Many alleged counter-examples to intentionalism, the thesis that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of a given sense modality supervenes on the contents of experiences of that modality, can be avoided by adopting a liberal view of the sorts of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. I argue that there is a class of counter-examples to intentionalism, based on shifts in attention, which avoids this response. A necessary connection between the contents and phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences can be preserved by distinguishing perceptual phenomenology from the phenomenology of attention; but even if this distinction is viable, these cases put pressure on the thesis that phenomenal character can, in general, be explained in terms of mental representation.

The core of intentionalism in the philosophy of perception is the thesis that there is the following necessary connection between the content and the phenomenal character (phenomenology) of perceptual experience:

**Minimal intentionalism.** Necessarily, if two perceptual experiences of the same sense modality differ in phenomenology, then they differ in content.¹

Much of the interest of minimal intentionalism derives from the idea that a thesis of this sort makes room for an explanation or reduction of perceptual phenomenology in terms of perceptual representation. Of course, to establish the truth of minimal intentionalism is not to establish this further explanatory claim;² but, plausibly, a defence of the explanatory claim requires at least that minimal intentionalism is true.

¹ Intrapersonal and interpersonal versions of this thesis can be distinguished. Here I shall be assuming only that intentionalists endorse the intrapersonal version, and I shall be concerned with potential counter-examples to it. To forestall confusion, it is worth noting that sometimes ‘intentionalism’ is used as a name for the view that perceptual experiences are relations to propositions. I do not think it is straightforward that any of the intentionalist theses discussed in this paper entail much about the metaphysics of experience. It seems to me that in the same way as many views of the metaphysics of belief are consistent with the idea that beliefs have contents, so also many views of the metaphysics of perception are consistent with the idea that perceptions have contents. If this is so, then it is hard to see how only one view of the metaphysics of experience could be compatible with the idea that there is a necessary connection between content and phenomenal character.

Most minimal intentionalists think not only that perceptual phenomenology can be explained in terms of perceptual representation, but also that phenomenology quite generally can be explained in representational terms.\(^3\) They would endorse intentionalism not just about perceptual states, but about mental states of any sort; accordingly I shall call them global intentionalists. It should be pointed out, following Byrne, that global intentionalists might state their characteristic supervenience thesis either as an intermodal or as an intramodal claim:\(^4\)

**Intermodal global intentionalism:** necessarily, if two mental events differ in phenomenology, then they differ in content

**Intramodal global intentionalism:** necessarily, if two mental events of the same type differ in phenomenology, then they differ in content.

Intermodal global intentionalism entails the intramodal thesis, but not *vice versa*. While the difference between these theses will be important later, for now I shall simply use ‘global intentionalism’ to label the view that the intramodal thesis is true, whether or not the intermodal thesis is. As with minimal intentionalism, these global intentionalist theses are supervenience claims rather than assertions of explanatory priority; but if true, they might serve as a first step towards a reduction of phenomenal character to mental representation.

Many of the most prominent alleged counter-examples to intentionalism are counter-examples to global intentionalism, but not to minimal intentionalism. Examples of ‘objectless’ moods and bodily sensations which seem to lack representational properties are apparent counter-examples to the view that every mental event with a phenomenology also has a content and so also to the view that phenomenology can in general be explained in terms of content; but they are not counter-examples to the minimal intentionalist idea that within a given modality of perceptual experience, there is a necessary connection between content and phenomenology.\(^5\) But minimal intentionalism has attracted its fair share of counter-examples as well.

Most of these are examples of pairs of perceptions which clearly differ in phenomenology, but do not differ with respect to their representation of a certain basic class of observational properties, such as the colour and shape.
Christopher Peacocke introduced the example of two trees of the same height, one further away from the perceiver than the other. The perceiver might represent the trees as of the same height; but clearly there is a difference in the phenomenal characters of the experiences of the trees. One can gesture at this phenomenal difference by saying that one tree occupies more of the perceiver’s visual field than the other. If this is right, then it provides a putative example of a pair of visual experiences which are alike with respect to content but differ in phenomenology, and hence constitute a prima facie counter-example to minimal intentionalism.⁶

A similar example focuses on a pair of visual experiences of a coin, one from above and one from an angle. Both visual experiences might well represent the coin as round; but there is a difference in the phenomenology of the two experiences, since there is surely some sense in which the appearance of the coin is round in one case, but elliptical in the other.⁷

The natural reply to these sorts of objections is that they rest on too narrow a view of the properties represented in perceptual experience. In Peacocke’s first example, the trees may be represented as of the same height; but they are not represented as in the same relative location. One is represented as farther away from the perceiver than the other. The coins may be represented as of the same shape; but they are not represented as in the same orientation. One is represented as facing the perceiver, while the other is not. So long as there is no principled reason why relative distance and orientation cannot be among the properties represented in perceptual experience, these cases pose no serious challenge to minimal intentionalism.⁸

