Jacques Maritain Center :
The Logic of Analogy /
by Ralph McInernyThe necessity and importance of logic is indicated by the place it occupies in the order of learning. St Thomas tells us that logic must be learned before any other science, and he points out that this has been the usual method of philosophers.
Primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium cuasas.{1}It can be seen that the order of learning is based upon what is more easily known by us as well as on the amount of experience required for the various sciences. Logic, however, does not come first because it is easy to learn; it is most difficult, second only to metaphysics in this regard.{2} The priority of logic is founded on the fact that it is presupposed by every other science. "Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam aliis scientiis, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis."{3} The very nature of the human mind requires logic, for although the object of the intellect is truth, it is not so determined to its object that error is impossible. There are first principles which are known easily and without possibility of error, but they are common and do not of themselves give a determinate and particular knowledge of everything that follows on them. As soon as we move away from these principles, error is possible. With regard to this further knowledge, then, we are not guided by nature so much as by art.{4} Given the indetermination of the mind apart from its grasp of first principles, some determination is required if it is to proceed easily, in an orderly manner, and without error. This determination is had from the art of logic.
Every art
determines human acts in
such a way that operation is
made easy. In other words,
art is a rational direction
of human acts whereby they
attain their ends by
determinate means. However,
reason is directive not only
of the acts of powers other
than itself, but also of its
own act: reason can reflect
on and reason about
reasoning. And, just as
reasoning about manual
operations is productive of
an art which directs such
activity in such a way that
man can proceed easily and
surely in, say, building, so
too an art is produced by
reason when it reflects on
its on activity. this art is
logic.{5}
St Thomas maintains that logic is necessary if the act of reason is to achieve its end. Sometimes he speaks of that reflexive act which gives rise to logic as one of discovery, as in the following text.
Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuentur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem.{6}Does this mean that logic is a natural product of reasoning and that the art of logic consists in pointing out what is already given? St Albert speaks of a natural logic of human reason, a way any man has of moving from what he knows to knowledge of something new, although this natural logic is exceedingly imperfect and liable to error.{7} On this view, the art of logic would perfect this natural logic by introducing that determination which produces facility and freedom from error. This constructive role of logic is suggested by St Thomas.
Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae.{8}The order which is introduced into the act of reason is the proper work of logic. This is not to say that there is something arbitrary about logic, as if a plurality of logics is possible because of the individual differences of men. In reflecting on its own operation, the intellect discovers a foundation for logical relations. We will see later what it is about the human mode of knowing which makes its concepts apt subjects of logical relations. Before discussing that, however, there is a prior problem. Logical relations are said to be beings of reason, entia rationis. What is meant by a being of reason?
The being of reason or the relation of reason is often said to be the subject matter of logic. although this is true, it should be pointed out that there are beings of reason which are not relations and that not just any relation of reason is the concern of the logician. But first of all there is a distinction made between real being and being of reason. Real being is that which is divided by the ten categories. "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures."{9} Real being is that which exists apart from our thought. Beings of reason on the other hand, would seem by definition to depend upon our minds. To avoid any confusion on this score, it may be well to observe a distinction made by John of St Thomas between kinds of dependence upon reason.
Ens rationis in omni sua latitudine, si nominis significationem attendamus, dicit id, quod dependet aliquo modo a ratione. Potest autem dependere vel ut effectus a causa vel ut obiectum a cognoscente.{10}Works of art, since they depend upon the mind of the artist, can be called beings of reason in the first sense. It is the second kind of being of reason that we shall be opposing to real being.{11}
The being of reason so understood can be subdivided into negation and relation. One finds this distinction made in discussions of what are called the transcendental properties of being, namely the one, the true and the good. although they are the same reality as being, they are said to differ from being ratione.
Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat. Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum.{12}In the text of the De ente et essentia cited above in note nine, St Thomas points out how negation and privation are said to be. Taking his example, blindness, the privation of sight, is an absence or lack in the real order. In the mind, however, it takes on objective existence and can enter into a proposition.{13} thus we say, "Blindness is _______." Not only privations, but also simple negations are said to be in this way.
