Jacques Maritain Center : The Logic of Analogy / by Ralph McInerny


The necessity and importance of logic is indicated by the place it occupies in the order of learning. St Thomas tells us that logic must be learned before any other science, and he points out that this has been the usual method of philosophers.

Primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium cuasas.{1}
It can be seen that the order of learning is based upon what is more easily known by us as well as on the amount of experience required for the various sciences. Logic, however, does not come first because it is easy to learn; it is most difficult, second only to metaphysics in this regard.{2} The priority of logic is founded on the fact that it is presupposed by every other science. "Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam aliis scientiis, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis."{3} The very nature of the human mind requires logic, for although the object of the intellect is truth, it is not so determined to its object that error is impossible. There are first principles which are known easily and without possibility of error, but they are common and do not of themselves give a determinate and particular knowledge of everything that follows on them. As soon as we move away from these principles, error is possible. With regard to this further knowledge, then, we are not guided by nature so much as by art.{4} Given the indetermination of the mind apart from its grasp of first principles, some determination is required if it is to proceed easily, in an orderly manner, and without error. This determination is had from the art of logic.

    Every art determines human acts in such a way that operation is made easy. In other words, art is a rational direction of human acts whereby they attain their ends by determinate means. However, reason is directive not only of the acts of powers other than itself, but also of its own act: reason can reflect on and reason about reasoning. And, just as reasoning about manual operations is productive of an art which directs such activity in such a way that man can proceed easily and surely in, say, building, so too an art is produced by reason when it reflects on its on activity. this art is logic.{5}

    St Thomas maintains that logic is necessary if the act of reason is to achieve its end. Sometimes he speaks of that reflexive act which gives rise to logic as one of discovery, as in the following text.

Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuentur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem.{6}
Does this mean that logic is a natural product of reasoning and that the art of logic consists in pointing out what is already given? St Albert speaks of a natural logic of human reason, a way any man has of moving from what he knows to knowledge of something new, although this natural logic is exceedingly imperfect and liable to error.{7} On this view, the art of logic would perfect this natural logic by introducing that determination which produces facility and freedom from error. This constructive role of logic is suggested by St Thomas.
Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae.{8}
The order which is introduced into the act of reason is the proper work of logic. This is not to say that there is something arbitrary about logic, as if a plurality of logics is possible because of the individual differences of men. In reflecting on its own operation, the intellect discovers a foundation for logical relations. We will see later what it is about the human mode of knowing which makes its concepts apt subjects of logical relations. Before discussing that, however, there is a prior problem. Logical relations are said to be beings of reason, entia rationis. What is meant by a being of reason?


The being of reason or the relation of reason is often said to be the subject matter of logic. although this is true, it should be pointed out that there are beings of reason which are not relations and that not just any relation of reason is the concern of the logician. But first of all there is a distinction made between real being and being of reason. Real being is that which is divided by the ten categories. "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures."{9} Real being is that which exists apart from our thought. Beings of reason on the other hand, would seem by definition to depend upon our minds. To avoid any confusion on this score, it may be well to observe a distinction made by John of St Thomas between kinds of dependence upon reason.

Ens rationis in omni sua latitudine, si nominis significationem attendamus, dicit id, quod dependet aliquo modo a ratione. Potest autem dependere vel ut effectus a causa vel ut obiectum a cognoscente.{10}
Works of art, since they depend upon the mind of the artist, can be called beings of reason in the first sense. It is the second kind of being of reason that we shall be opposing to real being.{11}

    The being of reason so understood can be subdivided into negation and relation. One finds this distinction made in discussions of what are called the transcendental properties of being, namely the one, the true and the good. although they are the same reality as being, they are said to differ from being ratione.

Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat. Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum.{12}
In the text of the De ente et essentia cited above in note nine, St Thomas points out how negation and privation are said to be. Taking his example, blindness, the privation of sight, is an absence or lack in the real order. In the mind, however, it takes on objective existence and can enter into a proposition.{13} thus we say, "Blindness is _______." Not only privations, but also simple negations are said to be in this way.
Item negationes eorum quae ad substantiam habitudines habent, vel etiam ipsius substantiae esse dicuntur. Unde dicimus quod non ens est non ens. Quod non diceretur nisi negationi aliquo modo esse competeret.{14}
Of course it is only in the mind that non-being enjoys existence.

