Free will, determinism, & indeterminism

First paper assignment

PHIL 20229: Paradoxes Due: Thursday, March 4 (the Thursday before spring break)

Below is a description of your first paper assignment. As an alternative to doing this assignment, you may come up with your own topic, though you must get the written approval of me or your TA by email first. If you do this, the question that I or your TA approves should be on the first page of your essay. The papers should be about 5 pages in length, double-spaced and with reasonable margins and font.

A late penalty of 3 points per day, including weekends, will be assessed for any papers which are handed in late.

Plagiarism is a serious and growing problem at Notre Dame and other universities. It is your responsibility to acquaint yourselves with the University's honor code, as well as with the philosophy department's guidelines regarding plagiarism. Both are linked from the course web site.

Many of the paradoxes we have discussed have no uncontroversial solution. Examples include: Zeno's paradoxes, McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time, Kant's antinomies, the problem of the statue and the clay, the puzzles of personal identity, the relationship between free will and determinism, and the rulefollowing paradox. Pick one of these paradoxes, and defend your own view about how the paradox should be resolved. The solution defended can be one of the views discussed in class, or one that you have come up with on your own.

A good paper will clearly explain the paradox and clearly explain why the solution defended is the best available solution. A very good paper will advance arguments which go beyond the arguments discussed explicitly in lectures.

There is no need to include anything more than a very brief introduction, and no need for a "summing up" paragraph at the end. The focus should be on a clear, concise defense of your view on the relevant topic.

There is no need to do any research for this paper. You are encouraged to spend time thinking about the problem for yourself, rather than reading what other people think about it. If you do use outside sources, any sources you read on the topic, whether or not you quote from them, must be cited at the end of the paper. Any citation style is fine so long as it is clear what you are citing. Our topic today is freedom of the will. More precisely, our topic is the relationship between freedom of the will and determinism, and a cluster of arguments which seem to show that free will is **incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, and hence impossible.**

To answer understand these arguments, we first need to get clear about what "determinism" means. Here is what van Inwagen says:

. Determinism

is the thesis that it is true at every moment that the way things then are determines a unique future, that only *one* of the alternative futures that may exist relative to a given moment is a physically possible continuation of the state of things at that moment. Or, if you like, we may say that determinism is the thesis that only one continuation of the state of things at a given moment is consistent with the laws of nature.

The example of "rolling back history" as an illustration of what determinism implies.

It is common to use "determinism" as name for the thesis that we have no free will. This is the source of much confusion. "Determinism" is the name of a thesis about the laws of nature, and that is all. It is not a thesis about free will, or about what we can predict, or anything else.

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Our question is whether determinism is compatible with free will. We now know what "determinism" means; but what does it mean to say that we have free will?

Here no neat definition is possible, since there is disagreement about what, exactly, it takes for an action to be free. But we can offer some helpful paraphrases: to freely choose between A and B is to be able to do either of A and B; to freely choose between A and B is for both of A and B to be open to you.

The question of the compatibility of free will and determinism is then: can it ever be the case that choices A and B are open to you, despite the fact that the laws of nature (and the prior state of the universe) are consistent only with you doing A?

The incompatibilist says "No." The compatibilist says "Yes."

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Many people have a strong initial intuition that free will and determinism are incompatible, and hence that compatibilism must be false.

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This argument relies on a principle that van Inwagen calls the "no choice principle":

Suppose that *p* and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether *p*. And suppose also that the following conditional (if-then) statement is true and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether it is true: if *p*, then *q*. It follows from these two suppositions that *q* and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether *q*.

As van Inwagen says, this principle seems intuitively very plausible: "how could I have a choice about something that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about?"

But if this principle is true, we can show -- with the assumption of two other plausible principles -- that free will is inconsistent with determinism.

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Each of the additional principles in van Inwagen's argument says that we have no choice about something.

The first principle is: We have no choice about events which happened in the distant past.

The second principle is: We have no choice about what the laws of nature are.

Putting these principles together, we can construct an argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

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To state the consequence argument, let 'DINOSAUR' stand for the state of the universe during some time when dinosaurs roamed the earth, and let 'DECISION' stand for my decision to not sing the Notre Dame fight song 10 minutes from now.

