ALMOST all Protestant theologians agree in saying that "a view of Christianity in which works are taken into account causes morality to be divided into two 'stories,' " one of the Commandments and the other of the Counsels.{1}
The Catholic Church, it is said, mistakes "the A B C of a Christian life," which recognizes the perfection of a Christian to consist in faith and in the love of God and His will, and which demands this offering of faith and love from all Christians, since it includes within itself the highest moral achievements.{2} The Church is said to regard the moral law as a routine which is not thorough enough for the elect;{3} and consequently "perfection, real Christianity," is possible only to a small circle of chosen souis, after the fashion of ancient aristocracy.
The spirit of asceticism which Catholicism possesses, in common with pagan religions, and which is hostile to the world and to civilization, determines in what this false perfection consists.{4} It believes in the possibility of "a spiritual life, having God as its sole aim, and being free from all worldly pursuits and moral duties."{5} "As the Catholic Church chiefly emphasizes the future life she has no proper appreciation for the present, for a man's work and calling."{6} Only in the religious state does she see "Christian perfection."{7}
In order to throw some light on these charges, let us begin with the actual and public instructions issued by our Church. In the Catechism used in the ecclesiastical province of Cologne, the question is asked: "Wherein does Christian perfection consist?" The answer is: "Christian perfection consists in our keeping ourselves free from all inordinate love of the world and of self, and in loving God above all things, and all things in God." Further on we are told that "the way to perfection lies in following Jesus Christ, and in practising the virtues taught us in the eight beatitudes." Prayer, the hearing of God's word, the reception of the sacraments, self-denial, and the performance of our daily work in a way pleasing to God, are recommended to every Christian as the means of attaining perfection. Finally we find the Evangelical Counsels, of voluntary poverty, perpetual chastity, and perfect obedience to a spiritual superior, designated as particular means of perfection. I may remind my readers that, in the same Catechism, love of God, which is here described as the essence of perfection, is not enjoined as a counsel, but made the fundamental duty of every Christian, and set down as the chief Commandment standing in the forefront of all moral teaching.
These quotations from the Catechism are only the crystallization of all theological teaching on the subject, the popular expression of what has been said by men like St. Basil and St. Augustine, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, Eckhart and St. Francis of Sales, Suarez and Bellarmine. Love is the very essence of Christian perfection, and this love is not a Counsel, but the first and greatest Commandment. This is the unanimous teaching of all Catholic authorities, and we may actually call it a Catholic dogma.{8}
Denifle refers to a great many ascetic writers, both well known and obscure, who taught the same doctrine in the Middle Ages.{9} This love can unfold and manifest itself in many different forms and under various circumstances of life. All external works and achievements, as well as the abstinence and sacrifice of the ascetic life, are only the material which is inspired and glorified by love, the means which love uses for its advancement. On account of its greater capacity to further this love, the religious life is sometimes called the "life of perfection"; but those who give it this name do not intend thereby to deny the possibility and duty of perfection to people in other ranks of life, any more than those who speak of the "religious life" mean to imply thereby that people in the world are not called upon to be religious.
It is not outward severity, not the magnitude of gifts or works, but the degree of love of God and one's neighbour, the purity and force of the inner disposition to virtue, that determine the degree of perfection; hence many in the world attain to even higher sanctity than those in religious houses.{10}
In his "Practica di amar Gesù Cristo," St. Alphonsus insists upon the duty of loving our crucified Saviour, and says that not austerities, not prayer, not the frequent reception of the sacraments, and not almsgiving constitute the essence of Christian perfection, but charity.{11}
When Protestant moralists light upon Catholic expressions of this kind, they admire them as utterances of a liberal spirit, and have no idea how obvious and commonplace these ideas are to any instructed Catholic. Not long ago an author collected and published some interesting Italian folk-lore, and amongst it was a tale that attracted particular notice. It was the story of a monk, to whom, in order to make him more humble, God revealed that there were despised vagrants and other such worldly people equal or superior to him in perfection. It was argued that this story arose from some reaction on part of the people against the prestige of the religious life; but, as a matter of fact, it was merely a very ancient monastic legend!{12}
Charity, the essential perfection, is the law of the Christian life in the sense that it is final; there is nothing beyond it. As St. Thomas says: "Love of God and one's neighbour does not fall under the Law in but a limited measure, so that what lies beyond it belongs to Counsels."{13} "The commandment of the love of God, that constitutes the highest aim of a Christian life, is not restricted by any limitations, so that one could assert a love of a certain intensity to fall under the commandment, whilst a greater love would go beyond the limits of the Commandments and fall under the Counsels." {14}
God being infinitely good and infinitely worthy of our love, and our obligation to Him being absolute, we ought to dedicate unreservedly to His glory and service all that we are and all that we do, the simplest as well as the highest actions. But within this general fundamental obligation there are distinctions between what is good and what is better, between what is permitted, required, and counselled. In the light of charity all means and ways leading to God are not alike, nor are all actions realizing His designs of an equal value. We saw in the preceding section that the moral value of an action is not added to it arbitrarily and from the outside, but is inherent in its nature and is the outcome of its ideal connection, when this connection is traced back to the absolute. Hence it is plain that gradations of goodness occur in the sphere of morals, and that there are degrees and an objective diversity in what is good, as well as in what is sinful.{15} Thus the care to preserve one's honour and good name is in itself better than the care to preserve one's property; the development of one's intellect is better than to increase bodily strength; keeping the marriage bond holy is better than to maintain friendly relations; and to defend life or country when in danger is better than to defend one's possessions. It is, however, true that these things are morally better only in the light of the highest Good.
