ART. VIII. -- CONSCIOUSNESS.
53. Consciousness is the knowledge which the soul has of its present affe ctions. -- Man not only has sensitive and intellective cognitions, but he also knows that he has them. The faculty by which the soul is cognizant of its sensations, is the common sense, sometimes called sensitive consciousness. But the knowledge which the soul has of its intellective affections and of itself is properly called consciousness. And because these affections may be viewed either in themselves or in their moral character of goodness or malice, a distinction must be made between psychological consciousness, which perceives the existence of the affections, and moral consciousness, which tells whether the acts are good or bad. This latter is generally called conscience. It is only with the former that psychology is concerned. The cognition afforded by consciousness, which is of a special kind, should not be confounded with intellective cognition in general. For by intellective cognition the intellect apprehends an essence, or by judgment or reasoning affirms or denies something of an essence; while consciousness has for its object this very act of apprehension, judgment, or reasoning, that is, the present affections of the thinking subject. Besides, the operation of consciousness depends entirely on the soul's activity. To confound it with cognition in general would therefore be to fall into the error of Fichte, who from the simple act of consciousness drew the creation of all intelligible objects, the Ego, the world, and even God.
54. Consciousness is habitual or direct, actual or reflex. -- Habitual consciousness is the disposition of the soul to see its own affections by the mere fact of being present to itself. Actual consciousness is the knowledge which the soul here and now has of its affections. The former accompanies all the intellective acts of the soul, because the soul is always present to itself; the latter is consciousness now exercised upon its present affections. "Direct consciousness," says Balmes, "is the presence of a phenomenon to the mind, whether that phenomenon be a sensation or an idea, an act or an impression, in the intellectual or the moral order." Reflex consciousness, which alone is consciousness properly so called, is the act whereby the intellect explicitly adverts to the phenomenon present in it.
55. Consciousness suffices to make us certain of the existence of the soul, but not to make known its nature. -- Many philosophers, and among them Hume and Kant, have attacked the testimony of consciousness. Others with Reid have admitted the value of consciousness, but have maintained that the existence of the soul cannot be known except by means of an instinctive judgment. Cousin pretended that the existence of the soul can be perceived in no other way than by reasoning made by the intellect consequent on the testimony of consciousness. But, whatever philosophers may assert, it is evident that, as the soul is present to itself in its operations, it must by consciousness perceive itself operating. Again, consciousness in perceiving the acts of the soul, cannot but perceive them as in the soul; therefore in perceiving these acts it perceives the existing soul itself. Yet though consciousness is competent to perceive the existence of the soul, it is not competent to perceive its essence. For it is one thing to perceive the soul in action, and quite another thing to know that it has this or that nature. This latter knowledge is the result of reasoning, and is proper to the learned, while the former pertains to all men.
56. Consciousness is not a faculty distinct from intellect. -- Several modern philosophers, with Descartes and Reid, make of consciousness a special and distinct faculty. But it is easy to prove that it is not distinct from the intellect. That two faculties be distinct, their acts or their objects must be not reducible one to the other. But the object of consciousness is reducible to that of intellect, for consciousness being an intellectual faculty can apprehend its object only under the form of its immateriality. In like manner, the act of consciousness is reducible to that of intellect; for consciousness properly so called is nothing else than the intellect knowing its own operations here and now.
ART. IX. -- ATTENTION AND REFLECTION.
57. Attention is an act by which the intellect is concentrated on a single object. Reflection is an act of concentrating the intellect on itself and its own acts. -- Several philosophers, following in the footsteps of Wolf (1679-1754), have distinguished between attention and reflection, saying that by the former the mind is fixed on a single object, while by the latter it passes successively from one object to another. But this distinction is false, for it is a necessary condition of every cognitive act that it can perceive but one object at a time, and that it can know several objects only successively. If a distinction be made between other cognitive acts and the acts of intellect, it must be made in accordance with the different modes in which they are accomplished. Hence we must say that attention is an act by which the intellect considers one object alone among many; and that reflection is an act by which the intellect concentrates its power on itself and its own acts, or reconsiders an object.
ART. X. -- THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLECT. -- JUDGMENT.
