Wittgenstein stated his famous rule-following paradox as follows: “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” This is the paradox that Kripke develops in this essay via the example of plus and quus.

Plus and quus are mathematical functions, which we can symbolize as ‘+’ and ‘⊕’ respectively. Plus, or the addition function, is defined in the usual way. The quus function is the same as the addition or plus function for low arguments, but diverges past a certain point. More specifically, it is defined as follows:

\[ x \oplus y = x + y \text{ if } x, y < 57 \]

\[ x \oplus y = 5 \text{ otherwise} \]
The skeptical question is: in the past, by the symbol ‘+’, did you mean plus or quus? (The focus on the past is just a simplifying device, to allow us to now talk unambiguously about these two functions.) This question is a way of raising the paradox mentioned by Wittgenstein because it seems that any evidence cited in support of the claim that I meant plus in the past is also consistent with my meaning quus; thus, the skeptic argues, it seems that there is no fact of the matter about whether I meant plus or quus. But if this is the case, then presumably the problem of general, and there are no facts about meaning at all.

The problem is is not, at least in the first instance, any sort of skepticism about mathematics. We can see the skeptic as granting that both plus and quus are perfectly well-defined arithmetic functions. The skepticism is about meaning rather than mathematics: it is about how we know which of these two well-defined functions is, or was, attached to the symbol ‘+.’

As Kripke thinks of it, the skeptical challenge really has two parts:

1. Is there any fact that I meant plus, not quus? In what did my meaning plus rather than quus consist?
2. Do I now have any reason to be confident that I should answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ to ‘68+57’, given that I now want to be consistent with my past intentions?

This raises a few questions. The first is about the nature of the first version of the skeptical challenge. What does it mean to ask what a fact consists in? Does this sort of question make sense? Should we think that questions like this always have answers? If not, do they ever have answers? Compare:

- In what does being someone’s granddaughter consist?
- In what does being water consist?
- In what does your knowing something, rather than just believing it, consist?
- In what does personal identity consist?
- In what does being red consist?

What are the constraints on answers to questions like this?

A second question about the nature of the skeptical challenge concerns the relationship between the two versions of the challenge Kripke identifies. Kripke himself takes the second question to put a constraint on answers to the first: whatever fact constitutes the fact that means plus rather than quus should be able to make sense of my being justified in making arithmetical judgements that presuppose my meaning plus rather than quus. Is this a reasonable requirement on answers to the skeptical challenge?
The bulk of the book is a consideration, and rejection, of a host of proposed answers to the skeptical challenge. Understanding Kripke’s arguments against these proposed answers gives a good idea of the sorts of challenges that proposed solutions to ‘the problem of intentionality’ encounter.

2 Proposed solutions to the paradox

2.1 Meaning as determined by past use of words

Claim: the fact that I meant addition by ‘+’ consists in the fact that I used ‘+’ as a symbol for the addition function; i.e., I held true just those equations involving ‘+’ which are made true by letting ‘+’ stand for the addition function.

Skeptical reply: Even supposing that you made no mistakes, in the past you held true only a finite number of equations involving ‘+.’ But the addition function is not the only function which can make these equations true; there are an infinite number of functions which make true the equations you held true involving ‘+.’ And among these infinitely many functions is the quus function.

2.2 Meaning as determined by rules or algorithms

Claim: the fact that I meant addition by ‘+’ consists in the fact that I adopted certain rules, or algorithms, to govern my use of ‘+’; and these algorithms single out the addition function.

Skeptical reply 1: this is just to give a ‘rule for interpreting a rule.’ And just as the skeptic can give a skeptical reinterpretation of one expression (the ‘+’ sign) so he can also give a skeptical reinterpretation of the expressions used in stating the rule for the interpretation of ‘+’ The presumption is that each of these expressions may be reinterpreted to preserve the skeptical hypothesis that in the past you meant quaddition by ‘+.’

Skeptical reply 2: in fact, many people mean addition by ‘+’ without doing anything so sophisticated as mastering algorithms for or recursive definitions of addition. So association with an algorithm is not a plausible candidate for the fact that a speaker means addition by ‘+.’

