ART. I. -- PRIMITIVE ELEMENTS OF BODIES.
13. All the theories relative to the primitive elements of bodies are necessarily reduced to three: Atomism, Dynamism, and the Scholastic system of Matter and Form. -- Bodies manifest themselves to us as endowed with force and extension. But certain philosophers, regarding the latter as the only essential property, admit only one principle in bodies, that of extension, and look upon force as an accident superadded to this principle. They are called Atomists. Others, called Dynamists, will, have it that extension is produced by the active principle of bodies. Lastly, the Schoolmen, avoiding equally these two extremes, have admitted two distinct principles in bodies, matter and form. Whatever other opinions are held as to the principles of bodies may easily be reduced to one of these systems. For either the body is composed of extended atoms, or it is constituted of active forces, or it has within it both a principle of extension and a principle of activity.
14. Atomism is false because it destroys the substantial difference between bodies. -- The atomic theory was taught in ancient times by Epicurus, Democritus, and Leucippus, and more recently by Descartes, Gassendi (1592-1655), and Newton (1642-1727). It considers extended atoms, i.e., indivisible substances, to be the sole constituent elements of bodies. (1) Whether the supporters of this system hold that the atoms are homogeneous or that they are heterogeneous, whether they endow the atoms with such or such qualities, it is still evident that their theory makes force in bodies an impossibility, since it views them as purely passive entities without any energy of their own. This is equally opposed to reason and experience. (2) It is also manifest that in this theory there is no substantial difference among bodies. For, if all the atoms are of the same nature, bodies will differ from one another only by a greater or less degree of condensation or rarefaction. Water, for instance, will differ from fire only by a greater or less condensation of its constituent atoms. If the atoms are not of the same nature they will never constitute substantial units, and bodies will be only accidental aggregations of atoms, which are united by attraction or by chance. To illustrate, water will be only the reunion of two volumes of hydrogen and one of oxygen; it will have no substantial nature, no properties of its own, but will possess only the united substances and properties of hydrogen and oxygen.
15. Dynamism is fase because it makes extension an impossibility. -- The dynamic theory, proposed ages ago by Pythagoras and adopted in modern times by Leibnitz (1646-1716), Boscovich (1711-1787), and Kant (1724-1804), maintains that the only elements of bodies are monads, i.e., simple inextended active substances. This theory is manifestly absurd. For by regarding monads as simple substances it suppresses a fundamental property of bodies, viz., extension. For in extension there are two elements, viz., multiplicity and continuity of parts. But if it be maintained with Leibnitz that the monads are placed side by side, extension is impossible, because two indivisible elements cannot come in contact without penetrating each other. If, again, it be stated with Boscovich that the monads are endowed with the forces of attraction and repulsion, extension is equally impossible; for two inextended points can never produce extension, whatever be the relation in which they exist. Given two points at a determinate distance, we can never say that we have a line; nor can any number of separate points make a line.
16. The Scholastic system of matter and form is demonstrated by the study of the very nature of bodies; and it alone explains the extension and force with which bodies are endowed. -- The system taught by Aristotle and Plato in ancient times, and in the Christian era by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and generally by all the philosophers of the Schools, admits two distinct principles as the ultimate constituents of bodies: one called matter, or, as it is termed, primordial or primary matter, to distinguish it from that out of which something is made by art, and which is called secondary matter; the other called form, and more precisely, substantial form, to distinguish it from that which is added to the subject after it is already complete in its substantial entity, and which is known as accidental form. According to the Schoolmen, matter is nothing but a reality indeterminate as body, and incapable of existing by itself; because it is not a principle of unity and activity, but only the basis of extension. As by reason of its indetermination it presents only a pure aptitude to become by virtue of the form this or that body, it is defined as a substantial potentiality, i.e., such a principle as though not yet a corporeal substance, is still apt to become any corporeal substance whatever. The form is a simple principle and in itself inextended; it constitutes each body in its own species, and is the principle of unity and operation. It is defined as the first act of matter, because by it the matter which has already an aptitude to become this or that body, really becomes this or that body. An easy proof of the existence of matter and form is drawn from the substantial changes of bodies. For every body is subject to the law of change; but a body changes when it becomes what it was not before, and ceases to be what it was.{1} Hence in every change we observe: (1) The subject which changes, and which, not having at the beginning of the change that which it is found to have at the end, may be conceived as really distinct from the state that it acquires after the change; (2) The determination to be such a body before, and the determination to be such a body after the change, determinations which by their subtraction and addition produce the change. The subject that changes is the matter when the change is substantial, otherwise the subject of the change is the substance; the determination to be actually such a body is the substantial form. The truth of this system of matter and form is also proved by the fact that it alone reconciles what is true in the arguments put forth by the atomists and dynamists in favor of their theories, and is free from the absurd and contradictory consequences of their doctrines. For in it the matter accounts for the extension of bodies; and the form for their substantial unity and their active forces.{2}
ART. II. -- PROPERTIES OF MATTER AND FORM.
