The Recovery of the Symbolic

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My major interest and area of research is the question of the Catholic church building, in both its historical and its modern Vatican II contexts. Therefore, my intention in this essay will be to propose a return to understanding the symbolic aspects of the human person, especially in regard to how such an understanding might aid us to better design church building, create works of sacred art, and consider the liturgy in which the person participates. This recovery is necessary, I believe, to counteract the prevalent reductionistic views of the person—rooted in Enlightenment rationalism, and common in the academy—which the Church has let influence the discussion of what constitutes an appropriate approach to the questions of liturgy, sacred arts, and church architecture.

In an entirely other discipline, the great political philosopher Leo Strauss (1899-1973) proposed a rather simple remedy to the problem of modern rationalism in the social sciences. He wrote:

The social scientist is a student of human societies, of societies of humans. If he wishes to be loyal to his task, he must never forget that he is dealing with human things, with human beings. He must reflect on the human as a human. And he must pay due attention to the fact that he himself is a human being and that social science is always a kind of self-knowledge.¹

In this age since the Second Vatican Council, an era of increasingly banal and alienating Catholic church architecture, Strauss’s exhortation can well be applied to the liturgical establishment in the West—the Episcopal conferences, diocesan liturgical commissions, professional liturgists and “liturgical designers,” parish “art and environment” committee members, pastors, and church architects—all who in varying degrees of indiscretion, complicity, and culpability have contributed to the current architectural malaise.²

² One is tempted to recall Eric Gill’s words about the bad repository art at the beginning of this century: “It is remarkable that things should get so bad without anybody being to
Across the twentieth century we have steadily moved away from the great tradition of church buildings that speak to the whole person, that respect the whole person, and that engage the whole person. In its stead we have church buildings that tend toward the spartan, the aniconic, and the functionalistic: more intended for a reductive view of the human person common to the social thought of the Enlightenment than to the rich and wonderfully complex understanding of classical Western anthropology. In short, to paraphrase Strauss, we have failed to remember that we are building for human beings, and that we should think about church design as human beings.

In order to recapture a robust, potent, and engaging tradition of sacred art and architecture, I will argue that it is first necessary to regain an understanding of the human being as symbol-knowing and symbol-using—a sort of *homo symbolicus*—which is integral to the fabric of the classical Catholic view of the human being, the material world, the liturgical experience, and the sacred arts tradition. Only in returning to our classical anthropological insights of the human person, a view that allows for and encourages the person to interact with the church building, with sacred art, and in the liturgy with one’s whole being—body and soul, will and intellect, memory and imagination, emotions, appetites, passions, and senses—can we hope for true renewal.

**The Loss of Architectural Symbolism**

I will venture that the history of twentieth century church architecture will be seen in history as a peculiar time of loss of symbol structure, transcendent meaning, and appeal to beauty. How did this happen?

Since the end of the First Great War, practically all the major Western architects—the Futurists in Italy, the de Stijl in Holland, the Bauhaus in Germany, Le Corbusier in France, and Frank Lloyd Wright in America—were advocating functionalism and machine-inspired efficiency as the basis of architectural design. They saw ornament and the eclectic historical stylist of the 19th century as decadently bourgeois—hardly appropriate for the proletariat worker of the new society. Adolf Loos in Vienna was writing tracts comparing architectural ornament to tattoos on criminals and tribal natives. Marinetti in Italy saw the future of art, architecture, and civilization embodied in the automobile racing through the night toward a new dawn. Le
Corbusier posited the future of architecture, indeed the truth of architecture, to be the efficiency of the steamship, the airplane, and the grain silo.