This strategy of explaining phenomenological differences in terms of representation of relative distance and orientation has wide application. For instance, it can be put to work in handling some cases of ‘Gestalt shifts’, or cases of ‘seeing as’, such as the difference in phenomenology between two experiences of the Necker cube with respect to the side of the cube that

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⁷ This example has an interesting history. It appeared prominently in versions of the argument from illusion used to defend sense-datum theories of perception: see, e.g., A.J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (Oxford UP, 1940). In those cases, it was essential to the argument that we regard perception of the shape of a coin from an angle as non-veridical. In the present use of the example in an argument against intentionalism, it is essential to the argument that we regard this sort of perceptual experience as a veridical experience of the shape of the coin as circular, since if we did not regard both experiences as veridical, there would be no pressure to regard them as representing the same shape property, and hence as having the same content. See, for example, Peacocke, *Sense and Content*; A.D. Smith, *The Problem of Perception* (MIT Press, 2002).

⁸ This is not to say that the representation of egocentric distance and orientation is easily handled by just any view of the nature of perceptual content; for some of the challenges, see the discussion in Peacocke, *A Study of Concepts* (MIT Press, 1992), ch. 3.
seems to be in front. The intuitive description of the two experiences, as exhibiting a difference in which side *seems to be in front*, makes it plain that the relevant visual experiences differ with respect to the representation of the distance between the perceiver and the relevant sides of the cube.

To be sure, not all examples of ‘Gestalt shifts’ can be handled by invoking perception of relative distance and orientation, as is shown by the well known drawing in Figure 1, which can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit. There is a phenomenological difference between seeing this figure as a representation of a duck and seeing it as a representation as a rabbit; but this difference does not consist in any change in the colour or shape the figure is represented as having, and there is no difference in the representation of relative distance or orientation. However, despite the differences between this example and the examples of ‘seeing as’ discussed above, the duck-rabbit example is open to substantially the same resolution. Even if representation of shapes, colours and locations is constant between seeing the figure as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit, there is a clear representational difference: in one case the figure is represented as duck-shaped, and in the other as rabbit-shaped. These are clearly distinct properties that an object can be represented as having, and the difference between them intuitively matches the difference in phenomenology between the two experiences.

Intentionalists might reasonably regard the discussion of the above cases as exemplifying a pattern: alleged counter-examples to minimal intentionalism, in general, rest on over-restrictive views of the properties which can be represented in experience. However, there is a class of counter-examples to minimal intentionalism which seem to resist this kind of reply.

Perhaps even more salient are local differences between the two experiences: the leftmost portion of the figure is represented first as beak-shaped, then as ear-shaped, etc. There are other more challenging examples of ‘seeing as’, including Mach’s example of the square/diamond, and the visual experiences of a 3 x 3 grid of squares discussed in B. Nickel, ‘Against Intentionalism’, *Philosophical Studies*, 136 (2007), pp. 279–304. I return to these below.

It is more difficult to cast in this mould examples of spectrum inversion without misrepresentation, though perhaps one can see the use of ‘appearance properties’ in S. Shoemaker, ‘Phenomenal Character’, *Noûs*, 28 (1994), pp. 21–38, as an instance of the strategy of finding an overlooked class of properties with respect to which the troublesome pair of experiences do differ in content. Examples designed to show the possibility of spectrum inversion without misrepresentation are an important challenge to minimal intentionalism, but are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of different versions of the ‘inverted spectrum’ argument against minimal intentionalism, see E. Marcus, ‘Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum’, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 35 (2005), pp. 321–39. For discussion of the closely related challenge to intentionalism from ‘shifted spectrum’ examples, see N. Block, ‘Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness’, *Philosophical Topics*, 26 (1999), pp. 39–70.
These are pairs of perceptual experiences which differ only with respect to the focus of the attention of the perceiver, for example, visual experiences of the drawing in Figure 2, on a white sheet of paper large enough to fill the perceiver’s visual field. Two visual experiences of these lines can be compared: in the first, the perceiver’s attention is focused on the intersection of the second vertical line from the left with the horizontal line; the second differs only in that the perceiver shifts his attention to the point of intersection to the right, between the horizontal line and the third vertical from the left. To make the case clearer, suppose this shift in attention does not involve any eye movement; it is possible (even if unnatural) to shift one’s attention from one point in the visual field to another without foveation.\textsuperscript{11} It is undeniable that one’s total phenomenology differs between these two cases. No one would say that the first case is indistinguishable from, or seems the same to the perceiver as, the second; you would never say, for example, that you are not sure which of the two sorts of experiences you are having at a given moment.

