ART. I. -- ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN GENERAL.
11. There are two kinds of attributes in God, absolute and relative. -- Although human reason cannot comprehend God, it can, however, acquire a knowledge not only of His existence, but also of some of His attributes. These attributes are of two kinds: some belong to God considered in Himself, and these are absolute attributes; the others belong to Him as Creator of the world, and these are relative attributes.
12. The divine attributes are not known by us directly, but we attain to a knowledge of them from the perfections which we discover in creatures. -- The cause must possess, if not in a superior degree, at least in an equal degree, all the perfections of the effect; otherwise the effect would excel its cause, which is absurd. Hence, as we infer the existence of the cause from the existence of the effect, so from the perfections of the effect we ascend to those of the cause. Therefore, since God is the absolute cause of all the perfections in creatures, it is from the knowledge of these perfections that we come to know those of God. Now, as creatures possess finite being, their perfections are also finite or limited; but as God, on the contrary, is infinite in being, His perfections must likewise be infinite. It is, therefore, necessary, before attributing to God any one of the perfections of His creatures, to take from it all limit and to consider it then as found in God in an eminent manner, as absolutely infinite.
13. As God is pure act, infinite Being, and perfectly simple, the divine attributes are identical with one another, and with the divine essence. If we distinguish them, it is because of the limitations of our mind. -- In creatures the attributes arise from the essence, but are not identified with it. Tbus man's liberty, though having its principle in his essence, is really distinct from it. In like manner, in creatures one attribute is distinct from another; in man intellect is one thing, will is another. These distinctions are not found in God. For since God is perfectly simple, to admit any distinction whatever between His attributes and His essence would be to destroy His perfect simplicity, since all distinction supposes a certain composition in that in which it exists. Now, if the divine substance were composed of parts, either each of these parts would be infinite, and then there would be as many gods as there would be parts, which is contrary to the divine unity already proved; or the infinite would result from a collection of finite parts, the perfect from the imperfect, which is absurd. Moreover, if the divine perfections were really distinct, as are those of creatures, they would no longer exist in an infinitely perfect manner in God; for, that two things be distinct, it is necessary that one be without some quality that the other has, and consequently all distinction is necessarily a principle of limit and imperfection. From this, however, it would be wrong to conclude that as the plurality of divine attributes depends on the mode in which our intellect knows God, these attributes do not really exist in Him. It is one thing to say that the perfections which we attribute to God do not exist in Him, and it is quite another thing to assert that in Him they are not distinct as our intellect conceives them. The perfections which we predicate of God are really in Him, but not with that distinction which our limited intellect establishes among them.
ART. II. -- ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. -- ASEITY.
14. Aseity is an attribute by which God is of Himself or from Himself. It is the primitive attribute from which we can deduce all the others. -- The divine attributes are manifold. But among them we can distinguish one to which all the others may, in our way of thinking, be reduced. This is aseity, that is, the perfection by which God is the absolute and independent Being who holds from Himself all that He has and all that He is. It is by this attribute that God defined Himself when He said, "I am who am." In this attribute philosophers have placed the metaphysical essence of God, because it is the principle and foundation of all the other perfections attributed to Him. For if we could conceive anything in God prior to aseity, we could conceive a self-existent being as dependent on another being. Since, then, God is independent in His being, and since He holds His essence from Himself alone, we very easily perceive that He possesses all possible perfections. Aseity, further, affords the primary reason for which God is distinct from every other being; for other beings have finite perfections, while God possesses infinite perfections. But it is evident that other beings than God have finite perfections, for the very reason that they do not hold their being from themselves; and that the perfections of God are infinite because He is the absolute Being who holds all from Himself and depends on none.
ART. III. -- INFINITY, ETERNITY, IMMUTABILITY, SIMPLICITY, AND IMMENSITY.
15. God is infinite, that is he has all possible perfections, and without limit. -- If God is of Himself, He must have all possible perfections, and there can no more be a limit in His being than in His perfections. All perfections are either self-existent or contingent; that is, either uncaused or capable of being caused. The former God possesses formally, or in their own specific nature; the latter He as First Cause must be able to produce, and therefore possesses virtually or equivalently with His creatures, and also eminently as being an infinitely perfect cause.
16. God is eternal, that is, he had no beginning and will have no end; he lives in a perpetual present. -- Since God is of Himself, He never began to be; He is eternal, and eternity excludes not only beginning and end, but all succession as well; for God possesses all perfections, and without limit. In God there is neither past nor future; there is nothing that has been, nothing that will be; all is in an indivisible and perpetual present. Moreover, since eternity implies existence which is essentially without beginning, it is proper to God alone; for even could a creature have existence without beginning, such existence would be always contingent.
17. God is immutable, that is, His perfections can neither be increased nor diminished; he is subject to no alteration or change. -- Since there is no succession in God, there can be no change in Him. Besides, if He changed, He would acquire or lose some quality, and this is contrary to His infinity.
