ART. I. -- DIVISION OF CAUSES.
57. There are in general four kinds of causes: the efficient, the final, the formal or exemplary, and the material. -- If any effect be considered in relation to its causes, we can distinguish the agent that has produced it, the end proposed by the agent, the form by which the being is constituted in a determined species, and the matter out of which the being is made. The agent that produces the effect is called the efficient cause; the end proposed is the final cause; the form by which the being is constituted in a determined species is the formal cause, which is also styled specific if it is considered as intrinsic in the effect, and exemplar if it is extrinsic to it and is considered as the idea to the likeness of which the effect is produced. Finally, the matter upon which the agent works to produce the effect is called the material cause. This cause is found in corporeal entities only in the various changes which they undergo after creation, not in creation itself; in pure spirits there is potentiality as a principle of being, but no material cause.
ART. II. -- MATERIAL CAUSE AND SPECIFIC FORMAL CAUSE.
58. The requisite conditions that matter and form be causes are (1) the influence of an efficient cause applying the form to the matter, and (2) the dispositions of the matter both preparatory to the reception of the form, and concomitant with its reception to render the matter capable of retaining the form. -- Since the matter is the subject, and the form is the term of the agent's action, it is evident that they cannot act as causes without the agent. The dispositions also are manifestly necessary, because the matter being indifferent to all kinds of form, needs something to determine it and fit it for one form rather than for another, and this can be found only in the dispositions.{1}
59. The proper effect of the matter and the form is the entire composite. -- This is evident since the matter and the form are the causes from whose union the being results.
ART. III. -- EXEMPLAR OR IDEAL CAUSE.
60. The exemplar cause is necessary. It is defined as That which the agent keeps in view in his work. -- An intelligent agent must possess in himself the idea, the reason of his work; otherwise he would act blindly, and this is contrary to his nature. This idea, this reason of his work, which the agent has in view in acting, is a cause, inasmuch as it is imitated by the agent in doing the work. The idea thus understood is no longer that by which an object is known, as is the "idea of a flower which I have when beholding a flower;" but it is that which the intellect by thought forms in itself to be imitated; as the "idea of a house, which the architect forms in his mind, and according to which he has the house built."
61. The exemplar cause is properly reduced to the formal cause, but it may also, in some manner, be reduced to the efficient cause and to the final cause. -- The form is that which determines a thing to a special kind of being. Now the idea determines the intelligent agent from whom the thing represented proceeds; therefore it determines the work also, not indeed in an intrinsic manner, by composing it, but in its source or origin. The exemplar cause is also reduced to the efficient cause, inasmuch as it is by the idea that the agent, who is the efficient cause, is ultimately determined and directed in his work. Finally, the exemplar cause may also be reduced to the final cause, because the idea, like a model, is what the agent intends to execute, and what the work is to reproduce.
ART. IV. -- EFFICIENT CAUSE.{2}
62. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle from which the production of a thing proceeds. -- efficient cause is styled an extrinsic principle, to distinguish it from the matter and form, which are intrinsic principles. Unlike the final cause, it does not merely move to produce the thing, but is itself the agent that produces it.
63. In respect to the effect the efficient cause is perfecting, disposing, helping, or counselling. -- The efficient cause is a perfecting cause when it completes the work; as, "when a sculptor gives the marble the artificial form of the statue." It is disposing when it prepares the matter to receive the last perfective form; as, "when a sculptor prepares the marble out of which he is to make a statue." It is said to be helping when it aids the principal cause; as, " a student who helps the artist to execute his masterpiece." And under these three aspects the efficient cause is a partial cause. It is counselling when it points out to the agent the form and the end, and may then be called a moral cause.