58. Judgment is an act of the intellect by which it predicates the agreement or disagreement of two ideas; or by which it affirms or denies that something is. -- The intellect may perceive an object without affirming or denying anything of it, or it may proceed to affirm or deny something of that object. In the latter case it is said to judge. This act of judgment does not, as is evident, require a distinct faculty. It is an effect of the imperfection of our intellect, which, unlike the understanding of the angels, does not attain its perfection immediately in passing from potentiality to act, but acquires complete cognition only by compounding or dividing different ideas or concepts.
59. Every judgment is necessarily comparative. The instinctive judgments of Reid must be rejected. -- Judgment is a complete cognition, since by it the intellect cognizes not only the essence, but also what does or does not belong to the essence. It must, therefore, be performed in the manner required by a complete cognition. But the perfection of intellectual cognition in a judgment requires not only that the attribute be affirmed or denied of the subject, but also that the reason of this affirmation or negation be likewise known. But this reason consists in the agreement or disagreement of the attribute with the subject, and hence they must be compared to find the reason. Therefore every judgment necessarily implies a comparison. The impulse which nature has given to intellect can be nothing else than a tendency to act, but not a tendency to perform an act of perfect and complete cognition like that of judgment.
60. The comparison instituted preparatory to a judgment is between the idea of the attribute and that of the subject. -- The intellect cannot compare attribute and subject unless it knows them; consequently it must compare the idea of the attribute with that of the subject. Besides judgment is an immanent act which is accomplished in the soul that judges; but the soul cannot judge of things external to itself unless they are in some way present in it; this can happen only through their concepts. Therefore a judgment is formed by a comparison of the concepts of subject and attribute. This, however, does not deprive the judgment of objective validity, because the concepts of the subject and attribute are themselves objective, since they have for their immediate term the subject and attribute as they are in themselves.
ART. XI. -- SPECULATIVE INTELLECT AND PRACTICAL INTELLECT.
61. The speculative intellect is that which contemplates the true without any reference to its practical application. The practical intellect is that which regards the true as the rule of action. -- The human intellect may stop at the mere consideration of the true; but it may also apply the known truth to action, considering it as the directive rule of action, In the former case, it is called speculative; in the latter, practical.
62. The speculative intellect and the practical intellect are not two distinct faculties, but only two functions of the same intellect. -- The object of the intellect is the true. But whether truth be speculative or practical, it is still truth, and does not constitute a specifically distinct object of intellect. The whole difference between the act of knowing speculative truth and that of knowing practical truth consists in this, that the consideration of practical truth is as it were an extension of the consideration of speculative truth.
ART XII. -- REASON.
63. Reason is that act of the intellect by which it deduces one truth from another. -- An angel perceives truth at once without any need of reasoning; but man comes to the knowledge of most truths step by step, passing from one truth to another. When the intellect compares the attribute with the subject and, perceiving their agreement or disagreement, predicates the same, it judges; when it perceives their agreement or disagreement by means of a third term, and concludes the same, it reasons.
64. Reason is not a faculty distinct from intellect. -- Modern philosophers make reason a distinct faculty; but it is evidently only a function of intellect. For to deduce one truth from another, an act of reflection is sufficient, by which the intellect, considering attentively a cognition, perceives there a greater or less number of truths. But the intellect is an essentially inorganic faculty, and hence suffices to accomplish this act. Thus, in passing from one truth to another, reason is to intellect what motion is to rest; and since it is the same body that is in motion or at rest, so it is one and the same faculty that understands and reasons.
ART. XIII. -- INTELLECTIVE MEMORY.
65. Intellective memory is the power which the intellect has to preserve and reproduce intellective cognitions that have already been acquired. -- When the intellect has perceived its object, it ought to be able to preserve it in memory, and, if need be, reproduce it. This is necessary both for science and for practical life: for science, because no conclusions can be drawn from truths already known unless memory actually reproduces their cognition; for our daily life, because it is guided by the history of the past, and that history memory alone can preserve.
