DOES LOCKE SANCTION CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (222-230)?

ARE SOME PEOPLE LEGITIMATELY AT WAR AGAINST GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO LOCKE’S CRITERIA (232)?

WHAT ARE LOCKE’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST BARCLAY (232-239)? WHAT DOES BARCLAY’S PHILOSOPHY OMIT, ACCORDING TO LOCKE (239)?

WHO, ACCORDING TO LOCKE, HAS THE RIGHT TO JUDGE WHEN A LEADER HAS VIOLATED THE TRUST AND CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE (240-243)?

3. STUDY QUESTIONS FOR JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY

GOAL OF READING AND ANALYZING MILL: TO SEE THE EXTENT TO WHICH ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY BY GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, AFFECTING OTHER PEOPLE, REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THOSE AFFECTED AND TO INVESTIGATE THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR LEGITIMATE USE OF SOCIETAL PATERNALISM (THAT IGNORES LAY CONSENT).

MILL IS A UTILITARIAN, AND YET HE DOES NOT ALLOW UTILITARIAN GROUNDS FOR INTERFERING WITH INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. IS HE CONSISTENT IN HIS POSITION?

MILL’S POSITION REQUIRE THAT HE BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH ACTS THAT AFFECT SOCIETY FROM ACTS THAT AFFECT ONLY ONESELF. CAN HE DO SO?

IS DERSHOWITZ RIGHT IN HIS TWO “EXCEPTIONS” TO MILL’S PRINCIPLE: (1) GIVING PEOPLE MINOR FINANCIAL PENALTIES TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO DO THINGS (LIKE WEAR SEATBELTS) TO WHICH THEY ARE NOT VIOLENTLY OPPOSED, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH THINGS HELP THEM AND (2) USING MINOR PATERNALISTIC COMPULSIONS ON OCCASIONS WHEN PEOPLE ARE NOT THINKING OR ACTING CLEARLY.

BECAUSE SOCIETY TODAY IS MORE INTERDEPENDENT, WOULD MILL’S LIBERTARIAN PROHIBITION AGAINST SOCIETAL INTERFERENCE BE
FORMULATED DIFFERENTLY, IF HE WERE TO WRITE HIS ESSAY TODAY?

IS DERSHOWITZ RIGHT THAT THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HEROIN VIOLATES MILL’S PRINCIPLE IN TWO WAYS?

IS THE IMPOSITION OF “RISK COSTS” (FOR UNHEALTHY LIFESTYLES THAT FINANCIALLY DRAIN SOCIETY) JUSTIFIABLE?

ARE THERE COMPELLING PHILOSOPHICAL REASONS TO VALUE FREEDOM MORE THAN THE “CONSTRUCTIVE INJURY” CAUSED BY MISUSE OF, OR ACCIDENTS RELATED TO, FREEDOM?

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WHAT IS THE ONLY GROUNDS ON WHICH MILL SAYS SOCIETY IS JUSTIFIED IN INTERFERING WITH INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY (12)?

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EXPLAIN AND EVALUATE MILL’S UTILITARIAN ATTACK ON THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (20-21).

IS MILL CORRECT THAT ALL SILENCING OF DISCUSSION IS AN ASSUMPTION OF INFALLIBILITY (21FF.)?

WHY DOES MILL SAY THAT NO BELIEF CONTRARY TO TRUTH CAN BE REALLY USEFUL (27)?
ARE THE CASES LEAST FAVORABLE TO MILL’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST CENSORSHIP THE CASES OF BELIEF IN GOD AND IN IMMORTALITY, AS HE SAYS (28)?

WHY DOES MILL USE THE EXAMPLES OF SOCRATES, JESUS, AND SAINT PAUL (29FF)?

MILL DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS PRODUCES TRUTH; IF NOT, DOES THIS ADMISSION (33) UNDERCUT HIS ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTY?

WHO IS HURT MOST, ACCORDING TO MILL, BY BANNING HERESY (39)?

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WHY MIGHT AN AUTHENTIC CHRISTIAN ACCEPT MILL’S VIEWS ON CHRISTIANITY (47FF.)?

WHY MIGHT MILL SAY THAT EVEN PARTIAL TRUTHS ARE NECESSARY TO SOCIETY (55FF.)?

WHAT ARE MILL’S FOUR GROUNDS OF FREEDOM OF OPINION (60FF.)?

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IS MILL CORRECT ABOUT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ECCENTRICITY AND STRENGTH OF CHARACTER (77) AND ABOUT THE “DESPOTISM OF CUSTOM” (81)?