    Although privations and negations are beings of reason, it is not entia rationis of this kind which are the subject of logic. That subject is always a relation of reason, and it is by opposing it to non-logical relations of reason that we can isolate it and discover what it is.

    It is only in the genus of relation, St Thomas holds, that we can have something of reason alone and not of the real order. In the other genera, such as quantity and quality, what is properly signified is something which inheres in something else. Those things, however, which fall in the genus of relation, which are said ad aliquid, properly signify only a reference to something else. Sometimes this reference is of the very nature of a thing, as when things are by nature mutually ordered to one another so that they have an inclination to each other. These are real relations. Sometimes the reference signified is due to the grasp of reason which refers one thing to another. These relations are of reason alone as, for example, when reason compares man to animal as a species to its genus.{15}

    The relations of reason with which the logician is concerned are called secunda intellecta or second intentions.{16} The things we know first of all are things outside the mind, and second intentions follow on the way the grasp their natures, namely, by abstracting them from their material conditions. To know these second intentions, the mind must reflect upon itself, know itself as knowing and the way in which it knows.{17} It is the order which is put among things as they are known which is the proper subject of logic.

Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei, et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.{18}
Although all logical relations are relations of reason, not all relations of reason are logical relations. St Thomas has, in a text which will occupy us for several pages, carefully distinguished logical from non-logical relations of reason. The basis of the distinction will be seen to be that to which the relations are attributed.

    Logical relations are attributed to known things precisely insofar as they are known. The intellect forms the relation of species by considering the order of that which is in the mind to that which is in the real order; it forms the relation of genus by considering the order of one concept to another.{19} To say of a given nature that it is a species or a genus is to attribute a relation to it insofar as it is known. The foundation of the relation is in things as they are known by our minds. This is not the case with non-logical relations of reason.

    Non-logical relations of reason are said to follow on our mode of understanding in that the intellect understands one thing as ordered to another. Such relations, although they are not in things as they exist, are nonetheless founded on them as they exist.

Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.{20}

    Given these three conditions of a real relation, St Thomas goes on to list four non-logical relations of reason which fail to fulfil one or the other of those conditions.

    The first such relation does not fulfil the first condition of real relations, namely that both of the things among which the order obtains be real beings.

Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes.{21}
The second such relation, that of self-identity, does not fulfil the second condition of real relations, namely that the things ordered be two really distinct entities. When something is said to be identical with itself, what is really one is understood as if it were two, and yet it is the existent thing which is said to be identical with itself.{22}

    The remaining non-logical relations of reason fail to fulfil the third condition of real relations, namely that the two extremes can be ordered to one another. The relation between a relation and the subject of that relation is said to be of reason alone, for if there were really such a relation, we would be involved in an infinite regress. Moreover, it is easy to see that this relation and the possible infinity to which it leads are due to reason alone.{23} Paternity is a relation, and we can understand it as related to the man who is a father by another relation intermediate between the subject and the relation of paternity.

    The fourth kind of non-logical relation of reason is that whereby the understand a mutual relation where there is a real relation in one direction alone.

Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad alius, in quantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum; et sic cum quodam ordine ad scientiam, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum.{24}
Our knowledge, both sense and intellectual, is really related to things, and, because of this, we understand things as related to our knowledge, naming them sensible or knowable. But things are not really related to our knowing powers. Nevertheless, like all such non-logical relations of reason, this is founded on things as they exist; not again because they are really related to our knowledge, but because our knowledge is really not such merely in our minds. The relation is of reason alone, but identity is something real.{25} Likewise with the transcendental properties of being; although they differ from being only ratione, they are attributed to real being: they are not logical properties, true of being as known but not as it exists. Being is said to be good because it is understood as related to appetite, true because it is understood as related to intellect.

When the appetitive and cognitive powers are ours, these are relations of reason alone, but things are good and true as they exist.