64. The efficient cause may be a cause in itself or by accident, principal or instrumental, first or second, universal or particular, univocal or equivocal proximate or remote, free or necessary, total or partial, physical or moral, a cause which or a cause by which, cause in potentiality or cause in actuality. -- It is a cause in itself (per se) when by virtue of its own power it produces the effect; as, "fire produces heat." It is a cause by accident (per accidens) when by its own nature it neither produces the effect, nor is connected with it; thus, "if a sculptor is deformed, it is accidentally that a deformed man has carved a statue." With the cause by accident may be classed occasion, which is that on the presence of which the cause is induced to act, or acts with greater ease and perfection; as, a "feast-day may be the occasion of granting an amnesty;" "a bright sunny day is an occasion of having one's photograph taken."{3}
A principal cause acts by its own power; thus "a tree is the principal cause of another tree." An instrumental cause acts by the power of its principle; thus "the painter's brush produces the picture."
The first cause is that which receives neither its power nor the exercise of its power from another; "God alone is first cause." A second cause receives both its power and the use of it from another, that is, from the first cause ; "all creatures are second causes."
A universal cause is that whose virtue is extended to different species of effect; as, "the earth which produces different species of plants." A particular cause produces only one species of effect; thus "the oak produces an oak."
A univocal cause produces an effect specifically like itself; thus "a lion begets a lion." An equivocal cause produces an effect of a different species; thus "the painter produces a picture."
A proximate cause produces its effect immediately; thus "fire generates heat." A remote cause produces its effect by means of another cause; thus "the heart produces heat by means of the blood."
A free cause has dominion over its actions, as "man;" a necessary cause acts from natural impulse, as a "plant." A total cause is that which by itself produces the effect; as, "when one horse draws a wagon." A partial cause is that which in conjunction with others of the same species produces the effect; as, "when several horses together draw a wagon."
A physical cause is that which by its own action directly produces the effect; thus "an assassin is a physical cause of homicide." A moral cause is that which produces the effect by persuasion, threats, or other moral means; as, "he who counsels or commands the assassination."
A cause which is that supposit which produces the effect; thus "a workman is the cause which of his work;" a cause by which is the power by which the cause which acts; as, "the skill of the workman," "the science of the teacher."{4}
A cause is in potentiality or is a cause materially viewed, when, although able to produce its effect, it does not produce it; as, "when, though able to write, one does not do so." A cause is in act, or is a cause formally viewed, when it really produces its effect; as, "when one writes."
65. Substances, even corporeal, are really active and are true causes. -- Several ancient and some modern philosophers, and among them Descartes and Malebranche, have maintained that God alone is truly causative and active, that He is the author of all the effects which are commonly referred to created beings, but which are simply the occasions of producing the effect. Hence the name of occasionalism given to this system. The absurdity of this system is manifest. For every creature is produced by the Supreme Being, of whose perfections it is an imitation; but it is the property of the First Being to be sovereignly active, because He is wholly in act; therefore it is the property of creatures to be active, each in its own degree, because in their own degree they are in act, and thus action follows being as its property. Whoever denies even to material substance the power of acting, "detracts from the Creative Virtue of the Creator," since the perfection of the effect determines the perfection of the cause as cause; more particularly when the cause is only known by its effect."{5} He would attack the divine Goodness, which, being diffusive of itself, has made all things to imitate some perfection existing in Him eminently, not only in their mode of being but also in their mode of acting. He would assail the divine Liberality, which grants nothing by halves, and which would produce only useless creatures if it did not give them, together with existence, the active force which is its complement. In a word, either God would be limited in His perfections, or pantheism would necessarily be admitted. For if it is God alone that acts in His creatures, it is easy to conclude also that He alone exists in them, and consequently, that God and the world are fundamentally but one being.{6}
66. The two kinds of action, the immanent and the transient, exist in corporeal substance. -- An immanent action is that whose effect remains in the agent; a transient action is that whose effect passes out beyond the agent. Thus, "when the soul elicits an intellectual act, that action is called immanent," and "when the sculptor carves his statue, the action is called transient." Although immanent action is the property of spiritual substances, yet as a superior being of a secondary order should have some of the perfections of an inferior being of a higher order, immanent action is found, in a certain measure, in the higher living corporeal substances. Thus animals, besides external action, have also internal action, as in sensitive cognition and appetition.
