

The cosmological argument


Last time we closed by considering an objection to Aquinas' assumption that if a first cause exists, then God exists: the objection was that the first cause could simply be some event, like the Big Bang, which is not a plausible candidate to be God.

We then considered one source of dissatisfaction with that reply: namely, that one could still ask of such a first cause why it occurred. It seems as though questions like these should have answers — but it is hard, you might think, to see how we could answer them without appealing to God.

One can think of our topic today — the cosmological argument — as a much more precise and sophisticated version of this intuitive line of thought.

The form of the cosmological argument we'll be discussing today is due to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a German philosopher, mathematician, theologian, and scientist, whose achievements included the invention of calculus.


His intellect and achievements were such that they led Diderot, a later French philosopher, to remark that



"When one compares the talents one has with those of a Leibniz, one is tempted to throw away one's books and go die quietly in the dark of some forgotten corner." Leibniz's argument is best thought of as beginning with a question which he poses at the end of the first paragraph of our reading for today:

"Why is there any world at all, and why is it the way that it is?"

Leibniz thought that there must be **some** explanation of why there is a world at all because he endorsed a certain principle about explanation, known as the principle of sufficient reason.



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The basic idea behind the principle is this: Take any feature of the world. If the world could have failed to be that way, then there must be some explanation of why the world is that way.

So, for example, we might notice that although the sky is blue, it might not have been — the sky on earth could have failed to be blue. Given only this, Leibniz concludes that there must be some reason, or explanation, why the sky is blue: some reason why it is blue rather than some other color. And this does seem quite plausible.

To state the PSR precisely, we'll need to introduce three terms which will also be important for topics we will discuss later in the course: possible, necessary, and contingent. Philosophers use the word 'possible' in a very broad sense: something is possible just in case it **could have happened** - no matter how absurd, or bizarre, it is. So, for example, it is possible that a pink elephant is presently running through south quad, or that a talking donkey will one day be a professor of philosophy at Notre Dame.

By contrast, it is not possible, in this sense, that there could be a three-sided plane closed Euclidean figure with four angles — it isn't just that this scenario would be silly or surprising; on reflection, we can see, on the contrary, that the scenario really **does not make sense**. In the same way, we can see that it simply could not be the case that I have an object in my office which is bright red and bright green all over. This is what we mean when we say that the scenario is **impossible**: it could not have been the case. possible **necessary** contingent

Once you understand what it means for a scenario to be **impossible**, you can understand what it means for a situation to be **necessary**: a situation is necessary just in case its opposite is impossible; or, equivalently, just in case it is impossible for that state of affairs not to be the case.

What are some examples of things that are necessary, in this sense?


possible necessary contingent

A state of affairs is contingent just in case (i) it actually is the case, and (ii) it is not necessary (that is, it is possible that it not be the case).

Can you think of any examples of contingent facts?

Must every contingent fact be possible? Is every possible fact contingent?

Using these terms, we can state the Principle of Sufficient Reason as follows:



Is there any reason to think that this principle is true?

Suppose that we were walking on campus and came across a metal sphere on the ground, and you say, 'I wonder how that got here.' Suppose that I replied: 'There's no explanation for why it is here. It just is.' Would there be something odd about my reply?

Some have also thought that the PSR is a presupposition of modern science. Why might someone think this?

This principle was one of the cornerstones of Leibniz's philosophy. Let's see how he puts it to work in the cosmological argument.

EYOND THE WORLD, that is, beyond the collection of there is some One Being who rules, not only as the soul is the or, better, as the self is the ruler in my body, but also in a much For the One Being who rules the universe not only rules the w **fashions** or creates it; he is above the world, and, so to speak, ex and therefore he is the ultimate reason for things. For we cann of the individual things, or even in the entire collection and set **sufficient** reason for why they exist. Let us suppose that a elements of geometry has always existed, one copy always made It is obvious that although we can explain a present copy of the the previous book from which it was copied, this will never complete explanation, no matter how many books back we go. ways wonder why there have always been such books, why the written, and why they were written the way they were. What is books is also true of the different states of the world, for the follows is, in a sense, copied from the preceding state, though with certain laws of change. And so, however far back we r previous states, we will never find in those states a complete explanation for why, indeed, there is any world at all, and why it is the w



As we mentioned, Leibniz's

argument is best thought of as beginning with a question which 150 LEIBNIZ: BASIC WORKS he poses at the end of the first superior strength of certain inclinations, as we shall soon see, where the reasons don the essible with absolute of meraphysical necessity, where the contrary implies a contradiction*) but incline. From this it follows that even if we assume the eternity of the world, we cannot escape the ultimate and extramundane reason for things, God.

