I The objects of experience

I.1 Hallucination, sense data, and relational vs. non-relational views of perception

We will lay out several versions of the traditional ‘argument from illusion’, and explain two traditional responses to the argument: the view that the objects of perception are sense data, and the view that perceptual experiences are non-relational. For a classic statement of the argument from illusion, see ch. 1 of Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. For a contemporary defense of sense datum theory, see Frank Jackson, Perception. The main version of the view that perceptions are non-relational (and hence do not have objects) is adverbialism. For a thorough explanation and defense of adverbialism, see Tye, ‘The adverbial approach to visual experience.’

I.2 Disjunctivist theories of perception

Many contemporary philosophers of perception find both adverbialism and sense datum theory unsatisfactory. One prominent recent alternative is ‘disjunctivism’, which avoid the argument from illusion by denying that veridical experiences and hallucinations are relations to the same sort of thing. Defenses of disjunctivism are given by McDowell in ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge’, and by Martin in ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness.’ For some criticisms, see Siegel, ‘Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal.’

I.3 ‘Common kind’ versions of direct realism

Many philosophers would like to join with disjunctivism in rejecting sense datum theories in favor of some form of direct realism, but find disjunctivism implausible. An attempt to handle cases of hallucination in these terms is Mark Johnston, ‘The obscure object of hallucination.’ For more discussion, see Hilbert, ‘Hallucination, sense data, and direct realism.’

II The contents of experience

II.1 Russellian vs. Fregean vs. scenario content

One basic question about the contents of experience is: what kinds of things are they? On one view, they are propositions; and there are two main views of what sorts of things those propositions might be: Russellian propositions, which are structured abstract objects with objects and properties as constituents (defended by Mike Thau in Consciousness and Cognition) and Fregean propositions, which differ from Russellian propositions in having as their constituents not objects and properties, but ‘ways of thinking about’ objects and properties (see David Chalmers, ‘The representational character of experience’). An alternative view is that the contents of experiences are non-propositional (see Christopher Peacocke, ‘Scenarios, concepts, and perception’).

II.2 Can kind properties be parts of the content of perception?

Membership in a kind is not equivalent to possession of any set of superficial (e.g., color and shape) properties. Something can be a tiger without being four-legged, striped, etc., and vice versa. This raises the question of whether kind properties can be a part of the contents of experiences. For an argument that they can, see Susanna Siegel, ‘Which properties are represented in perception?’ and ‘Are kind properties represented in perception?’ We may also discuss some arguments to the contrary (TBA).

II.3 Can evaluative properties be parts of the content of perception?

A further question about the richness of the contents of perceptions is whether we perceptually represent the world as containing evaluative properties such as ‘the beautiful, the charming, the erotic, the banal, the sublime, the horrific, and the plain old appealing and repellant.’ The claim that we do is defended in Mark Johnston, ‘The authority of affect’. For further discussion, see Ralph Wedgewood, ‘Sensing values?’ and Johnston, ‘Is affect always mere effect?’

III The phenomenal character of experience

III.1 The intentionalist thesis

An attractive view about the relationship between the content of an experience and its phenomenal character is that the former determines the latter: that any two experiences which represent the world as being the same way will also have the same phenomenology. Different versions of the view are distinguished and defended in Alex Byrne, ‘Intentionalism Defended.’

III.2 The problem of the possibility of the inverted spectrum

The intuition that spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible is prima facie inconsistent with intentionalism. A good place to start with the problem of the inverted spectrum is Alex Byrne’s Stanford Encyclopedia article on ‘Inverted Qualia.’ We will discuss two responses on behalf of intentionalism to the apparent possibility of the inverted spectrum: the view that inverted spectrum scenarios (of the relevant sort) are in fact impossible (Hilbert & Kalderon, ‘Color and the Inverted Spectrum’), and the view that the possibility of inverted spectrum scenarios is compatible with intentionalism (Shoemaker, ‘Phenomenal Character’).

III.3 The problem of the intrinsicness of phenomenal character

Another problem for intentionalism results from the following pair of plausible claims: the contents of one’s experiences do not supervene on one’s intrinsic properties, but the qualitative character of one’s experiences do. We will discuss how the intentionalist should respond to this challenge. Readings TBA.

IV Content in perception, thought, and language

IV.1 Perceptual content and the problem of intentionality

The problem of intentionality is the problem of saying how we are able to represent the world. Since we represent the world in many ways -- in thought, perception, and language -- the problem of intentionality can be thought of as a cluster of problems. But it is natural to think that these problems should be related to each other in some way -- that the fact that we, say, represent the world in perception should have something to do with our capacity to represent the world in thought and in language. One plausible idea here is that perceptual content plays a foundational role with respect to thought and language. We’ll discuss how far this idea can be taken, with special attention to its bearing on the relationship between mind and language.

IV.2 Mary and the puzzle of inexpressible contents

Frank Jackson’s example (in ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’) of Mary, the color-blind scientist, was originally used as an argument against physicalism. But, whatever the merits of this use of the example, it can also be used in a compelling argument for the conclusion that there are some properties represented in our experience which cannot, even in principle, be expressed in language. We will look at the version of the argument presented in Byrne, ‘Something About Mary.’ In addition to seeing whether there is a way to escape this conclusion, we will ask whether it threatens the idea that perceptual content has a foundational role to play with respect to thought and language.