67. The substantial form is the first source of all action in corporeal substances. -- Action and being have the same source and origin; but the substantial form is the first source of being; therefore it is also the first source of action. Although some accidents are principles of action, yet they derive their efficiency from the substantial form, just as second acts proceed from the first act.
68. Substantial form has only a radical and principal power for the production of another substantial form. -- A substantial form is that which, by itself, gives a being the power to produce a substantial effect. Accidental forms affect the substance only by participating in the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form alone can be called the principal power for the production of another substantial form. The accidents are only secondary powers.
69. Then an accidental form produces another similar form, the substantial form on which the former depends is the radical power, and the accidental form the principal power in this production. -- The accidental form fulfils the conditions of a principal power with regard to a similar accidental form, as "heat with respect to the heat which it produces." This is evident, since, in this case, the accidental form is the reason of the production of the effect and contains the effect.
70. The faculties capable of producing immanent actions may be regarded as principal powers in their production. -- A faculty is defined as the proximate principle of the operation to which it is naturally ordained. It is a proximate principle, since the substance qualified by the faculty is a remote principle from which the faculty itself derives its efficacy. It is the principle of the operation only to which it is naturally ordained, for not all faculties are capable of producing the same operations. Immanent actions are effects which do not pass outside the faculties from which they proceed; therefore they may simply be attributed to their proper faculties as to principal powers, and to the substantial form as to their radical principle. Thus the "act of understanding is attributed to the intellect as to its principal power."
71. No created substance is immediately operative; but in every creature the operative power is an accident distinct from the substance. -- In God alone operative power is not distinct from substance. In the creature, these two elements are really distinct, the substantial form being the principle of operation, not because it operates immediately, but because it is the source of the operative forces which proceed from it as properties. Thus the soul which is the principle of the acts of the intellect, does not elicit them immediately, but only by the means of the intellective faculty. Now, the act of the faculty or power is an accident; this power, therefore, being ordained to its operation, will be itself an accident; but if it is an accident, it is distinct from the substance in which it inheres. Therefore this substance will operate not immediately by itself, but by a virtue distinct from itself. This truth is also proved by experience. We see, indeed, the virtue that has emanated from the plant and is in the seed, produce its effect, although the substance of the plant has disappeared. Therefore it is by virtue of properties communicated to them by the parent-plant that the accidents evolve the substantial form and generate the new plant.{7}
72. Action is not exerted at a distance.{8} -- This truth, which is confirmed by experience, is also proved by reason. For action follows being;{9} but the being of a natural agent exists in a determinate place; therefore the action of the agent ought to be in the same place, and it can act upon those things only which are locally united either with itself or with the medium which it modifies, and to which it communicates its action, in view of the things which it is to modify.
ART. V. -- FINAL CAUSE.
73. Final cause may be defined as That on account of which something is done. -- The final cause is that which moves the agent to act; consequently it is that on account of which the agent acts.{10}
74. The end is a true and real cause. -- The end really influences the effect, since it moves the agent to act, and since without it the effect would not take place; it is, therefore, a true and real cause.
75. The end may be objective or subjective, ultimate or intermediate, objective or formal, the end of the work or the end of the agent, principal or secondary, natural or supernatural. -- The objective end is the good which we desire; and the subjective end is the person for whom we wish the good. "When a father works to enrich his son, riches are the objective end, and his son the subjective end of his labor."
The ultimate end is that for which we wish all the rest, while we wish it only for itself;{11} the intermediate end is that which we do not seek for its own sake, but for something else to which it leads. "When a man prays to acquire virtue, God is the last end of his prayer; virtue is oniy an intermediate end."
The objective end, or finis qui, is the thing which we desire; the formal end, or finis quo, is the act by which we possess the thing desired. Thus "riches are the objective end, and the possession of riches the formal end of the miser."
The end of the work (finis operis), is that to which the work naturally tends; the end of the agent (finis operantis), is that which he determines according to his liking. Thus "the end of the work in almsgiving is the relief of the poor; the end of him who gives the alms is sometimes God, sometimes vain glory." The end of the work and the end of the agent may coincide, since it is manifest that the agent may intend that to which the work intrinsically tends.