The virtues also are not all of the same dignity and beauty, and among duties there is diversity of obligation and importance, and in matters where there is no moral obligation we can distinguish what is simply permitted from what is advisable. At the risk of again incurring the charge of taking a material view, we may even say that to give abundant alms and to found a splendid social institution are things objectively "better" than to offer scanty gifts, and a fatiguing and pious pilgrimage is better than a simple "Our Father." And in doing so we are not unmindful of what our Lord said about the widow's mite, nor of St. Paul's panegyric of charity; for in these comparisons we are not thinking of the absolute dignity and significance of the act, which we also make dependent upon the greatness of the love prompting it, but rather of the relative, material side of morality, of which we assert that while it is subordinate to the absolute, it is not altogether merged in it. God looks primarily at the love, the disposition of the heart; but where the inward disposition is the same, the more abundant gift is more pleasing to Him than the scanty one; a generous disposition naturally impels a man to do great deeds, and his heroic action reacts upon his disposition and increases its generosity.{16}
Circumstances affecting the occasion and the individual often alter and even reverse this "objective" valuation, so as to give what is of counsel the character sometimes of sin and sometimes of duty. But is not this equally true of the requirements that every one recognizes as moral commandments? All that is morally good, the highest Good alone excepted, is, as we have seen, relative, and these things limit and condition one another. Hence the claims that they make upon us may be in conflict or even destroy one another. Obedience to parents ceases to be an obligation if the parents demand what is wrong. The duty of regarding one's neighbour's life as sacred is not binding in case of self-defence or war. The prohibition to injure the property of others admits of exceptions when higher interests are at stake. In spite of this relativity or elasticity of the moral rule, are not obedience to parents and respect for the life and property of others objectively virtues and duties, and is not failure to observe them a sin? If this is so, we cannot deny that the moral truths called Counsels have also an objective value, although they are not judged by any absolute standard, and may be affected by clashing with other moral duties, and possess an absolute value only when referred to their highest end, which is charity.
It may, however, be maintained that when a serious and tender conscience recognizes one thing as better than another, it is bound to choose it. Our opponents tell us "that to despise the better course, when it is recognized, is a moral defect," and "that everything is contrary to duty that is not required by duty." A Christian has but one thing to seek -- viz., doing God's will; but this will is always authoritative. The utmost that can be conceded is that our inability to see clearly the authoritative will of God may give to a duty the appearance of a Counsel.{17}
It is not correct to say to one honestly striving after morality that the recognition of a better course invariably makes it his duty to adopt it. We can see here that it is precisely Catholic morals which grasp in their deepest meaning the true unity and absolute character of morality and the superiority of the moral ideal to all mere forms of it. We may sum up the Catholic theory thus: As charity is subordinate only to the highest Good, "the Best," it is free in its attitude towards what is only "the Better." It stands under the Law, but above the laws.{18}
Charity is bound only by the highest Good; no virtuous aims, no external good works, are equal to real charity, directed towards the Absolute; and therefore it is obligatory only in as far as the maintenance of order to the highest end requires. No one can say that greater love necessarily impels us to do a greater deed, since love knows that in God's sight the ex quanto, and not the quantum, decides the moral value of an action. A Christian, says St. Thomas, is not bound to aim at the perfection which resides in the objects of his actions, nor to possess it; but he is bound not to despise it and not to be callous or indifferent to it.{19} This respect for what is better, and its greater suitability to attain the purposes of love, make it preponderate over what is less good when they are weighed in the moral balance; and in this way we arrive at what is of counsel, in addition to what is permitted and what is of obligation.{20}
This Catholic theory is not weakened by pointing out that we are never free from the obligation to do God's will. We have already seen that the conscience does not receive, in every case, special enlightenment, upon which a moral decision can be based. However much attention may be paid to individual considerations, personal experiences and impulses, this individual and accidental factor must be appreciated in the light of the necessary and general idea.{21}
It is contrary to all experience to assume that we enjoy a particular revelation in every moral decision. The important thing to notice is that the adoption of this principle excludes not only what is counselled, but also what is permitted. For if I invariably have to fulfil duties, there is no place left for freedom, and therefore no place for what is permitted. The short-sighted opposition of Protestant theology to the Catholic view of the Counsels has had disastrous results, and to the present day there are, in Protestant ethics, strange contradictions and obscurities on so simple and fundamental an ethical truth as the existence of the permitted.{22}
A superficial thinker may be tempted to accept the statement that, by assigning preëminence to the ascetic life, the Catholic Church regards the ordinary life as evil,{23} and science, art, and literature as pagan abominations.{24} The argument is: The recognition of one thing as better pronounces the other to be bad. In what other sphere of thought would logic such as this be tolerated? But when employed against the Church it always has its effect. If a man ascribes a higher value to gold, does that necessarily mean that he despises silver? Or does a preference for the rose imply a dislike of other flowers? And these comparisons are used by the Fathers of the Church. How many admire Beethoven as the greatest musician, without wishing to disparage Haydn and Mozart! Many honour Goethe as greater than Schiller, without any desire to undervalue the latter! Many a lover of nature returns again and again to the Alps, though he regrets that on his way he cannot stop to explore the charming heights of the Vosges or the Black Forest. Why should the praise given by the Church to virginity be regarded as a disparagement of marriage, or the recommendation of heroic self-denial be considered a condemnation of riches?