The Church was not slow to be swept up in this movement. In the 1920s Auguste Perret explored the potential of reinforced concrete and modular building systems in the design of churches in France, while Rudolf Schwarz and Dominikus Böhm in Germany were obviously influenced by the Bauhaus concerns for efficiency, formal abstraction, and freedom from ornament. These architectural expressions were adopted by the pre-WW II Liturgical Movement in Germany through Rudolf Schwarz’s close association with Romano Guardini. Their vision came to America by way of the writings of the H. A. Reinhold, and through the architectural projects of Barry Byrne, both of which were widely disseminated in religious and secular arts and architectural journals in the 30s and 40s.3

The 1950s saw the post war boom. The mass production techniques perfected in the wartime industrial complex were easily transformed to produce consumer items for the growing and affluent American population. Programmatic planning, developed by corporate America, came to bear on the architectural problem, and gave rise to campus planning for churches as it had developed for corporations, academic institutions, and government projects. The most important incursion of the corporate functional efficiency mentality into the world of sacred architecture came in 1960 with the publication of Peter Hammond’s highly influential book *Liturgy and Architecture*, in which he argued for the same approach to designing churches as any other contemporary building. He wrote: “that good churches—no less than good schools or good hospitals—can be designed only through a radically functional approach.”4 Hammond’s view was concisely summarized in his oft-quoted statement, “The task of the modern architect is not to design a building that looks like a church. It is to create a building that works as a place for liturgy. The first and essential requirement is radical functional analysis.”5 Hammond was clear that the traditional styles of architecture “have no message for the contemporary world.”6 For Hammond, rather, as long as the process of radical functional planning was done properly, the church building’s “symbolic aspect can be left to take care of itself.”7 Thus, with a few strokes of the pen, the Liturgical Movement discarded as meaningless a 2000-year-old tradition of sacred architectural language.

5 Ibid., p. 9.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Ibid., p. 7.
So it was that church buildings began to take on an increasingly schematic feeling. The efficiency of the machine replaced the wondrously organic complexity of the human body—or the sacramental representation of the Heavenly Jerusalem—as the basis for design. Driven by economic concerns, *multi-purposefulness* and *multi-functionality* were the values of the day. Classical architectural decoration was widely discarded along with the human figural elements in the arts. Amidst this tumult, much of the distinctly human element of sacred architecture was lost.

The Pressing Need for Catholic Anthropology

Over twenty years ago, the Bishops Committee on the Liturgy (BCL) issued a provisional document titled *Environment and Arts in Catholic Worship* (EACW), in which were set out guidelines for the contemporary ordering and reordering of Catholic churches. Issued at perhaps the nadir of liturgical architecture—at a time when the architectural academy was critically evaluating the previous 60 years of increasing alienating architectural modernism and was proposing various returns to a classical or at least “postmodern” understanding of architectural tradition and multivalent symbolical meaning—EACW, despite its occasional rather obtuse references to symbol, beauty, and mystery, did little to further that academic movement among church architects. Rather it enshrined a functionalist, stripped-down, liturgical aesthetic in intentionally nondescript, aniconic, and transient barn-like buildings.

In effect, the BCL (but more so the hordes of iconoclastic liturgists who ransacked perfectly good and even beautiful traditional churches to implement EACW) rushed headlong into 1930 by apotheosizing the liturgical experiments of Romano Guardini and Rudolf Schwarz at Burg Rothenfels. The castle at Rothenfels was the headquarters of the “Quickborn” Catholic Youth Movement, which under Guardini’s directorship became a center for vibrant liturgical renewal, especially among the laity. Liturgy was held at Burg Rothenfels in two places: the first was a rather typical small chapel with an altar against the side wall (typical of counter-Reformation churches), albeit rendered in a stripped down, Bauhaus

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9 Ibid., art. 42 states: “The building or cover enclosing the liturgical space is a shelter or ‘skin’ for a liturgical action. It does not have to ‘look like’ anything else, past or present.”
10 Ibid., art. 98-99.
11 Ibid., art. 100.
inspired, functionalist aesthetic. The larger liturgies were celebrated in a bigger multifunctional meeting room, called the “Knight’s Hall.” This was also a spartan, flat ceilinged, non-differentiated, assembly room. For Mass, sleek black cuboid stools were gathered around three sides of a portable table for celebrating *versus populum* in an atmosphere of convivial hospitality. The influence of the machine-inspired Bauhaus aesthetic then in vogue throughout Germany is obvious in three ways:

1. The flexible arrangement of the multifunctional room capable of being modified to suit changing programmatic needs
2. The transient and provisional nature of the portable altar and the other liturgical furnishings, and
3. The clean, crisp, image-free quality of the space.

