Here is one way to reconstruct the knowledge argument as an argument against functionalism (Jackson, in the paper we read, focuses mainly on the use of the argument as an argument against materialism):
| 1. | Mary knows all the functional facts about color experiences while in the black & white room. |
| 2. | If functionalism about color experience is true, then there are no facts about color experience which are not functional facts. |
| 3. | If functionalism is true, Mary knows all the facts about color experiences while in the black & white room. (1,2) |
| 4. | Upon leaving the black & white room, Mary learns something new about color experience — she learns what it is like to see red. |
| 5. | So, Mary did not know everything about color experience while in the black & white room. (4) |
| C. | Functionalism about color experience is false. (3,5) |
What should ‘functional facts’ mean here?
This argument seems to be valid. So any one who defends functionalism must reject one of premises (1), (2), and (4). Which, if any, can plausibly be rejected?