The principal end is that which is intended primarily and directly by the agent; a secondary end is that which is intended as a consequence. Thus "the good education of children should be the principal end of a professor; the receiving of a fee may be a secondary end."
The natural end is that which does not surpass natural powers; a supernatural end can be attained by the aid of grace alone. Thus "health is the natural end of medicine; the beatific vision is the supernatural end of man."
76. Only the good can have the character of end, never the evil apprehended as evil. -- There are two sorts of good, the true good, which is really such, and the apparent good, which though evil in itself yet seems to be good. Now, a thing can be desired as an end only in so far as it is regarded as good. For a thing has the character of end in so far only as it is desirable; but the good alone is desirable; therefore it alone has the character of end. Thus, "when a vindictive man revenges himself on his enemy, he wishes it, not because it is evil, but because it satisfies the craving of his passion."
77. The goodness of the end has the character of causality; the apprehension of the goodness is only a requisite condition. -- In the final cause the character of causing consists in this, that the thing which is the end is agreeable to the agent; but this belongs to goodness and not to apprehension; therefore not the apprehension, but the goodness of the end has the character of cause.
78. The end is truly a cause, not merely from the fact that it makes known its goodness, but because it moves to act by the desire or love which it excites. -- The end does not move the will by simply making its own goodness known; for knowledge appertains to the intellect, and we often omit what is good, although we both know and approve it. It is by the love which it excites that the end moves and inclines the will toward itself; therefore the love of the end is that by which it actually causes.
79. Beings without intelligence, such as stones and plants, act passively and executively for an end. -- A being acts for an end when, in its works, all the marks of a cause which acts for an end are discernible, and there appears no trace of chance or disorder; but such is the mode of action observed in beings destitute of intelligence, as the contemplation of nature abundantly proves. But as these beings cannot know their end, they are ordained to it by Him who does know it. If in some rare cases nature seems not to act for an end, as in the production of monsters, this is not due to nature itself, but to an accidental defect in the subject by which it acts.
80. Animals tend to their end by a certain knowledge which they have of it, when they perceive its goodness, and are moved to act by this perception; but they do not act directly and electively for the end, for they do not know its connection with the means; their knowledge and their appetites are ruled by instinct only. -- Descartes denies to animals all life and knowledge, and considers them machines set in motion by secret springs, like a clock. But this opinion is in manifest opposition to good sense. Indeed, experience clearly proves to us that animals tend to their end, not only because Providence directs them to it, but also because they have some apprehension of this end, representing it to themselves in their imagination, desiring to possess it if it be absent, and delighting in it if it be present.
But, though animals have a certain knowledge of their end, it would be false to assert with some philosophers, as Pythagoras (B.C. 580-500?), that they have reason, and differ from man only in bodily form. For animals do not perceive the relation of the means to the end. As they are incapable of abstracting, they do not know the end as such; therefore they are guided in their acts by instinct, that is, by a natural judgment, which is determined to a single object, and is not the result of reasoning, but is the gift of the Author of nature. It is the vis aestimativa, or estimative faculty, of the Schoolmen.
81. Man acts for an end not only executively and apprehensively but also directively and electively. -- Since man is endowed with reason, he knows the proportion of the means to the end; he chooses the means which seem good and rejects the others; therefore he acts for an end, not only executively, like a stone, nor apprehensively, like the brute, but also directively.
82. Fortune and chance are accidentally efficient causes, that is, they produce an effect beyond the order and intention of the agent. -- These two terms differ only in this, that fortune, properly speaking, is specific, and predicated of free causes only, while chance is generic, and predicated also of natural causes. Fortune may even be affirmed of the angels, since some things may happen beyond their intention; but not of God. For God as universal cause directs all particular causes, and therefore no effect can transcend the order of His efficiency nor can any second cause prevent its exercise.
