Although you can, of course, write your final papers on any topic connected with the course, I thought that it might be helpful to suggest some ideas for papers. Papers are due on or near the date of the last meeting of the seminar.
1. Why is it (apparently) a necessary truth that trying to perform an action can only be done intentionally?
2. Are intentions reducible to beliefs and desires?
3. Is a causal theory of action compatible with our having introspective, non-empirical knowledge of what is said by claims of the form `I A-d because r'?
4. How should a theory of intentional action handle arational actions? Can they plausibly be regarded as a sub-class of actions deserving special treatment?
5. What kind of non-observational knowledge of our actions can we have? What, if anything, does this tell us about the nature of intentional action?
6. Are functionalist theories of belief compatible with Davidsonian analyses of intentional action?
7. What, if anything, can actions guided by unconscious motives tell us about intentional action?