Item negationes eorum quae ad substantiam habitudines habent, vel etiam ipsius substantiae esse dicuntur. Unde dicimus quod non ens est non ens. Quod non diceretur nisi negationi aliquo modo esse competeret.{14}Of course it is only in the mind that non-being enjoys existence.
Although
privations and negations are
beings of reason, it is not
entia rationis
of this kind which are the
subject of logic. That
subject is always a relation
of reason, and it is by
opposing it to non-logical
relations of reason that we
can isolate it and discover
what it is.
2
It is
only in the genus of
relation, St Thomas holds,
that we can have something
of reason alone and not of
the real order. In the other
genera, such as quantity and
quality, what is properly
signified is something which
inheres in something else.
Those things, however, which
fall in the genus of
relation, which are said ad aliquid,
properly signify only a
reference to something else.
Sometimes this reference is
of the very nature of a
thing, as when things are by
nature mutually ordered to
one another so that they
have an inclination to each
other. These are real
relations. Sometimes the
reference signified is due
to the grasp of reason which
refers one thing to another.
These relations are of
reason alone as, for
example, when reason
compares man to animal as a
species to its genus.{15}
The relations of reason with which the logician is concerned are called secunda intellecta or second intentions.{16} The things we know first of all are things outside the mind, and second intentions follow on the way the grasp their natures, namely, by abstracting them from their material conditions. To know these second intentions, the mind must reflect upon itself, know itself as knowing and the way in which it knows.{17} It is the order which is put among things as they are known which is the proper subject of logic.
Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei, et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.{18}Although all logical relations are relations of reason, not all relations of reason are logical relations. St Thomas has, in a text which will occupy us for several pages, carefully distinguished logical from non-logical relations of reason. The basis of the distinction will be seen to be that to which the relations are attributed.
Logical
relations are attributed to
known things precisely
insofar as they are known.
The intellect forms the
relation of species by
considering the order of
that which is in the mind to
that which is in the real
order; it forms the relation
of genus by considering the
order of one concept to
another.{19} To say of a
given nature that it is a
species or a genus is to
attribute a relation to it
insofar as it is known. The
foundation of the relation
is in things as they are
known by our minds. This is
not the case with
non-logical relations of
reason.
Non-logical relations of reason are said to follow on our mode of understanding in that the intellect understands one thing as ordered to another. Such relations, although they are not in things as they exist, are nonetheless founded on them as they exist.
Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.{20}
Given these three conditions
of a real relation, St
Thomas goes on to list four
non-logical relations of
reason which fail to fulfil
one or the other of those
conditions.
The first such relation does not fulfil the first condition of real relations, namely that both of the things among which the order obtains be real beings.
Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes.{21}The second such relation, that of self-identity, does not fulfil the second condition of real relations, namely that the things ordered be two really distinct entities. When something is said to be identical with itself, what is really one is understood as if it were two, and yet it is the existent thing which is said to be identical with itself.{22}
The
remaining non-logical
relations of reason fail to
fulfil the third condition
of real relations, namely
that the two extremes can be
ordered to one another. The
relation between a relation
and the subject of that
relation is said to be of
reason alone, for if there
were really such a relation,
we would be involved in an
infinite regress. Moreover,
it is easy to see that this
relation and the possible
infinity to which it leads
are due to reason alone.{23}
Paternity is a relation, and
we can understand it as
related to the man who is a
father by another relation
intermediate between the
subject and the relation of
paternity.
The fourth kind of non-logical relation of reason is that whereby the understand a mutual relation where there is a real relation in one direction alone.
Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad alius, in quantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum; et sic cum quodam ordine ad scientiam, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum.{24}Our knowledge, both sense and intellectual, is really related to things, and, because of this, we understand things as related to our knowledge, naming them sensible or knowable. But things are not really related to our knowing powers. Nevertheless, like all such non-logical relations of reason, this is founded on things as they exist; not again because they are really related to our knowledge, but because our knowledge is really not such merely in our minds. The relation is of reason alone, but identity is something real.{25} Likewise with the transcendental properties of being; although they differ from being only ratione, they are attributed to real being: they are not logical properties, true of being as known but not as it exists. Being is said to be good because it is understood as related to appetite, true because it is understood as related to intellect.