The no choice principle

If I have no choice about p, and no choice about whether if p, then q, I have no choice about q.

We have no choice about events which happened in the distant past.

We have no choice about what the laws of nature imply.

Determinism

The laws of nature + the state of the universe at a time determine a unique future. In particular, the laws determine that if DINOSAUR is the case, then so is DECISION.


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Determinism

The laws of nature + the state of the universe at a time determine a unique future. In particular, the laws determine that if DINOSAUR is the case, then so is DECISION. It is important to be clear about the nature of this argument. We begin by assuming the four principles at left, and from them derive that I have no choice about some future action. Since there is nothing special about DECISION, it seems clear that the argument generalizes to show that I have no choice about any of my future actions. So, if we assume these four principles, we can show of any particular action that it is unfree. Hence, if we assume these four principles, we can show that no action is ever free.

If the first three principles are true -- the No Choice Principle + the claims that we have no choice about the laws of nature or the past -- then, what the argument shows is that if determinism is true, then we have no free will.

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So to demonstrate the incompatibility of free will and determinism, we assume the truth of determinism, and argue from there to the absence of free will. This is a style of argument called **conditional proof**. To prove the truth of a statement

if p, then q

we assume p as a premise, and argue from this premise, using only other true premises, to q as our conclusion. If we can construct a valid argument with p + some true statements as premises for q, it follows that the conditional statement

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We can lay out the consequence argument in premises as follows:

The consequence argument

1	The laws of nature + the state of the universe at a time imply a unique future. In particular, (let's suppose) the laws imply that if DINOSAUR is the case, then so is DECISION.	Determinism (premise assumed for conditional proof)
2	If the laws of nature imply that X is the case, then we have no choice about X.	No choice about the laws of nature
3	We have no choice about the fact that if DINOSAUR, then DECISION.	1, 2
4	We have no choice about events which happened in the distant past.	No choice about the past
5	We have no choice about DINOSAUR.	4
6	If I have no choice about p, and no choice about whether if p, then q, I have no choice about q.	No choice principle
С	We have no choice about DECISION.	3, 5, 6

If premises 2, 4, and 6 are true, then it follows that if Determinism is true, there is no free will. Hence, if these premises are true, then Incompatibilism is true.

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So far, this cannot be considered a paradox.


If the consequence argument succeeds, it establishes only the conditional claim that if determinism is true, then we have no free will (and so also that if we have free will, the world must not be deterministic).

One way to think about this is in terms of the following chart illustrating four possible combinations of views about free will and determinism:

free val +	no free will +
determinism	determinism
free will + no	no free will + no
determinism	determinism

In terms of this chart, what the consequence argument establishes, if successful, is that the upper left box does not describe a way the world could be.

It does not, by itself, establish that we do or do not have free will; and it does not by itself establish that determinism is false, or that it is true.



In terms of this chart, what the consequence argument establishes, if successful, is that the upper left box does not describe a way the world could be.

It does not, by itself, establish that we do or do not have free will; and it does not by itself establish that determinism is false, or that it is true.

However, it does limit our choices. One option is that we **deny the existence of free will**; a second option is that we **accept the existence of free will, but say that this is only possible in an indeterministic world**.

The first of these is an extremely difficult option to accept, for at least two reasons.


First, it is simply extremely hard to believe that I have no choice about what I will be doing 5 seconds from now. And second, it seems that if there is no free will there is no moral responsibility; and it certainly seems that people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions.

So at this point the view that free will exists, but requires the falsity of determinism, looks like a pretty attractive option.

So at this point the view option.

However, upon reflectio falsity of determinism co

A good way to introduce imagining that Jane is d that if this decision is free



Make a Mental Picture of Yourself

initiated were consistent with its terminating in her remaining silent. But suppose that Jane caused the process to terminate in her speaking and that she had been able to cause it to terminate in her being silent. Then she had a choice about the outcome. That is what it *is* to have had a choice about whether a process terminated in A or B: to have caused it to terminate in one of these two ways, and to have been *able* to cause it to terminate in the other."