18. God is absolutely simple, that is, there cannot be in Him any kind of composition. -- God is absolutely simple, because all composition supposes an imperfection. Thus God is not merely exempt from all material composition, but His perfections are identified with one another and with His essence. If in God there were attributes distinct from one another, each of these attributes would necessarily be limited and therefore finite; but the finite added to the finite can never give the infinite.
19. God is immense, that is, He is in his essence present to all things. -- Since God is infinite or without limits, He is everywhere infinitely -- in Himself, in the world, and even outside the world -- in that He can fill all possible space extended ad infinitum, without the least circumscription of His being.{1}
ART. IV. -- THE DIVINE INTELLIGENCE.
20. God knows Himself perfectly; He knows all things outside Himself, all future contingent and possible things. -- The intelligence of God is infinite like His being. God knows Himself and eternally affirms Himself It is this eternal and unchangeable affirmation of Himself that constitutes truth in itself, absolute and essential truth, the prototype and supreme norm of all truth. God in knowing Himself perfectly, knows through His essence all other beings. He knows them in their eternal types, which are nothing but His knowledge of the various degrees in which His divine essence can be imitated and represented outside Himself, none of which, however, is adequate to the divine essence itself. God has a perfect knowledge of all real beings, because it is He who created them with their essences and perfections. Since God by His knowledge is the cause of all things, His knowledge and His power have the same extent; and since He is the cause of all that exists in every individual, it follows that His knowledge embraces all beings also in their individuality. God knows all things possible, for, knowing His own power, He knows all its terms, both real and possible. He knows the good, and with it the evil that is its privation. As He knows all that can exist either by an effect of His power, or by the action of creatures, He knows all future contingencies, and this from all eternity and with certitude, because all things are eternally present to God. Lastly, as there is no succession in God, His knowledge is not discursive, but He comprehends all things simultaneously; and since His knowledge is nothing else than His essence, it is absolutely immutable.{2}
ART V. -- THE DIVINE WILL.
21. God has a perfect will; He loves Himself necessarily, all else He loves freely. -- Intelligence supposes will; therefore God has a perfect will, as He has an infinite intelligence. God primarily loves Himself absolutely as His own proper end; He loves His divine goodness absolutely and necessarily, just as we necessarily desire happiness; therefore God has no free will in this respect. As it enters into the perfection of the will to communicate the good which one possesses, so it is consonant with the divine goodness to be in some way diffusive of itself to others. But God does not will this absolutely and necessarily, because, being infinitely perfect, He needs nothing external to Himself; therefore as regards creatures He has free will. To say that God gives them existence by a necessity of His nature, would be equivalent to affirming that He is not self-sufficient, or that He created without intelligence and will; in a word, that He is not God. Yet, though God's decrees in regard to His creatures are free, they are eternal, since there is no sufficient reason for delay; and irrevocable, since God's knowledge is infinite, and therefore more perfect knowledge or "a fuller consideration of the matter and circumstances" as motives of repeal, is an utter impossibility.
22. The divine will is immutable; yet it does not make contingent effects necessary. -- The divine will is immutable, as are the divine substance and intelligence; and it is always accomplished in all that it desires. But from this it does not follow that it renders necessary all that it wills. It renders necessary the effects that it has made dependent on necessary causes, and it leaves contingent the effects that it has made dependent on contingent causes; for, as the divine will is sovereignly efficacious, whatever God wills is accomplished and in the way in which He wills. Hence God, in willing effects to be contingent, has subjected them to contingent causes which may or may not produce them. Among these contingent causes there are some that do moral evil, which consists in choosing a good which is forbidden in preference to another good that is enjoined by the moral law, and of which consequently one deprives himself. It is evident that God can in no way will moral evil, because it is opposed to His goodness, and because there is no other good that He can will more than His goodness. Yet it is not repugnant that God should sometimes will physical evil, which is an imperfection of nature or a punishment; this evil He wills indirectly, and only in view of the good to which it is attached.
23. God loves Himself with a love equal to Himself, that is, infinite as He is; He loves all other beings in so far as they are good, and because they come from Him. -- Since God has a will, He loves, for love is the first act of the will, and without it the will cannot be even thought of. God loves Himself first with a love equal to Himself, a love which has absolute goodness and holiness as its object, the source and type of all goodness and holiness. Secondly, God loves all existing creatures, because they are good and come from Him; and He loves them the more the better they are, for they are better simply because God wills them to have more good. So while with us it is the goodness of things that determines us to love them, with God it is His love that is the cause of their existence and of the measure of goodness that He imparts to them.
ART. VI. -- THE DIVINE POWER.
24. God is omnipotent, that is, He can do every thing that does not imply a contradiction. -- The power of any being to operate has its principle in the essence of that being; consequently this power is always proportionate to the nature of the being. But God is infinite in essence; therefore He is infinite in power. Since He is omnipotent, He can do all that is intrinsically possible; for whatever is intrinsically possible can be, and divine power requires only this possibility in order to give existence to being. The disciples of Descartes hold that God by His omnipotence can also produce what involves a contradiction, as a "square circle." This doctrine is essentially absurd, for a contradiction being the affirmation and negation of the same thing at the same time, is equivalent to nothing. As God cannot produce a contradiction, so He cannot do evil; for the possibility of doing evil is only the possibility of a defect in acting, and this is repugnant to omnipotence.