In summary, we can say that the beings of reason which are opposed to real being are negations or privations, on the one hand, relations on the other. Some relations of reason are said to follow on our mode of understanding, but are founded on things as they exist. Logical relations are founded on things as known. We will schematize our findings thus far.
Ens(i) realis rationis(ii) negatio(iii) relatio(iv) quam ratio adinvenito(v) consequens modum intelligendi(vi) (a) alterum vel neutrum ens (b) identitas(vii) (c) relatio relationis (d) scientia / scibile(viii)
(i)
Cf. De ente et
essentia, cap. 1; In V
Metaphys., lect.
9, 889. Cf. John of St
Thomas, op. cit.,
pp. 285-290. For the
division of ens rationis
into negation and relation,
see Q.D. de ver.,
q. 21, a. 1.
(iii) In V Metaphys., lect.
9, n. 896; In IV Metaphys.,
lect. 1, n. 539.
(iv)
Ia, q. 28, a. 1.
(v)
In IV Metaphys.,
lect. 4, n. 574; Q.D. de pot.,
q. 7, a. 11; Q.D. de ver., q.
1, a. 5, ad 16.
(vi)
Q. D. de pot., q.
7, a. 11.
(vii) In V Metaphys,
lect. 1, n. 912.
(viii) Q. D. de
ver., q. 21,
a. 1.
Logical entities or
relations are properties of
things as known. Just as the
reflexive act whereby the
intellect knows its own
nature presupposes knowledge
of something else, so too
the reflexive act which
logic implies requires
knowledge of real entities
and these real entities are
the remote foundation for
logical intentions. Logical
beings of reason have as
their purpose the orderingof
our knowledge of real
things. One does not study
logic for its own sake, but
ultimately as an instrument
of science. For this reason,
logic is not said to be a
speculative science; it is
not however, called a
practical science
either.{26}
The root of logic is the imperfection of human reason. The indeterminations of our intellect requires an art which can guide the very act of reason to its goal of truth. This is accomplished by the formation of second intentions, a realm of entities which are properties of things as known and not as they exist. Our knowledge of logical entities is a mediate knowledge, as we have seen.{27} furthermore, second intentions have as their purpose the directing of the mind in its knowledge of real things. It can be seen that it is extremely important to respect the difference between the logical and real orders: to confuse them is to court philosophical disaster.
The first problem that the
logician must consider,
according to St. Albert,{28} is that of
universality. Universality,
as we shall see, is a second
intention and in examining
an instance where
universality was given an
ontological status in rerum natura
we will see the consequences
of confusing the real and
intentional orders. The
Platonic philosophy provides
the instance, and by this we
mean Plato as Aristotle and
St. Thomas understood him.
For our purposes, it matters
little whether or not Plato
meant what St Thomas takes
him to mean; the criticism
of Plato serves to bring out
the difference between the
logical and real orders.
As has been pointed out above, second intentions are properties of natures as they are known by us: something happens to these natures when they are grasped by out intellect.
Nec oportet, sicut multoties dictum est, quod aliquid eumdem modum essendi habeat in rebus, per quem modum ab intellectu scientis comprehenditur. Nam intellectus immaterialiter cognoscit materialia; et similiter natura rerum, quae singulariter in rebus existunt, intellectus cognoscit universaliter, idest absque consideratione principiorum et accidentium individualium.{29}In the real order there are only singular things, and in the realm perceived by the senses, these singulars are material. This man differs from that in such a way that the first man is located here and the other there. They are set off from one another, individuated. And yet, in knowing what man is, we form an idea which does not include every particular difference of man and man. Rather our idea expresses what is common and essential to this man, that man and every man. Because our intellect grasps only what is essential to the individuals and leaves aside their individual differences, the nature as known founds a relationship to the many from which it has been abstracted. The property of human nature whereby it is one thing which can be said of many individuals is a property of that nature as it is known. It is the second intention of universality.
Certain
names are imposed to signify
the nature with the
intention of universality,
such as genus, species, etc.
