

Some questions about Anscombe

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- Why does Anscombe think that (as she says in §4) intentions to act must be understood in terms of intentional action? Is the argument: (i) we can only distinguish intentions from predictions in terms of a distinction between evidential and reason-giving answers to the question ‘Why?’, and (ii) we can only make this distinction in terms of a prior understanding of intentional action? But why think that (ii) is true?
- Suppose we can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action in terms of non-observational knowledge. Would that amount to a plausible analysis of intentional action? Why or why not?
- How should the following claim be modified to handle cases of self-deception:

A ϕ s intentionally \equiv there is some action ψ (i) *A* knows non-observationally that he is ψ ing, and (ii) *A* knows non-observationally why he is ψ ing, and (iii) either $\phi = \psi$ or *A* is ψ ing in order to ϕ .
- Anscombe is generally skeptical of a philosophy of mind which takes seriously inner states and episodes which are not to be characterized in terms of anything outer. This prejudice often informs her arguments. Does she offer anything by way of defense of this attitude?