17. Primary matter has no existence of its own; it is indifferent to all modes of corporeal being; it individualizes the form from which it receives its perfection; it is the same for all bodies; it tends naturally to the form; it is incapable of generation or corruption. -- Primary matter cannot have an existence of its own, because it has being in potentiality only; whereas it is being in act that really exists. It is indifferent to all modes of corporeal being, for if it were determined to receive a particular form, the substantial changes that we see in nature would be impossible. The matter individualizes the form; for as the matter, although susceptible of several forms, is yet limited by the form that it receives, so the form, which, considered in itself, may be applied to a multitude of beings, is determined by the matter. The matter is the same for all bodies as experience shows, for we observe the same subject passing through all the varieties of corporeal being.{3} The matter tends naturally to the form, for, as a potentiality, it is naturally ordained to an act. Lastly, the matter is incapable of generation or corruption; for as primary matter is the first subject of all substantial changes, it excludes by that very fact every previously existing material subject. It can proceed from nothing else, and is therefore incapable of generation, and must be produced by creation. And as the matter remains always the same from its origin, viz., by itself a mere potentiality, it suffers no alteration, it is incorruptible; and as it could begin only by creation, so it can end only by annihilation.
For a better understanding of the nature and properties of primary matter, we need only compare them with the nature and properties of secondary matter. Thus, when we see secondary matter, a mass of bronze, for example, disposed to take on all artistic forms, to become a statue, a table, or a basin, we can conceive how primary matter is disposed to assume all substantial forms, to become a stone, a plant, or an animal. When we observe that this mass of bronze cannot exist without some kind of form from which it is really distinct, we understand how primary matter can have no existence of its own apart from every substantial form, and how to the eyes of reason it is still distinct from all substantial forms. When we consider also that the bronze is indifferent to being round or square, we infer the indifference of primary matter to receive this or that substantial form. And as the mass of bronze makes concrete the round or square figure that terminates it, so we perceive how the primary matter individualizes the form by which it passes into act. Finally, the mass of bronze remains always the same during the various changes of form which it is made to undergo, and is always the subject of these changes; and so we conclude that the primary matter is the same for all bodies, and that it can neither be generated nor corrupted.{4}
18. All forms, except those that are intellective, are capable of generation and corruption. -- Substantial forms are of two kinds, subsisting and informing. The former exist alone without being united with matter, and of these are the "angels;" the latter have existence only when united with matter; as, the form of an "animal" or a "plant." The "human soul" shares the nature of both these forms, because it can exist with the body or without the body. But it is evident that all other forms than the angels and the human soul are capable of generation and corruption. For since it is by virtue of its form that a body is this or that substance, it follows that in substantial changes what was one kind of substance becomes another kind, because the matter loses one form and receives another. Hence, in substantial changes, the old form is corrupted and the new one is generated; and as every form, except an intellective one, is subject to perish and give place to another form, every one, except an intellective form, must be capable of corruption and generation.{5}
To understand better the nature and properties of the substantial form, we have only to compare them with the nature and properties of the accidental form. Thus when we consider the figure or accidental form of a mass of bronze which, although it cannot exist without being united to the bronze, is still distinct from it, we understand how the informing substantial form, although it cannot exist without the matter, is still distinct from the matter. From perceiving how, by the form given to it, the bronze becomes a statue or a vase, we learn how the substantial form causes the matter to be actually this or that substance. If, moreover, we observe that when a new form is given to the bronze the old one passes away, we understand something of how substantial forms are corrupted and generated.