Therefore, the reasons for the world lie hidden in something extramundane, different from the chain of states, or from the series of things, the collection of which constitutes the world. And to we must pass from physicilier, hypothetical necessity, which determines the later things in the world from the earlier, to something which is or absolute of metaphysical necessity, something for which a reason cannot be given. For the present world is physically or hypothetically necessary, but not absolutely or metaphysically necessary. That is, given that it was once such and such, it follows that such and such things will arise in the future. Therefore, since the ultimate ground must be in something which is of metaphysical necessity, and since the reason for an existing thing must come from something that actually exists, it follows that there must exist some one entity of metaphysical necessity, that is, there must be an entity whose essence is existence, and therefore something must exist which differs from the plurality of things, which differs from the world, which we have granted and shown is not of metaphysical necessity

Furthermore, in order to explain a bit more distinctly how temporal, contingent, or physical truths arise from eternal, essential or metaphysical truths, we must first acknowledge that since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. Futhermore, it follows from this that all possibles, that is, everything that expresses essence or possible reality, strive with equal right for existence* in proportion to the amount of essence or reality or the degree of perfection they contain, for perfection is nothing but the amount of essence.

From this it is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities and possible series, the one that exists is the one through which the most essence

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And what goes for the geometry books, Leibniz thinks, goes for the world as a whole. Even if the can explain one state of the world in terms of the preceding state the world, we lack an explanate of the fact that there is a word all. superior strength of certain inclinations, as we shall soon see, where the reasons don't necessitate (with absolute or metaphysical necessity, where the contrary implies a contradiction^{**}) but incline. From this it follows that even if we assume the eternity of the world, we cannot escape the ultimate and extramundane reason for things, God.

Therefore, the reasons for the world lie hidden in something extramundane, different from the chain of states, or from the series of things, the collection of which constitutes the world and so we must pass from physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the later things in the world from the earlier, covernet thing which is of also but or metaphysical necessity, something for which a reason cannot be given. For the present world is physically or hypothetically necessary, but not absolutely or metaphysically necessary. That is, given that it was once such and such, it follows that such and such things will arise in the future. Therefore, since the ultimate ground must be in something which is of metaphysical necessity, and since the reason for an existing thing must come from something that actually exists, it follows that there must exist some one entity of metaphysical necessity, that is, here must be an entity whose essence is existence, and therefore something must exist which differs from the plurality of things, which differs from the world, which we have granted and shown is not of metaphysical necessity.

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From this ic is obvious that of the infinite containing of possibilities and possible series, the one that exists is the one through which the most essence or possibility is brought into existence. In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. And in this context, time, place, or in a word, the receptivity or capacity of the world can be taken for the cost or the plot of ground on which the most pleasing building possible is to be built, and the variety of shapes [therein] [formarum . . . varietates] corresponds to the pleasingness of the building and the number and elegance of the rooms. And the situation is This is suggestive. But it's not quite obvious how to turn these thoughts into a clear argument for God's existence which we could then put in premise/conclusion form, and begin to evaluate.

We know that Leibniz thinks that the existence of "the individual things, or .. the entire collection and series of things" needs some explanation, which can't be provided by those individual things.

> But what does Leibniz have in mind when he is talking about "the individual things"? Which things?

the collection of finite things, is the soul is the ruler in me, t also in a much higher sense. only rules the world, but also l, so to speak, extramundane, gs. For we cannot find in any ollection and series of things, suppose that a book on the by always made from another. resent copy of the book from this will never lead us to a oks back we go, since we can books, why these books were y were. What is true of these e world, for the state which g state, though in accordance r far back we might go into a complete explanation [ratio] why it is the way it is.

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h the New System was first published. des Sçavans, which was the title he k it over from Pierre Bayle in 1687.

A passage later in the reading suggests an answer.

Therefore, the reasons for the world lie hidden in something extramundane, different from the chain of states, or from the series of things, the collection of which constitutes the world. And so we must pass from physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the later things in the world from the earlier, to something which is of absolute or metaphysical necessity, something for which a reason cannot be given. For the present world is physically or hypothetically necessary, but not absolutely or metaphysically necessary.

iz contrasts two kinds of necessity: **physical or** necessity and **absolute or metaphysical** necessity

is what is necessary, given the way the laws of nature aphysical, or absolute, necessity is what is necessary Since the laws of nature could have been different than can be physically necessary without being absolutely or cally necessary. Can you think of an example?