Three conditions are requisite for an act of intellective memory: (1) That the intellect be able to preserve an intellective cognition acquired in the past; (2) That the intellect be able to distinguish the time when the cognition was formed; (3) That the intellect be able to recognize the cognition that is now reproduced as having been acquired in the past. Now, it is evident that the intellect can preserve its intellectual acts, for they are immaterial and inherent in an immaterial subject, and hence are not subject to corruption; secondly, the intellect, as being an inorganic power can apprehend not merely the intellective acts, but also the time when they took place; thirdly, the intellect can recognize a particular cognition as had in past time, because, as it preserves a knowledge of its intellective acts just as they were elicited, that is, in the past, and is endowed moreover with the power of comparison, it can in their reproduction recognize them as elicited in past time.
66. Intellective memory is not a distinct faculty from the possible intellect. -- A power which by its nature is referred to a general object cannot be diversified by the particular differences of the object. Thus the faculty of sight, which is referred in general to color, is not different from the faculty that perceives green or orange. But the object of the intellect is the intelligible in general or the universal. Consequently a power like memory which has for its object the intelligible perceived in the past, cannot be different from the intellect itself.
67. Intellective memory differs essentially from sensitive memory. -- In the first place, sensitive memory reproduces sensitive perceptions; intellective memory reproduces intellective cognitions. Secondly, sensitive memory reproduces the past as its proper and immediate object; intellective memory reproduces it only so far as, in perceiving the intellective act, it perceives also the time when the act was elicited.
Several modern philosophers make no distinction between these two kinds of memory.{1} This is a gross error, as even experience can show, because one man may often recall sensible things with ease, but intelligible objects with difficulty, while the contrary is true of another individual. The same phenomenon is manifest also in the same individual at different periods of his life under different conditions.
68. The laws of the development and exercise of intellective memory are the same as those of the development and exercise of sensitive memory. -- The sole difference is that sensitive memory resides in an organ, and depends for its perfection on that of the organ; intellective memory is an inorganic faculty, and has only indirect dependence on the state of organism, in so far, namely, as the intellect requires the concurrence of the sensitive faculty to furnish matter for its operation.
ART. XIV. -- THE INTELLECTIVE APPETITE, OR WILL.
69. The will is an intellective appetite, or a tendency toward the good as apprehended by the intellect. -- When the intellect has apprehended the good, the soul seeks to be united with the good. The faculty by which it tends to the good is called the will. But whatever is may be apprehended as good; therefore whatever exists, the reprobate excepted, may become the object of the will. And as the will and its act are good, they too may become the object of the will. Thus we can love not only external creatures, but also our own will and the love to which it determines us.
70. The will differs from the sensitive appetite in its object and its mode of action. -- The sensitive appetite depends on the senses, and has for its object the sensible and material; the will depends on the intellect and has for its object the universal good, and seeks either material objects under their universal character of good, or immaterial objects. Secondly, the sensitive appetite acts like the will so far as it is the intrinsic principle of its own act, but it cannot propose to itself an end. That an agent may propose to itself an end, it is necessary that it be able to return upon itself and consider itself in relation to its end. Now the sensitive appetite depends on material organs, which are incapable of reflection; but the intellect, as being intrinsically independent of organs, and, therefore, capable of complete return upon itself, can both present the good to the will, and cause it to consider the good as its end and perfection. Lastly, the sensitive appetite is incapable of choice and is necessarily determined to its act; but the will can choose its own means to attain its end.
ART. XV. FREEDOM.{2}
71. Freedom is divided into freedom from coaction, freedom from necessity, and freedom from law. Freedom from necessity is divided into freedom of contradiction, freedom of contrariety, and freedom of specification. -- Freedom from coaction excludes all external constraint; thus a prisoner in his cell is without this freedom, which is possessed by the beasts of the forest. Freedom from necessity excludes all internal constraint; of this the insane man and the beast are destitute. Freedom from law excludes all dependence on a law imposed by a superior; God alone enjoys this freedom. Man naturally possesses freedom from coaction; but to constitute free choice, by which the will chooses the means to attain its end, freedom from necessity suffices. This is called freedom of contradiction, when one is free either to will something or not will it. It is called freedom of contrariety, when one is free to will either good, or evil under the appearance of good. It is called freedom of specification, when one is free to will this, that, or some other object or act. It is to be remarked that freedom of contrariety, far from being necessary to constitute free will, is rather an imperfection; and just as it is a defect in the reason to draw false conclusions from principles, so it is an imperfection in the free will not to choose the means proper to attain the end.