These are kinds of logical
universal and cannot be
predicated of the nature as
it exists outside the
mind.{32} Sometimes,
however, St Thomas refers to
the existing nature as a
universal. There is a
universal in things,
namely the nature
which is in particulars,
although in them it does not
have the note of
universality. "Quoddam
(universale) est in re,
scilicet natura ipsa, quae
est in particularibus,
quamvis in eis non sit
secundum rationem
universalitatis in
actu."{33}
When the
different modes of existence
which the nature has in
reality and in the mind are
not distinguished, we have
the Platonic confusion.
Aristotle's criticism of
Plato is that he confused
the logical and real orders,
that he wanted something
real to respond as such to
the intentions which the
mind forms in knowing. This
issued in a reification of
the logical universal that
that not only was there to
be a concept of man
representing a nature common
to many individuals, but
there would also be an Idea,
Man in himself, which exists
apart and by participation
in which particular men are.
That the World of Ideas
arose from the reification
of logical entities seems
obvious. The Platonist saw
that in universals there is
something one which is
common to many, and it was
this one thing which was
postulated as enjoying
separate existence.
Logically, they would be
forced to maintain that
there must be separate
genera as well and the World
of Ideas soon becomes more
densely populated than the
world of singulars it is
meant to explain.{34}
We say
that universality follows on
our mode of understanding:
it is in fact a principle or
means of knowing for us.
What Plato has done
consequently, is to make
what is a principle of our
knowledge of things, a
principle of the being of
those things. This can
hardly be the case, however,
for our concepts are not
always representations of
what in reality are the
principles of a thing's
being, as when we know
causes through their effects
and substances through their
accidents.{35} Something can
be a cause of knowledge even
when it is not a cause of
being. Plato's position does
not necessarily entail that
our knowledge be causative
of things, however. That is,
the Platonic position may be
seen as a likening of human
knowledge, not to the
divine, but to the angelic
mode of knowing. In the
Christian tradition,
following the lead of St
Augustine, the Platonic
Ideas have been interpreted
as the divine creative
ideas. {36} In somewhat the
same way, Plato seems to
want our knowledge to be ad re.
True knowledge of things is
had by means of the ideas in
which they participate, and
not by species abstracted
from them. Plato's Ideas
are, as it were, concepts
existing outside the mind.
Aristotle, on the other
hand, is quite insistent
that the universal nature is
for us posterior to things,
derived from them{39}
What
Plato has done, in effect,
is to make the logical
universal, the universale in
praedicando, a
universal cause, an universale in
causando. "Sed alia
est communitas universalis
et causae. Nam causa non
praedicatur de suis
effectibus, quia non sunt
idem causa suiipsius. Sed
universale est commune quasi
aliquid praedicatum de
multis; et sic oportet quod
aliquo modo sit unum in
multis, et non seorus
subsistens ab eis."{40}
There can
be principles common to all
things in two ways, by
predication or by causality.
The metaphysician, whose
interest is those common
causes, must not be waylaid
by logical universals.{41}
If there is a realm of
separate entities, it cannot
be attained by Plato's
method.
{1} In librum de
causis, (ed.
Saffrey), proemium; Cf. In VI Ethic.,
lect. 7, n. 1211.
{2} Ad tertium
dicendum quod in addiscendo
incipimus ab eo quod est
magis facile, nisi
necessitas aliud requirat.
Quandoque enim necessarium
est in addiscendo incipere
non ab eo quod est facilius,
sed ab eo, a cuius
cognitione sequentium
cognitio dependet. Et hac
rationeeo quod est facilius,
sed ab eo, a cuius
cognitione sequentium
cognitio dependet. Et hac
rationeoportet in addiscendo
a logica incipere, non quia
ipsa sit facilior ceteris
scientiis, habet enimmaximam
difficultatem, cum sit de
secundo intellectis, sed
quia alia scientiae ab ipsa
dependet, inquantum ipsa
docet modum procedendi in
omnibus scientiis." - In Boethii de
trin., (ed. Wyser),
q. 6, a. 1, qa 2, ad 3.
{3} In II Metaphys.,
lect. 5, n. 335; In Boethii de
trin., q. 5, a. 1,
ad 2. The priority of logic
is argued for in the via
addiscendi, not in the via inviendi. Cf.