So it seems that the minimal intentionalist must find some difference in content to correspond to this difference in phenomenology. But it is hard to see what this representational difference could be. Given that the background of the figure is an uninterrupted stretch of solid white, the change in focus between the two points of intersection does not bring with it a change in the representation of anything on the periphery of the perceiver’s visual field. (If the example is of a shift in attention without foveation, there would be no change in the location of the ‘periphery’ anyway.) Nor does the figure seem to move when one shifts one’s attention from one point of intersection to the other. Further, given the simplicity of the figure, it does not seem plausible to claim that one experience represents a given portion of the lines with more detail or determinacy.

One might object that this last point rests on the discredited view that visual experience reveals ‘a broad, stable field, flush with precise detail, hazy only at the borders’.\textsuperscript{12} But it can be granted that this view is false, and that we only visually represent colour and shape properties with a high level of determinacy within a surprisingly small area of the visual field – one estimate is an area of one degree of visual angle.\textsuperscript{13} The example can be


\textsuperscript{12} For discussions of this view, see the discussion of the snapshot conception of vision in A. Noé, Action in Perception (MIT Press, 2004), ch. 2, and the examples in Schwitzgebel, ‘The Unreliability of Naive Introspection’, §vi. The quotation is from Schwitzgebel, p. 256.

adapted so that the shape in question is smaller than that area, but still large enough for the subject to be able to shift attention from one point of intersection to another. In that case the subject, in both experiences, represents all of the lines and points of intersection in the figure, and there is still a clear phenomenological difference between the two experiences.\textsuperscript{14}

But emboldened by the success of this strategy in handling the preceding cases, intentionalists might yet try to handle this example by finding some overlooked class of properties with respect to which the two experiences do, contrary to initial impressions, differ in their representational content. Pursuing this strategy, they might be tempted to say that the experiences differ with respect to which points of intersection are represented as prominent to the perceiver. After all, if we can make use of perceptual representation of egocentric locations and orientations, why not also representation of egocentric relations of perceptual prominence?\textsuperscript{15}

However, there is an important difference between the representation of egocentric relations of distance and orientation and the representation of egocentric relations of perceptual prominence. The latter, but not the former, involves representation of \textit{properties of the relevant experiences}. After all, to say that one point of intersection on the horizontal line is more prominent than the other is just to say that one, but not the other, point of intersection on that line is attended to by the perceiver. So to say that in one experience the perceiver represents a given point of intersection as prominent just is to say that in one experience the perceiver represents himself, or his own experience, as attending to that point of intersection.

There are at least three reasons why intentionalists should not endorse the claim that the pair of experiences described above is distinguished by their representation of the attention of the perceiver.

First, there is a worry about trivializing intentionalism. If intentionalism is to be a substantive thesis, it surely cannot be legitimate to slide without further argument from the premise that an experience has a certain phenomenal feature to the conclusion that the experience represents that phenomenal feature as being a property of the experience. This is the sort of built-in response to alleged counter-examples which should arouse suspicion. In each case, the intentionalist should make plausible the idea that the representational property adverted to is a genuine representational property of the experience. In the present case, the idea that we not only attend to aspects of the represented scene but also, just in virtue of so doing,

\textsuperscript{14} Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me to see the importance of the issues discussed in this paragraph, and for suggesting the clarificatory point about attention vs foveation made above.

\textsuperscript{15} The perceptual representation of perceptual prominence is also discussed in Nickel, ‘Against Intentionalism’; I discuss the central example of that paper below.
perceptually represent ourselves as so attending, does not seem to have much initial plausibility. It is hard to see what the intentionalist could say to make it more plausible.

Secondly, a kind of positive argument can be provided to show that this is not a genuine case of perceptual representation. It seems plausible that representation of any sort of property in any sense modality can be veridical or not. But then perceptual representation of oneself as attending to an object would be, if genuine, the lone counter-example to this rule. What would it be like to have a perceptual experience which represented oneself as attending to an aspect of the presented scene when one was not so attending? The difficulty of answering this question indicates that it is unclear what perceptual representation of attending to a point – as something over and above simply attending to that point – could be. This seems to indicate that what is being offered is just a relabelling of an aspect of phenomenal character in representational terms.

The argument can also be run in the opposite direction. By hypothesis, the intentionalist cannot allow the possibility of shifts in attention which are not represented as such (for this would entail a change in phenomenology without any corresponding change in representational content). So perceptual representation of attention is not just infallible, but, so to speak, omniscient – no shift in attention can fail to be represented as such by the perceptual experience. But again it seems implausible that any sort of perceptual experience could be omniscient, in this sense; it seems plausible that for any property sometimes represented by experience, the property could be instantiated either perceived or unperceived.

