

Should we believe the findings of science? How should we respond to disagreement?

Today we are going to talk about two different issues regarding rules of belief.

The first is the question of whether we should believe the findings of science. In order to answer that question, we first have to ask what is distinctive about the way in which scientific reasoning leads to beliefs.

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All massive objects attract one another. Every 24 hours, the earth rotates on its axis.

These claims are not, on a natural interpretation, claims which we can know to be true directly on the basis of sense experience: for example, though we can observe some massive objects attracting each other, we certainly have not observed this of all presently existing massive bodies, let alone all massive bodies past and future. These claims are generalizations.

Much of what science tells us is a matter of generalizations. Other things that science tells us are based on generalizations. An example might be

Halley's comet will next be visible from earth in 2061.

This is not itself a generalization; but our knowledge of it depends on our accepting certain generalizations about the movement of celestial bodies.



It is highly plausible that we should believe some of the generalizations which our best scientific theories endorse. But why is this? What rule of belief might explain this?

Here is a natural answer. We've already encountered the following two proposed rules of belief:

Experience \rightarrow Belief

If your sense experience tells you that P, and you have no reason to think that your sense experience is misleading, believe P. Proof → Belief If you can prove P, believe P.

Even if our experiences don't directly tell us that certain generalizations are true, our experiences do seem to be part of the reason for believing those generalizations. One might think that we can give a kind of proof of the relevant generalizations based on those experiences. If so, the above two rules of belief put together might explain why we should endorse the findings of science.




It will be useful to have a simple example to discuss. Let's suppose that I have a quantity of water, and I am wondering at what temperature that water will freeze. (Suppose that it is pure water, and that I am at sea level.) Then some elementary science tells me that:

This sample of water will freeze at 0°C.

What experiences might count in favor of this claim?

The answer seems pretty obvious. We have a whole host of observations of the form:



Suppose that, in accord with the first rule of belief just listed, I take all of these observations at face value. Why might these observations give me reason to believe the claim about the current sample?

Let's try to construct an argument in the obvious way.



1. Sample 1 of water froze at 0°C.

2. Sample 2 of water froze at 0°C.

3. Sample 3 of water froze at 0°C.

N. Sample N of water froze at 0°C.

C. This sample of water will freeze at 0°C. (1-N)

This argument is an example of enumerative induction — a kind of reasoning on which we seem to rely all of the time.

Is this argument valid?

This seems to ruin our initial thought that we can justify the claims of science on the basis of experience + proof.

Can you think of any premise which we can add to the argument which would make the argument valid?

Here's a natural choice:

If all past samples of water froze at O°C, then this sample of water will freeze at O°C.



 Sample 1 of water froze at 0°C.
Sample 2 of water froze at 0°C.
Sample 3 of water froze at 0°C.
Sample N of water froze at 0°C.
N+1. If all past samples of water froze at 0°C, then this sample of water will freeze at 0°C.
This sample of water will freeze at 0°C. (1-N+1)

Is this argument valid?

This looks like progress. If we should believe all of the premises of this argument, then it looks like we have an explanation of why we should believe the conclusion.

We already have an explanation of why we should believe premises 1-N. What about premise N+1?



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David Hume addresses the question of whether we should believe premises like this by drawing a distinction between two different kinds of claims:

"All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *relations of ideas*, and *matters of fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. ...Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. ...

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; ... The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise tomorrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. ..."

Premise N+1 appears to be like the claim that the sun will rise tomorrow: it is a matter of fact rather than a matter of the relations of ideas, and so cannot be known "by the mere operation of thought."



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> N+1. If all past samples of water froze at 0°C, then this sample of water will freeze at 0°C.

But if this cannot be known just by thought, it seems that we must believe it on the basis of experience. But do we have experiences which tell us that N+1 is true?

N+1 is an instance of a more general claim, which Hume calls the principle of the uniformity of nature:

The Uniformity of Nature The future will be like the past.

It seems as though, if we should believe in the Uniformity of Nature, we should believe N+1. So the basic question is whether we should believe in the Uniformity of Nature.



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Is the negation of this claim a contradiction?

It seems not. So it seems that, if we should believe it, we must believe it on the basis of experience.

But we don't have any experience which tells us directly that this principle is true. So we must know it on the basis of some series of experiences. And it might seem pretty clear what this series of experiences is.

After all, yesterday the future was like the past. And the same for the day before that. And this suggests an argument for the Uniformity of Nature.



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1. Yesterday, the future was like the past.

- 2. The day before yesterday, the future was like the past.
- 3. The day before the day before yesterday, the future was like the past.