    In summary, we can say that the beings of reason which are opposed to real being are negations or privations, on the one hand, relations on the other. Some relations of reason are said to follow on our mode of understanding, but are founded on things as they exist. Logical relations are founded on things as known. We will schematize our findings thus far.

Divisio Entis Rationis

			quam ratio adinvenito(v)
			consequens modum intelligendi(vi)
				(a) alterum vel neutrum ens
				(b) identitas(vii)
				(c) relatio relationis
				(d) scientia / scibile(viii)

(i) Cf. De ente et essentia, cap. 1; In V Metaphys., lect. 9, 889. Cf. John of St Thomas, op. cit., pp. 285-290. For the division of ens rationis into negation and relation, see Q.D. de ver., q. 21, a. 1.

(iii) In V Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 896; In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, n. 539.

(iv) Ia, q. 28, a. 1.

(v) In IV Metaphys., lect. 4, n. 574; Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 11; Q.D. de ver., q. 1, a. 5, ad 16.

(vi) Q. D. de pot., q. 7, a. 11.

(vii) In V Metaphys, lect. 1, n. 912.

(viii)  Q. D. de ver.,  q. 21, a. 1.

Logical entities or relations are properties of things as known. Just as the reflexive act whereby the intellect knows its own nature presupposes knowledge of something else, so too the reflexive act which logic implies requires knowledge of real entities and these real entities are the remote foundation for logical intentions. Logical beings of reason have as their purpose the orderingof our knowledge of real things. One does not study logic for its own sake, but ultimately as an instrument of science. For this reason, logic is not said to be a speculative science; it is not however, called a practical science either.{26}

    The root of logic is the imperfection of human reason. The indeterminations of our intellect requires an art which can guide the very act of reason to its goal of truth. This is accomplished by the formation of second intentions, a realm of entities which are properties of things as known and not as they exist. Our knowledge of logical entities is a mediate knowledge, as we have seen.{27} furthermore, second intentions have as their purpose the directing of the mind in its knowledge of real things. It can be seen that it is extremely important to respect the difference between the logical and real orders: to confuse them is to court philosophical disaster.


The first problem that the logician must consider, according to St. Albert,{28} is that of universality. Universality, as we shall see, is a second intention and in examining an instance where universality was given an ontological status in rerum natura we will see the consequences of confusing the real and intentional orders. The Platonic philosophy provides the instance, and by this we mean Plato as Aristotle and St. Thomas understood him. For our purposes, it matters little whether or not Plato meant what St Thomas takes him to mean; the criticism of Plato serves to bring out the difference between the logical and real orders.

    As has been pointed out above, second intentions are properties of natures as they are known by us: something happens to these natures when they are grasped by out intellect.

Nec oportet, sicut multoties dictum est, quod aliquid eumdem modum essendi habeat in rebus, per quem modum ab intellectu scientis comprehenditur. Nam intellectus immaterialiter cognoscit materialia; et similiter natura rerum, quae singulariter in rebus existunt, intellectus cognoscit universaliter, idest absque consideratione principiorum et accidentium individualium.{29}
In the real order there are only singular things, and in the realm perceived by the senses, these singulars are material. This man differs from that in such a way that the first man is located here and the other there. They are set off from one another, individuated. And yet, in knowing what man is, we form an idea which does not include every particular difference of man and man. Rather our idea expresses what is common and essential to this man, that man and every man. Because our intellect grasps only what is essential to the individuals and leaves aside their individual differences, the nature as known founds a relationship to the many from which it has been abstracted. The property of human nature whereby it is one thing which can be said of many individuals is a property of that nature as it is known. It is the second intention of universality.

Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio secundum quam dicitur species.{30}

The way in which the nature exists in the mind and the way in which it exists in rerum natura differ. This can pose a rather grave problem. If man exists only individually and we grasp human nature as something universal and common to many, it would seem that we understand things otherwise than they are. But truth consists in the conformity of knowledge with reality. So it would seem that intellectual knowledge is radically false and destroys its object in knowing it. We must ask to what "otherwise" refers in the statement, "The intellect understands things otherwise than they are." If the adverb refers to the object known, the objection holds: to understand the object to be otherwise than it is is to have a false understanding. But if "otherwise" refers to our mode of knowing, it does not follow that our understanding things otherwise than they are produces falsity.{31} It is one thing to understand that a material thing is immaterial and quite another to understand a material thing immatrially.