Thirdly, the suggestion that in the standard case we represent properties of experience undercuts one of the principal lines of argument in favour of intentionalism, the argument from the transparency of experience that phenomenal characters cannot be qualities of experiences of which we are directly aware, since when we attend to our experiences we are not aware of anything other than the external particulars and their qualities represented as in our environment. But suppose that in addition to objects, shapes,
colours, etc., our perceptual experiences represented us as attending to these objects, shapes, colours, etc. Then one would think that when we attend to those perceptual experiences, we would notice, in addition to objects, colours and shapes, our own attention to them. But this is just what proponents of the transparency of experience deny.

(Of course, the intentionalist might reply by simply denying that experience is, in this sense, transparent. The resulting position is not inconsistent; the present point is just that making this move undermines what many take to be a central argument for intentionalism.)

It is worth adding that matters get worse yet for the intentionalists in question, if, as many do, they explain phenomenal character in terms of representational content, at least if they endorse a Russellian view of the contents of perceptual experience on which propositions have objects and properties as their constituents. For then these intentionalists would be explaining the phenomenal property corresponding with attention to a point via the perceptual representation of that phenomenal property; so on a Russellian view of perceptual representation, they would then be explaining the phenomenal property by means of a relation to a proposition of which that very property is a constituent. But this would make the proposition explanatorily prior to one of its own constituents, which is both prima facie odd and inconsistent with the conjunction of (i) the idea that the essence of a proposition is given by a specification of its constituents along with their relations to each other and (ii) the plausible principle that nothing can be a part of the explanation of its own essence. If we cannot point to perceptual representation of our own attention to objects and properties, then it seems fairly clear that there is no representational difference between the pair of experiences described above. So it seems that there is here a genuine example of a pair of visual experiences with the same content but different phenomenology.

One can see in hindsight why defenders of intentionalism have overlooked the possibility of this kind of counter-example. As just noted, intentionalists are often impressed by the transparency of experience, which is often glossed as the view that the only things we can notice when we attend to our experiences are the objects and properties which experience represents as in the environment of the perceiver. From here it seems but a short step to the conclusion that any noticeable difference between experiences, i.e., any difference in phenomenology or phenomenal character, must

correspond to some difference in the objects and properties presented as in the perceiver’s environment, and so also to a difference in content.\textsuperscript{19} What this step misses is that a difference in phenomenal character can be generated not just by a change in \textit{what} is noticed when one attends to one’s experience but also by a change in \textit{where} one’s attention is focused.

The most straightforward response to this sort of example is that minimal, and a fortiori global, intentionalism are false, and so that there is no internal connection between the content and phenomenology of perceptual experiences. On this sort of anti-intentionalist view, content and phenomenology are two distinct sorts of properties of perceptual experiences, which may be systematically, but only contingently, correlated.

However, a second kind of response is possible. There is a clear sense in which these kinds of shifts in attention are not part of specifically visual phenomenology at all: similar cases can easily be generated for any of the other sense modalities. (One can listen to a duet in an otherwise silent environment while shifting the focus of attention to one voice or the other.) So perhaps the minimal intentionalist should respond to these cases not by trying to find some representational difference between the two experiences, but by thinking of attention as having its own \textit{sui generis} phenomenology, which is distinct from visual phenomenology, auditory phenomenology, and the phenomenologies specific to the other sense modalities.\textsuperscript{20} Attention is not itself a modality of sense experience, so differences in the phenomenology of attention which are unaccompanied by differences in content would, on this view, be no more a threat to minimal intentionalism than are alleged examples of pains or moods which differ in their phenomenal characters without differing at the level of content.

On this view, the two experiences of the grid could be compared with a pair of visual experiences identical except that one is accompanied by a toothache. While there is a clear difference in the total phenomenology of the subject during the two visual experiences, without a difference in the content of the two visual experiences, this is no counter-example to minimal intentionalism, since there is also no difference in specifically visual


\textsuperscript{20} One challenge to this separation of the various modalities is to emphasize cases in which experiences in one sense modality affect the phenomenology and content of experiences in other modalities. See, e.g., the discussion of cross-modal illusions in C. O’Callaghan, \textit{Sounds: a Philosophical Theory} (Oxford UP, 2007), ch. 11.

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phenomenology. Of course, visual attention is constrained by visual perceptual experience in a way toothaches are not, but from the point of view of minimal intentionalism, which is a thesis only about the supervenience of perceptual phenomenology on perceptual representation, the two examples are equally irrelevant.