N. N days ago, the future was like the past.

C. Today, the future will be like the past. (1-N)

Is this argument valid?

What extra premise would make the argument valid?

It is hard to see how we could make the argument valid without adding a premise which was just a restatement of the very claim — the Uniformity of Nature — which we were trying to prove.



This line of argument from Hume is sometimes called "the problem of induction." Because scientific reasoning seems to rely on induction, it is a problem with understanding why we should believe the claims of science which go beyond our experience.

Notice that we cannot avoid the problem by abandoning our belief in

This sample of water will freeze at 0°C.

In favor of some weaker claim like

It is probable that this sample of water will freeze at 0°C.

To get even this claim, we would need to rely on the claim that it is probable that the future will be like the past. But the negation of that claim also seems clearly intelligible, and it is no easier to argue for it than it is to argue for our original Uniformity of Nature principle.



It is worth being clear about what that problem is. We have not given a direct argument that the use of enumerative induction is irrational; rather, we have shown that it seems very difficult to give a justification of enumerative induction which is not circular, in the sense that it presupposes the legitimacy of inductive reasoning.

It is interesting to compare induction in this respect with deduction: the formation of beliefs on the basis of valid arguments.

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believe P.	1
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But could one prove that this is a correct rule of belief? It looks like any attempt to give such a proof would be circular.

Perhaps, then, we should just adopt the following as a rule of belief, even if we can give no non-circular justification for it:

Induction → Belief If you have inductive support for P, believe P.



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Let's return to our original argument:

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This argument is invalid. But it shows that the conclusion has strong inductive support; so if the above rule of belief is a good one, this shows that we should believe the conclusion. (And, by extension, we should believe other scientific claims made on similar inductive grounds.)



Induction → Belief If you have inductive support for P, believe P.

On the other hand, this point still leaves us with a bit of a puzzle. It seems clear that inductive and deductive reasoning are better ways of forming beliefs than, for example, astrology. But what would this difference consist in, if we could give an argument, using premises from astrology, for the reliability of the astrological method of belief formation?




Induction → Belief If you have inductive support for P, believe P.

Let's turn now to a different kind of worry about this proposed rule of belief. The worry is that, surprisingly, there are cases which appear to be straightforward counterexamples to it. This is a different, and in some ways more serious, challenge to scientific reasoning than the one that Hume raised.

This challenge is due to Nelson Goodman, one of the most important American philosophers of the 20th century.

Goodman's aim in his book *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* was to show that rules of belief like ours are false; he did by defining a made up word, "grue," as follows:



x is grue if and only if either: (i) x is green, and has been observed before 2019, or (ii) x is blue, and has not been observed before 2019.



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It is important to see, first, that this is a perfectly legitimate definition; it succeeds in classifying all objects as either grue or non-grue.

But suppose that we enumerate all of the emeralds which have been observed so far, and consider the following pieces of data:



Now suppose that it is January 1, 2020, and you are going emerald hunting. If you accept our Induction → Belief rule, the following argument might occur to you.



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Emeralds first observed in 2019 were grue.
Emeralds first observed in 2018 were grue.
Emeralds first observed in 2017 were grue.
C. The next emerald I find will be grue.

Would it be reasonable for you to believe the conclusion of this argument?

Of course not; the next emerald you discover will be green and, since it was not observed before 2020, will not be grue. So it looks like Induction \rightarrow Belief is false.

A very natural reaction is: this is a silly example! It would be crazy just to throw out all inductive reasoning on the basis of "grue."

Perhaps what we need to do is to restrict the cases of induction that we use to avoid annoying examples like "grue;" a natural thought is that we should restrict them to cases in which only suitable scientific vocabulary is used. (Words like "grue" that we want to rule out

are sometimes called "gruesome predicates.")

grue

Perhaps what we need to do is to restrict the cases of induction that we use to avoid annoying examples like "grue;" a natural thought is that we should restrict them to cases in which only suitable scientific vocabulary is used. (Words like "grue" that we want to rule out are sometimes called "gruesome predicates.")

To pursue this thought, we need to be able to say what a gruesome predicate is - that is, we need to be able to say what, exactly, is so bad about "grue." This turns out to be harder than you might think.

A first thought is that the problem is due to "grue" being a made-up word. But this won't get us very far — after all, scientific theories introduce new scientific terms all the time, and these are "made up" in just the way that "grue" is — they are new terms defined in terms of existing vocabulary. At one time, "electron" was made up.

A more promising idea is that the problem with "grue" is that it is defined in terms of a particular time.