72. Free choice belongs essentially to the will of man; it is the power of the will to choose the means by directing them to the end. -- The will is necessarily determined by its nature to universal good, and when the intellect points out to it this good, it cannot but love and seek it. But the same is not true of particular goods: the will may or may not seek any one of them as a means to attain its end, which is universal good; it is free to choose between them.{3} Some philosophers, with Locke, make this freedom consist in the physical power of the will to execute what it desires; but this is an accident of freedom which may be wanting, while freedom of the will properly so called still exists; as is the case with the paralytic who is unable to move his arm. Other philosophers, following Ockham, have maintained that the will may or may not desire a thing without any necessity of its being apprehended as good. But this is tantamount to saying that the will is free because it is free. Moreover, such a doctrine contradicts the true nature of the will, which is a blind faculty, and cannot desire any object unless the intellect points it out as good. Others, again, assert that the apprehension of good, which is the motive of an act of the will, is a mere condition; that, given this condition, the will may still elicit an act or not, may desire one thing rather than another. According to these philosophers, freedom is the property of the will to act or not act, or to act in one way rather than in another, when the necessary conditions for acting are present. This view is correct.
To apprehend the nature of the will, one must keep well in mind that it is a blind faculty and can never act until the good, which is its object, has been shown to it by the intellect. But since the will is directed towards this or that particular good by the intellect, it follows that the free exercise of the will requires as a necessary condition a previous act of intellect. Now, reason and experience prove that the intellect is really indifferent to knowing this or that particular good, since every thing that is good for the will is also true for the intellect. When, therefore, the intellect has pronounced this or that to be a particular good, the will is free to choose whichever particular good pleases it. Hence freedom may not, as some affirm, be defined as the free judgment of reason; for it is a property, not of reason, but of the will; and the judgment of the intellect regarding a particular good imposes no necessity on the will of choosing that particular good rather than another.
73. The existence of this freedom is proved from the very nature of the will, from the testimony both of consciousness and of conscience, from the common sense of mankind, and from the absurd consequences of its denial. -- 1. The will has for its proper object the absolute good, and as to this good it is not free; thus man cannot but will to be happy. But as to the particular goods which are the means of attaining the absolute good, the will is necessarily free; because if the absolute good, as completely satisfying the tendencies of the will, inevitably determines it, particular goods, as lacking some perfections, may under this aspect be viewed as evil, and so be rejected by the will. Thus, while we necessarily will to be happy, we may yet, according to our liking, choose virtue or riches as a means to attain happiness. 2. Consciousness attests the existence of freedom. For we clearly distinguish in ourselves indeliberate movements from those that depend for their existence on our will and reason. In a multitude of cases we not only recognize a principle of activity which we can determine at will, but we also exercise it at pleasure; it is thus, for example, that I move my arm or my hand for the mere pleasure experienced in exercising my freedom. The reality of free will and its constant exercise are so evident, that we may say with Fénélon that no man in his senses can practically doubt it. 3. We have the irresistible conviction of being the responsible cause of certain actions which we regard as our own, and which we esteem worthy of praise or blame. Before performing these actions we examine whether we can do them; and we experience remorse if they are criminal. On the other hand, conscience reproaches us for moral evil, but never for physical evil. 4. The freedom of the will is a truth universally admitted by men, as is attested by all languages, by the civil and religious institutions of all peoples, and the means employed in every age to instruct and educate man. 5. Finally, if the freedom of the will be denied, it must be admitted as a consequence that there is neither good nor evil, that remorse is a mere fiction, that laws are useless and absurd, that deliberation is nonsensical, and that God is the cause of all existing evil.
74. It is absurd to urge against free will, as do fatalists, the action of God upon man, His foreknowledge of events, His goodness and power, and the influence of motives and temperament. -- In ancient times fatalism formed the basis of every religion and every philosophical system. It was continued in some of the heretical doctrines of the first ages of the Church, and Mahometism inoculated it into the manners of the Oriental peoples. In modern times it has been renewed as a doctrine by Protestantism, and later by Jansenism; it is an immediate consequence of the two chief errors that in our day divide non-Catholic philosophy, namely, materialism and pantheism.
