ART. I. -- LOVE OF ONE'S NEIGHBOR.
23. Even apart from civil society men are bound to reciprocal duties in virtue of the likeness of their specific nature and the identity of their end. -- All men have the same specific nature, the same origin, and the same end. This establishes a kind of affinity among them which, apart from civil society, imposes on them reciprocal duties.
24. The foundation of all duties to one's neighbor is the precept, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. -- Love of one's neighbor is not a mere natural inclination resulting from likeness of specific nature, but it is a precept of reason. For order demands that as other men have the same human nature as ourselves, we should wish them the blessings that we desire for ourselves. Yet because the bond of identity or substantial unity is stronger than that of likeness of specific nature, we should indeed love our neighbor as ourselves, but not as much as ourselves. -- The precept of loving our neighbor imposes both negative and positive duties. The former are contained in the maxim, "Do not to others what you would not have them do to you;" the latter, in the maxim, "Do to others as you would that they should do to you."
25. From love of one's neighbor results the duty of doing nothing that injures his moral dignity, or impedes or perverts the lawful exercise of his free will. -- The moral dignity of one's neighbor is impaired by scandal, which gives him an occasion of falling into evil; by seduction, which deceives him in order to draw him into evil; in a word, by whatever turns him from his duty. All these acts are a manifest violation of the love of justice due to our neighbor. But if a man of evil habits have a good name, and thereby take occasion to injure the rights of others, it is lawful to reveal his true character, but so far only as is necessary to protect the innocent. Hence, adds Russo pertinently, we may judge how far are justifiable the revelations made by newspapers, at the time of elections, of a man's public and private character.
26. From the love of one's neighbor arises the duty of doing no violence to his intellect by deceitfully leading him into error. -- Veracity is indispensable to society. Take away from speech its nature as sign of thought and you destroy all intercourse among men. Besides, even if lying would not harm society, it would still be an evil, for God has given speech to man as a means of expressing his thoughts and communicating with his equals; therefore, to use it to deceive is to oppose nature. Hence lying is never permitted. But when the matter is such that it is unlawful to reveal it, then is it not only justifiable but obligatory to use equivocal terms, provided the following conditions enumerated by Russo{1} are present: "(1) that the questioner have no right to know the matter which we conceal; (2) that equivocal words, whether such in themselves or in their circumstances, are used only when there is a proportionately grave cause for uttering them; (3) that the speaker intend the true sense, though the hearer attach another meaning to them, when he could avoid this error by attending to the existing circumstances." And the author further explains: "When there is a proportionately grave cause for concealing the truth, and a question is proposed concerning it which must be answered, because one's very silence would be a manifestation of the truth; two rights come into conflict: in one person, the right and at times even the duty, of concealing the truth, and in the other the right to keep his intellect free from the infection of error. One of these rights must be suspended; but which? Certainly the right of him who is the cause of the conflict. But the hearer is the one who by unlawful questioning caused the conflict; therefore his right must be suspended." The author further distinguishes between words essentially equivocal and words which though having in themselves but one determinate signification may from certain circumstances acquire another. Of this latter kind of equivocation he cites two instances: if a man be questioned as to something which he knows by incommunicable knowledge (sub secreto) and answers, "I do not know," his reply means ignorance simply, but if the circumstances be considered, it means ignorance of incommunicable matter. If a prisoner answers the judge, "Not guilty," though his words taken by themselves signify innocence, yet viewed in connection with the circumstances they signify that he has not committed a crime of which he is bound to make himself his own accuser.{2}
27. From love of one's neighbor results the duty of not attempting his life or maltreating his body. -- Life is a most precious boon to man, for it enables him to work out his present destiny and to prepare for his future state; hence homicide is one of the greatest crimes that can be committed. The interdict laid upon homicide extends to every action that impairs the integrity of the human organism, such as mutilations, wounds, and blows.
28. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty not merely of doing him no harm, but even of doing him good. -- We ought to love our neighbor as ourselves; now, we wish not only that others do us no evil, but also that they do us good. Hence besides negative or perfect duties, we have also positive or imperfect duties toward our neighbor. We should enlighten his mind, strengthen his will in the practice of good, help him in need, and defend his good name. Positive duties are either humane or beneficent. They are duties of humanity if they are rendered our neighbor without any personal sacrifice; they are duties of beneficence if they involve some personal inconvenience or loss. They are, therefore, more meritorious than the former class. Yet though both kinds of positive duty are commanded in a general way, they do not constitute a determinate obligation in this or that particular case; their obligation being only moral and not juridical, no one can he forced to fulfil them. They become a strict and imperative duty only in case of our neighbor's extreme need, owing to the presence of imminent and deadly evil to soul or body.
29. Both negative and positive duties of loving our neighbor oblige us in regard to our enemies. -- The love due to our neighbor is not founded in his personal merit, but in his dignity and specific nature as man. Hence, although it is permitted to detest the wrong done us by an enemy and to demand satisfaction, it is not lawful to pursue with hate the author of this evil and to neglect in his regard the duties that bind us toward other men as such.{3}
ART. II. -- THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE, AND DUELLING.
30. It is lawful to repel force by force, even to the killing of the unjust aggressor, provided the moderation of blameless defence be observed. -- The moderation of blameless defence has five conditions: (1) that there be no other means of defence from the aggression but force; (2) that violence be offered only in the act of aggression; (3) that no more evil be done the aggressor than is here and now necessary to nullify the aggression; (4) that the evil done the aggressor be proportionate to the good that is the object of aggression; (5) that the evil be done in self-defence and not in revenge. When these conditions are present, it is evidently lawful to repel an unjust aggression by force even to the killing of the aggressor. For he who has the right to possess a good has also the right to remove even by force the obstacles to the possession of that good. Undoubtedly, in the case of aggression, the aggressor suffers loss when violently repulsed; but since one of the two adversaries must suffer loss, it is just that he should suffer who exposed himself to this risk and in a measure willed it. Besides, man is not bound to love his neighbor more than himself; but this he would do were he to lose his own goods in order to save his neighbor's. Yet though man has the right to repel by force an unjust aggression, he may forego its exercise, and he will then at times perform an act of heroic virtue; but he is bound to use his right, says Liberatore, when he knows that he is himself in mortal sin, or that his own death will imperil the common safety.
31. Duelling is a violation of the natural law. -- The natural law forbids duels, or single combats in which two persons engage of their own private authority, after previously agreeing upon weapons, judges, and the time and place of combat. For by duelling (1) One exposes himself without lawful motive to give or receive a mortal wound, and is thus guilty of both homicide and suicide; (2) He commits a crime against society, since he deprives it of one of its members and contemns its laws; (3) He sins against reason and justice, since there is no proportion between death and the vain motives invoked by adversaries, and no relation between the honor at stake and the skill or chance on which the issue of the duel depends. -- It is idle to object that honor should be preferred to life, and that when challenged one should always accept in order not to pass for a coward. For it is evident that while real honor is preferable to life, it cannot be kept by the duel, the issue of which depends not on justice, but on skill or force or chance. He that refuses a duel does not prove himself a coward, for there can be no cowardice in not doing a bad action; and besides, it is not courage, but skill, force, or chance that decides a duel. Reasonable men find as much courage as good sense in him who rejects a challenge to combat.
ART. III. -- RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL GOOD.
32. Social good is that which a man enjoys as a member of a constituted community. -- Man is composed of soul and body. The social blessings that pertain to the life of his soul are honor and reputation, and consist in the good opinion in which he and his qualities are held; those that benefit the life of his body are property or wealth.{4}
33. Man is bound to guard his honor and reputation. -- Man ordinarily must live in society to attain the end of his existence. But if his reputation be injured, he loses a part of that benefit which he would otherwise derive from society; therefore he must see to it that he does not, compromise his reputation. Yet his care for his good name should have a just limit, and so far is one from being obliged always to make known his good parts, that he often proves his virtue by concealing them.