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However, there are a few problems with this suggestion. One is that any predicate can be given a similarly time-indexed definition. For suppose that we define a new term, "bleen", as follows: x is bleen if and only if either x is blue, and has been observed before 2020, or x is green, and has not been observed before 2020. Using "grue" and "bleen" we can then give the following definition of "blue":

x is blue if and only if either: (i) x is bleen, and has been observed before 2019, or (ii) x is grue, and has not been observed before 2019.

One might reply: "Yes, one can define "blue" this way - but we don't have to. The difference between "grue" and "blue" is that no one could understand "grue" without this sort of timeindexed definition." This suggests that we should exclude terms which are impossible to understand except via a time-indexed definition.

One might wonder why we should be so sure that, for example, aliens quite different from ourselves could not find "grue" quite easy to understand without such a definition, and find "blue" rather confusing. But set that aside; there are two further worries about the proposed restriction on admissible vocabulary.



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The first is that this restriction is not restrictive enough: one can concoct gruesome predicates which are not defined in terms of times - for example, if all the emeralds which have been observed are from 17 emerald mines, we could define "grue" in terms of place. Or, if all the emeralds in the world have been seen by one person, we could define "grue" in terms of what has been observed by that person.

The second worry is that it is too restrictive: after all, we might be interested in investigating theories which are only about particular times, and places, and people - we don't want our theory of confirmation to simply fail to apply to such theories.

The idea that we can save Induction → Belief by restricting it to a certain privileged class of vocabulary is thus — while initially promising — hard to carry out.

Let's pursue a different idea, which involves a more sweeping rejection of the idea that one should in general accept the consequences of enumerative inductive arguments.



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This idea involves the claim that whether a piece of evidence counts in favor of a theory depends partly on our background beliefs about the subject matter in question.

Consider, for example, the following piece of evidence:

Every lobster I have seen has been pink.

Now suppose that every lobster I have seen has been in a restaurant; and I know that lobsters in restaurants are pink because they are boiled. Given this knowledge it would, it seems, be absurd for me to take my observations of lobsters to confirm the generalization:

Every lobster is pink.

Why? A natural thought goes something like this: I know that all the instances of this generalization I have observed have a certain property — being boiled in a restaurant — which explains why they are instances of the generalization. Moreover, I know that not all lobsters have this property — some are still in the wild. Whenever this is the case, one might think, the instances of a generalization fail to count in favor of the generalization.

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This might be laid out in the following (cumbersome) rule of belief:

Induction \rightarrow Belief If you have observed that many A's are B, and there is no property F such that (i) you believe that the observed A's are B because they are F, and (ii) there are some A's that are not F, then believe that all A's are B.

What would this rule say about our original "grue" argument?



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One interesting consequence of this sort of approach - something which Goodman also took the example of "grue" to illustrate - is that there can be no such thing as the "logic" of scientific theory confirmation. If the above is right, we can never tell when some evidence confirms a theory just by looking at the evidence and the theory - in the way that we can look at a deductive argument and tell, just by looking at the premises and conclusion, whether it is valid.

If this is right, it does not really make sense to ask, without specifying a person or set of background beliefs, whether some evidence supports a theory — or even whether the theory is, in general, well-supported by the evidence. In general, it will be true that evidence can confirm a theory relative to person A but not relative to person B. Does this undercut the idea that the scientific method provides a method of belief formation which is rational for everyone?



Let's turn to our second main topic of the day: the challenge posed by **disagreement**.

The horse race

Imagine that you are at a horse track with a friend. Two horses, A and B, are competing for the lead down the stretch. At the finish, it is extremely close, but it looks to you that horse A won. You are highly confident that you are correct.

Your friend then turns to you and says "I can't believe that B won."

Should you now be less confident in your initial judgement?



Splitting the bill

You are in a restaurant with some friends, and the bill comes. You've agreed to split the bill equally. You think that everyone owes \$19.

Your friend says, "OK, everybody should chip in \$18."

Should you now be less confident that everyone owes \$19?



These are simple cases of disagreement. Many people have the intuition that, in cases like these, disagreement should lead us to revise our beliefs.

Here is one way to state this view:

The Equal Weight View

In cases of disagreement, you should give equal weight to your own opinion and the opinion of the person with whom you disagree.

There are two (related) ways to understand what exactly this view implies about the above cases.



The Equal Weight View

In cases of disagreement, you should give equal weight to your own opinion and the opinion of the person with whom you disagree.

Here is the first, and simplest:

The judgement suspension rule If you believe P, and then come across someone who believes not-P, you should respond by suspending judgement over whether P or not-P is true (and so should they).

This seems to explain our intuitive judgements about the horse race and check splitting cases.



The Equal Weight View In cases of disagreement, you should give equal weight to your own opinion and the opinion of the person with whom you disagree.

