Jeff Speaks

Professor of Philosophy
Chair, Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
100 Malloy Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556

email
office hours
curriculum vitae















fall 2018
PHIL 30304: Gateway Seminar: Consciousness

spring 2019
PHIL 1010x: Introduction to metaphysics & epistemology


fall 2017
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
spring 2018
PHIL 24810: Philosophical theology (in London)
fall 2016
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
spring 2017
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
fall 2015
on leave
spring 2016
on leave
fall 2014
PHIL 43916: Natural language semantics
spring 2015
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
fall 2013
PHIL 13195: Honors philosophy seminar
spring 2014
PHIL 20229: Paradoxes
PHIL 20801: Philosophy of religion (summer)
fall 2012
PHIL 43916: Natural language semantics
spring 2013
PHIL 20810: Philosophical theology
fall 2011
PHIL 13195: Honors philosophy seminar
PHIL 83104: Proseminar on 20th century philosophy
spring 2012
PHIL 20229: Paradoxes
PHIL 93507: Perception & phenomenal properties
fall 2010
on leave
spring 2011
on leave
fall 2009
PHIL 13195: Philosophy university seminar
PHIL 93507: Perception & color
spring 2010
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
PHIL 20229: Paradoxes
fall 2008
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
PHIL 13195: Honors university seminar
spring 2009
PHIL 10100: Introduction to philosophy
PHIL 43503: Philosophy of action
fall 2007
PHIL 13195: Honors philosophy seminar
PHIL 43904: The origins of analytic philosophy
spring 2008
PHIL 20229: Paradoxes
PHIL 93914: Philosophy of language: Meaning
fall 2006
PHIL 13195: Honors philosophy seminar
PHIL 20208: Minds, brains, and persons
spring 2007
PHIL 13185: Philosophy university seminar: The design argument and the problem of evil
PHIL 93515: Language and mind
fall 2005
PHIL 682: Proseminar on Meaning (co-taught with Jim McGilvray)
winter 2006
PHIL 201: Introduction to Philosophy
PHIL 515: Perception & Intentionality
fall 2004
PHIL 370: Problems in Analytic Philosophy
PHIL 519: Intentional action and mental states
winter 2005
PHIL 201: Introduction to philosophy
PHIL 415: Philosophy of Language
fall 2003
PHIL 415: Philosophy of language
winter 2004
PHIL 370: Problems in analytic philosophy
PHIL 519: Self-knowledge, externalism, & functionalism






















Books

Books

Oxford University Press, 2018
Table of Contents & Introduction
Oxford University Press, 2015
Table of Contents & Introduction
with Jeffrey King & Scott Soames (Oxford, 2014)
Table of Contents | drafts of my contributions














































































































































Philosophy of mind

Philosophy of mind

Is there a problem about nonconceptual content?
Philosophical Review 114:3 (2005), 359-398.
Abstract. In the past twenty years, issues about the relationship between perception and thought have largely been framed in terms of the question of whether the contents of perception are nonconceptual. I argue that this debate has rested on an ambiguity in `nonconceptual content' and some false presuppositions about what is required for concept possession. Once these are cleared away, I argue that none of the arguments which have been advanced about nonconceptual content do much to threaten the natural view that perception and thought are relations to the same kind of content.
Is mental content prior to linguistic meaning?
Noûs 40:3 (2006), 428-467.
Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:3 (2009), 539-573.
Attention and intentionalism
Philosophical Quarterly 60:239 (2010), 325-342.
Explaining the disquotational principle
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40:2 (2010), 211-238.
Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible
Philosophical Studies 156:3 (2011), 339-361.
What are debates about qualia really about?
Philosophical Studies 170:1 (2014), 59-84.
Is phenomenal character out there in the world?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91:2 (2015), 465-482.
Content and the explanatory role of experience
forthcoming in Singular Thought and Mental Files, James Genone, Rachel Goodman, & Nick Kroll, eds. (Oxford).
Symposium on The Phenomenal and the Representational
forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.














































































































































Philosophy of language

Philosophy of language

Truth theories, translation manuals, and theories of meaning
Linguistics & Philosophy 29:4 (2006), 487-505.
Conversational implicature, thought, and communication
Mind & Language 23:1 (2008), 107-122.
The normativity of content and 'the Frege point'
European Journal of Philosophy 17:3 (2009), 405-415.
The epistemic argument and epistemic two-dimensionalism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88:1 (2010), 59-78.
Introduction, transmission, and the foundations of meaning
New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Sarah Sawyer (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 226-249.
Millian descriptivism defended
Philosophical Studies 149:2 (2010), 201-208.
Frege's puzzle and descriptive enrichment
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83:2 (2011), 267-282.
Predication
A Companion to Davidson, ed. Ernie LePore and Kirk Ludwig (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 328-338.
Individuating Fregean sense
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43:5-6 (2013), 634-654.
No easy argument for two-dimensionalism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92:4 (2014), 775-781.
The role of speaker and hearer in the character of demonstratives
Mind 125:498 (2016), 301-339.
A puzzle about demonstratives and semantic competence
Philosophical Studies 174:3 (2017), 709-734.














































































































































Propositions

Propositions

On possibly nonexistent propositions
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:3 (2012), 528-562.
New Thinking About Propositions

with Jeffrey King and Scott Soames (Oxford U.P., 2014)
Ch. 2: What's wrong with semantic theories which make no use of propositions?
Ch. 5: Propositions are properties of everything or nothing
Ch. 8: Representational entities and representational acts
Ch. 11: Representation and structure in the theory of propositions
Merricks vs. the Russellian orthodoxy
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93:2 (2016), 469-477.
Act theories and the attitudes
forthcoming in Synthese
Propositions as Cambridge properties
forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of Propositions
Cognitive acts and the unity of the proposition
in progress ms., new draft 10/18
Do propositions represent?
in progress ms.














































































































































Philosophy of religion

Philosophy of religion

Foreknowledge, evil, and compatibility arguments
Faith & Philosophy 28:3 (2011), 269-293.
The method of perfect being theology
Faith & Philosophy 31:3 (2014), 256-266.
Perfect being theology and modal truth
Faith & Philosophy 33:4 (2016), 465-473.
Permissible tinkering with the concept of God
Topoi 36:4 (2017), 587-597 (special issue on the divine attributes)
The Greatest Possible Being
forthcoming with Oxford University Press, 2018













































































































































Other stuff

Other stuff

My CV.

Book reviews

Encyclopedia entries

Talks & old stuff