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The point Leibniz emphasizes in this passage is that the existence of things in the world is not metaphysically necessary.

And this, in turn, suggests an answer to our question. When Leibniz says that "the entire collection and series of things" needs some explanation, he is talking about the entire series and collection of things whose existence is not metaphysically necessary - i.e., the collection of things which exist only contingently.


This gives us a plausible candidate for a premise of Leibniz's argument:


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Moreover, given that Leibniz endorses the principle of sufficient reason, we can begin to see how he might argue for this premise.


The fact that there are contingent things is contingent.





Now remember the example of the geometry books. Leibniz's idea there seemed to be that, even if the existence of each geometry book in the (infinite) series could be explained by the one which preceded it, still the existence of the series as a whole cannot be explained by an geometry books in the series.

This seems plausible. It seems that if we want to explain why there are **any** things of a certain kind, this explanation can't be given in terms of some thing of that kind.




This line of thought seems to suggest the following:

The fact that there are contingent things can't be explained by any contingent thing. nedium of your was the item in


i of Things per 1697)²¹²

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'ery close to Leibniz's intended conclusion:

there must exist some one entity of metaphysical necessity, that is, there must be an entity whose essence is existence



1. The fact that there are contingent things is contingent.

- 2. Every contingent fact has an explanation. (PSR)
- 3. The fact that there are contingent things has an explanation. (1,2)
- 4. The fact that there are contingent things can't be explained by any contingent thing.
- 5. The fact that there are contingent things is explained by some thing which is not contingent. (3,4)
- 6. The fact that there are contingent things is explained by some necessary being. (5)

C. There is a necessary being which explains the existence of contingent things. (6) Of course, like Aquinas, Leibniz is interested in arguing for the existence of God; so the representation of the argument at left is incomplete.

Let's expand it in the obvious way.

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- 7. There is a necessary being which explains the existence of contingent things. (6)
- 8. If there is a necessary being which explains the existence of contingent things, then God exists.

We found reason to doubt the idea that, if there is a first cause, then God exists. Do similar doubts apply to premise (8) of Leibniz's argument?

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Is Leibniz's argument valid?

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If it is valid, then we can turn to the question of whether it is sound. And this boils down to the question of whether all of the four independent premises are true.

Before turning to these, let's consider a more general objection to the argument:

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Before turning to these, let's consider a more general objection to the argument:

Leibniz demands that everything get an explanation. But then why is the existence of God the one thing that does **not** need an explanation? Surely if the existence of contingent things needs some explanation, then so does the existence of God - but no religious believer can accept the idea that the existence of God would be explained by something else!

How should Leibniz, or any defender of the principle of sufficient reason, respond?

We've already discussed premise (8). Do premises (1) and (4) seem plausible?

If we grant that premises (1), (4), and (8) are true, and that the argument is valid, then the success of Leibniz's argument hinges on premise (2): the principle of sufficient reason. Let's turn to two objections to that premise.

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The first objection is based on certain interpretations of **quantum mechanics**, our best current theory of the physical world.

According to the standard interpretations of quantum mechanics - though not all interpretations of the theory - the physical world is indeterministic. That is, what the laws of nature tell us in many cases is not what will happen, but rather than probabilities of various outcomes each of which is consistent with the laws of nature.

Let's imagine a case in which there are three such possible outcomes, A, B, and C, and that quantum mechanics tells us that A has a 40% chance of happening, B has a 25% chance of happening, and C has a 35% chance of happening. Now suppose C is what in fact happens, and we ask this question:

'Why did C, rather than A or B, happen?'

Many people think that quantum mechanics strongly suggests that there is no answer to this question: there simply is no reason why C, rather than A or B, happened.

Is this a counterexample to the principle of sufficient reason?


A final objection is quite different, and in some ways more worrying.

Let us suppose for purposes of argument that the conclusion of Leibniz's argument is true, and hence that the following is true:



This must be either necessary, or contingent. But either path leads to trouble.





The right hand side of the dilemma might not look too bad at first. We might think, for example, that we can explain God's creation of contingent things in terms of God's deciding to create contingent things.

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The right hand side of the dilemma might not look too bad at first. We might think, for example, that we can explain God's creation of contingent things in terms of God's deciding to create contingent things.

But this just gives us a new fact:



And this fact must be necessary, or contingent.

If it is necessary, then, again, premise (1) of our initial argument is false.

And if it is contingent, then by the PSR it must have some explanation. But what could this be?