    Certain names are imposed to signify the nature with the intention of universality, such as genus, species, etc. These are kinds of logical universal and cannot be predicated of the nature as it exists outside the mind.{32} Sometimes, however, St Thomas refers to the existing nature as a universal. There is a universal in things,  namely the nature which is in particulars, although in them it does not have the note of universality. "Quoddam (universale) est in re, scilicet natura ipsa, quae est in particularibus, quamvis in eis non sit secundum rationem universalitatis in actu."{33}

    When the different modes of existence which the nature has in reality and in the mind are not distinguished, we have the Platonic confusion. Aristotle's criticism of Plato is that he confused the logical and real orders, that he wanted something real to respond as such  to the intentions which the mind forms in knowing. This issued in a reification of the logical universal that that not only was there to be a concept of man representing a nature common to many individuals, but there would also be an Idea, Man in himself, which exists apart and by participation in which particular men are. That the World of Ideas arose from the reification of logical entities seems obvious. The Platonist saw that in universals there is something one which is common to many, and it was this one thing which was postulated as enjoying separate existence. Logically, they would be forced to maintain that there must be separate genera as well and the World of Ideas soon becomes more densely populated than the world of singulars it is meant to explain.{34}

    We say that universality follows on our mode of understanding: it is in fact a principle or means of knowing for us. What Plato has done consequently, is to make what is a principle of our knowledge of things, a principle of the being of those things. This can hardly be the case, however, for our concepts are not always representations of what in reality are the principles of a thing's being, as when we know causes through their effects and substances through their accidents.{35} Something can be a cause of knowledge even when it is not a cause of being. Plato's position does not necessarily entail that our knowledge be causative of things, however. That is, the Platonic position may be seen as a likening of human knowledge, not to the divine, but to the angelic mode of knowing. In the Christian tradition, following the lead of St Augustine, the Platonic Ideas have been interpreted as the divine creative ideas. {36} In somewhat the same way, Plato seems to want our knowledge to be ad re. True knowledge of things is had by means of the ideas in which they participate, and not by species abstracted from them. Plato's Ideas are, as it were, concepts existing outside the mind. Aristotle, on the other hand, is quite insistent that the universal nature is for us posterior to things, derived from them{39}

    What Plato has done, in effect, is to make the logical universal, the universale in praedicando, a universal cause, an universale in causando. "Sed alia est communitas universalis et causae. Nam causa non praedicatur de suis effectibus, quia non sunt idem causa suiipsius. Sed universale est commune quasi aliquid praedicatum de multis; et sic oportet quod aliquo modo sit unum in multis, et non seorus subsistens ab eis."{40}

    There can be principles common to all things in two ways, by predication or by causality. The metaphysician, whose interest is those common causes, must not be waylaid by logical universals.{41} If there is a realm of separate entities, it cannot be attained by Plato's method.


{1}   In librum de causis, (ed. Saffrey), proemium; Cf. In VI Ethic., lect. 7, n. 1211.

{2}  Ad tertium dicendum quod in addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac rationeeo quod est facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac rationeoportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enimmaximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia alia scientiae ab ipsa dependet, inquantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis." - In Boethii de trin., (ed. Wyser), q. 6, a. 1, qa 2, ad 3.

{3} In II Metaphys., lect. 5, n. 335; In Boethii de trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 2. The priority of logic is argued for in the via addiscendi, not in the via inviendi. Cf. Q.D. de ver., q. 11, a. 1.

{4} Insofar as the intellect, like every potency of the soul, is quaedam natura, it has a natural appetite. That is why the grasp of first principles is said to be per modum naturae, as opposed to per modum rationis. However, the grasp of the first principles  per modum naturae does not imply the will's entering into the specification of the object, as is the case when faith and the moral virtues are siad to be per modum naturae. In the latter two, the will has an influence of the very object, whereas in the case of first principles, the intellect is moved by the evidence of its proper object. Cf. IIII Sent.,  d. 23, q. 3, sol. 2, ad 2.