Q.D. de ver., q.
11, a. 1.
{4} Insofar as the
intellect, like every
potency of the soul, is quaedam natura,
it has a natural appetite.
That is why the grasp of
first principles is said to
be per modum naturae,
as opposed to per modum
rationis. However,
the grasp of the first
principles per modum naturae
does not imply the
will's entering into the
specification of the object,
as is the case when faith
and the moral virtues are
siad to be per modum naturae.
In the latter two, the will
has an influence of the very
object, whereas in the case
of first principles, the
intellect is moved by the
evidence of its proper
object. Cf. IIII Sent.,
d. 23, q. 3, sol. 2, ad 2.
{5} "Et inde est quod ad
actus humandos faciliter et
ordinate perficiendos
diversae artes deserviunt.
Nihil enim aliud ars esse
videtur, quam certa
ordinatio rationis quomodo
per determinata media ad
debitum finem actus humani
perveniant. Ratio autem non
solum potest dirigere
inferiorum partium actus,
sed etiam actus sui
directivus est. Hoc enim est
proprium intellectivae
partis ut in seipsam
reflectatur: nam intellectus
intelligit seipsum et
similiter ratio de suo actu
ratiocinari potest. Si
igitur ex hoc quod ratio de
actu manus ratiocinatur
adinventa est ars
aedificatoria vel fabriis,
per quas homo faciliter et
ordinate huius modi actus
exercere potest; eadem
ratione ars quaedam
necessaria est, quae sit
directiva ipsius actus
rationis, per quam scilicet
homo in ipso actu rationis
ordinate, faciliter et sine
erore procedat. Et haec ars
est logica, idest rationalis
scientia." - In I Post.
Analyt., lect 1,
nn. 1-2.
{6} Q.D. de
pot., q. 7,
a. 11.
{7} St. Albert, De
Praedicabilibus, tract.
1, cap. 1.
{8} In I Ethic., lect.
1, n. 1. Cf. Ia {9} Metaphysics
{10} Cursus
Philosophicus, T.
I, p. 285.
{11} "Quod autem secundo
modo ab intellectu dependet,
scilicet ut obiectum,
dicitur proprie ens
rationis, ut pertinet ad
praesens, quia nummum esse
habet extra rationem, sed
solum obiective dicitur esse
in ipsa, et sic opponitur
enti reali." Ibid.
{12} Q.D. de
ver., q. 21,
a. 1.
{13} Cf. In V Metaphys.,
lect. 9, n. 896: "Sciendum
est autem quod iste secundus
modus comparatur ad primum
sicut effectus ad causam. Ex
hoc enim quod aliquid in
rerum natura est, sequitur
veritas et falsitas in
propositione, quam
intellectus significat per
hoc verbum Est prout est
verbalis copula. Sed, quia
aliquid, quod est in se non
ens, intellectus considerat
ut quoddam ens, sicut
negationem et huiusmodi,
ideo quandoque dicitur esse
de aliquo hoc secundo modo,
et non primo. Dicitur enim,
quod caccitas est secundo
modo, ex eo quod vera est
propositio, qua dicitur
aliquid esse caccum; non
tamen dicitur quod sit primo
modo vera. Nam caccitas non
habet aliquod esse in rebus,
sed magis est privatio
alicuius esse."
{14} In IV Metaphys.,
lect. 1, n. 539.
{15}"Ad cuius evidentiam
considerandum est quod solum
in his quae dicuntur ad
aliud inveniuntur aliqua
secundum rationem tantum, et
non secundum rem. Quod non
est in aliis generibus, quia
alia genera, ut quantitas et
qualitas, secundum propriam
rationem significant aliquid
alicui inhaerens. Ea vero
quae dicuntur ad aliquid,
significant secundum
propriam rationem solum
respectum ad aliud. Qui
quidem respectus aliquando
est in ipsa natura
rerum; utpote quando aliquae
res secundum suam naturam
ordinatae sunt, et invicem
inclinationem habent. Et
huiusmodi relationes oportet
esse reales. (...) Aliquando
vero respectus significatus
per ea quae dicuntur ad
aliquid est tantum in ipsa
apprehensione rationis
conferentis unum alteri; et
tunc est relatio rationis
tantum; sicut cum comparet
ratio hominem animali, ut
species ad genus." - Ia, q. 28,
a. 1.
