As promised, on 11/2 we will begin looking at alternatives to causal-psychologistic theories of intentional action. This will involve looking at three recent pieces:
1. George Wilson's "Davidson on Intentional Action" (in the volume Actions and Events, ed. LePore)
2. Rowland Stout's Things That Happen Because They Should (ch. 1,3,5)
3. Michael Thompson's manuscript "Naive Action Theory".
Each of these is now in the course folder for photocopy; the Thompson piece can also be downloaded from his web site.
Obviously, we will only begin this next week. A likely plan for our next meeting is to begin by discussing the Hornsby, which I now think deserves at least some discussion, and then move on to the Wilson. Most likely we will not begin discussing Stout until the following week; but, since that is the longest reading, you may want to get started on it.
The broader topic will be the relationship between functionalism, which is a kind of theory of mental states, and the kind of neo-Davidsonian accounts we have been discussing. I will spend some time explaining what functionalism is. But if you are not familar with it, it would be a good idea to brush up. A good quick way to do this is to read the encyclopedia articles on functionalism from either the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/) or the Routledge Encyclopedia (http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V015?ssid=74966786&n=1#).
Also, for those of you who have so far been unable to purchase Anscombe's
Intention but would like to, copies should now be available at Paragraphe.