Another important consideration presents itself here. What is better in abstracto is not better for every one, and a man's special calling must be kept in view as well as the general "counsel."{25} The kingdom of God is intended to include persons of various ranks and spheres, and by means of outward circumstances and inward suggestions God takes care that there shall always be some who are ready to devote themselves to the clerical state.{26}
The thought of Christian society as an organism had great influence on opinions in the early ages of Christianity. It is not always clearly expressed with regard to the antithesis between work in the world and retirement from the world, but it can be traced from very early times, and has gone on developing itself more clearly. The Church is a body having various members; the eye may be nobler than the foot, but still it is best for the body that both should be healthy.{27} The Church is a garden, the beauty of which consists in the variety of its flowers and plants.{28} Christ praised Mary for choosing the better part, but He did not tell Martha to leave her work and come to sit at His feet. Non ergo Dominus opus reprehendit, sed munus distinxit;{29} and accordingly Martha's office as well as Mary's was to continue in the Church.
Modern ascetical writers express the same opinion. St. Francis of Sales says that it is love of God which impels one man to poverty and withdraws another from it, which makes one enter the married state and another practise celibacy.{30} "The state that is holiest in itself is not the best for all; it is only when each man occupies the position assigned to him by God, and labours in it zealously, that unity, harmony, and beauty can prevail in society or in the Church. . . . Only a few are called to dedicate themselves to serve God as priests at the altar, or as religious in a monastery; most are destined to be laymen, living the ordinary life of Christians in the world, fighting the good fight there, and earning for themselves the eternal crown."{31}
But it may be asked whether the social idea does not preclude the distinction between what is good and what is better. If all the members are indispensable to the organism, must they not all be equal?{32}
In reply I may quote Lagarde, who says (p. 164): "Equality amongst the members exists only in a corpse; in a living body the eye, the brain, or the heart is worth more than the little toe." All that St. Paul says in 1 Cor. vii. would have no meaning if the head were not nobler and of greater importance than the foot. In comparison with zealous Martha, Mary is praised for having chosen "the better part"; and within the number of our duties, as we have seen, some are of greater importance and dignity than others, although the essence of every duty consists in its being necessary, not merely in a collective or social, but also in a particular and personal sense.
But in this case would not the divine vocation to this or that state include the call to a greater or lesser degree of morality? If this were so, and God distributed the moral talents also in such a manner that the varying glory of the blessed in heaven could be connected with a vocation for some particular state, would this contradict the Christian doctrine of grace, especially as taught by St. Paul? Human liberty and the recognition of its moral striving can be reconciled even with such a theory.{33}
Under all circumstances we must hold as follows: After what has been said, it is clear that the lower degree of moral worth ascribed to any work or state determines its morality only relatively; the absolute worth of a man depends upon the purity and depth of his love, and this love may attain a higher development in the lower than in the more perfect state. Artistic genius can, with inferior materials, produce better results than a lesser capacity can produce with better materials at his disposal. If a man carefully examines his vocation, and from motives of love of God, of his family, and of humanity believes that he ought to marry, he is choosing what is for him the better state, and he should find peace of mind in this thought. The average man has, of course, no right to judge the inner morality of his neighbour, but we may recall what St. Augustine says with reference to the words, "the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord, that she may be holy."{34} He asks: "Are there not married people who deserve this praise? Certainly there are; but how many of them have married solely for the purpose of advancing in godliness?"
In the same way we may ask: How many people seek riches for the express purpose of coming by means of them into closer union with God, and of obtaining thereby the power to benefit their neighbours? Those who renounce the world cannot be influenced by any motives of worldly pleasure and passions, and under normal circumstances love of God is the pure motive that leads them to do so.