19. The corruptible forms of bodies are not created, but they are educed by the action of the agent from the potentiality of the matter. -- Corruptible forms are contained potentially in the matter; hence, when they are produced by the action of the agent, they cannot be said to be made out of nothing; but they are educed from the potentiality of the matter, just as the form which the sculptor gives to the marble is not said to be drawn from nothing, but from the potentiality of the marble to become a statue.{6} Of corruptible forms only the first that informed matter have been created; since matter cannot exist without form, these first forms cannot have been educed from the potentiality of the matter. Matter and the first forms of matter were concreated.{7}
ART. III. -- THE NATURAL COMPOSITE.
20. Bodies in nature are called natural composites, because they are constituted by the natural union of matter and form. -- Neither the matter alone nor the form alone constitutes the complete being; but this consists in the whole resulting from their union, which is therefore called a natural composite. This composite, which is a product of nature, differs from an artificial composite, which is a work of art, for the parts of the natural composite form a unity of being and of substance, while the parts of the artificial composite preserve each its own being and substance. The "stones" in a building retain their own being and nature, and are natural composites; the "building" is artificial.
21. The matter and form of the natural composite are united immediately by the action of the agent, without requiring any intermediate bond of connection.{8} -- The matter and form of the natural composite are not united by means of a third object, as two stones are united in a building by means of the mortar; for potentiality united with act is potentiality in act. Since, therefore, the form is united to the matter as act to potentiality, nothing intervenes to unite them except the action of the agent by which the matter is constituted in act; just as no medium is necessary to unite the marble and the form of a statue given to it, the labor of the sculptor alone being sufficient.
22. The natural composite is not a mere collection of two entities, matter and form; it is a third entity distinct from these. -- The matter and form separately cannot be called substances; the substance is the composite that results from their union. Therefore the composite is not a mere contact of the two entities, matter and form, as a dozen of pens would be a collection of twelve pens; but it is a new entity, distinct from the matter and form, and resulting from their union. Thus we understand how the agent truly produces something, although he makes neither the matter nor the form; for by the very fact that he unites the form to the matter, he produces that which before did not exist, the composite.
23. The form of a compound body in nature, at least when the combination is perfect, is not a mere mechanical mixture of elements; it is a substantial reality or entity which is distinct from the elements. -- A compound (or mixed) body{9} is that which is formed by the union of several elements, as "water," which is formed by uniting hydrogen and oxygen. When the union is perfect -- that is, when the elements are so united as to form a substance specifically distinct, as in the case of "water," the compound body does not consist in a simple combination of elements, but has a proper substantial form, since from the mixture there results a new substance, and every substance is constituted by its proper form.
24. The substantial forms of the elements do not remain in compound bodies. -- Two substantial forms cannot exist together in the same matter, as may be seen from the very nature of substantial form, which, being the first act of matter, implies that all the supervening forms will only give the matter a second being after the first, and that, consequently, they will be only secondary forms. But a compound (or mixed) body has its own substantial form; hence the substantial forms of the elements cannot remain in the body. Yet, although the forms of the elements no longer exist actually in compound bodies, they remain virtually, and the properties of the elements survive the destruction of the forms which made the elements what they were.{10}
ART. IV. -- SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES OF BODIES, OR GENERATION AND CORRUPTION.
25. Generation and corruption are changes as to substantial forms; generation is the gaining of a new substantial form, which with matter makes a new substance; and corruption is the losing of a substantial form, and the consequent destruction of the substance. -- Whenever a substantial change takes place in a natural composite, a new form is produced or generated, and the old form passes away or is corrupted. Hence, in every substantial change, as matter cannot be without form, the corruption of one form is the generation of another. More strictly speaking, generation takes place when the matter of an inferior form becomes invested with a superior form; and corruption takes place when the matter loses a superior form and assumes an inferior one.