34. Man has a natural right to his honor and reputation. -- No man may of right demand to be honored by others with positive marks of consideration unless in virtue of some legitimate dignity added to that of his nature as man; but every man may demand that no one shall injure his natural dignity.
35. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not injuring his honor. -- Honor or reputation is one of man's most precious possessions; to injure it without lawful motive is to violate one of his dearest rights. Therefore does the natural law forbid unjust suspicion, rash judgment, contempt, false testimony, detraction, and calumny.
36. Every man is bound to procure for himself the material goods necessary for life. -- Since man is bound to preserve his life, and cannot live without the material means of food, clothing, and lodging, it is evident that he must provide himself with these means.
37. Every man is obliged to labor. -- The obligation of procuring the goods necessary for life imposes the law of labor, since it is by labor only that we can procure these goods. Labor is also a duty for this reason, that it is an essential condition of man's moral and intellectual development. Again, labor is obligatory on every man, because in no other way can he render himself useful to society, in which he is called to live.
38. Man is permitted to acquire riches. -- Riches supply food to man's activity; therefore their acquisition is a condition favorable to the development of his faculties. They enable him to satisfy his wants more perfectly, and are therefore conformed to order, which requires him to have care of his existence. Riches are also useful to society; they afford a means of remedying the inevitable inequality of the fortunes of its members; they are an element of public prosperity, and, by exciting the intellectual activity as well as the labor of individuals, they contribute to order and the general well-being. Yet one should not forget that they are but a means of attaining man's end. When pursued immoderately, and when turned from their true end, they produce idleness, luxury, and all kinds of evil.
39. To man's duty of preserving his life and promoting his well-being, there is the correspondent right of property, which originates in nature. -- Viewed abstractly, property is exclusive dominion over some corporeal thing; {5} viewed concretely it is the object possessed. Its possession supposes that the object can confer some advantages, and the exclusion of every other person from its possession supposes that the benefits to be derived are limited in nature. If the object can serve all equally and without detriment, it cannot become property. Dominion is perfect or imperfect according as it implies the possession of the object and the enjoyment of its fruits, or the possession of the object without its fruit, or the fruits without the object. Dominion is transitory or permanent, according as it is temporary or lasting.
Transitory dominion evidently arises from nature. It is man's duty to procure whatever is necessary for his life and well-being; but these things cannot serve him and others also; therefore he has the right to their exclusive use. It is also certain that permanent property is of natural right. For by the conditions of his nature man is obliged to provide for the future; otherwise he would fall a victim to the inevitable vicissitudes of life, such as sickness, old age, and the caprices of fortune, and, moreover, being restrained by his material wants, he could not give himself up to the nobler occupation of intellectual pursuits. Secondly, man is naturally active and industrious; it would be unjust that the fruits of his labors should fall to others. Thirdly, the family, which is an institution of nature, cannot subsist, if the father or head does not by permanent property provide for the future wants of his children. Fourthly, the social state, or civil society, is morally necessary for human nature but without respect for property society cannot prosper, cannot even exist. Lastly, stability of property is characteristic of all nations and of all times; so universal a fact must rest upon a law of nature.
40. The right of permanent property extends not only to the necessaries of life, but also to its luxuries. -- All the arguments establishing the right of property show also the legitimacy of man's right to the luxuries of life. Besides, to put limits to the right of property is to destroy it, because, since it is impossible to determine these limits, the denial of the right to the necessaries of life becomes a natural consequence. To attack the right of property, whatever its object be, is to attack man's liberty and to arrest all development, all individual and social progress. It is idle to object that all men being equal, all have a right to an equal share of property. Men are indeed equal in their specific nature, but not in their individual natures; and as inequality of possessions arises from the natural inequality of individual men, their equality in specific nature demands not that every man should have equal wealth with his fellows, but that all men's justly acquired possessions should be equally respected.