{5} "Et inde est quod ad actus humandos faciliter et ordinate perficiendos diversae artes deserviunt. Nihil enim aliud ars esse videtur, quam certa ordinatio rationis quomodo per determinata media ad debitum finem actus humani perveniant. Ratio autem non solum potest dirigere inferiorum partium actus, sed etiam actus sui directivus est. Hoc enim est proprium intellectivae partis ut in seipsam reflectatur: nam intellectus intelligit seipsum et similiter ratio de suo actu ratiocinari potest. Si igitur ex hoc quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabriis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huius modi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine erore procedat. Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis scientia." - In I Post. Analyt., lect 1, nn. 1-2.

{6} Q.D. de pot.,  q. 7, a. 11.

{7} St. Albert,  De Praedicabilibus,  tract. 1, cap. 1.

{8} In I Ethic., lect. 1, n. 1. Cf.  Ia

{9}  Metaphysics, Delta, 7, 1017a24. Cf. De ente et essentia, cap. 1: "Sciendum est quod, sicut in 5 Meta. Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter: Uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera; alio modo, quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est, quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiamsi illud in re nihil ponat; per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur: dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo, non potest dici aliquid quod sit ens, nisi quod in re aliquid ponat."

{10} Cursus Philosophicus, T. I, p. 285.

{11} "Quod autem secundo modo ab intellectu dependet, scilicet ut obiectum, dicitur proprie ens rationis, ut pertinet ad praesens, quia nummum esse habet extra rationem, sed solum obiective dicitur esse in ipsa, et sic opponitur enti reali." Ibid.

{12} Q.D. de ver.,  q. 21, a. 1.

{13} Cf. In V Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 896: "Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum Est prout est verbalis copula. Sed, quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationem et huiusmodi, ideo quandoque dicitur esse de aliquo hoc secundo modo, et non primo. Dicitur enim, quod caccitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caccum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo modo vera. Nam caccitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius esse."

{14} In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, n. 539.

{15}"Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod solum in his quae dicuntur ad aliud inveniuntur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, et non secundum rem. Quod non est in aliis generibus, quia alia genera, ut quantitas et qualitas, secundum propriam rationem significant aliquid alicui inhaerens. Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid, significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud. Qui quidem respectus aliquando est in ipsa  natura rerum; utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ordinatae sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent. Et huiusmodi relationes oportet esse reales. (...) Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea quae dicuntur ad aliquid est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri; et tunc est relatio rationis tantum; sicut cum comparet ratio hominem animali, ut species ad genus." - Ia, q. 28, a. 1.

{16} Cf. I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 3.

{17} Q.D. de pot.,  q. 7, a. 9: "Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit. Secundum ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio (between God and creature) non sit in rebus extra animam, sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et secundarum substantiarum."

{18} In IV Metaphys., lect. 4, n. 574.

{19} Q.D. de pot.,  q. 7, a.11.

{20} Ibid.

{21} Ibid.

{22} "Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum." - Ibid.  Cf. In V Metaphys., lect 11, n. 912: "Ex hoc autem ulterius concludit, quod identitas est unitas vel unio; aut ex eo quod illa quae dicuntur idem, sunt plura secundum esse, et tamen dicuntur idem inquantum in aliquo uno conveniunt. Aut quia sunt unum secundum esse, sed intellectus utitur eo ut pluribus ad hoc quod relationem intelligat. Nam non potest intelligi relatio nisi inter duo extrema. Sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibipsi. Tunc enim intellectus utitur eo quod est unum secundum rem, ut duobus. Alias eiusdem ad seipsum relationem designare non posset. Unde patet, quod si relatio semper requirit duo extrema, et in huiusmodi relationibus non sunt duo extrema secundum rem sed secundum intellectum solum, relatio identitatis non erit relatio realis, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur idem simpliciter." Cf. Ia,  q. 13, a. 12.