26. In substantial corruption the substantial form of the previous composite does not remain, the accidental forms also disappear. -- Since there is only one substantial form in the composite, when the new form supervenes, the form of the previous composite no longer remains. And because the subject which supports the accidents ceases to exist, the accidents also pass away.
27. The accidents which precede a generated form dispose the matter for the reception of this form. -- The matter cannot naturally receive the form without certain accidents which dispose it for this form. Accidental forms are of two kinds: some are preparatory and precede the form; others are concomitant and accompany the form. Thus the "degree of heat which the wood reaches before bursting into flames, immediately precedes the form of fire, and the intensity of the heat is an accident which accompanies the form." The preparatory dispositions cease at the moment of generation, and are immediately replaced by the others; and just as the former make way for the reception of the form, so the others tend to preserve its existence in the matter.{11}
ART. V. -- PROPERTIES OF BODIES.
28. There are two kinds of qualities in bodies: primary and secondary qualities. -- Experience makes known to us two kinds of qualities in bodies: one constant, permanent, and common to all bodies; as, "extension, figure, divisibility, and motion;" the other varied in different bodies and in different states of the same body; as "color, sound, taste, smell, and resistance." The former are styled primary, because they are the basis and condition of the others. The latter are also called secondary, because they have their foundation in the primary qualities.
29. The fundamental property of bodies is extension, which results from the multiplicity and continuity of the parts. -- Bodies are first manifested to us as composed of many and continuous parts. This multiplicity and this continuity of parts constitute the extension of bodies. It is the property that first flows from their essence. Yet although it is false to make it, with the Dynamists, something merely apparent, not real, it is none the less absurd to hold, with Descartes, that it is the very essence of bodies. For before extension can be had there must be the extended substance; hence extension, far from constituting the corporeal substance, rather presupposes it. Besides, with extension alone the substantial unity of bodies and their active principle cannot be explained.
30. Bodies are naturally impenetrable, that is, two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time, unless by the power of God. -- This is a truth attested by experience. Besides, impenetrability is a consequence of extension; for if a body in virtue of its extension occupies a particular space, it must for that reason prevent another body from occupying the same space.{12}
31. It is essential to the extension of bodies to have parts that, mathematically considered, are always divisible. -- The indivisible is inextended; but the inextended added to the inextended will never produce the extended. Hence, metaphysically and mathematically considered, the parts that constitute the extension of a body are necessarily divisible ad infinitum. Still this is true mathematically, not physically; for a part may become so small as to be insufficient for the operations of any natural form (p. 188). It is also to be noted that this divisibility is infinite not actually, but potentially.
32. Every body is subject to motion. Motion is the actual tendency of a movable entity to its term. -- Experience proves that every body is subject to motion. This quality undoubtedly supposes an agent that gives an extrinsic impulse; but it also supposes in the body an intrinsic principle of passivity in virtue of which it receives and retains the force of the impulse given and continues to move. Motion is defined by Aristotle as "the act of an entity existing in potentiality." It is an act relatively to the past and present, but in potentiality relatively to the "future." The meaning of this definition can be readily understood, if for the moment we limit it to locomotion, the principal species of motion. Let the movement of a body be represented by a line, between whose initial and final points is virtually contained "an indefinite number of potential points." The initial point will represent the term whence (terminus a quo), and the final point the term whither (terminus ad quem); the line itself will represent motion. At any one of the potential points "the body in motion is in act up to this imagined point, but is in potentiality to the remainder of the line."{13}
ART VI. -- SPACE AND TIME.
33. Real space is real extension of bodies with an added relation of container to contained. -- Every body is extended. Now, when abstracting from bodies, we conceive their extension, we form the idea of space in general, whence it is evident that real or positive space is not in itself distinct from the extension of bodies. And since the extension of a body is constituted by the relative distance of its parts, just as the extension between two bodies is constituted by the relative distance of their surfaces, space cannot be conceived without extension. Yet it by no means follows that space is identical with extension; it supposes real extension, says Zigliara, "but it adds a certain relation to extension, not indeed a relation of existing corporeal things with one another and with possible bodies, as Leibnitz holds, but a relation or order of the parts of extension with one another. This relation is founded on extension, and immediately arises from the distance of the continuous parts," which space contains.
