HANDOUTS
Intentionalist reply 2: The appeal to appearance properties
Intentionalist reply 1: behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is impossible
Spectrum inversion as a problem for intentionalism
Attention and intentionalism
Transparency, intentionalism, and the contents of experience
Perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and non-sensory attitudes
Alleged counterexamples to intentionalism
Skepticism about perceptual content
The value of epistemic two-dimensionalism
A non-2Dist treatment of metaphysical and epistemic possibility
More than you wanted to know about epistemic 2D-ism
Objections to the two-dimensionalism of TCM
The two-dimensionalism of The Conscious Mind
Double-indexing and the Kaplan semantics for indexicals
The modal argument and scope distinctions
A guide to Lectures I & II of Naming and Necessity
Russell on naming and denoting
Fregeanism and attitude ascriptions
Russellianism and (serious) actualism
The semantics of adverbs and Russellianism
Stalnaker's semantics for belief ascriptions
Theories of propositions
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