There are two "standard" objections to this sort of answer. They take the form of questions. The first question is, "But what does one add to the assertion that Jane decided to speak when one says that she was the agent-cause of her decision to speak?" The second is, "But what about the event *Jane's becoming the agent-cause of her decision to speak*? According to your position, this event occurred and it was undetermined—for if it were determined by some earlier state of things and the laws of nature, then her decision to speak would have been determined by these same factors. Even if there is such a thing as agent-cause about


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hese two standard objections have standard replies. The first reply is, "I 't know how to answer that question. But that is because causation is a stery, and not because there is any *special* mystery about *agent*-causation. v would *you* answer the corresponding question about event-causation: at does one add to the assertion that two events occurred in succession in one says that the earlier was the *cause* of the later?" The second reply is, t Jane did have a choice about which of the two events, *Jane's becoming the t*-cause of her decision to speak and Jane's becoming the agent cause of increased

to remain silent, would occur. This is because she was the agent-cause of former and was able to have been the agent-cause entropy of the datter. In any case which Jane is the agent-cause of an event, she is also the agent-cause of her ig the agent-cause of that event, and the agent-cause of her being the nt-cause of her being the agent-cause of that event, and so on 'forever.' Of rse, **She is use accuration of the agent-cause of that event**, and so on 'forever.' Of rse, **She is use accuration of the agent-cause of that event**, and so on 'forever.' Of rinevoletigen to caustation of the agent of the agent suite a gent of all to think it of which the averagent to use the state of Jane's brain (or the state of the agent of the agent of the state of Jane's brain (or the state of

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The pulse could go one of two ways. Which way it goes will determine whether or not Jane speaks; and which way will go is not determined by the the laws of nature + the state of Jane's brain (or the state of anything else).



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agent-cause of her decision to speak and Jane's becoming the agent cause of ner nectsion to remain silent, would occur. This is because she was the agent-cause of the former and was able to have been the agent-cause of the latter. In any case in which Jane is the agent-cause of that event, she is also the agent cause of her ing the agent-cause of that event and the agent-cause of her being the ent-cause of her being the agent-cause of that event, and so on 'forever.' Of urse, she is not aware of being the agent-cause of all these events, but the ctrine of agent-causation does not entail that agents are aware of all of the ents of which they are agent-causes."

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
John, I lied to you about Alice.

stery. I do not intend this as an argument tion—of some relation between individual nally comprehended, will be seen to satisfy asation" that have been advanced by those who

im to grasp this concept. The world is full of mysteries and of verbal de-

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The Powers of Rational Beings

scriptions that seem to some to be nonsense and which later turn out to have been appropriate. ("Curved space! What nonsense! Space is what things tha are curved are curved in. Space itself can't be curved." And n

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Make a Mental Picture of You

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been appropriate. ("Curved space! What nonsense! Space is what things tha are curved are curved in. Space itself can't be curved." And n

one of these situations and imagine that you are in it. (If you are in fact fact fact is with a non-trivial choice, then you have no need to imagine anything. This your own situation.) Consider the two contemplated courses of action. If them before your mind's eye, and let your attention pass back and forth tween them. Do you really think that you have no choice about which of the courses of action will become actual? Can you really believe that?


Many philosophers have said that although the choice between control plated future courses of action always seems "open" to them, when they l back on their past decisions, the particular decision that they have made ways or almost always seems inevitable once it has been made. I must say I do not experience this myself, and, even if I did, I should regard it as an o question whether "foresight" or "hindsight" was more to be trusted. (W should we suppose that hindsight is trustworthy? Maybe there is withir some psychological mechanism that produces the illusion that our past d sions were inevitable in order to enable us more effectively to put these d

This argument seems to rely on some principle like the following:

If nothing determines whether someone chooses A or B, the choice of A or B is random, and hence not a free choice.

Make a Mental Picture of Yourself

If any principle of this sort is true, this is serious trouble for the incompatibilist who wants to believe in free will. After all, this sort of principle seems to show that free will **requires** determinism -- or at least requires that human actions be determined.



