ART. I. -- NATURE OF SCEPTICISM. -- ITS DIFFERENT KINDS,
12. Scepticism is a denial of the existence of truth or of the possibility of knowing it with certainty.
13. Scepticism is partial or complete, modified or absolute. -- Partial Scepticism rejects the truth or certitude of only a certain class of cognitions. Thus, Idealists, such as Berkeley, reject the truth of sensible cognitions, while Materialists or Empiricists, with Locke and Condillac, admit as certain only facts perceived by the senses. Rationalists, like Descartes, accept as certain only what appears evident to reason; the Sentimentalists, with Reid, consider as certain only what is not repugnant to instinct, to natural sentiment; the Traditionalists and Fideists, represented by La Mennais and Huet (1630-1721) respectively, regard as certain only traditional or revealed truths. Partial Scepticism, as experience shows, leads logically to complete Scepticism. Complete Scepticism rejects the truth, or certitude of all knowledge, and is either absolute or modified. It is absolute when it denies the existence of objective or ontological truth, admits that contraries may co-exist, and regards all things as phenomena or illusions. This kind of Scepticism was taught in ancient times chiefly by Gorgias (B.C. 426) and Protagoras (B.C. 440); in modern times it has been disseminated by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Scepticism is modified when it admits the existence of truth, but rejects the veracity of the means at our disposal to apprehend truth. The principal representatives of this phase of Scepticism in ancient times were Pyrrhus (B.c. 380) and Sextus Empiricus (B.C. 200); in modern times, Bayle and Hume (1647-1706) are the most noted.
ART. II. -- REFUTATION OF SCEPTICISM.
14. Scepticism is contradictory; it is logically and practically impossible. -- The consistent Sceptic ought not to reason nor even to think; for, in thinking of his doubt, he affirms his doubt, and consequently is no longer a Sceptic. Above all, a Sceptic should not attempt to propagate his Scepticism, for in doing so he simply uses reason against itself. The consistent Sceptic should no longer act, for all action proceeds from an affirmation of the mind, and thus involves the Sceptic in self-contradiction.
15. Scepticism is absurd, since its consequence is the negation of all science and all virtue. -- Scepticism denies truth or the possibility of attaining truth with certitude, and thereby renders science impossible, for science is nothing more than the certain knowledge of truth. Scepticism subverts all morality, for it is a truth that every action is either good or bad; but if we must deny or doubt all truth, evidently it is a matter of indifference whether we do this or that act. History, moreover, shows that the ages of Scepticism have always been ages of intellectual and moral decay.
16. Scepticism is contrary to the nature of man. -- Certitude is the life of the intellect, as air is the life of the body; thus, Scepticism is a state contrary to nature, an abnormal, exceptional state, in which the mind can be placed only by an abuse of reason.
17. The facts brought forward by Scepticism against certitude prove nothing. -- Sceptics bring forward in support of their system the great variety of human opinions and the errors into which our faculties lead us. But if men differ in opinion on certain truths, they all agree on fundamental truths, and our faculties do not deceive us when we apply them to their proper object and when they act under the requisite conditions.