

Leibniz's cosmological argument

Here is one way to lay out Leibniz's version of the cosmological argument:

1. The fact that there are contingent things is contingent.
2. Every contingent fact has an explanation. (PSR)
3. The fact that there are contingent things has an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent things can't be explained by any contingent thing.
5. The fact that there are contingent things is explained by some thing which is not contingent. (3,4)
6. The fact that there are contingent things is explained by some necessary being. (5)
7. There is a necessary being which explains the existence of contingent things. (6)
8. If there is a necessary being which explains the existence of contingent things, then God exists.

C. God exists. (7,8)

The only independent premises of this argument are (1), (2), (4), and (8).
Which of these is most open to challenge?