Now, it would be unfair to accuse Guardini of liturgical minimalism, or of promoting an egalitarian, demotic approach to liturgy. This was hardly his agenda, as his books, *Sacred Signs* and *Spirit of the Liturgy*, testify. Rather, he seemed interested in helping the idealistic Catholic youth, who had left behind the bourgeois decadence of the Weimar Republic, find meaning for their lives in the liturgy through engaging in a sort of chivalric quest: Guardini’s project for the youth had far more to do with rebuilding a Christian civilization in the spirit of the German Romantic movement and the heroic ideals of the Round Table and the Grail legend—one thinks of Wagner’s *Parsifal*—than with the reductivistic philosophy and socialism of the Bauhaus. These good intentions notwithstanding, the combination of Schwarz’s sleek functionalism and Guardini’s centralized liturgy has had widespread and enduring impact. At a *festschrift* for Guardini, no less a personage than Karl Rahner stated plainly, “It is a widely known fact that the Rothenfels experiment was the immediate model for the liturgical reforms of Vatican II.”

With this background in mind, it can be argued that that EACW’s consideration of Catholic architecture owes at least as much to the *zeitgeist* of the Bauhaus (with its strong and deliberate socialistic anthropology and sociology undergirding it) as to a traditional Catholic perspective. EACW evinces that the principles of radical functional analysis have continued to inform the Church’s approach to liturgical architecture even into the late 1970s. And yet EACW—despite its unevenness, its time-bound agenda and artistic examples,
and its vague and obtuse language—was not entirely devoid of merit. One of its almost completely overlooked clarion calls was to develop an appropriate anthropological basis for liturgy and church architecture:

Like the covenant itself, the liturgical celebrations of the faith community (Church) involve the whole person. They are not purely religious or merely rational and intellectual exercises, but also human experiences calling on all human faculties: body, mind, senses, imagination, emotions, memory. Attention to these is one of the urgent needs of contemporary liturgical renewal.¹⁴

To my knowledge, in the past twenty years this “urgent need” has yet to be addressed in respect to the liturgical innovations and architectural arrangements.¹⁵ Rather, the predominant model of the human person implicit in most recent Catholic architecture is that of the Enlightenment man: rationalistic, scientific, socially atomic, and rejecting of deep symbol structure. This tendency can be seen in the abstractive art of most contemporary crucifixes and stations of the Cross that bear no realistic idea of the human body (disregarding the difference between knowing “mental image” and knowing “concept”); and in the “universal liturgical spaces” (i.e., multifunctional assembly spaces) that disregard our capacity and desire for knowing things as discrete knowables (i.e., “church,” “meeting room,” “theater” become merged into one vague, functionally determined, “room” or “centrum”¹⁶). The tendency toward reductionism also gives us a certain univalency of emotional experiences in most recent church buildings, where we are given only well-lighted open assembly spaces for public gathering, with no more dark, intimate corners to find solace before a devotional shrine, or quiet, emotionally-laden chapels for times of grief, desolation, contrition, or contemplative silence.