F. Thalhofer makes the following remark on the foregoing passage: "Mausbach does not fail to refer to the vocation necessary in following the Counsels. When, however, in order to prove the superiority of the religious life, he compares it with the nobler members of the body, he should remember that purely animal functions cannot be compared with moral activity." He thinks also that I have not succeeded in solving the many difficulties involved in the Catholic doctrine of the Counsels.{35} In making the comparison to which Thalhofer alludes, I had no intention of proving the superiority of the religious state; had I wished to do so, I might have referred to the Canon of the Council of Trent: Si quis dixerit, statum conjugalem anteponendum esse statui virginitatis vel coelibatus, et non esse melius ac beatius manere in virginitate aut coelibatu, quam jungi matrimonio, anathema sit.{36} But because Luther and modern Protestants deduce from the unity of life in a living organism the conclusion that, owing to the unity of the fundamental disposition, there can be no difference in the values of moral acts, such as Catholic teaching maintains, I wished to show that this conclusion was based upon a superficial presumption and that it actually favoured the Catholic theory. Moreover, animal activity can very well be compared with moral; I need only mention Plato, Menenius Agrippa, and St. Paul, who applies the metaphor of the body to the Church. In order, however, to find analogies for my argument in the higher activity of man, let me ask whether, in spite of the unity and importance of the artistic conception, there is not a difference between the drama and epos, on the one hand, and a novel on the other; between a sonata, as a work of art, and a two-step? Do not the former belong to a higher form of art than the latter? Even in a drama there are important and subordinate parts, and in distributing them the manager takes into account the amount of talent possessed by the actors, although an actor with real genius can shine even in the smallest and most insignificant part. Of the various institutions for training the young, Kämmel remarks -- and most Catholics will agree with him: "A full classical training will always be the highest and best,
COMMANDMENTS AND COUNSELS 281 --> and it must not be allowed to disappear from our national life, but not all can or ought to receive it."{37}
Is there no meaning in describing philosophy as the specifically higher branch of knowledge? The idea of a social and political organism approaches that of the kingdom of God still more closely. However high a value we may set upon the duty and honour of each calling in the sphere of labour or in official life, however much we may appreciate the loyalty and devotion of an individual in discharging the duties of his calling, still we cannot deny that some callings rank higher than others, and that it may be morally reprehensible to content oneself with lower manual labour when it is possible to do something better. "Those callings which are immediately concerned with the aims of civilization hold a higher rank than others in the social organism. . . . Callings that serve directly intellectual ends stand higher, or ought to stand higher, in public estimation than those concerned with the life of the body or the gratification of the senses. But this by no means implies that persons following a profession of the former class are better than those engaged in industrial life."{38}
I never proposed to solve all the difficulties connected with the doctrine of the Counsels, nor could I undertake to do so, In the first place, both in Catholic and in Protestant literature there is still no thorough theological explanation of what constitutes a calling or vocation. The only merit that I can claim is this: (1) In answer to the alleged "difficulties," or rather misrepresentations, on the part of Protestant controversialists, I laid great stress upon the principle that "charity is the essence of perfection." (2) In spite of some obscurities in Catholic works, I showed that throughout the whole of natural and Christian ethics we can trace the distinction between an absolute and a relative factor in morality, and between the final end and the immediate aims; also that this distinction gives rise to objective differences in value, although all of these are not unconditional and absolute. The infinitely greater importance of the final end, the summum bonum, makes the ardour and force of charity, the innermost disposition, of greater importance to the judgment of morality than all other distinctions. Hence it is misleading to assert, as is sometimes done, that virginity or the religious life constitute "the Catholic ideal."
The difficulty lies in this question: If the religious state is in itself better calculated to lead to perfection, by encouraging an undisturbed development of love of God, must not this love recommend this means to the individual, with an urgency proportionate to its strength and depth? If this is so, does it not follow that, in selecting the religious or secular state, the man who chooses the former shows greater obedience to the prompting of this love than a man who chooses the latter? No, not unconditionally; for entrance into the religious state may be impossible owing to some bodily defect, to the rejection on part of the orders, or to the removal of religious orders from the country. But even where the choice is outwardly free the conclusion is not a necessary one. The objective considerations of morality involve fitness, not compulsion; what is firmly established is rendered uncertain as soon as the higher postulate of charity is added. The various forms of religious "life" stand on the basis of "good works" and are great systems for performing works of charity and piety. In the case of single actions it often happens that the most enlightened charity chooses the lesser rather than the greater; a social gathering rather than study; some mechanical occupation rather than prayer; even the vegetating condition of sleep rather than intellectual activity. The reason is that, in the connection of life, what is in itself better and higher may become the lesser good; and precisely because it is so good and noble it can claim but a comparatively small place in the limitations of our earthly existence. May not something similar be the case with regard to choosing a profession or vocation? There can be no doubt that a natural capacity for the higher secular professions (science, art, politics) is much rarer than one for the lower forms of labour.