2.3 Meaning as determined by dispositions to use words in certain ways

2.3.1 The simple dispositional theory

Claim: the fact that I meant addition by ‘+’ consists in the fact that I was disposed, when presented with any expression ‘x + y’ to respond with the sum of x and y (rather than their quum). This has an obvious advantage over the claim that meaning
consists in actual past usage. After all, even if I never considered the expression ‘68 + 57’ before, I surely was disposed to accept ‘68 + 57 = 125.’

Skeptical reply 1: Error. Typically we are not disposed to respond to every instance of ‘x + y’ with the sum of x and y: everyone is disposed, in at least some cases, to make mistakes. But then it follows that if the function attached to ‘+’ is determined by the equations involving ‘+’ which we are disposed to accept, we do not mean addition by ‘+.’

Skeptical reply 2: Finitude. We are finite creatures capable only of understanding numbers of limited size; so “not only my actual performance, but also the totality of my dispositions, is finite” (26). But the addition function is defined over numbers of arbitrary size. So, once again, the dispositional theory delivers the wrong result: if our dispositions for using ‘+’ really did determine the function attached to it, then the function expressed by ‘+’ would apply to only numbers small enough for us to grasp. But addition is not like this.

Skeptical reply 3: Normativity. The dispositionalist tries to explain the nature of meaning in terms of what we are disposed to do. But, Kripke says, this is the wrong sort of answer. He says:

“Suppose I do mean addition by ‘+’. What is the relation of this supposition to the question how I will respond to the problem ‘68 + 57’? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if ‘+’ meant addition, then I will answer ‘125.’ But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by ‘+’, I will answer ‘125’, but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of ‘+’, I should answer ‘125.’ . . . The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive” (37).

We should be clear about two points about this objection. (i) It is supposed to explain why the error and finitude objections get their force. (ii) It is closely related to the second form of the skeptic’s challenge, that of explaining how we are justified in answering ‘125’ when queried with ‘68 + 57’. The idea is that even if we knew our past dispositions, this would not be enough to justify our view that ‘125’ is the correct answer. (See on point (ii) pp. 23-24.) This objection is not easy to understand, and we’ll be coming back to what it might mean to say that meaning is normative.

2.3.2 The community-wide dispositional theory

Claim: the fact that I meant addition by ‘+’ consists in the fact that most or all members of my linguistic community were disposed, when presented with any expression ‘x + y’ to respond with the sum of x and y (rather than their quum). This has some advantage over the individualistic dispositional theory: it gets rid of some cases of error, and, sometimes, if we imagine a possible linguistic community diverging in
their judgements in sufficiently systematic ways from ours, we also imagine the mean-
ings of their terms as different from ours. This fits nicely with the community-wide
version of the dispositional theory.

Skeptical reply 1: Community-wide error. This doesn’t seem to solve all cases of
error.

Skeptical reply 2: Finitude. If this is a good objection to the simple dispositional
theory, it applies equally well here.


2.3.3 The counterfactual dispositional theory

Claim: the fact that I meant addition by ‘+’ consists in the fact that, were my
brain expanded or were my cognitive capacities massively increased, I would have been
disposed, when presented with any expression ‘x + y’ to respond with the sum of x
and y (rather than their quum). So on this view facts about meaning consist not in
what people are or were disposed to do, but in what they would have been disposed
to do, had certain conditions been fulfilled.

Skeptical reply 1: Science fiction. This makes facts about meaning hostage to claims
about what would have happened had the world been changed in certain radical
ways. But really we have no idea what the world would have been like in such
settings. (There’s a connection here with the idea that any answer to the skeptical
challenge should provide facts which can justify our answers to addition questions.)

Skeptical reply 2: Normativity. See above.

2.3.4 The ‘whatever-it-takes’ dispositional theory

Claim: the fact that I meant addition by ‘+’ consists in the fact that, were I free
from mistakes, I would have been disposed, when presented with any expression ‘x +
y’ to respond with the sum of x and y (rather than their quum).