The problems of Enlightenment consciousness, with its increased alienation of the individual in society, have certainly affected Catholic life and art, both from without and from within. Their deleterious effects on parish life have not gone unnoticed, even among the progressive members of the liturgical renewal. In a recent article, Rembert Weakland, OSB, Archbishop of Milwaukee, an acknowledged “progressive” in matters liturgical, questioned the work of the Reformists who have brought about the horizontalization and immanentization of the liturgy through the introduction of what he calls

¹⁴ Ibid., art. 5.
¹⁵ Indeed, two of the few texts to even look at the relationship between the liturgy and the human person are Dietrich von Hildebrand’s 1943 classic Liturgy and Personality and Jacques and Raissa Maritain’s Liturgy and Contemplation.
¹⁶ To use Edward Sövik’s phrase. See his Architecture for Worship (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1973).
“the homespun creeds that have no regard for the tradition, eucharistic prayers that leave little room for God, the reading of questionable material in the place of Scripture and the like.” He likewise questioned whether these tendencies have not contributed to the loss of belief in and respect for the Blessed Sacrament. Similarly, a few years ago the theme of one of the national liturgical conferences called for a return to “mystery,” and likewise, one now sees Jungian appeals to archetypal symbology in current liturgical journals. More traditionally minded groups are calling for a restoration of classicism in church architecture, and one also sees the obvious rise in popularity of Tridentine indult masses and other forms of traditional piety such as icons and Gregorian chant.

The Thomistic Model of Knowing

Across the centuries the Church has developed a working paradigm for understanding the human person: our composition, operation, purpose, and end. What I intend here is the view of person which St. Thomas and traditional Catholic anthropology uphold, and which Pope John Paul II’s thought has further developed—that of a spiritual being of body and soul, with faculties of intellection and volition—a being in relationship. This paradigm has been foundational for the Church’s moral theology, social teaching, spiritual counsel, and pastoral guidance. And yet, regardless of whether the discussion is among progressives or traditionalists, conspicuously absent from most recent discussions of Catholic liturgy, art and architecture is the matter of the human person. Few thinkers in matters liturgical seem to have grappled with the question of the human person qua person, the “urgent need” mentioned in EACW, in these discussions.

Such a broad topic needs containment (since its implications extend to every human activity imaginable), and so I wish to constrict this current discussion to the question of how man knows reality, and particularly how he participates in the experience of symbol. Thus, rather than dealing with the manifold problems of various fragmentary modern anthropologies (e.g.,

18 Form/ Reform 1995, San Diego, California. Sponsored by Georgetown Center for Liturgy.
20 E.g., Professor Duncan Stroik at the School of Architecture, University of Notre Dame.
psycho-analytical, behaviorist, determinist, evolutionary, etc.), I will content myself to advance a classical Catholic understanding, one which is rooted in Aristotle, developed by St. Thomas, and implicitly continued in the contemporary teachings via the Universal Catechism. Time and space do not allow for a detailed explication, so it must suffice to concentrate on the power of the phantasm in the imagination as the locus of symbolic knowing which is pertinent to the question at hand. In brief, I wish to draw our attention to certain important considerations:

1) We first apprehend things through sense powers (sight, hearing, smell, etc.) that are seated in the sense organs (eyes, ears, nose, etc.).

2) These external sensory data, or sensibles, are presented to the internal senses. The common sense apprehends the preliminary unity among the sensibles.

3) The next stage, presupposing the operations of the common sense and the cogitative sense, is the appearance of the phantasm in the imaginarium. The phantasm, which is a sort of "mental picture," preserves and presents before the mind the material conditions of the thing perceived. The phantasm is deposited in the imaginarium for retention and recollection.

4) The imaginarium is a complex faculty for St. Thomas. It has the powers of:
   a) Storage: The imaginarium stores the phantasm with its record of sense data that are the material conditions of the thing perceived.
   b) Recall: The imaginarium has the power of phantasmal memory. The phantasms remembered in the imaginarium are conjoined to the concept in the intellect as integral to the symbol-understanding process.
   c) Synthesis: It is in the imaginarium, working in conjunction with the practical intellect, that stored images are manipulated and new ones created as part of our participation in the creative process.
   d) Emotion: The emotions are properly triggered through the imaginarium when a particularly meaningful phantasm

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21 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 78, a. 3; and I, q. 78, a. 4.
22 I use the term imaginarium to express that this faculty is a sort of psychic locus, a "place" in the soul, wherein these operations occur, as distinct from the common usage imagination understood as the ability to conceive ideas or form images in the mind.
(either experienced or recalled) is conjoined with a clear and important concept. There seems to be a sort of potency, or a polar charge, between concept and phantasm, which activates emotional responsiveness when the two are conjoined in the imaginarium.