This distinction between perceptual phenomenology and the phenomenology of attention also gives the minimal intentionalist the resources to handle two of the most challenging recent apparent counter-examples to the view.

The first of these is Mach’s example of seeing a box as a square, and then as a diamond. There is a clear difference in phenomenology between the two experiences, but no obvious difference in representational content. The natural line of response for the intentionalist is to say that some properties of the shape are represented by the experience in which the subject sees it as a square, but not in the experience in which the subject sees it as a diamond, and vice versa. For example, Peacocke suggests in A Study of Concepts that when the figure is seen as a square one’s visual experience represents a symmetry about the bisectors of the sides of the shape, whereas when the figure is seen as a diamond one’s visual experience represents a symmetry about the bisectors of the angles of the shape. However, as Fiona Macpherson has pointed out, it is possible to see a box as a square while visually representing the symmetry in the bisectors of the angles of the shape. I suggest that intentionalists should respond to this case in the same way as they should respond to the example of the intersecting lines: they should say that the difference between seeing the box as a square and seeing it as a diamond is not a difference in visual phenomenology, but rather is a difference in the phenomenology of attention. When the box is seen as a square, one is attending to symmetries involving the sides, whereas when it is seen as a diamond one is attending to symmetries involving the angles.

Against this suggestion, Macpherson might argue that one can see the box as a square even while attending to the symmetry in the bisectors of the angles. This is suggested by her claim (p. 103) that ‘it seems perfectly possible to see a square as a square while focusing intently on its angle bisector symmetry’. But this seems not to be the case. Macpherson discusses the drawing in Figure 3. It is plausible that, as she says, visual experiences of this figure represent the angle bisector symmetry and that it is possible to see the figure as a square; as she says, this seems to count against Peacocke’s idea that one sees the box as a diamond when one visually represents the symmetry about the bisectors of the figure’s

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angles. But if one attends to the angle bisector symmetry by attending to the intersecting dotted lines, this shift in attention generates the *Gestalt* shift to seeing the figure as a diamond. This is strong evidence that the difference in phenomenology between seeing the box as a square and seeing it as a diamond is, like the difference between the two experiences of the intersecting horizontal and vertical lines above, due to a shift in attention. If this is correct, and if (as suggested above) it is legitimate to regard attention as a type of non-perceptual state with its own associated phenomenology, the square/diamond example is no threat to minimal intentionalism.

The second proposed counter-example to minimal intentionalism is due to Bernard Nickel, who discusses (‘Against Intentionalism’, p. 284) two perceptual experiences of a 3 x 3 grid of squares like that in Figure 4, which differ only in which groups of squares appear as prominent. In one experience, the corner and centre squares appear prominent, and in the other the remaining four ‘side’ squares appear as prominent. There is, as Nickel says, a clear difference in phenomenology here, and he argues convincingly against a number of different attempts to find a difference in content between the two experiences. Intuitively, though, it seems that this is an instance of the same phenomenon as in the case of the intersecting lines and the case of the square/diamond: the relevant phenomenological difference is generated by a shift in attention from one group of boxes to the other. So, as above, if attentional states are non-perceptual states with their own phenomenology, this sort of example need not worry the minimal intentionalist.

22 Macpherson also argues convincingly that similar phenomena arise with figures which lack the symmetries which seem central to the square/diamond example. To adapt the above view to these cases, what is needed is to find properties of the relevant figures which can serve as the focus of the relevant attentional shifts; there is no reason why these properties should have to involve symmetries. This discussion of the square/diamond case leaves open the question of whether it is a threat to global intentionalism; this depends on how we should understand the relevant attentional states. I return to this issue below.

23 Nickel himself notes (p. 289) that it ‘seems apt’ to describe the difference between the two experiences in terms of a shift in attention, but he does not consider the present way of using this point in defence of minimal intentionalism. Though I think the distinction between the phenomenology of perceptual experience and of attention is ultimately the right way to handle this example, I am less convinced that Nickel’s example forces this distinction on the intentionalist. It seems plausible to say that in the experiences of the 3 x 3 grid, the squares which seem prominent also seem, as in the case of the Necker cube, slightly closer to the perceiver. This would, as in the case of the cube, provide the needed difference in content between the two experiences. Nickel objects (p. 288) that this response neglects the fact that if one object appears closer than another, and each subtends the same angle of the visual field of the perceiver, the closer object will appear smaller. However, I am inclined to think, *contra* Nickel, that the prominent squares do appear slightly smaller. This, to be sure, leads to a further oddity, since it makes the content of the relevant experience necessarily false, given that one cannot have a 3 x 3 grid composed of squares which share an outer boundary but where (for example) the middle
One might worry that this way of handling the cases runs the risk of trivializing minimal intentionalism; the strategy used to explain the phenomenological differences discussed above must not provide an unprincipled way for the minimal intentionalist simply to relabel any proposed counter-example as a mere shift in the phenomenology of attention without any change in the phenomenology of the relevant perceptual experiences.