Does not the superiority of what is morally good to what is good in the purely worldly sense, lie in the fact that it, like the highest Good of all, is also the most universal and accessible and comprehensible to all men alike? Must not, therefore, a mode of life, "in itself better" than another, be recognized by all as better for them individually, if they are able to adopt it? If, in the case of isolated good works, the reverse takes place, it is because what is in itself inferior seems likely to do more to further life as a whole; but with regard to the choice of a career, the whole of life is concerned, and here, it may be said, genuine charity and prudence could have no reason for choosing the lower course! Many moralists and ascetics have come to this conclusion and maintain that, the greater the purity of intention with which a Christian aims at union with God, the more will he feel himself drawn to the religious state. To this extent God gives every one both the counsel and the vocation to the religious life. The multiplicity of ranks and positions in the Church is the outcome, then, of an actual moral inferiority on the part of the majority of Christians; the "bestowal" of callings by God is placed in the same mysterious obscurity as the bestowal of grace.
This theory admits of exceptions, cases where no physical impediment, but free, moral, and social considerations advise against entering a religious life; and this fact in itself suggests that the theory is open to question. Moreover, in course of time it has become a regular practice to submit those anxious to embrace the religious life to a very careful and special test of their vocation. The religious life, based on the Evangelical Counsels, is something impersonal and objective. It stands in closer and fuller relation to the Christian ideal than life in the world, and from this point of view is no doubt "better and higher." This truth is made known to all Christians and affects them in so far as they recognize, esteem, and admire the dignity of this state; but for the Counsel to amount to a "vocation," the fitness of the individual for that state must be taken into account, as well as the objective and abstract features of it. In many cases this fitness depends upon the use made of liberty; the beauty of this life is apparent only to the morally pure, and courage and joy in adopting it exist only in a high-strung disposition. But, as St. Thomas points out, there are unmistakable tendencies and inclinations of the soul and arrangements of divine Providence which show many Christians, honestly striving after perfection, that in selecting another calling they will be choosing what is for them the "better part."{39}
Lastly, some one may argue: "Although they may choose what is better for them, they must in the long run remain behind those who have chosen what is intrinsically better. This is particularly the case with those numerous Christians who have chosen without great conscientiousness and eagerness to follow the higher course, who have rather as a matter of course grown into their calling or profession." I grant the truth of this in the latter case; if people will permit themselves to be influenced by external things and circumstances, and simply yield to the force of "circumstances" and follow the example of those about them, etc., they are not likely to rise above the level of their surroundings. I grant the force of the argument also with regard to those who remain in the world from motives of love of God, and will admit that they run the risk of lagging behind others who enter the religious state; it is implied in the abstract superiority of the religious life that the conditions of moral progress are better fulfilled and perfection is more attainable in it. But the superiority is here again not absolute. The ideal of the spiritual life is often only imperfectly realized, and a lax monastery of course cannot guarantee moral advancement; on the contrary, Corruptio optimi pessima.
Apart from this, however, lapse of time gives opportunity to human freedom to raise or lower its initial degree of moral and religious devotion. In dealing with so important a matter as the choice of one's life work, the disposition of the moment is of small importance; and the mystery of a man's personality and of the grace working within it, is here certainly not subject to a rule derived from usual circumstances. There is also a diversity in moral capacity and maturity to be considered. Many a great sinner enters the religious state to secure his salvation, but of course he cannot at once get rid of the moral defects of which he had more than a saintly Christian living in the world. Those theologians, too, who represent the choice of the ascetic life as personally better for all, recognize the weight of these latter considerations and acknowledge that, in spite of the better start, the beginning, continuance, and completion of the great work remain doubtful and depend ultimately upon the free will of the individual. In this way, therefore, we can adhere to the rule that, given equal conscientiousness, the religious life leads to greater sanctity than a secular profession; but this ought not to lead to personal judgments, proud and overbearing on the one hand, or timid and despondent on the other.
In what has been said above, we have referred to those Counsels which are of chief importance in religion and history -- viz., poverty, chastity, and obedience; but they are by no means the only ones; in fact, as we have seen, Commandments and Counsels are interwoven in the life of every Christian. Why does the Catholic Church attach a higher degree of perfection to renunciation of the advantages of this life than to reasonable use and enjoyment of them? When a man from religious motives refrains from marriage, money making, and power, is he not really undervaluing the natural aims of the human race and displaying a dualistic aversion to the visible world of sense?
