Intentionalist reply 2: The appeal to appearance properties

Intentionalist reply 1: behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is impossible

Spectrum inversion as a problem for intentionalism

Attention and intentionalism

Transparency, intentionalism, and the contents of experience

Perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and non-sensory attitudes

Alleged counterexamples to intentionalism

Skepticism about perceptual content

The value of epistemic two-dimensionalism

A non-2Dist treatment of metaphysical and epistemic possibility

More than you wanted to know about epistemic 2D-ism

Objections to the two-dimensionalism of TCM

The two-dimensionalism of The Conscious Mind

Double-indexing and the Kaplan semantics for indexicals

The modal argument and scope distinctions

A guide to Lectures I & II of Naming and Necessity

Russell on naming and denoting

Fregeanism and attitude ascriptions

Russellianism and (serious) actualism

The semantics of adverbs and Russellianism

Stalnaker's semantics for belief ascriptions

Theories of propositions