{16} Cf. I Sent., d.
23, q. 1, a. 3.
{17} Q.D. de
pot., q. 7,
a. 9: "Prima enim intellecta
sunt res extra animam, in
quae primo intellectus
intelligenda fertur. Secunda
autem intellecta dicuntur
intentiones consequentes
modum intelligendi: hoc enim
secundo intellectus
intelligit in quantum
reflectitur supra se ipsum,
intelligens se intelligere
et modum quo intelligit.
Secundum ergo hanc
positionem sequeretur quod
relatio (between God and
creature) non sit in rebus
extra animam, sed in solo
intellectu, sicut intentio
generis et speciei, et
secundarum substantiarum."
{18} In IV Metaphys.,
lect. 4, n. 574.
{19} Q.D. de
pot., q. 7,
a.11.
{20} Ibid.
{21} Ibid.
{22} "Quandoque vero accipit
unum ut duo, et intelligit
ea cum quodam ordine: sicut
cum dicitur aliquid esse
idem sibi; et sic talis
relatio est rationis
tantum." - Ibid. Cf.
In V Metaphys., lect
11, n. 912: "Ex hoc autem
ulterius concludit, quod
identitas est unitas vel
unio; aut ex eo quod illa
quae dicuntur idem, sunt
plura secundum esse, et
tamen dicuntur idem
inquantum in aliquo uno
conveniunt. Aut quia sunt
unum secundum esse, sed
intellectus utitur eo ut
pluribus ad hoc quod
relationem intelligat. Nam
non potest intelligi relatio
nisi inter duo extrema.
Sicut cum dicitur aliquid
esse idem sibipsi. Tunc enim
intellectus utitur eo quod
est unum secundum rem, ut
duobus. Alias eiusdem ad
seipsum relationem designare
non posset. Unde patet, quod
si relatio semper requirit
duo extrema, et in huiusmodi
relationibus non sunt duo
extrema secundum rem sed
secundum intellectum solum,
relatio identitatis non erit
relatio realis, sed rationis
tantum, secundum quod
aliquid dicitur idem
simpliciter." Cf. Ia, q.
13, a. 12.
{23} St Thomas shows this
would follow if we
considered identity a real
relation. "Si enim
identitatis relatio esset
res aliqua praeter illud
quod dicitur idem, res
etiam, quae relatio est, cum
sit idem sibi, pari ratione
haberet aliam relationem,
quae sibi esset idem, et sic
in infinitum. Non est autem
possible in rebus infinitum
procedere. Nam cum
intellectus reflectatur
super suum actum, intelligit
se intelligere. Et hoc ipsum
potest etiam intelligere, et
sic in infinitum" - Q. D. de pot.,
q. 7, a. 11. CF. Q.D. de
ver., q. 1,
a. 5, ad 16.
{24} Ibid. Cf.
Q.D. de
ver., q. 21,
a. 1: "Illa autem relatio
(...) dicitur esse rationis
tantum, secundum quam
dicitur referri id quod non
dependet ad id ad quod
refertur, sed e
converso, cum ipsa
relatio quaedam dependentia
sit, sicut patet in scientia
et scibilis, sensu et
sensibili. Scientia enim
dependet a scibili, sed non
e converso: unde relatio qua
secientia refertur ad
scibile est realis; relatio
vero qua scibile refertur ad
scientiam est rationis
tamtum."
{25} Q.D. de
pot., q. 7,
a. 11, ad 3: "...dicendum
quod sicut aliquis est idem
sibi realiter, et non solum
secundum rationem, licet
relatio sit secundum
rationem tantum, propter hoc
quod relationis causa est
realis, scilicet unitas
substantiae quam intellectus
sub relatione intelligit..."