Christianity in every age has had to wage war upon the open and hidden idolatry of this world, and this explains why, from the New Testament onward, throughout all Christian literature, there is more reference to avoidance of the world than to its joys. It cannot be denied that in the writings of the Fathers and in mediaeval works, the Evangelical Counsels are so highly extolled and recommended, as to reveal, on the part of the authors, an inability to appreciate duly the importance of work in the world. The same exaggeration of the ascetical principle is displayed in many facts of history and culture. It should not, however, be forgotten that the great number of religious writings of the Middle Ages to which these remarks chiefly apply were compiled by religious and for religious. This accounts for the enthusiasm shown for the ascetical life. Protestant scholars have been quick to lay hold of these unfamiliar expressions, and have overlooked those with a contrary tendency. Even in the writings of the Fathers, a more careful search reveals a surprising number of statements expressing sympathy with the secular life.{40}
Finally, in considering the whole question, we must not lose sight of the practical aims of the Church and her great historical labours in the cause of civilization. At the time of her greatest power, the Church actually sanctioned most fully the free development of secular knowledge, art, and commerce; she did not merely tolerate secular pursuits, but encouraged and blessed them. "It was from no mere necessity, nor with uneasy consciences, that priests and monks studied the classics, wrote poems and chronicles, planted gardens and vineyards, and carried on arts and handicrafts; all that they produced by their labours shows their creative impulse and absorption in the beauties of God's universe. It was not only in order to accumulate riches, or to compete with the State, that the Church took the guilds under protection, bestowed her blessing upon the knight's sword and the king's crown, granted indulgences for making roads or building bridges, and granted privileges to schools of secular and religious learning, but she did all these things because she seriously desired the welfare of society and the advancement of education."{41}
Explicit decrees of the Church, containing actual reoognition of these facts, were issued whenever heretics or mistaken enthusiasts attacked the natural order of life. Both the dualism of the Gnostics and the rigorism of the Montanists were condemned by the Church. The Council of Gangra in the fourth century defended marriage, property, and secular occupations against the extravagances of ascetics, and Innocent III did the same very emphatically against the errors of the Albigenses and Waldensians.{42}
The Council of Trent, though it declared religious virginity to be superior to marriage, nevertheless defended the natural liberty and morality of mankind and the sacramental character of marriage. The Vatican Council laid stress upon the advantages and religious significance of the fine arts and sciences;{43} and Leo XIII praised them enthusiastically in his Encyclical on the Christian State.
The very principles of Catholicism require the Church to adopt this attitude. The dogma of the creation of the world by God, His pronouncing everything to be "good," and His command to devote six days to labour and the seventh to rest in God, -- all these exclude all pessimism and any antagonism to matter and earthly industry. According to the Catholic opinion, even sin has not had so disastrous an effect upon human nature as to destroy its essential constituents and its innate determination to its end. Hence grace can be connected with nature; the old axiom Gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit naturam brings nature and grace, creation and redemption, reason and faith, humanity and sanctity into close relation with one another. Even irrational nature shares in this glorification, and the things of sense serve as the symbols and instruments of grace. With regard to morals, it is enough to remind my readers of the principle of ideal realism, that may be traced through all our investigations. A system that so emphatically recognizes the value of moral goods as to incur on that account a charge of exaggerating their importance, cannot at the same time deserve the reproach of caring nothing for the valuable work to be done in this world. A system that, in discriminating mortal and venial sin, so seriously and successfully transfers the economic value, in a case of damage to property, to the sphere of morality, shows irrefutably that it has grasped the moral significance both of property and of economic life.
The praise lavished by the Church upon voluntary poverty and renunciation of the world is not opposed to this principle. St. John Chrysostom makes a very shrewd and apt remark when he says that, if marriage and domestic life and labour were slight or contemptible in the sight of a Christian, the sacrifice of these things could not be considered heroic; for only he who sacrifices something great deserves to be called a hero.{44}
Cardinal Newman rightly says that true asceticism consists in admiring what is earthly whilst we renounce it. Pionius, a priest put to death in Smyrna under Decius, was urged by the people to obey the emperor. "Is it not a good thing," they asked, "to live, breathe, and see the light?" Pionius replied: "Yes, it is good to live in the light, but in that light which we desire. We are not abandoning God's gifts through ingratitude, but because we hope to receive yet greater ones."
When St. Elizabeth was kneeling beside her husband's coffin, she said: "Lord, Thou knowest that, if it might be in accordance with Thy holy and divine will, my husband's life and his cheerful, loving presence and appearance would be dearer to me than all the joy, happiness, honour, and luxury of this world. But now, dearest Lord, I will not struggle against Thy divine will. I would not, even if I could, purchase his restoration to life at the cost of a single hair against Thy holy will."