{23} St Thomas shows this would follow if we considered identity a real relation. "Si enim identitatis relatio esset res aliqua praeter illud quod dicitur idem, res etiam, quae relatio est, cum sit idem sibi, pari ratione haberet aliam relationem, quae sibi esset idem, et sic in infinitum. Non est autem possible in rebus infinitum procedere. Nam cum intellectus reflectatur super suum actum, intelligit se intelligere. Et hoc ipsum potest etiam intelligere, et sic in infinitum" - Q. D. de pot., q. 7, a. 11. CF. Q.D. de ver.,  q. 1, a. 5, ad 16.

{24} Ibid. Cf. Q.D. de ver.,  q. 21, a. 1: "Illa autem relatio (...) dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur, sed e converso,  cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et scibilis, sensu et sensibili. Scientia enim dependet a scibili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua secientia refertur ad scibile est realis; relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam est rationis tamtum."

{25} Q.D. de pot.,  q. 7, a. 11, ad 3: "...dicendum quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit..."

{26} In Boethii de trin.. q.5, a.1, ad 2: "Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias, Et ideo logica non continetur sub speculativa philosophia quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad philosophiam speculativam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismum et definitiones, et alia huiusmodi, quibus in scientiis speculativis indigemus."

{27} Cf. iid., q. 6, a. 3.

{28} St Albert, De Praed., tract. 2, cap. 1.

{29} In III Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 446.

{30} I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1.

{31} Ia, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1: "Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si ly aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus quando intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. (...) Non est autem verum quod proponitur si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte  intelligentis. Est enim alsque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, qum modus rei in essendo; quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter per modum intellectus, non autem materialiter per modum rei materialis." Cf. ibid., q. 13, a. 12, ad 3.

{32} "Sic igitur patet, quod naturae communi non potest attribui intentio universalitatis nisi secundum esse quod habet in intellectu: sic enim solum est unum de multis, prout intelligitur praeter principia, quibus unum in multa dividitur: unde relinquitur, quod universalia, secundum quod sunt universalia, non sunt nisi in anima. Ipsae autem naturae, quibus  accidit intentio universalitatis, sunt in rebus. Et propter hoc nomina communia significantia naturas ipsas, praedicantur de individuis; non autem nomina significantia intentiones. Socrates enim est homo, sed non est species, quamvis homo sit species." - In II de anima, lect. 12, n. 380; cf. Q. D. de pot.,  q. 7, a. 6.

{33} II Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.

{34} In I Metaphys., lect. 14, n. 209: "...determinaverunt (Platonici) procedentes de his sensibilibus ad praedictas species, manifestum est si consideretur, qua ratione Platonici ideas induxerunt: hac, scilicet, quia videbant in omnibus univocis unum esse in multis. Unde id unum ponebant esse speciem separatam. Videmus tamen, quod circa omnes substantias rerum aliarum ab ideis invenitur unum in multis per modum univocae praedicationis, inquantum inveniuntur multae unius speciei. (...) Vel ponuntur ideae non solum specierum, sed etiam generum; et sic sunt plures ideae quam species omnes, et praeter haec omnia et singula genera."

{35} Ia, q. 85, a. 3, ad 4.

{36} Cf. De diversis quaestionibus 83,  q. 46; St Thomas, Ia,  q. 84, a. 5; ibid., q.15.

{37} Ia, q. 55, a. 2, ad 1.

{38} Il Sent.,  d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1: "Est autem quoddam universale quod est a re acceptum per abstractionem, et hoc posterius est re; et hoc modo formae angelorum non sunt universales. Est etiam quoddam universale ad rem, quod est prius re ipsa, socut forma domus in mente aedificatoris; et per hunc modum sunt universales formae rerum in mente angelica existentes, non ita quod sint operativae, sed quia sunt operativis similes, sicut aliquis speculative scientiam opertativam habet."

{39} Ibid.; cf. In I de anima, lect. 1, n. 13; Ia, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1.

{40} In Metaphys., lect. 3, n. 1964. See below, chapter VII.

{41} In Boethiis de trin., q. 5, a. 4; cf.  Q.D. de ver.,  q. 7, a. 6, ad 7. The two kinds of community will be discussed in chapters VII and X.

{42} In Metaphys.,  lect. 10, n. 158.

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