Bradley, selections from ‘Substantive and Adjective’, ‘Relation and Quality’, and ‘The General Nature of Reality’ (from Appearance and Reality); McTaggart, ‘Time’ ( from The Nature of Existence, v. 2).
As a brief sampling of the kind of philosophy against which early analytic philosophers were reacting, we will read selections from two prominent late nineteenth century British idealists, F. H. Bradley and John McTaggart, who argued that various parts of what we think of as reality are in fact unreal. We will look at McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time and Bradley's arguments against the reality of substances, qualities, and relations.
Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’; Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 1.
Moore’s attempt to refute skepticism about the external world (and some forms of idealism) on the basis of his knowledge that he has two hands; the difference in philosophical method between Moore’s and the idealists’ attempts at philosophical proofs.
Russell, ‘Descriptions.’
Russell’s analysis of phrases of the form of ‘the so-and-so’; his distinction between the surface form and the logical form of a sentence; and the importance of Russell’s analysis in dissolving metaphysical puzzles about existence.
Moore, ‘External and internal relations’; McTaggart, selections from ‘Derivative Characteristics’ and ‘Determination’ (from The Nature of Existence, v. 1); Bradley, selection from ‘Relation and Quality’ (Note B of the Appendix to Appearance and Reality).
Moore’s critique of the view, held by some British idealists, that the identity of an object depends on each of its qualities and relations; Moore’s critique as an example of the uses of the method of logical analysis in metaphysics.
Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (selections from ch. 1, ‘The Argument from Illusion’).
The argument from illusion for the claim that the immediate objects of perception are mental items, and that our only perceptual access to the external world is via these sense data.
Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.’
The role of the theory of descriptions in reconciling sense datum theories of perception with empiricism about the contents of thoughts.
Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, ch. 2, ‘Definition of number’; Scott Soames, ‘Logic and Mathematics: The Logicist Reduction’ (from his Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, v. 1).
Russell’s version of the claim that mathematical truths are disguised truths of logic. We will consider Russell’s definitions of the numbers, Russell’s paradox, and his theory of types.
Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (selections from ‘Facts and Propositions’ and ‘Excursis into Metaphysics: What There is’), Our Knowledge of the External World (Lecture III, ‘On Our Knowledge of the External World’).
Russell’s version of logical atomism, on which the basic constituents of reality are minds and sense data; his view that material objects are logical constructions out of sense data.
Ayer, Language, Truth, & Logic, ‘Introduction’.
The view that only those sentences whose truth or falsity may be verified by observation have a meaning; problems saying exactly what it is for a sentence to be verifiable in this sense.
Ayer, Language, Truth, & Logic, ch.4, ‘The A Priori’; Quine, ‘Truth by Convention’.
Ayer’s claims that necessity is a matter of linguistic conventions, and that a priori knowledge is explained by knowledge of linguistic stipulations; Quine’s response to these claims.
Ayer, Language, Truth, & Logic, ch. 6, ‘Critique of Ethics & Theology’; Peter Geach, ‘Assertion’.
The emotivist view that evaluative claims -- such as ethical, political, and aesthetic claims -- do not state facts and are neither true nor false; Geach’s critique of this view.