the chief priests. The audience should hate them.

Pharisees. In the narrative, the Pharisees continually judged Jesus: as an improper witness (8:13), a “sinner” (9:16, 24), and as a nowhere man (9:28). Twice they conducted a trial of Jesus, albeit illegal because in two instances Jesus was absent (7:45-52; 11:46-48). Moreover they agreed with the chief priests to put Jesus to death (11:53), even ordering those who knew of Jesus’ whereabouts to report to them (11:57). Readers were schooled to judge them as unjust judges who judge according to appearances or out of indignation, which recurs in the conclusion.

If we let him go on thus, every one will believe in him (11:48)
You see that you can do nothing; look, the world has gone after him (12:19).

The appropriate judgment of them is the same as for the high priests; and the appropriate
emotion the author seeks to arouse is hate. There is an irreconcilable division between
them and Jesus, filled with hostility to Jesus and disciples. This will never end nor can it
be excused or erased. In John’s logic, they will remain indignant murderous. Hate is the
appropriate reaction to them.

Certain “authorities” (12:42) try to prohibit people from publicly acknowledging
Jesus. It seems safe to include both Pharisees and chief priests in this reference. They
declare a rule (do not acclaim Jesus as Messiah) to which they attach a penalty (expulsion
from the synagogue). In harming others or causing them to stumble, they harm the Jesus
group as well. If these “authorities” are Pharisees and chief priests, this behavior only
adds to the judgment of them as deserving hate.

Those silenced by the authorities are also the subject of critical judgment. They
lack courage to speak publicly of Jesus or to come to him in the daylight or openly. To
these the author would have us feel “anger-as-slight.” “Slight” (ολιγωρία, the emotion
we feel toward what is worthless, comes in three flavors: “contempt” (καταφόρνησίς),
“spite” (ἐπηρεασμός, and “insult” ὅβρις). We judge that the author is trying to appeal
to the emotion of “anger-as-slight-as-contempt.” Again Aristotle, “One who shows
contempt belittles; people have contempt for those things that they think of no account”
(2.1.4). Contempt, then, means withdrawing honor or worth from some person. Those
who show contempt are thus shaming (αἰσϑχνη) and bringing another into dishonor.

Finally, as we noted, the crowds typically divide in their evaluations of Jesus.
What emotion is appropriate to those who misunderstand or challenge Jesus at this point? To them the heavenly voice spoken to Jesus is only “thunder” (12:29). A second misunderstanding occurs when they challenge Jesus (12:32-34). Thus the crowds in 12:29 and 34 should be treated as having no worth, and so deserve contempt. They are not enemies as are the Pharisees and chief priests, nor do they plot Jesus’ death. Not hate, but contempt is appropriate to them. Summary, Summary, Conclusions and Further Questions

Since a good conclusion highlights the major points of an argument, we know now what a rhetorical conclusion is, its parts, and its purposes. The point of judgment is whether it is an appropriate model for reading and interpreting John 12. This pushes the argument one step further, what is a good or appropriate model? Rhetoric is rhetoric; all writers in antiquity employed some of the arts of communication and persuasion. “Conclusion” seems appropriate because it is rooted in ancient rhetoric; they is the way the ancients thought and wrote. It is also appropriate in the sense that, like all models, it surfaces data – especially data that other models do not – and provides a system in which to interpret the data discovered. Hence, using this rhetorical model, we are by no means imposing a meaning on John 12, but surfacing its data and synthesizing it in a way suitable to ancient discourse.

Given this argument, what can we say about the educational level of the author of the Fourth Gospel? It would seem that the person who composed and wrote John 1-12 was minimally schooled in the middle stages of education where the progymnasmata were
taught, but might also have had more elite training in rhetoric. The use of classical rhetoric here is hardly unique in the Fourth Gospel, for he knows the topos on “noble death” and the contents of the encomium and vituperation.

If John 1:1-18 is a prologue which finds its conclusion in John 12, then what about John 13:1-3 and a second conclusion? It would seem that John 20-21 would serve that rhetorical role, for all the major characters in John 13-19 return to the scene, such as the Beloved Disciple, Mary Magdalene and Peter. As we see them in John 20-21, we are instructed once more how to think about them in terms of their relationship to Jesus, either confirming them as elites or as redeeming them from their folly. By the end of the story, we know that all of them “love” Jesus, and so the audience is instructed to “love” them. These sketchy ideas, however, need to be worked out in some detail. But if they make rhetorical sense, then the second pair of prologue and conclusion would indeed confirm the presence and function of the first pair.
NOTES


9. Not all characters re-appear in John 12; missing are the mother of Jesus, Nicodemus, the Samaritan woman, the royal official, the man at the pool, the brothers of Jesus, and the man born blind.