It is no want of natural affection, no Stoical apathy or Buddhist "weltschmerz," but the preponderating force of a higher love, that robs earthly delights of their charm for Christian ascetics. Not the renunciation as such, but the greater liberty derived from it to undertake a nobler life work, directly devoted to the service of God and humanity, imparts its higher moral value to the action of a Christian who abandons the world.{45} It is the figure standing before the ciphers that gives them their significance. The Evangelical Counsels are particularly well-adapted instruments for living a perfect life of charity, and they are also spontaneous effects and manifestations of perfect charity.{46}
Ardent enthusiasm for an ideal is not satisfied with words, it longs to make acts of sacrifice. What is true of every "disposition" is peculiarly true of the disposition to make sacrifices and to rise above the world; the serious mind reveals itself in works of renunciation.{47} That such a life of sacrifice not only honours God, but also benefits mankind in general, is a necessary consequenee of the natural connection between love of God and love of one's neighbour; and history records the magnificent achievements of the Catholic religious orders.{48}
To a modern student of ethics, who regards worldly culture as the absolute standard of morality, the ascetic principle is utterly incomprehensible. A Christian, however, who believes in God, and in his own call to the happiness of heaven in the next life, cannot consistently see that they who esteem highly a state of life aiming exclusively at God and eternity are false to Christianity. He is deterred from doing this, even if he would, by Christ's words regarding celibacy and poverty{49} and St. Paul's teaching on virginity.{50} The essence of the Evangelical Counsels is expressed so plainly in these passages that nowadays many eminent Protestants interpret them in the Catholic sense;{51} and the same fundamental ideas of asceticism can be traced throughout the whole literature of Christianity from the earliest times.
The chief reason for the moral excellence of real detachment from the world is that God becomes the centre of the moral life. St. Paul emphasizes the fact that a virgin dedicates herself "wholly to God"; and he suggests thereby that freedom from earthly joys and sorrows encourages a fuller development of charity, which is the essence of perfection. St. Augustine says: "He loveth Thee too little, who loveth besides Thee anything that he loveth not for Thy sake." These words show that there is a natural love for things temporal, but that the ideal love is that of God alone, which uses earthly things only in as far as they serve God's interests. Absorption in worldly aims and possessions almost inevitably entangles the spirit not only in reasonable "cares," but also in selfish "lusts."{52} The river of charity, if it spreads its waters over the lowlands of worldly occupations, cannot bring them to the ocean in such force, purity, and abundance as it would do if it were confined within the narrow bed of religious renunciation of the world.{53}
{1} Luthardt, p. 212; Gaas, II, 35.
{2} Frank, System der Christl. Sittlichkeit, Erlangen, 1884, I, 439.
{3} Frank, p. 436.
{4} Luthardt, pp. 211, 213; Ziegler, p. 300; H. Weiss, p. 183; Herrrnann, Röm. u. evang. Sittlichkeit, p. 12.
{5} Sell, p. 230.
{6} Tschackert, p. 20.
{7} Ritachl, Gesch. des Pietismus, I, 38; cf. Harnack, Das Mönchtum, 7th ed., p. 6.
{8} Thom., S. theol., II, II, q. 184, a. 3.
{9} Denifle, Luther, 2d ed., I, 133, etc.
{10} Thom., de cant., a. 11 ad 5; Quodlib., III, a. 17; St. Augustine says: "When I praise the perfect chastity of a virgin dedicated to God, I praise this particular virtue; there are other virtues that are still more important."
{11} Meffert, p. 258.
{12} Rufin, Mist. monach. Migne., XXI, 435 ss.
{13} S. theol., II, II, q. 184, a. 3. c.
{14} Opusc. 17 (Contra retrah. ab ingr. relig.), c. 6.
{15} See page 251, seq.
{16} Commandments and Counsels are not two provinces distinct from one another. The fulfilment of the Counsels includes that of the Commandments, as love feels bound to sacrifice everything, great and small, necessary and unnecessary, to God.
{17} Frank, p. 440; Luthardt, p. 209; Sell, p. 200; Herrmann, p. 191.
{18} Möhler, Neue Untersuchungen, p. 308.
{19} Thom., in ILL sent. dist. 29, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2, quaestiunc.
{20} A fourteenth century mystic writes: "Man should accustom himself always to have God present in his mind and intention and love. Keep the same disposition that thou hast in church or in thy chamber, and carry it with thee amongst other men, and amidst the troubles and trials of the world. But this is not to be understood as if all works, places, and people were to be esteemed alike. That would be most unjust, for it is better to pray than to spin, and a church is a better place than a street. Whoever did not think this, would be a heretic. But in all our works and in every place we ought to preserve the same disposition and the same loyalty and love and confidence in God" (Denifle, Das geistliche Leben, 5th ed., p. 585).
{21} It is characteristic, but very natural, that as Protestantism denies in abatracto to chastity and poverty all superiority, there are very few Protestant clergy who in concreto feel called to a life of celibacy, although many Protestant commentators acknowledge that, according to Matt. xix. 12 and 1 Cor. vii. 35, there is an ideal connection between celibacy and active labour for God's kingdom.
{22} G. Mayer, Die Lehre vom Erlaubten . . . seit Schleiermacher, Leipzig, 1899.
{23} Ziegler, II, 300.