Man's ownership of objects is always subject to God's supreme dominion, and extends only to their use as means of attaining his destiny both in the natural and in the supernatural order. In this sense it is true that man has only the usufruct of these objects. It is also true that in the beginning all material things were, negatively, in common; that is, the natural law does not determine them to any individual, but leaves them open for his appropriation by impressing his personality upon them and so making them his own. "Private property," says St. Thomas,{6} "is necessary to human life for three reasons: first, because every one is more solicitous to look after what belongs to himself alone than what is common to all or many; secondly, because human affairs are handled more orderly when on each individual is the care of managing something; thirdly, because thereby a peaceful state of society is secured, while each one is content with his own."
Even landed property does not belong to government, since, as will be shown farther on,{7} the State naturally originates in the propagation of families from a common stock, and therefore its right, if any, of property must preexist in the head of the family. But the State has the right of eminent domain, or dominion "over all the property within the State, by which it is entitled by constitutional agency to any part necessary to the public good, compensation being given for what is taken."{8} Since, then, landed property is not apportioned by the natural law, and it does not belong naturally to government, it must be divided by "positive convention." Since, moreover, for men as now constituted, in a fallen state, the division of landed property is morally necessary to enable them to tend to their due perfection as members of society, this apportionment must be made by public authority, to which alone it belongs, to determine the just conditions that establish a legal title to land, since to civil government pertains the office of securing the temporal good of the community.{9} Communism, the doctrine that forbids all private property and would vest all dominion in government alone, must be rejected.
An equally pernicious theory is Socialism, "the quintessence of which is the double proposition that inequality of conditions -- the distinction of rich and poor, masters and servants -- is the principal cause of misery and crime; and secondly, that the maximum of temporal welfare will be gained by the State becoming the owner of all means of production, reducing all industries to branches of the public services, and all workers to be public servants paid by the State."{10} Such a doctrine fails to consider that civil authority is vested in human beings, who as such are liable to err; that man's highest end is not to produce, but to contemplate the truth. Besides, it means stagnation of art, science, and literature, and precludes the development both of political life and industrial arts."
Mr. Henry George also ascribes vice and misery to inequality of conditions, but "attacks only one class of rich people, not all, and would confiscate not every kind of difference, but only one." His scheme is the nationalization of the land, the taking by the State of "all difference due to the law of diminishing returns from land." "He assumes, like the Socialists, a wonderful piety and moderation among those who would have the handling of the goods taken from the rich; but he has to extend his piety and moderation to the delicate relations of buyers and sellers, of masters and workmen; and thus he combines the delusions of those who worship competition and those who execrate it. Finally, his proposal bids us do what is impossible. For we have seen that in all old countries, owing to long continued cultivation and use of land, and to the frequency of the realization of differences, it is practically impossible to ascertain the amount of the difference (or rent, as he calls it), or if the amount could be ascertained, to ascertain who is getting it. Hence this scheme of social reform is a scheme of taking nobody knows how much from nobody knows whom."{11}
Inequality of condition is a law of nature. Hence every scheme of social reform should aim not at the destruction of either the poor class or the rich, but at the permanent establishment of harmonious relations between them, so that they may, "as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital." The most powerful means of securing this happy result is religion. It "teaches the laboring man and the work man to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made, never to injure capital, nor to outrage the person of an employer; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, nor to engage in riot and disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their slaves; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to reason and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power." It imposes upon him likewise the duty of seeing that the workman have time for "the duties of piety; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just; . . . to make one's profit out of the need of another is condemned by all laws, human and divine."{12}
The State is bound to protect the rights of all its citizens; but because the rich have many means of self-defence, of which the poor are deprived, it is particularly bound to safeguard the rights of the poor, of the workman and laborer. These are in truth the bone and sinew of the nation, and without their coöperation the State cannot prosper. Hence it should see to it that the hours of labor are not too long whether in relation to the workman or the nature of the work or the season of the year; that the work is not too hard; and that the wages are sufficient. Now "a man's labor has two notes or characters. First of all, it is personal; for the exertion of individual power belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing this power for that personal profit for which it was given. Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the results of labor a man cannot live." Wages, therefore, should be sufficient for the support of the workman, his wife, and two or three children. "As a rule, workman and employer . . . should freely agree as to wages; nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort."{13} Whenever these rights of the workman are trespassed on by the employer, the workman has the right to strike, and further, is entitled to the active support of the State, to which it belongs to institute tribunals of arbitration.