12. What is meant by “emotions” in rhetorical literature? First of all, we are considering “emotions,” not “passions” or “desires.” At the end of his address, the speaker seeks to “alter judgments” in those overseeing the case, trying to put them in a certain frame of mind (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.2.5; 2.1.8); these “emotions of the soul” are intended to shape an evaluation of the situation and prompt an appropriate response. See Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero, 65-75.


14. For a convenient view of these three items functioning in a rhetorical context, see DiCicco, Paul’s Use of Ethos, Pathos, and Logos, 36-164. For a more restricted study, see Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney, eds., Paul and Pathos (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001).


18. Inevitably modern readers will ask about the morality of hating another. In heroic Greece, we are told, it was considered a virtue to hate one’s enemies; W. B. Stanford, Sophocles: ‘Ajax’ (Salem, N H : Ayer Co., 1985). Although the dramatists portrayed excessive hate as the cause of destruction to some heroes, hatred was a regular factor of social life: see Mary W. Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Elaine Fantham, ““Envy and Fear the Begetter of Hate”: Statius’ Thebaid and the Genesis of Hatred,” in eds. Susanna Braund and Christopher Gill, The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). The strongest criticism of hate came from the Stoics, not because of its social harm but because it was a passion and so was unreasonable.

19. Quintilian makes an excellent point about “hate”: “There are two kinds of invidia (hatred, envy), to which the two adjectives invidius (envy) and invidiosus (hatred) apply. . .For though some things are hateful in themselves such as parricide, murder, poisoning, other things have to be made to seem hateful. This latter contingency arises when we attempt to shew that what we have suffered is of a more horrible nature than what are generally regarded as evils” (Inst. Orat. 6.2.21-22).
20. “Hate” is directed to Jesus (3:20; 7:7; 15:18), his disciples (15:18-24; 17:14). The world is not just “angry” at Jesus and company, but hates them and wished to destroy them utterly. Fundamentally, Jesus and company do not belong to this world, which hates those who are not its own. Furthermore, Jesus tells would-be disciples that “He who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life” (12:25). “Hate” here suggests willingness to be crushed by evil, an acceptance of hate from others.


22. In the Scriptures, then, revenge and hate are praised as virtues (Deut 7:2-9; 20:16; 30:11; Pss 26:5; 137:7-9 and 139:19-22). In this case, one “hates” an enemy, especially someone who has done you a harm.

23. There are four more usages of “hate” that are worth considering. 1. Hyperbole. Jacob is said to have “loved Rachel more than Leah” (Gen 29:30) such that Leah considered herself “hated” (29:33). Inasmuch as Jacob begat a flock of children through her, this suggests that what is called “hate” is close to “love less.” 2. From love to hate. Ammon once “loved” his sister Tamar; but after he raped her, “the hatred with which he hated her was greater than the love with which he had loved her” (2 Sam 13:15). Amnon’s hatred springs not from some injury to him by Tamar, but from his change in family loyalty to her after he injured her. 3. Hate as no loyalty toward. A man cannot serve two masters, for he will love one and hate the other (Matt 6:24). If “love” suggests faithfulness, then “hate” means an absence of loyalty and allegiance. 4. Ethnic love and hate. Tacitus writes of the Judeans: “The Jews are extremely loyal toward one another, and always ready to show compassion, but toward every other people they feel only hate and enmity” (Histories 5.5). Again, this appears to be a matter of loyalty and compassion to insiders and suspicion and separation from outsiders.

24. We consider the antithetical character of emotions to be a constant in any discussion of them. For example, Cicero says that the aim of a speaker is to make the jury “angry or appeased, to feel ill will or to be well disposed. . .scorn or admiration, hatred or love, desire or loathing” (Orator 131; see also de Oratore 2.185).

25. Following the universal penchant to distinguish items, Cicero provides a useful description of aggressive emotions: “‘Anger is the lust of punishing the man who is thought to have inflicted an undeserved injury; rage on the other hand is anger springing up and suddenly showing itself, termed in Greek ῥήμασις; hate is inveterate anger; enmity is anger watching for an opportunity for revenge; wrath is anger of greater bitterness conceived in the innermost heart and soul” (Tusc. Disp. 4.9.21). Hatred is “inveterate,” it never ceases or moderates.