I think that there are two responses to this worry, one intuitive and one more theoretically loaded. The intuitive point is just that each of the three cases really do seem to involve attention essentially. It is difficult even to describe the initial example of the intersecting lines without describing it as a shift in attention. The same is true of the two experiences of the box in Figure 3 with dotted lines marking bisectors of the shape’s angles; to generate the two different experiences, one directs a subject ‘to change his focus of attention’ from the dotted lines to the symmetry of the sides, and back. Analogous remarks apply to Nickel’s 3 x 3 grid. It is also telling that in each case it is natural to describe the two experiences by talking about what aspects of the relevant figure are ‘prominent’. In contrast, it would not be natural to extend this model to other putative counter-examples to minimal intentionalism; the differences between visual experiences of Peacocke’s trees, the two perspectives on the round coin, the views of a brightly lit scene at the end of a dark tunnel with one and with two eyes open, and blurred vision and seeing an object as blurry, have, intuitively, nothing to do with shifts in attention or focus.

The second line of response involves the voluntariness of at least some attentional shifts. Typically, changes in, for example, visual phenomenology cannot be brought about at will; one cannot go from a view of the coin in which it has a round appearance to one in which it has an elliptical appearance without changing the relative position of the coin. But in each of the cases above, we can effect the relevant phenomenal change without bringing about any such ‘external’ change in the scene perceived; this makes it more plausible that these changes are due to attentional shifts since, in at least many cases, we can shift our attention from one element of a represented scene to another at will.24

and corner squares are all smaller than the others. This consequence does not strike me as implausible, but in so far as one thinks that perceptual experiences of the sort exemplified by Nickel’s discussion cannot have necessarily false propositions as their contents, it might seem that thinking that the present response to Nickel’s case is unsatisfactory. But in any case, once the intentionalist admits that the example of the shift in attention from one point of intersection in the grid to another requires the distinction between the phenomenologies of visual experience and attention, there seems no reason not to deploy that distinction here as well.

This is not to say that there is no involuntary aspect to these phenomenal changes; as Macpherson (§4) argues, there is. The point is just that the relevant phenomenal shifts can, in the standard case, be initiated at will without any change in stimulus from the environment.
If the foregoing is correct, then minimal intentionalism can handle all the examples discussed thus far. But this sort of separation of the phenomenology of attention from the phenomenologies of the senses is, obviously, of no help to the global intentionalist’s project of reducing phenomenology to representation. Whether or not shifts in attention are thought of as changes in perceptual phenomenology, they are still changes in phenomenology for which so far no corresponding changes in content have been found.

If we stop here, and endorse minimal intentionalism without global intentionalism, the project of a comprehensive reduction of phenomenology to content is dead. If this were the end of the story, then for many, minimal intentionalism would lose much of its interest. I suggest that if we are interested in understanding the nature of perceptual experience, this is a mistake. If even minimal intentionalism is true, there is a necessary connection between the representational and phenomenological properties of the various modalities of perceptual experience. This puts a substantial constraint on theorizing about perception: for surely one of the things any theory of perception which hopes to make sense of the representational and phenomenological aspects of perceptual experience should explain is why this necessary connection obtains.

But perhaps one need not stop here; perhaps the distinction between visual phenomenology and the phenomenology of attention can also come to the rescue of the global intentionalist. Since attention is a state with its own associated phenomenology, the global intentionalist ought to say that it is a state with representational content. If this is correct, then perhaps, even if there is no difference in the content of visual experience between the first visual experience of the intersecting lines and the second, there is a difference in the content of the two attentional states.

This leads to the question of what sorts of things such states represent. There seem to be two sorts of answers to this question: either they represent properties of the relevant perceptual experience, or they represent aspects of the scene represented by that perceptual experience. Either route, however, forces some difficult choices on the global intentionalist.

According to the first option, the attentional states with which we are concerned are higher-order representational states, which represent properties of the subject’s perceptual experiences.25 On one way of developing this

25 This view corresponds roughly to the ‘inner eye’ model of attention, discussed in, e.g., Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); W. Lycan, *Consciousness* (MIT Press, 1987); Hill, *Sensations*. It is hard to connect the distinction between these two views of the content of attention with current discussion of attention, since much of this does not explicitly attribute content to attentional states at all: see, e.g., J. Campbell, *Reference and Consciousness* (Oxford UP, 2002). Of course, if attentional states do not have contents, then if the foregoing argument is correct, it follows at once that global intentionalism is false.
view, the phenomenal difference between the two experiences of the intersecting lines is to be explained by the fact that the attentional state which accompanies the first visual experience represents the subject’s experience as representing the left-hand point of intersection, whereas the attentional state which accompanies the second represents the subject’s experience as representing the right-hand point of intersection. (Of course, in both cases the subject’s visual experience is representing both points of intersection; it is just that in each case the subject’s attention only represents part of what is represented by the corresponding visual experience.)