I will not go further into the operations of the intellect here. Suffice it to remind ourselves that:

6) When the agent intellect has stripped the material conditions from the phantasm, the resulting intelligible species actualizes the passive intellect, thus producing a concept. 23

7) However, the end of knowing is not merely a concept, but being itself. 24 All the concepts are “mental words” by which we know being. It is these concepts that our mind apprehends, judges, understands, and retains in our consideration of being. 25

8) Furthermore, we can also be reminded that vis-à-vis the material world there is no knowing of concepts without recourse to phantasm. 26 That is to say, there is no “imageless thought.”

9) Thus it is necessary for human knowing to access images—either previously retained mental images or newly experienced physical images that we then convert to new mental images—for us to know.

This then is the anthropological basis of symbolic knowing: the image perceived recharges our imagination with a fresh or refreshed phantasm. Given that symbols per se speak to a whole constellation of ideas, the various concepts associated with the symbol—or in the case of liturgical art and architecture a whole deep symbol structure—are conjoined to produce a engagement of the person in the senses, the intellect, the memory, the imagina­tion, and the emotions. With this epistemology in mind, I will simply posit that abstraction in sacred art frustrates this experience.

23 The need for both agent (active) intellection and potential (passive) intellect is based on the aforementioned rule of powers corresponding to operation. Whereas the agent intellect (AI) causes understanding, the potential intellect (PI) formally understands; whereas AI is an active potency, i.e., always ready to act, PI is a passive potency, i.e., needs to be complemented before being fully ready to act. See Henry Koren, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate Nature (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1955), pp. 179-80.

24 Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 8: “our intellect’s proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing.”


26 Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 7: “it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.”
The Problem of Abstract Art

The abstract strains of modern art, which have so greatly influenced the production of sacred art in the twentieth century, fail to understand this operation, much to the loss of the art. Speaking only to the question of the necessary qualities of sacred art, and leaving aside the question of the value of abstract art in general, it seems that the very attempt to convey artistically a pure concept already abstracted from the material conditions of a previous phantasm can only short-circuit the fully human participation in the work of art. From a stripped down phantasm, we might well be able to grasp the concept of the piece of work, say of a crucifix, but the lack of material conditions will possibly result in a dearth of recollected images to further engage our memory. Furthermore, since we know concepts by recourse to phantasms, the substitution of an already stripped down phantasm may only allow for a virtually “one-to-one correspondence” between the mental word and the mental image. The relatively close proportion between the mental word and the mental image may thus prevent the concept from activating the power of the imagination to engage the emotions in a fully human act of emotional response.

So within the idea that a concept can be portrayed is the two-fold problem that (1) a concept, or “mental word,” requires an associated phantasm, or “mental image,” for it to be actually knowable; and (2) given the need for some sort of polar charge between concept and phantasm, the relative univalency in abstract art fails to charge the imagination to produce a meaningful emotional response. Even given the best of intentions on the part of the artist: say that the artist wants to provide us with a reductionistic image so as to allow our imagination to fill in the lacunae from its storehouse of image memories: the realities of faulty memory and wandering imagination tend to militate against this intention. In short, the human person is not made to be moved emotionally by abstract art, and the lack of material conditions related to history or events fails to engage our memory or imagination. Thus,


28 As was pointed out to me by a fine German philosopher, Anselm Ramelow, it seems that the modern artists may be fooling themselves in fancying that they are portraying concepts, when in fact they are portraying phantasms. Just as the concept must resort again to the phantasm, so the phantasm must resort via the external senses to the particular image to be better understood. Failing memory quickly reduces a phantasm of a particular to a generic, and our imagination thus needs to be “recharged” with sense data of particular material conditions.
from a Thomistic understanding of the human person, we can see how poor anthropology can frustrate the potential of sacred art to move the human heart toward greater love for God.