Something like this was the view of David Hume. He thought that genuine free will requires that one's actions be determined by one's prior motives, and that the idea that there is a conflict between determinism and free will just rests on a confusion:



'Tis commonly allow'd that mad-men have no liberty. But were we to judge by their actions, these have less regularity and constancy than the actions of wise-men, and consequently are farther remov'd from necessity. Our way of thinking in this particular is, therefore, absolutely inconsistent; but is a natural consequence of these confus'd ideas and undefin'd terms, which we so commonly make use of in our reasonings, especially on the present subject.

> This was part of Hume's argument for **compatibilism:** the view that determinism is consistent with the existence of free will. But, as van Inwagen says, one might take the example of Jane and her brain to show something quite different.

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But now a disquieting possibility suggests itself. Perhaps the explanation of the fact that both compatibilism and incompatibilism seem to lead to mysteries is simply that the concept of free will is self-contradictory. Perhaps free will is, as the incompatibilists say, incompatible with determinism. But perhaps it is also incompatible with *in*determinism, owing to the impossibility of anyone's having a choice about the outcome of an indeterministic process. If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, then, since either determinism or indeterminism has to be true, free will is impossible.

Before we accept this conclusion, we should try to get a bit more explicit about how the argument against incompatibilist free will is supposed to work.

The basic idea seems to be this: if we think about the causal chain leading up to some putatively free action A of Jane's, then, if A is really free and incompatibilism is true, there must be some event, E, in this causal chain which is not determined by prior events plus the laws of nature. Further, it seems that for A to be free, Jane must have had a choice about whether E happened. But it is hard to see how Jane could have had a choice about whether E happened. But it is hard to see how Jane could have had a choice about whether E happened. But it is hard to see how Jane could have had a choice about whether E happened at a choice about whether E happened at all.

One way to bring out the intuition here - that if the history of the universe up to E is consistent with E happening and E not happening, it can't be up to Jane whether E happens - is brought out nicely by a thought experiment which van Inwagen discusses in his paper "Free will remains a mystery".


One way to bring out the intuition here - that if the history of the universe up to E is consistent with E happening and E not happening, it can't be up to Jane whether E happens - is brought out nicely by a thought experiment which van Inwagen discusses in his paper "Free will remains a mystery".

Let us suppose

undetermined free acts occur. Suppose, for example, that in some difficult situation Alice was faced with a choice between lying and telling the truth and that she freely chose to tell the truth—or, what is the same thing, she seriously considered telling the truth, seriously considering lying, told the truth, and was able to tell the lie she had been contemplating. And let us assume that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that Alice's telling the truth, being a free act, was therefore undetermined. Now suppose that immediately after Alice told the truth, God caused the universe to revert to precisely its state one minute before Alice told the truth (let us call the first moment the universe was in this state t_1 and the second moment the universe was in this state t_2 , and then let things "go forward again." What would have happened the second time? What would have happened after t_2 ? Would she have lied or would she have told the truth? Since Alice's "original" decision, her decision to tell the truth, was undetermined-since it was undetermined whether she would lie or tell the truth -, her "second" decision would also be undetermined, and this question can therefore have no answer; or it can have no answer but, "Well, although she would either have told the truth or lied, it's not the case that she would have told the truth and it's not the case that she would have lied; lying is not what she would have done, and telling the truth is not what she would have done. One can say only that she *might* have lied and she *might* have told the truth."