This seems to be a coherent view, and one which suits the global intentionalist’s purposes. But it is in some ways an odd view. When I shift my attention from one point of intersection to the other, it seems to me that if I am representing anything, I am representing aspects of the figure represented by my perceptual experience, and not that experience itself. Indeed, this sort of intuition is one of the ‘transparency’ intuitions often used to generate intuitive support for intentionalism. The following quotation from Michael Tye (Ten Problems, p. 30) is representative:

Intuitively, you are directly aware of blueness and squareness as ... features of an external surface. Now shift your gaze inward and try to become aware of your experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects. Try to focus your attention on some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences, something other than what it is an experience of. The task seems impossible: one’s awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and squareness, as instantiated together in an external object. In turning one’s mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external features or properties.

This is explicitly a claim about attention, and the claim is that even when we try to attend to properties of our perceptual experiences, we end by attending to properties of the scene represented by that experience. But this is at least in tension with the claim that attentional states represent properties of perceptual experiences, rather than properties of the things represented by perceptual experiences.26

This view also runs into a sort of problem which I mentioned above in connection with the suggestion that perceptual experiences represent the subject as attending to this or that. Ordinarily, we expect types of representational states, even states which represent other mental states, to be such that some of their tokens represent their target correctly, and some

26 One could claim that attentional states have ‘two layers’ of content, one which concerns aspects of the represented scene, and one which concerns aspects of the perceptual experience which represents that scene. This seems ad hoc to me, but perhaps it could be developed in a way which would make the view seem plausible.
incorrectly. But the present view makes attention a counter-instance to this rule. After all, how could attentional states misrepresent, on the present view? Presumably by representing the relevant perceptual experience as representing something which it does not, in fact, represent. But what would such a state be like? Suppose (for reductio) that an attentional state represented an experience as representing an object as purple but that the experience did not in fact represent the object as purple. Would the subject’s total phenomenology include the phenomenal character typical of visual experiences which represent things as purple, or not? If so, then it seems that, contra the hypothesis, the subject’s visual experience would be representing the relevant object as purple. But if not, then it seems that (again contra the hypothesis) the attentional state is not representing the experience as representing the object as purple. (In virtue of what would it be representing the experience as representing the object as purple, rather than as some other colour?)

So the idea of attentional states misrepresenting the associated perceptual experiences of the subject seems incoherent; it appears to be a necessary truth that if attentional states represent perceptual experiences as having certain contents, they must always represent those experiences correctly. But this is mysterious. Why should attention, alone among representational states, be incapable of false representation?

I think it would be preferable for the global intentionalist not to be tied to a view which is in tension with transparency intuitions, and which involves commitment to a class of infallible representational states. So the second option for the global intentionalist is that attentional states are representational states, but ones which represent aspects of the scene represented by the experience, rather than aspects of that experience. On this view, attention, like the various perceptual modalities, represents objects and properties in the environment of the subject. To deal with the above case, a proponent of this view might say that in the first experience, the subject’s attention represents the left-hand point of intersection, and in the second experience, the subject’s attention represents the right-hand point of intersection.

The odd thing about this sort of response on behalf of the global intentionalist is that there is a clear sense in which attention does not add anything to the total representational state of the subject. The subject already visually represents both points of intersection; so why should adding an attentional representation of one of those points make any difference? It is tempting to reply to this question by finding some property of the relevant point of intersection that is represented in attention, but not in visual experience. But this reply faces a dilemma: either the properties represented by the attentional state are properties of the perceptual experience of the
subject, or they are properties of the figure perceived. The first option involves a return to the view of attention as a higher-order representational state, which is what the present view aims to avoid. But the second option seems a non-starter, since there simply are no plausible candidates for properties of the figure which are represented by the subject’s attentional state but not represented by his visual experience of the figure. Indeed, it seems that it is in principle impossible to attend to any aspect of the scene before one which is not represented by one’s perceptual experience.\textsuperscript{27}

So it seems that global intentionalists who avoid a higher-order view of attention have some difficulty explaining, in terms of representational content, why an attentional state whose content simply duplicates an aspect of the content of the subject’s visual experience can affect the subject’s total phenomenology. What they seem forced to say is that it is simply that the relevant content is the content of an attentional state which explains the difference in total phenomenology. But saying this involves abandoning the strongest and most popular version of intentionalism.