{26} In Boethii de
trin.. q.5, a.1, ad
2: "Res autem de quibus est
logica, non quaeruntur ad
cognoscendum propter
seipsas, sed ut adminiculum
quoddam ad alias scientias,
Et ideo logica non
continetur sub speculativa
philosophia quasi
principalis pars, sed sicut
quoddam reductum ad
philosophiam speculativam,
prout ministrat speculationi
sua instrumenta, scilicet
syllogismum et definitiones,
et alia huiusmodi, quibus in
scientiis speculativis
indigemus."
{27} Cf. iid., q.
6, a. 3.
{28} St Albert, De Praed.,
tract. 2, cap. 1.
{29} In III Metaphys.,
lect. 9, n. 446.
{30} I Sent. d.
19, q. 5, a. 1.
{31} Ia, q. 85,
a. 1, ad 1: "Cum ergo
dicitur quod intellectus est
falsus qui intelligit rem
aliter quam sit, verum est
si ly aliter referatur ad
rem intellectam. Tunc enim
intellectus est falsus
quando intelligit rem esse
aliter quam sit. (...) Non
est autem verum quod
proponitur si ly aliter
accipiatur ex parte
intelligentis. Est enim
alsque falsitate ut alius
sit modus intelligentis in
intelligendo, qum modus rei
in essendo; quia intellectum
est in intelligente
immaterialiter per modum
intellectus, non autem
materialiter per modum rei
materialis." Cf. ibid., q.
13, a. 12, ad 3.
{32} "Sic igitur patet, quod
naturae communi non potest
attribui intentio
universalitatis nisi
secundum esse quod habet in
intellectu: sic enim solum
est unum de multis, prout
intelligitur praeter
principia, quibus unum in
multa dividitur: unde
relinquitur, quod
universalia, secundum quod
sunt universalia, non sunt
nisi in anima. Ipsae autem
naturae, quibus
accidit intentio
universalitatis, sunt in
rebus. Et propter hoc nomina
communia significantia
naturas ipsas, praedicantur
de individuis; non autem
nomina significantia
intentiones. Socrates enim
est homo, sed non est
species, quamvis homo sit
species." - In II de anima,
lect. 12, n. 380; cf. Q. D. de
pot., q. 7,
a. 6.
{33} II Sent.,
d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.
{34} In I Metaphys.,
lect. 14, n. 209:
"...determinaverunt
(Platonici) procedentes de
his sensibilibus ad
praedictas species,
manifestum est si
consideretur, qua ratione
Platonici ideas induxerunt:
hac, scilicet, quia videbant
in omnibus univocis unum
esse in multis. Unde id unum
ponebant esse speciem
separatam. Videmus tamen,
quod circa omnes substantias
rerum aliarum ab ideis
invenitur unum in multis per
modum univocae
praedicationis, inquantum
inveniuntur multae unius
speciei. (...) Vel ponuntur
ideae non solum specierum,
sed etiam generum; et sic
sunt plures ideae quam
species omnes, et praeter
haec omnia et singula
genera."
{35} Ia, q.
85, a. 3, ad 4.
{36} Cf. De diversis
quaestionibus 83, q.
46; St Thomas, Ia, q.
84, a. 5; ibid.,
q.15.
{37} Ia, q. 55,
a. 2, ad 1.
{38} Il Sent., d.
3, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1: "Est
autem quoddam universale
quod est a re acceptum per
abstractionem, et hoc
posterius est re; et hoc
modo formae angelorum non
sunt universales. Est etiam
quoddam universale ad rem,
quod est prius re ipsa,
socut forma domus in mente
aedificatoris; et per hunc
modum sunt universales
formae rerum in mente
angelica existentes, non ita
quod sint operativae, sed
quia sunt operativis
similes, sicut aliquis
speculative scientiam
opertativam habet."
{39} Ibid.; cf.
In I de anima,
lect. 1, n. 13; Ia, q. 85,
a. 3, ad 1.
{40} In Metaphys.,
lect. 3, n. 1964. See below,
chapter VII.
{41} In Boethiis de
trin., q. 5, a. 4;
cf. Q.D. de
ver., q. 7,
a. 6, ad 7. The two kinds of
community will be discussed
in chapters VII and X.
{42} In
Metaphys., lect.
10, n. 158.
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