Skeptical reply 1: this is circular. The skeptic is challenging you to say what the
facts are in virtue of which you meant addition rather than quaddition by ‘+.’ If
you appeal to facts about what you would have said had you not made any mistakes,
the skeptic will say that in such a situation you would have been correct to answer
‘5’ to ‘68 + 57’ since, after all, you mean quaddition all along. To rule this out you
must assume that you meant addition, which is of course the point at issue. (See pp.
27-28.)

Skeptical reply 2: Normativity. (Again.)
2.4  Meaning as determined by ‘machine program’

Claim: Machines can be built to embody functions; in particular, they can be built to embody the addition function. (Just think of a calculator.) But if a machine can be built to embody the addition function, then surely human beings, which are relevantly like complex machines, can do so as well. “A machine can follow this rule; whence does a human being gain a freedom of choice in this matter which a machine does not possess?” (Dummett, quoted p. 32)

As we’ll see, there are two different versions of this response to the skeptic.

2.4.1  Machine as physical object

Claim: a machine like a calculator embodies the addition function just in case when given two numbers as input, the machine spits out their sum (rather than their quum).

Skeptical reply: This is just a version of the dispositionalist’s response, and open to the same objections. In particular, calculators like human beings are finite, and are prone to breakdown (error).

2.4.2  Machine as instantiated program or algorithm

Claim: But cases in which machines break down are cases in which they fail to act as they were programmed to act. So when it is said that a machine can embody the addition function, what is meant is not that some particular physical machine or other can embody it, but rather that a computer program can embody it.

Skeptical reply: This is just a version of the view, discussed above, that the meaning of ‘+’ for me is determined by which algorithm or rule I associate with the symbol. That is to say that this is just giving a rule for interpreting a rule, which is open to the objections discussed above.

2.5  Meaning as determined by simplicity

Claim: It is true that my dispositions do not single out the addition function as the meaning of ‘+’. But the addition function is the simplest function similar enough to my dispositions. (Quaddition seems a more complex function perhaps because it is defined in terms of addition.) I mean addition by ‘+’ in part because of my dispositions and in part because when there is indeterminacy between an expression meaning one of several things, the simplest of these things is automatically assigned as the meaning.

(For relevant discussion, see footnote 25 rather than the confused discussion on pp. 38-39. Kripke is right that using simplicity alone to solve the skeptical problem makes
no sense; but presumably the relevant version of the idea uses simplicity along with something like the dispositional solution, to decide between alternate interpretations of ‘+’ between which the version of the dispositional solution in question does not decide.)

Skeptical reply 1: Problems defining simplicity.

Skeptical reply 2: Seems on the wrong track. Would we decide that we didn’t mean addition by ‘+’ if we found out that, according to the true measure of simplicity, quaddition was simpler than addition?

Skeptical reply 3: This reply is ill-suited to answer the justificatory problem raised by the skeptic: “I do not justify my choice of ‘125’ rather than ‘5’... by citing a hypothetical simplicity measure of the kind mentioned” (p. 40).

2.6 Meaning as determined by irreducible meaning-experiences

Claim: Meaning addition by ‘+’ is having a certain introspectible experience, like a headache (except, presumably, more subtle), upon using ‘+’ with this meaning. This view has the significant advantage that it can explain how we know that we mean addition by ‘+’.

Skeptical reply 1: But it cannot explain how we can be so sure that we should answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’. Even if we had a special headache associated with meaning addition by ‘+’, how would this headache tell us how to answer?

Skeptical reply 2: It does not seem that there is any such introspectible experience. (If there were such, how could the skeptic’s challenge have seemed difficult in the first place?)

2.7 Meaning as a Platonic Fregean sense

Claim: Meanings - including the meaning of ‘+’ - are abstract objects in Frege’s third realm, and thus are not contained in anyone’s minds. It is simply in the nature of such abstract objects to determine their reference: so it is simply in the nature of the addition function to imply that ‘125’ is the right answer to ‘67 + 58’.

Skeptical reply: This is not to the point. Granted, once we have the result that the addition function is the meaning of ‘+’, there is no further problem about why ‘125’ is the right answer to ‘68 + 57’. But the skeptic’s challenge is to show us how the addition function gets to be the meaning of ‘+’ in the first place.