34. It is erroneous to admit with Epicurus and Democritus that vacuous space is substance. -- Vacuous space is a mere negation; for we call that a vacuum which is occupied by no body. But a pure negation is nothing; vacuous space, therefore, cannot be anything really existing in nature. Besides, a vacuous space distinct from bodies would necessarily be extended. But whatever has extension needs space to contain it; and thus we should be forced to admit an infinite series of spaces contained one in another, which is absurd.
35. It is an error to hold, with Newton and Clarke, that space is the immensity of God. -- Space cannot be conceived otherwise than as extended; therefore, were it an attribute of God, we would be forced to admit that God has extension. Besides, if space were an attribute of God, it would be God Himself, since the divine essence and attributes are really identical; therefore we would be obliged to conclude that the bodies that fill space occupy a part of the divine essence.{14}
36. Time is the number or sum of motion with reference to before and after. -- Motion consists essentially in a continuous succession of parts, one of which is before and the other after; that which numbers the extent of this succession is time. But time measures the succession in so far as it expresses the relation of the changes which constitute the succession, and this relation is nothing but the order of the succession. Hence time is defined as the number of motion with reference to before and after.
37. Time is neither present nor existing in reference to before and after, but only in reference to the present instant. -- The present instant, the now, is the indivisible that connects the before and after, and with them constitutes the essentials of time; and all three are elements of motion, which is implied in time. Motion implies a substance that moves or is changed. The now (nunc) which always accompanies the moving entity as its accident, cannot be considered otherwise than as moving without destroying the very idea of time and going away from the truth. Mere succession is not time; it is the number of the motion causing succession, with reference to before and after, that constitutes time. Time resembles a sphere in constant motion; if in its motion we consider it as present in a place, disregarding the distance over which it has passed and tbat which it has yet to traverse, there is no motion, but an indivisible point of motion; if, on the other hand, we consider the constant motion of the sphere from one place to another, we see existing or rather passing motion. Hence the idea of time, as formed by the mind when it considers succession and abstracts from the successive things, is objective as to the indivisible present which alone is real; it is subjective in regard to the past, which no longer exists, and the future, which does not yet exist except in our mind.
38. They err who, with Cicero and Gassendi, regard time as an incorporeal entity apart from successive things. -- Time implies successive duration; but duration independent of the things that endure is a mere abstraction, as is motion independent of the things that move.{15}
39. Newton, Clarke, and the French Eclectic School err in regarding time as the eternity of God. -- Time implies succession, and succession implies change; therefore if time is a divine attribute, God is subject to change.{16}
{1} Thus, to borrow the example of Father Harper, an atom of carbon may be traced from the air to the grass of the field, thence to the sheep, and later to the human body, from which it returns to the air.
{2} See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 215-271, for a detailed account of these theories with the various arguments for and against.
{3} Only primary matter and informing form are meant in these two articles.
{4} Compare Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 187-215, and pp. 385-505.
{5} Intellective forms are incapable of eduction from the potentiality of the matter, because they are spiritual, and spiritual being cannot be the term of material action, since no effect can exceed the power of its cause.
{6} "No Form strictly speaking can be corrupted. It is the composite that is corrupted and corruption is metonymically predicated of the Form. By the corruption of the substantial composite the Form ceases to be in act. But it is not annihilated, just as it was not created or made. It recedes then into the potentiality of the matter; -- in other words, it is no longer actual, but virtually exists in the matter after such sort that, should the requisite dispositions recur, it can again be educed out of the matter." -- Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 486.
{7} "It is plain that the composite element was the primary and adequate term, the matter and Form partial and secondary terms, of the Divine act of creation.
"We say, then, with St. Thomas, that the two constituents were concreated and that the composite was created; -- or, more accurately, that the constituents, Form and Matter, were concreated in the creation of the composite." -- See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., prop. 184, p. 495.