**Anthropology and Liturgical Architecture**

To conclude, I would ask why is it that, in general, we wish to keep returning to Chartres or Saint Peter's, each time seeing it anew as if for the first time, and not so with most modern buildings, let alone most modern churches? Having examined the problem of abstraction in sacred art, its inability to engage fully the human person, and its failure to move the human heart, we can begin to understand the analogous problem in recent church architecture that fails to move the soul. St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, teaches that the mind is meant for rest. It is a common human experience that once we sufficiently understand something, it ceases to attract pressingly our attention. Once we understand the essence of something, which is the goal of human knowing, the mind is content.

We have already seen how the valorization of abstraction can frustrate the fully human engagement in the arts. In architectural terms, much of modern architectural programming involves the reduction of things to only their functional aspects, these parts then to be considered one to another in respect of their functional relationships. Thus the modern building (properly designed according to functional planning principles) is somewhat “schematic,” and it takes on the characteristics of concepts: it tends to be devoid of particular material conditions that should individuate it. 29 This explains why the typical schematically designed American parish church that we have been building lacks the vitality to capture our interest: the human, in quickly understanding it, quickly loses interest. 30 Conversely, this explains why buildings which are rich and complex, which are capable of supporting a wide of human emotions, with multivalent symbolism, and with a wealth of architectural details continue to intrigue us and engage us.

By failing to engage the senses with a wealth of images from which to draw phantasms in the imagination, the building fails to engage the heuristic process of the soul to understand that which it does not. As we have seen in

29 Consider, for examples, the typical urban high rise, or the suburban shopping center and anonymous mass-produced tract houses.

30 Conversely great art, be it Dante’s *Divine Comedy* or Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*, Michelangelo’s *David* or Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony*, can be experienced again and again, each time anew.
the case of abstract art, because of the conceptual nature of the typical modern building, the soul does not apply from its storehouse of memory corresponding phantasms, concepts, and emotions to organically participate in the building.

If this Thomistic model of knowing is valid, and if the goal of church building is to create sacred spaces that engage the human community in a full range of human experiences toward one's loving participation in the things of God, then these would suggest a different approach to church building from that which we have been doing for the past seventy years. What might this entail? For instance, remembering that the external sense are ordered to perceiving accidentals (color, odor, texture, etc.), but the whole person is ordered to knowing being, this should suggest that we ought return to a more depictive way of sacred art. Rather than continuing the abstract tradition of reductionistic and fragmented splotches of colored glass, emblematic grape clusters and wheat stalks, and Stations which consist of geometric exercises—physical images which move virtually from the external senses to the intellect to inform us of concepts—our art should be rooted in reality of the human body both as subject and intended viewer. That is to say, by virtue of humanity we should be presented with physical images which engages not only the external senses with light and color, but can present to the imagination a potent phantasm so as to engage our intellect, memory, and emotions.

Church interiors should inflame our imagination with images of the holy, especially since our imaginations need to redirected and re-informed with sacred images to combat the consumeristic and often pornographic media with which we are daily assaulted. With careful iconological programming these images can all be properly ordered so as to support the liturgy and still allow for the subjectivity of the individual in the community.

In conclusion, if one of the major goals of the conciliar reforms is to help achieve truly "active participation," we should seek to engage the person on as many levels as possible in a truly human way. By returning to a fuller Catholic anthropology, one that engages the whole person, "body, mind, senses, imagination, emotions, memory," there is great hope for returning to a rich, robust, meaningful, and beautiful way of sacred architecture; which is still very much the unfinished business and "one of the urgent needs of contemporary liturgical renewal."