{24} Jul. Beloch, Histor. Zeitschr., 1900, p. 30.
{25} Suarez points out (de relig., tom. 3, 1. 1, c. 9, n. 25) that the Evangelical Counsels are not, strictly speaking, a stimulus to the will, but a judgment resulting from moral thought.
{26} Thom., S. theol., suppl., q. 41, a. 2; S. c. Gent.. III, 134; Quodlib., VII, a. 17: Haec autem diversificatio hominum in diversis offlciis contingit primo ex divina providentia, quae ita hominum status distribuit, ut nihil unquam deesse inveniatur de necessariis ad vitam; secundo etiam ex causis naturalibus, ex quibus contingit, quod in diversis hominibus sunt diversae inclinationes ad diversa officia.
{27} 1 Cor. vii. 7, xii. 21; Aug., de bono fid., n. 4, 5, 9; Thom., S. c. Gent., III, 134, 136; S. theol., II, II, q. 183, a. 2; Bonav, de perf. evang., q. 2, a. 2 ad 16.
{28} Method., Conviv., II, 7; Ambros. De Viduit, n. 83.
{29} Aug., Sermo, 104, n. 3.
{30} Theotimus, Bk. VIII, ch. 6.
{31} Krier, der Beruf., 3d ed., Freiburg, 1899, pp. 6, 278; cf. v. Nostiz-Rieneck, Stimmen aus Maria Laach, supplement 43, p. 160, etc.
{32} This argument is adopted by v. Schulthess-Rechberg (Theol. Rundschau 1899, p. 388) in his criticism "Christentum und Weltmoral" (Münster, 1897), in which the following sentence occurs: "The religious life forms, as it were, the quiet, golden background, and life in the world, with its many changing aspects, stands in contrast to it, but at the same time forms its necessary complement" (p. 60).
{33} Thom., I, II, q. 112, a. 4: Unus perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiae quam alius. . . . Prima causa hujus diversitatis accipienda est cx parte ipsius Dei, qui diversimode suae gratiae dona dispensat ad hoc, quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo dt perfectio ecclesiae consurgat.
{34} 1 Cor. vii. 34. De hon. coniug., n. 14.
{35} Korrespondenzblatt f. d. kath. Geistl., 1902, p. 34.
{36} s. 24, can. 10, Denz. ed., X, 981.
{37} Grenzboten, 1901, I, 161.
{38} H. Schwarz, Das sittl. Leben, p. 375.
{39} In the same way Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor., 11th ed., I, 364) distinguishes the vocation to the religious life, in an extended sense, from the call to the religious life in a special, direct, and practical sense.
{40} Cf. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hi. Augustinus, I, 264-350, 396 -- 442; Schilling, Die Staats- und Soziallelire des hl. Augustinus, 1910.
{41} Mausbach, Christentum und Weitmoral, 2d ad., p. 39.
{42} Denzinger ed., X, 424: Hominem quoque cum sua conjuge salvari credimus et fatemur, nec etiam secunda et ulteriora matrimonia condemnamus. P. 425: De potestate saeculari asserimus, quod sine peccato mortali potest judicium sanguinis exercere. p. 427: Remanentes in seculo et sua possidentes, eleemosynas et cetera beneficia ex rebus suis agentes, praecepta Domini servantes, salvari fatemur et credimus.
{43} Cap. 4, de fide et ratione.
{44} Chrysost., de virgin., n. 8;
{45} Origen, c. Cels., I, 26, 27; August., de s. virgin., n. 11: Nec nos hoc in virginibus praedicamus, quod virgines sunt; sed quod Deo dicatae pia continentia virgines. Thom., S. theol., II, II, q. 24, a. 8.
{46} S. theol., II, II, q. 186, a. 2.
{47} Schopenhauer (Ges. W. W. Reclam., II, 180) ridicules the merely "mental" mortification of the Stoics, "who fancied that they could compromise their principles, and, when seated at a luxurious Roman banquet, might leave no dishes untasted, provided that they ate, drank with a disdainful expression, protesting that they really cared nothing for this whole feasting."
{48} St. Thomas, too, points out the connection of the religious and social elements in the religious life (Opusc., 17, 6; 18, 14).
{49} Matt. xix.
{50} 1 Cor. vii.
{51} E.g., Strauss, Schopenhauer, Ueberweg, Hilgenfeld, Paulsen, Pfleiderer, Holtzmann, Gottschick, etc. Some weaken down their meaning, others exaggerate it. A token of the inward connection between Christianity and withdrawal from worldly life may be discovered in the fact that the worldly inclined Protestantism of the present time is constantly asking the question "whether we are still Christians," and that men such as Ibsen and Kierkegaard, in opposition to this worldliness, describe as Christian a spirit of sacrifice that lacks all moderation, all practical clearness and possibility of attainment.
{52} Mark iv. 19.
{53} Gregor. Nyse., de virgin., c. 7.