Earlier, I distinguished between intermodal and intramodal global intentionalist theses:

**Intermodal global intentionalism:** necessarily, if two mental events differ in phenomenology, then they differ in content

**Intramodal global intentionalism:** necessarily, if two mental events of the same type differ in phenomenology, then they differ in content.

Most philosophers who would endorse intramodal global intentionalism would also endorse the intermodal thesis.\textsuperscript{28} The reasons for this are, I think, less straightforward arguments than considerations of theoretical economy. If the aim is to naturalize phenomenal character via intentionalism plus a materialist reduction of mental content, then intermodal intentionalism is what is needed – otherwise an account is still required of what it is for a content to be, for example, visually or auditorily represented. The simplest reduction, one which identifies phenomenal properties with certain representational properties, clearly entails intermodal intentionalism. But it

\textsuperscript{27} If this were possible, then it seems that attention would be a modality of perceptual experience. An anonymous referee pointed out that this principle, that attention can represent only what is represented by the sense modality in question, can also be used to pose a problem for the view that attentional states are higher-order representational states. After all, the higher-order view of attention, along with this principle, entails that perceptual experiences represent themselves as having certain properties. But many people deny that perceptual experiences can represent themselves as having certain properties. Important exceptions here include Searle in *Intentionality*, and S. Siegel, ‘Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience’, *Philosophical Review*, 115 (2006), pp. 355–88.

\textsuperscript{28} See, e.g., Tye, *Ten Problems and Consciousness, Color, and Content*; F. Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind* (MIT Press, 1995); Byrne, ‘Intentionalism Defended’.
seems fairly clear that if attentional states represent aspects of the scene around me which are already represented by my perceptual experiences, but none the less bring about a change in my total phenomenology at the time of the experiences, intermodal intentionalism must be false, since on this view differences in modality would alone have phenomenal effects.

It is important to see that the present problem for intermodal global intentionalism is, in some respects, more serious than a more familiar problem for intermodal intentionalist theses. This problem is based on the fact that some properties, like shapes, can be represented in more than one sense modality. This seems to pose a problem for the intermodal intentionalist: after all, visual and tactile representations of a curved surface clearly differ in phenomenology, but seem to be representations of just the same property. So does this not show that the sense modality of an experience, as well as the content of the experience, makes a contribution to phenomenology?

Intermodal intentionalists have a few replies available. They can point out that the two experiences do differ in content, even if there is some overlap; for example, in at least the simplest versions of the case above, the visual experience but not the tactile experience of the curved surface will represent the colour of that surface. They might also claim that the two experiences represent the relevant property at different levels of detail, and so differ representationally even with respect to the property represented by both experiences. But neither of these ways of finding a representational difference to explain the difference in phenomenology seem as plausible in the case of changes in the phenomenology of attention. After all, if attentional states have contents, it seems to be in the nature of such states that their contents are parasitic on the contents of the relevant experiences. So attentional states do not represent properties which are not represented by the relevant visual experience, and do not represent the properties which are represented by the visual experience with more or less detail than the visual experience itself. The contents of the attentional states really just are parts of the contents of the relevant visual experiences. So it does seem that in this case, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the difference in phenomenology generated by attentional shifts must be explained by the fact that a given content is the content of an attentional state.

To sum up: shifts in the focus of a subject’s attention present problems for the intentionalist which cannot be handled simply by adopting a relaxed view about the properties which can be represented in perceptual experience. To explain the differences in phenomenology which accompany attentional shifts, the intentionalist has to make use of a distinction between

29 For discussion, see, e.g., Tye, ‘Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap’, *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 18 (1995), pp. 268–9; Block, ‘Mental Paint’.

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perceptual phenomenology and the phenomenology of attention. But even if this move saves minimal intentionalism, it does so only by introducing another state type – attentional states – with an associated phenomenology, which in turn raises for the global intentionalist the question of whether the phenomenal characters of states of this type are explained by the contents of those states.

If the answer to this question is in the negative, then global intentionalism must be false, and hence phenomenal character cannot, in general, be explained in terms of representational content. Global intentionalists do have the resources to resist this challenge, and to explain how the contents of attentional states might determine the phenomenal characters of those states; but in order to do so they must either say some \textit{prima facie} odd things about attention, or abandon intermodal global intentionalism.\textsuperscript{30}

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\textsuperscript{30} Thanks for helpful discussion of these issues to Casey O’Callaghan and the participants in my graduate seminar on mental content at Notre Dame in the spring of 2007.