The objection drawn from the action of God upon the will of man has no weight; for although God, as the first cause of all motion, moves man's will also, yet the will, as second cause, is a real cause of its own actions. Moreover, the action of God upon the will is so far from destroying its liberty that it rather protects it; for He always intervenes in the actions of all creatures in a manner conformable to their nature. Therefore He does not prevent their action, but preserves it to them together with its proper characteristics, that is, freedom in man's action. If the particular action of grace be cited, it is evident that, as grace is simply a help, it does not destroy our liberty; on the contrary, it perfects it, since it is an aid to avoid moral evil, which is an abuse of our liberty. When grace proposes to the will the means it should choose to attain its end with certainty, it does for the freedom of the will what the skilled teacher does for the reason of his pupils when he enables them to draw true conclusions from given principles. To those who put forth the divine foreknowledge as an objection, the reply is that God is infallible, and hence the particular free act which He has foreseen will happen infallibly, not necessarily. To God the future is present, and His foreknowledge influences our acts no more than our vision changes the nature of the objects which we see. Nay, this foreknowledge rather confirms our liberty than destroys it, for if God foresees that such an act will be done freely, and His foreknowledge is infallible, the act will be done not otherwise than freely.
Some philosophers have pretended to see a contradiction between God's goodness and the existence of evil which results from free will; but it is evident that a world in which free creatures are subjected to trial, and personally merit happiness, cannot be opposed to the divine goodness. Besides, although God has permitted the evil, He has not willed it; He has set fixed limits to it, and in His wisdom He knows how to draw greater good from it. -- The objection that the power of God in its government of the world would be restricted by the liberty of man, is refuted by answering that God, like a wise king, knows how to attain His ends by leaving to each man his liberty. He reserves to Himself certain extraordinary events to show forth His power; but He ordinarily conceals His action under the general laws by which He directs all things, and He makes the very exercise of liberty by intelligent creatures concur in the accomplishment of His will.
The philosopher Collins (1676-1729) pretended that motives necessitate the will, just as the weights placed in the scales of a balance bear down the side in which the heavier weight has been placed. Undoubtedly the will does not act without some motive proposed by the intellect, but the motive imposes no necessity on the will, as has been shown. -- The influence exerted on the will by climate, temperature, the conformation of the brain, and other similar causes, cannot be contested, but it can be easily explained, by the union of soul and body; besides, the will has power to resist their influence, and often acts contrary to it.
ART. XVI. -- RELATIONS OF THE WILL TO THE OTHER FACULTIES OF THE SOUL.
75. The will has a certain dominion over all the other faculties of the soul. -- The will has the universal good of the person for its object, while the other faculties have each its own particular good for theirs. Thus the good of the imagination is restricted to sensible images by which it is perfected; that of the intellect, to the true, which is its life and nutriment; the will has, on the contrary, for its object whatever is good for the whole being, for all the faculties, and hence it can wish the particular good of each faculty as contained in the universal good. Therefore, that the will may be enabled to seek the particular good proper to each faculty, it must exercise a certain control over that faculty, and consequently over all the faculties. This control is attested by experience. It is exerted, (1) over the external senses in either furnishing them with their object, or directing them to it; (2) over the internal senses in rousing them to action, and in taking complacency in their action; (3) over the sensitive appetite, which, although it inclines the will to this or that action, may in its turn be ruled and repressed by the will; (4) over the motive faculty, which executes the motion ordered by the will -- If the intellect moves the will when it presents to it the good as its object, it is in turn moved by the will, inasmuch as the true, the object of the intellect, is a good, and the will excites the intellect to seek this good. Thus the intellect exerts on the will a determination of specification when it presents the object to it, and the will has over the intellect a dominion of exercise by applying it to its action.