83. Fate is a reality in the sense of a divine preordination or a certain disposition given to contingent things by which God executes the decrees of His Providence. -- The Stoics denied Providence, and therefore meant by fate a series of determinate causes which necessarily produce their effects. Other philosophers regarded fate as a necessity superior to all else, even to the gods, which it was impossible to modify. In these two senses fate is evidently an absurdity. But fate understood as a preordination of God, or as a certain disposition given to contingent beings, by which God executes the decrees of His Providence, is a reality. If the preordination be regarded as in God, it is not fate but providence.
{1} See Cosmology, 26.
{2} See Special Ideology, 67.
{3} A condition is that which disposes the power of the cause to act, or removes impediments to its action; thus "if a man wishes to write, it is a necessary condition that the ink flow freely from his " pen.
{4} The Schoolmen speak of the radical cause, cause in remote first act, in proximate first act, and in second act. "A cause is said to be in its second act when it actually produces its effect. It is said to be in its proximate first act if no one of the conditions necessary for the production of the effect is wanting. it is said to be in its remote first act if either all or some of the conditions are wanting. Thus, for example (to borrow the illustration of Taparelli), when a steam-engine is actually propelling the vessel over the waves, it is in its second act. When the steam is up -- the cables on board -- the anchor weighed -the helmsman at the wheel -- the captain on the paddle-box -- the plank removed, but the machine not yet set in motion, it is in its proximate first act. When the steam has been let off -- the fires out -the vessel moored -- the ship's company ashore -- it is in its remote first act ." -- Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 155. The radical cause in the example cited is merely the steam-engine as such.
{5} Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., p. 25; see also pp. 26, 27. God in creating does not exhaust His creative power. The degree of power manifested is determined by His free will.
{6} The teachings of occasionalism have little weight to-day; but Hume's denial that we have an idea of efficient cause should be flatly contradicted; for (1) we have, as is attested by consciousness, some idea, though generic, of efficient cause (2) every cause must precontain in itself whatever perfection it gives to its effect; (3) experience proves that no finite cause can act upon a pre-existing subject unless it be mediately or immediately present to it. Cf. Russo, Summa Philosophica, p. 192.
{7} "In all instances, without exception, of the generation of living things, -- whether they be plants or animals, -- accidents (that is to say, things that are accidental relatively to the principal agent) are the proximate and direct causes of the eduction of the form out of the potentiality of the matter." -- " Allowing . . . that the accidents, in instances [as in the pollination of plants] such as have been just detailed, effect the evolution of the substantial form and the generation of the new living body in a state of physical isolation and separation from the principal agent, how is it to be explained, that the accidents so circumstanced can of themselves operate an effect that is thoroughly disproportioned to their nature? . . . It is to be borne in mind that in the generation of living bodies the instrumental cause (which in relation to the principal agent is justly denominated an accident, since it forms no part of the essence of the said agent) is in itself absolutely a substance with its own substantial form." . . . This form, "though only provisional, . . . by virtue of its procession from the principal agent . . . is endowed with the properties which continue in their essential nature throughout the successive substantial changes up to the ultimate development, and gradually organize the matter for higher and higher forms of life. They have no sooner produced by their action a more perfect organism, than the matter grows impatient of the lower form; and the form next in order is educed by the virtue originally impressed on the instrumental cause." -- Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., Prop. ccxlvi., ccxlviii.
{8} See Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., pp. 852-862.
{9} That is, natural operation, or the second act of being, must as an effect be in accordance with the first act of being, which is "constituted existence." "Natural operation is the whole course of action by which a being tends towards the natural end of its existence; and connotes all those faculties by means of which the said being is enabled to energize with this intent." -- Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., p. 411.
{10} Some scientists of a materialistic tendency loudly declaim against the doctrine of final causes or teleology, on the ground that it is destructive of all the natural sciences. But against these views we argue that creatures, being the effect of a Supreme Intelligence, must have an end, and that the knowledge of this truth should stimulate man, the lord of creation, to search for the particular end of the various species.
{11} The ultimate end may be so absolutely or relatively. Thus the relatively ultimate end of a student unlergoing examination is to "pass." The absolutely ultimate end is that which "the will seeks as the last complement of every desire and of all life," viz., supreme felicity.