SYLLABUS
Grice, “Meaning”; Grice, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.”
A version of the mentalist view that the contents of linguistic expressions are determined by more fundamental facts about the contents of thought: specifically, the view that the meanings of sentences are determined by what speakers mean by uttering them, and that what speakers mean by utterances of sentences are a function of their communicative intentions.
Lewis, “Language and Languages.”
A second version of mentalism, which holds that the meaning of a sentence is inherited from the belief with which it is conventionally correlated.
Davidson, “Thought and Talk” and “Radical Interpretation.”
Davidson’s view that the meaning of an expression is whatever an ideal interpreter would assign to it, and the idea that an ideal interpreter is one who maximizes the true beliefs of the agent to be interpreted.
Devitt and Sterelny, Language and Reality (selections from chs. 4 & 5).
The externalist view that the meaning of an expression is determined, at least in part, by what causes utterances of that expression.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (selections)
Wittgenstein’s view that the meaning of an expression is its use in a community.
Sellars, “Notes on Language Games” and“Meaning as Functional Classification.”
Sellars’ attempt to work out a rigorous theory of meaning along Wittgensteinian lines.
Dummett, “What Does the Appeal to Use Do for the Theory of Meaning?” and “Language and Communication.”
Dummett’s version of the use theory of meaning, and his criticism of rival mentalist and Chomskian views of the foundations of meaning.
Horwich, Meaning (selections).
Horwich’s idea that expressions have their meaning by virtue of having the property of being accepted by members of a community in certain circumstances.
Brandom, Making It Explicit , Chapter 3, ‘Linguistic Practice and Discursive Commitment’.
Brandom’s idea that meaning is determined by social practices of ‘giving and asking for reasons.’
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Part I.
Kripke’s presentation of a paradox, which he finds in Wittgenstein, which seems to rule out any foundational theory of meaning.
Chomsky, Knowledge of Language (selections from ch. 1 and ch. 4).
Chomsky’s criticisms of some of the foregoing theories of meaning, including the view of linguistic rules employed in Dummett’s theory of meaning and Kripke’s skeptical paradox.
McGilvray, “Meaning and Creativity.”
The distinction between a theory of language and a theory of language use, and the connection of innateness to a Chomskian view of meaning.
Pietroski, “Meaning Before Truth.”