The judgement suspension rule

If you believe P, and then come across someone who believes not-P, you should respond by suspending judgement over whether P or not-P is true (and so should they). But this can't handle all of the cases of disagreement we might want to think about. Suppose that you believe P, and you come across someone who has suspended belief in P. What should you do?

The natural answer to this question introduces the fact that, in ordinary life, we don't just believe or disbelieve things; we also take them to have a certain probability of being true. The probability that you take P to have is called your credence in P. Credence can be expressed as a percentage, or as a number between 0 and 1 (1 means that you are sure that P is true, 0 that you are sure that P is false).



The Equal Weight View

In cases of disagreement, you should give equal weight to your own opinion and the opinion of the person with whom you disagree.

If we take this fact about credence into account, it is natural for the proponent of the Equal Weight View to adopt the 'probability splitting rule.'

Suppose that both you and your friend have credence of 0.9 in your initial views about the winner of the horse race. This rule says that, on learning of your disagreement, you should both adjust your credence to 0.5. The probability splitting rule If you assign P credence N, and come across someone who assigns P credence M, then you should assign as P's credence the average of N and M.



The probability splitting rule If you assign P credence N, and come across someone who assigns P credence M, then you should assign as P's credence the average of N and M.

Here is a different case which, many think, the Probability Splitting Rule says just the right thing about.

The poll

I put an argument on the screen, and conduct a poll, asking you to say whether the argument is valid or invalid. You confidently answer "Valid." When the poll results show up, you find to your surprise that you are the only student who answered this way.



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What should you say in this case? Why?

We can think of this as a case in which you have many simultaneous disagreements. Supposing for simplicity that everyone initially has credence 1 in her answer, the Probability Splitting Rule would suggest that you should lower your credence in your initial answer to 0.5, then to 0.25, then to 0.125, then to a small number.



Here's a problem case for the probability splitting rule:

An argument for astrology?

Astrology is the view that we can predict the events in ordinary people's lives by the time of their birth and the relative locations of the stars and planets. I have the view that astrology is completely unscientific; there's just no evidence to show that it works. But 45% of Americans (62% between the ages of 18 and 24!) think that astrology is either "scientific" or "sort of scientific." So, following the advice of The Equal Weight View, I significantly increase my credence in the scientific status of astrology.



Other, similar examples are easy to come by. 20% of Americans think Obama was born in Kenya; 30% think global warming is a hoax; etc. Should any of these facts lead me to revise my views on these topics?

A reply: we need to restrict the relevant cases of disagreement to disagreement between **epistemic peers**. This was already implicit in our earlier examples; if your friend is drunk, then you will be unlikely to lose confidence in your judgement about how to split the bill at the restaurant.



The probability splitting rule If you assign P credence N, and come across someone who assigns P credence M, then you should assign as P's credence the average of N and M.

Does the probability splitting rule have any practical consequences?

Consider any religious, moral, or political view you have. There would seem to be plenty of people who have the same evidence as you, have thought about the issues as much as you, and are as smart as you, who have a view opposite to yours.

This suggests an argument with massive consequences for what you believe about these domains.



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the disagreement \rightarrow agnosticism argument

- 1. For every moral, political, of religious view you have, you have at least roughly as many epistemic peers who disagree with you as you have epistemic peers who agree with you.
- 2. The probability-splitting rule.
- C. You should not have credence >0.5 about any moral, political, or religious view. (1,2)



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
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Is this argument convincing?

It looks hard to deny premise (1), for at least many of our moral, political, and religious views. So it looks like a reply to this argument must involve a rejection of the probability-splitting rule.

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
Is this plausible? Let's look at two arguments against this rule of belief.

The first is that the principle is in a certain way self-refuting. There are plenty of people who have thought about disagreement as much as you have who think that the probability-splitting rule is false.

What, given that, does the probability-splitting rule tell you to think about itself?



So there is a sense in which, given actual beliefs of your epistemic peers, this rule of belief is unstable: it recommends against itself.



The second argument is simpler. The main point is that this rule makes the facts about what we ought to believe oddly hostage to the beliefs of others.

It is for that reason a somewhat conservative rule of belief: it argues in favor of thinking what other people think.

Would this make it impossible to be a self-aware radical and to be rational in your beliefs?



The Equal Weight View is not the only view you might take. Here is the opposite view:

The No Weight View In cases of disagreement, you should give no weight to the opinion of the person with whom you disagree, and should maintain your initial view.

We've already seen the problem for this kind of view: it seems to say very surprising things about the kinds of cases discussed at the outset.

One thing you might want to think about: is there some middle ground between these two rules which would be preferable to both?