Now let us suppose that God a thousand times caused the universe to revert to exactly the state it was in at t_1 (and let us suppose that we are somehow suitably placed, metaphysically speaking, to observe the whole sequence of "replays"). What would have happened? What should we expect to observe? Well, again, we can't say what would have happened, but we can say what would probably have happened: sometimes Alice would have lied and sometimes she would have told the truth. As the number of "replays" increases, we observers shall-almost certainly-observe the ratio of the outcome "truth" to the outcome "lie" settling down to, converging on, some value.¹⁶ We may, for example, observe that, after a fairly large number of replays, Alice lies in thirty percent of the replays and tells the truth in seventy percent of them-and that the figures 'thirty percent' and 'seventy percent' become more and more accurate as the number of replays increases. But let us imagine the simplest case: we observe that Alice tells the truth in about half the replays and lies in about half the replays. If, after one hundred replays, Alice has told the truth fifty-three times and has lied forty-eight times,¹⁷ we'd begin strongly to suspect that the figures after a thousand replays would look something like this: Alice has told the truth four hundred and ninety-three times and has lied five hundred and eight times. Let us suppose that these are indeed the figures after a thousand replays. Is it not true that as we watch the number of replays increase, we shall become convinced that what will happen in the *next* replay is a matter of chance? (The compulsive gamblers among us might find themselves offering bets about what Alice would do in the next replay.) If we have watched seven hundred and twenty-six replays, we shall be faced with the inescapable impression that what happens in the seven-hundred-and-twenty-seventh replay will be due simply to chance. Is there any reason we should resist this impression? Well, we certainly know that there is nothing we could learn about the situation that could undermine the impression, for we already know everything that is relevant to evaluating it: we know that the outcome of the seven-hundred-and-twentyseventh replay will not be determined by its initial state (the common initial state of all the replays) and the laws of nature. Each time God places the universe in this state, both "truth" and "lie" are consistent with the universe's being in this state and the laws of nature. A sheaf of possible futures (possible in the sense of being consistent with the laws) leads "away" from this state, and, if the sheaf is assigned a measure of 1, surely, we must assign a measure of 0.5to the largest sub-sheaf in all of whose members Alice tells the truth and the same measure to the largest sub-sheaf in all of whose members she lies. We must make this assignment because it is the only reasonable explanation of the observed approximate equality of the "truth" and "lie" outcomes in the series of replays. And if we accept this general conclusion, what other conclusion can we accept about the seven-hundred-and-twenty-seventh replay (which is about to commence) than this: each of the two possible outcomes of this replay has an objective, "ground-floor" probability of 0.5—and there's nothing more to be said? And this, surely, means that, in the strictest sense imaginable, the outcome of the replay will be a matter of chance.

Now, obviously, what holds for the seven-hundred-and-twenty-seventh replay holds for all of them, including the one that wasn't strictly a *re*play, the initial sequence of events. But this result concerning the "initial replay", the "play," so to speak, should hold whether or not God bothers to produce any replays. And if He does not—well, that's just the actual situation. Therefore, an undetermined action is simply a matter of chance: if it was undetermined in the one, actual case whether Alice lied or told the truth, it was a mere matter of chance whether she lied or told the truth. So one problem for incompatibilism + belief in free will is the apparent link between undetermined actions and random actions. A second problem is brought out by an important example due to Harry Frankfurt.



"Suppose someone ---- Black, let us say ---- wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something *other* than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do....

Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne is Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action ... on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no role at all in leading him to act as he did.... Indeed, everything happened just as it would have happened without Black's presence in the situation and without his readiness to intrude into it." "Suppose someone ---- Black, let us say ---- wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something *other* than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do....

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Now suppose that, at time T+1, Jones is deliberating about whether or not to take a bus out of South Bend. He goes back and forth, but eventually decides to board the bus.

At time T+2, Jones boards a bus leaving South Bend. This seems (certainly, at least, to Jones himself) to be a free action. Since it never got to time T+3, Black never had to execute his nefarious plan.

But now think about Jones' decision making at time T+1. At that time, it was already determined that Jones would be boarding a bus out of South Bend. After all, Jones must either decide to board the bus, or not. In the former case he gets on the bus, and in the latter case, Black forces him on the bus, so again he gets on the bus. So facts fixed prior to his decision making process determined that he would get on the bus. Nonetheless, his decision to get on the bus seems to be a free action.

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But one might also view the argument another way especially if one finds the consequence argument for incompatibilism convincing. One might think that what this argument shows is that if any of our actual actions are free, then free will is possible even if determinism is true - after all, Jones seems to be free in whatever sense we are free. But then if we think that it is **not** possible for free will and determinism to coexist, it will follow that none of our actual actions are free.

Basically, we have three options:

Deny that there is any such thing as free will.

Affirm the existence of free will, and say that this is compatible with determinism being true.

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Explain how an action can be undetermined without being random, and hence not free.

Make sense of Frankfurt's example; either explain why Jones is really not free, or why Jones's being free is not a genuine example of a free action determined by factors outside of the agent's control. Deny that there is any such thing as free will.

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This is why free will seems to be such a great mystery. It is clear that one of the views listed at left must be true, but it is hard to see how any of them could be.