76. Considered absolutely, the intellect is more noble than the will; but relatively, the act of the will may be more noble than that of the intellect. -- 1. The nobility of a faculty is in proportion to that of its object; but the object of intellect is the true. Now, the true is good, and the good is our end, and our end is happiness. Therefore, as the truth must be perceived before the will can tend to it as a good, so the perception of the supreme truth is the attainment of supreme happiness; and consequently that faculty by which we attain this is the noblest of all. But this faculty is the intellect. 2. It is more noble also, if considered as to the mode in which the two faculties are moved. For the intellect, it is true, is moved by the will to exercise; but it, on the other hand, determines the will as to its specification, it enlightens and directs it, so that the will depends for its act upon the intellect. 3. The intellect is more noble, because it brings its object in some way to itself and keeps it there, whereas the will tends outward toward its object, and moves the whole man to it. Still, as some things have a nobler mode of being in themselves than in our intellect, it is better to will them than to know them; thus in this life it is better to love God than merely to know Him.{4} Will is more noble than intellect also in that it has dominion over the other faculties, and moves them to act.
ART. XVII. -- HABIT.
77. Habit is a permanent quality inherent in the intellective powers and inclining them to act well or ill. -- Habit is a kind of supplement added to a faculty, enabling it to accomplish acts of the same kind with ease. It must be permanent in the faculty, otherwise it would not incline it constantly to produce the same kind of acts. It can be found in the intellective faculties only, for beings that by their nature are necessarily determined to their operation cannot modify or change it; therefore only such beings and faculties as are masters of their own acts are susceptible of habit. Still, as in man the sensitive nature is subject to the intellective, and he can impress on the sensitive faculties a certain constant mode of acting; so, in virtue of his dominion over animals, he can by training form habits in them which may eventually become hereditary instincts. Lastly, habit has the effect of inclining the faculty to act well or ill according as it imparts a good or a bad quality. Thus virtue perfects the will, while vice degrades it.
78. Every habit, whether good or bad, produces ease, constancy, and pleasure in acting. -- Constancy in producing the same kind of acts results from the fact that habit is a permanent quality. Yet it must be observed that this constancy never develops into necessity, because habit is but a quality superadded to the faculty, and hence has less extension than the faculty itself. Therefore the faculty can always perform an act to which the habit does not concur, and consequently can even act contrary to the habit. Facility and promptitude result from the fact that the habit inclines the power to action. Lastly, the pleasure experienced by the agent is owing to the fact that habit is a second nature, and the conformity of the action with the nature of the agent is the very cause of his pleasure.
79. Habits are natural, infused, or acquired. -- A natural habit is one bestowed in the natural order by the Author of nature. Thus the disposition of the intellect to know first principles is a natural habit. This is sometimes called the "habit of first principles." Others admit no natural habit, but call it disposition. An infused habit is one given by God in the supernatural order; thus "faith, hope, and charity" are supernatural and infused habits. An acquired habit is one formed by man's activity; thus "science" is an acquired habit. The difference between these three kinds of habits is, that natural habits are simple dispositions; but, far from determining the faculty to the act, they must themselves be determined by some external principle. The other habits, on the contrary, of themselves dispose the faculty to act easily and promptly.
80. Acquired habits are formed by repeated acts of the same kind; they are weakened and lost by the cessation of the acts that have formed the habit or by eliciting contrary acts. -- Experience affords sufficient proof that acquired habits are formed only by a repetition of the same acts. The destruction or weakening of habit is the result of a long cessation of the acts that formed it, and of a repetition of acts proper to form a contrary habit. It may also be a consequence of obstacles to a natural disposition; but, in the case of the intellective faculties, it is to be noted that the obstacle to their disposition must be indirect. Thus insanity puts a stop to tbe habit of knowledge, by affecting not the intellect, but the sensitive faculties, which supply the intellect with matter for its operations.
{1} With these may be reckoned Dr. Maudsley and Herbert Spencer. But all conceptualists and nominalists, all, in fact, who fail to divide off accurately the sensible image from the idea, must, if consistent, identify the sensitive memory with the intellective.
{2} "Freedom is used where emphasis is laid upon large opportunity given for the exercise of one's powers; or where the previous or possible restriction has been or is legal or moral. . . . Liberty has more in mind protection from external constraint or from the aggressions of power; hence, in civil affairs, liberty is freedom as outlined and protected by law." -- Century Dictionary.
{3} Consult the valuable article by J. Gardair, Le Libre Arbitre Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne, April and June, 1889.