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IS MILL CONSISTENT IN CLAIMING THAT SOCIETY IS NOT FOUNDED ON A CONTRACT, YET THAT CITIZENS “OWE” SOMETHING TO SOCIETY IN RETURN FOR ITS PROTECTION (86)?
IS MILL A RUGGED INDIVIDUALIST (87)?

IS MILL CORRECT THAT NO ONE IS ACCOUNTABLE TO FELLOW CREATURES FOR SELF-DEVELOPMENT (91)?

DOES MILL ADEQUATELY ANSWER THE OBJECTIONS (92) THAT NO PERSON IS ENTIRELY ISOLATED AND THAT SOME PEOPLE, LIKE CHILDREN, ARE INCAPABLE OF SELF GOVERNANCE (92)? IS HIS RESPONSE CONSISTENT WITH UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLES (93)?

IS MILL CORRECT ABOUT THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT AGAINST PUBLIC INTERFERENCE IN PERSONAL CHOICES (96)?

IF CENSORSHIP WERE VALUE NEUTRAL (AND MILL SAYS IT IS NOT (96-100)), WOULD MILL’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST CENSORSHIP BE LESS LEGITIMATE?

ARE MILL’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOCIAL OR WELFARE RIGHTS PLASIBLE? HOW MIGHT THEY BE MADE STRONGER OR MORE PRECISE (103)?

EVALUATE THE NOTION OF CONSENT THAT MILL PRESUPPOSES IN HIS DISCUSSION OF POLYGAMY AND MORMONISM (105FF.).

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CRITICALLY EVALUATE MILL’S TWO AXIOMS (108FF.)

DOES MILL ADEQUATELY RECOGNIZE THE SOCIAL AND MARKET-RELATED INSTITUTIONS THATInterfere WITH CONSENT AND THAT MIGHT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF HARM (109FF.). ARE THE FLAWS, IF ANY, IN HIS ARGUMENTS, FLAWS IN LOGIC/THEORY OR FLAWS IN FACTUAL CLAIMS?

IS MILL RIGHT THAT ONLY THE INDIVIDUAL HIMSELF, FACING THE RISKS, CAN JUDGE WHETHER HE OUGHT TO INCUR RISKS (111FF.)?

WOULD MILL (111) AGREE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S REJECTING THE NOTION OF LABELLING US PESTICIDES (SHIPPED TO DEVELOPING NATIONS) AS RESTRICTIONS ON FREE TRADE?

IS MILL CORRECT THAT WHATEVER IS PERMITTED, IT MUST BE PERMITTED TO ADVISE TO DO, IF THE ADVISING COSTS MONEY (114)?
EXPLAIN AND EVALUATE MILL’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT SLAVERY, MARRIAGE, PARENTING, AND EDUCATION (118F.).

EXPLAIN AND EVALUATE MILL’S THREE KINDS OF OBJECTIONS TO GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE (125FF.).

4. STUDY QUESTIONS FOR RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE

GOAL OF READING AND ANALYZING RAWLS: TO SEE THE EXTENT TO WHICH CONSENT/CHOICE, IN A PROCEDURALLY NEUTRAL WAY, JUSTIFIES BELief IN A SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, OR SOCIETAL STRUCTURE, AND TO INVESTIGATE THE ETHICAL LEGITIMACY OF USE OF SOCIETAL PATERNALISM (THAT IGNORES LAY CONSENT).

WHAT IS RAWLS’ MORE ABSTRACT ANALOGUE FOR THE “STATE OF NATURE” USED BY OTHER SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORISTS SUCH AS LOCKE (12)?

DOES RAWLS’ USING THE SOCIAL-CONTRACT APPROACH, IN SUCH AN ABSTRACT WAY, JUSTIFY HIS CLAIM THAT THE TWO PRINCIPLES ARE THOSE PEOPLE WOULD CONSENT TO, IF THEY WERE CHOOSING PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL WAY (12FF., 167FF.)? SHOULD SUCH PRINCIPLES BE CHOSEN IN A MORE REALISTIC WAY?

DOES THE EQUALITY OF THE PARTIES IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION BEG THE QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY WOULD CONSENT (19FF.)?

IS RAWLS RIGHT THAT CONTRACTARIANISM, NOT UTILITARIANISM, TAKES SERIOUSLY THE PLURALITY AND DISTINCTNESS OF INDIVIDUALS (29)?

WHAT ARE RAWLS’ ARGUMENTS THAT THE INTUITIONISTS’ CLAIM (THAT THERE ARE NO SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF THE PRIORITY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES) IS WRONG (40FF.)? DO HIS ARGUMENTS SUCCEED?

DOES RAWLS’ BEG ANY QUESTIONS BY ASSUMING THAT PRINCIPLES ARE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME FOR DIFFERENT PERSONS WHOSE