{8} Compare Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 616-627.
{9} The phrase, mixed bodies, as employed by the Scholastic philosophers, "is specially applied to those compound bodies which are the result of chemical combination. -- Avicenna, against whom the present Thesis is mainly directed, maintained that the substantial Form of the elements, or simple bodies, remain actually in the compound substance, and that the mixture is accidental -- that is to say, that these compounds are a mere combination of the qualities proper to the respective elements." According to Averrhoes, "the greatest of the Arabian Peripatetics, -- the forms of the elements are the most imperfect of all substantial Forms. Wherefore, they are half-way, as it were, between substantial and accidental Forms, so as to admit of increase and diminution. Accordingly, in the compound they become relaxed in energy by mutual reaction, and conspire toward the production of the substantial Form of the compound. " -- Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 675; consult entire proposition -- The distinction of modern chemists between mechanical mixture and chemical combination is clearly gathered from the statement of Avicenna's opinion and the thesis which it opposes.
{10} See 19, Note 1.
{11} See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., prop. 146, p. 273.
{12} Compare Russo's proposition, Sum. Phil., pp. 245-252, that "reason cannot evidently demonstrate any intrinsic contradiction in the compenetration or the multi-location of bodies, so that not even by Divine power would it be possible either for several bodies to be in the same place at the same time, or the same body to be in several adequate places." The first part of the proposition the author proves from the fact that a body does not cease to be a body, though it be prevented by God from exerting its power of resistance, or from producing any effect by that power. This is important when applied to the miracle of Christ's resurrection and His entrance into the closed supper-room. The second part he establishes by showing that the unity and indivision of the body remain when the body is present in many places at the same time that its quantity is not lost, nor increased, nor diminished, but its external relations are multiplied. A contrary view is that of St. Thomas, who reasoning from the fact that a body is in place circumscriptively, i.e., so in place that it is bounded by the dimensions of that place, and that no part of it is outside the place, concludes that it is impossible even by miracle for a body to be locally in two places at once. [Sup. q. 85, art. 8, ad 8.] The question concerns certain facts in the lives of a few saints, St. Aiphonsus Liguori, for instance, but does not touch the presence of Christ upon our altars. For in heaven the body of our Saviour exists locally or circumscriptively, i.e., the parts of His body correspond to the parts of the place, since a body is in place by means of its extension; but in the Holy Eucharist His body, by the words of consecration, is present after the manner of substance, the nature of which is entire in the whole dimensions and in each part of the dimensions that contain it. [ Sum. Th., iii., q. 86. art. 8, ad 6.]
{13} See Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., pp. 275-280; 310-313, 411. See Logic, § 16.
{14} The source of this error is a confounding of vacuous or imaginary space with real space. But the latter is essentially finite; the former is not infinite, but indefinite.
{15} Duration is of three kinds: eternity, which is, according to Boethius, the "simultaneous, complete, and entire possession of life that can never end " aevum, the everlasting existence of created spirits, i.e., of angels and human souls; and time, which is proper to material entities.
{16} Immanuel Kant, styled by admiring disciples the "Aristotle of modern thought," will have it that our ideas of space and time are not derived by abstraction from daily experience. In his own words: "Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena alone." Kant's principles, as given in his Critique of Pure Reason, imply the rejection of previously established habits and laws of thought, and the setting up in their stead of forms of tkought, i.e., subjective conditions that are prior to all experience, and so modify all phenomena that we can never know essences [noumena] as they are in themselves, but only as affected by these subjective forms. "Kant undertook the task of constructing a foundation for scientific knowledge amid the chaotic heap of ruins which the scepticism of Hume had left." "Yet he utterly fails to bridge over the chasm which Hume made between the subjective and the objective, -- between thought and reality, -- between human intelligence and that external world whose objective existence is assured to us by the general voice of mankind in all ages, by the safe instincts of common sense, and by that cogent argument of a practical necessity which scatters to the winds all mere dreams of the study, however geometrical in construction." See Summary of Kant's Doctrine in Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 104-125.