25. God alone can work miracles. -- A miracle is a sensible, unusual, and supernatural work, exceeding the powers of created nature. It is evident that God, who freely established the order of nature, can derogate from it when He wishes, either by producing directly, without the concurrence of second causes, the effects proper to those causes, or by producing effects of which secondary causes are not capable. The angels of themselves cannot work true miracles; they can do extraordinary things, but only those that are preternatural, not supernatural. A miracle is defined a "sensible" work, because the change which it implies must be perceptible by the senses; an "unusual" work, because it is opposed to the ordinary course of nature; a "supernatural" work, because although a divine work, it is not required to complete the natural existence of either man or any inferior creature. Thus in the raising to life of the widow of Naim's son, there is a sensible change from a dead body to a body in the vigor of health; an "unusual" work, in that the dead youth is restored to life; a "supernatural" work, since it was by no means due to the young man's natural existence and it "exceeded the powers of created nature," since God alone could work it, though often God's servants are intercessors or instruments.
26. Animal magnetism is the art of producing wonderful phenomena, especially in man, by either physical or moral means. -- This theory is called mesmerism from its author, Mesmer (1733-1815), and magnetism because he first used this influence to produce the phenomena, which, occurring chiefly in sentient beings, gave to this art the epithet animal. Its aim is to deny the existence of miracles, or at least to weaken their evidence.{3}
27. Magnetism is common, transcendental, or hypnotic. -- The first species of magnetism makes use of sensible means, such as gestures, fixed gaze upon a bright object, stroking the limbs, etc. The second is also called spiritism. It provokes the intercourse of men with spirits, with angels, or departed souls, who are called up by determinate signs, or of their own accord present themselves to the magnetizer. The third species originated with Braid (1843), and differs from the first in this only, that the magnetic sleep or hypnotism is produced by fixing the eyes intently upon some bright object.
28. The phenomena of magnetism are mechanical, physiological, cognitive, and transcendental. -- The mechanical phenomena are rotations, attractions, elevations, and other motions of bodies. The physiological phenomena are: (1) spasm or tremor, and convulsion of the members in the subject operated on by the magnetizer; (2) dilation and contraction of the pupil and nerves; (3) magnetic sleep in which the subject holds exclusive communication with the operator and obeys him in all things; (4) lucid somnambulism, in which the subject has extraordinary powers, such as seeing with closed eyes, with his stomach, hands, or feet. The phenomena of cognition comprise the power of knowing the inner affections of the soul, of predicting future contingent free events, of examining the internal structure of the human body, of discovering remedies for disease, of treating of scientific matters, speaking all languages, etc. The transcendental phenomena include all those already mentioned, but they are effected by the conjuring of spirits, who speak to men through a person called a medium, and who is only a passive instrument of their operations. These phenomena include apparitions, voices, writings, scientific dissertations, etc.
29. Five theories have been framed to explain these phenomena: the theory of material causes, of imagination, of animism, of spiritism, and spiritualism. -- The first theory ascribes the phenomena of mesmerism to a certain magnetic fluid which issues from the body of the operator and enters that of the subject. But such a cause is purely material, and is therefore incapable of producing spiritual phenomena. Nor can such phenomena be the effect of imagination, which is also material, and is common to man and beast. -- The theory of animism is a disguised materialism, whether we say that vibrations in the magnetizer's soul are communicated to external objects and thereby to the soul of the subject, or that a subtile matter, Od, is communicated to the soul of the subject, and this produces the phenomena. -- Of those who ascribe the effects to spirits, some are spiritists and hold the doctrine of metempsychosis, or trausmigration of human souls. Their assumption is gratuitous, and has been refuted in Psychology (§ 94); moreover, they can assign no valid reason why departed souls should be subject to the will of man. -- Lastly, spiritualists are they who attribute the phenomena, not to departed souls, but to angels. But manifestly these angels cannot be good spirits, since their answers often inflame the passions and attack revealed truths. They must, therefore, be evil spirits or demons.
{1} See page 203.
{2} Since God's knowledge is infinite, He knows not only all actions of all creatures, but also all possible actions and all possible consequences of those actions. This knowledge does not, however, destroy man's freedom. It is because man will do an action that God, wbose knowledge is infallible, foresees it. But since His knowledge is infinitely perfect, He must foresee not only the action, but also its nature, viz., free if proceeding from free agents, necessary if produced fly a necessary cause. Otherwise God's knowledge would destroy what His creative act had effected, He would contradict Himself, be no longer immutable, and therefore no longer God.
{3} These four numbers have been abridged from Zigliara, Sum Phil., C. 24, 25.