41. It is absurd to hold with Heinecius (1681-1741), Grotius (1583-1645), and Puffendorf (1632-1694), that the right of permanent property arises from compact. -- Some philosophers have maintained that by the divine law all things were at first held in common by men, but that when the human race increased in numbers they were divided by common compact. This assertion is contradicted by history, which has preserved no record of this agreement; it is opposed to reason, since, were it true, the savage state would be more conformed to nature than the civilized state. Finally, this assertion favors communism; for, if all things are held in common by the natural law, the compact of our ancestors cannot be binding on us, and we have the right to return to the primitive state of mankind.
42. It is equally absurd to hold, with Hobbes, Bentham, and Montesquieu (1689-1755) that the right of permanent property arises from civil laws. -- Some philosophers derive the right of property from civil laws. This opinion is based on the false hypothesis that the savage state was the primitive state of man; it makes the civil laws on property the rule of justice, and it leads easily to communism, for if civil law has established the right of property, it can also destroy it.
43. The primitive fact determining the right of property is the exercise of man's activity. -- Man's action is, as it were, a development of his personality, and what results from his action is thus stamped with the seal of his personality. He who first takes possession of a thing that belongs to no one, and declares his intention of keeping it, thereby contracts with it a relation that makes it his. A fortiori, should such an object belong to him if, while in possession of it, he improved it by his labor; to deprive him of it would be robbing him of the product of his activity.
44. A father has the right to will his property to his children. -- The right of property evidently gives the right to use it and dispose of it; therefore a father has the right to transmit his property to his children. Again, a father owns an object, because he has impressed upon it the seal of his personality; but his personality is continued in his children; therefore the right of property is also continued in them Liberatore adds that a will drawn up to this effect is unnecessary, that children may succeed to their father's possessions; yet Blackstone seems to judge it a civil right.
45. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not injuring his property. -- Theft is an injustice to the individual, whom it deprives of a lawful possession; it is an attack upon society, of which respect for property is one of the firm foundations, for men are united in society as well for the protection of their property as for the defence of their lives. The natural law in forbidding theft forbids also all that is disguised theft, as fraud and usury. It also forbids one to keep stolen goods, and commands them to be restored.{14}
ART. IV. -- CONTRACTS.
46. A contract is a "consent of two or more wills to the same object, manifested by some sensible sign and productive of an obligation in at least one of the consenting parties."{15} -- No man can suffice for himself, hence the necessity of an exchange of goods and services among men, a necessity imposed as well by love of self as by love of one's neighbor. But to effect an exchange among two or more persons, their consent is necessary; this consent is called a bargain. When the bargain produces an obligation in at least one of the consenting parties, it is called a contract.
47. The validity of a contract depends on five conditions: (1) knowledge of the object; (2) liberty of the contractants; (3) their mutual consent; (4) the possibility of the object of contract; (5) its moral goodness. -- That a contract be valid, its object must be known, because an action done in ignorance is not voluntary; hence deceit and fraud render a contract null. Secondly, it must be free, else it cannot be considered an effect of the will; hence drunkenness, insanity, childhood, and violence, nullify a contract. Thirdly, there must be mutual consent, and this is of the very essence of contract; hence he who promises is legally bound only when his promise is accepted. Fourthly, the object of contract should be possible, for no one is bound to the impossible. Lastly, the object should be lawful, for no contract can ever remove man's obligation of shunning moral evil.
48. Contracts are unilateral or synallagmatic, commutative or aleatory, gratuitous or onerous, consensual or real, principal or accessory, solemn or not solemn, explicit or implicit. -- A unilateral or unequal contract is one in which only one of the contractants assumes an obligation. A "loan of money" and a "promissory note" are instances. A synallagmatic, bilateral, or equal contract is one in which both the parties are bound to fulfil some obligation toward each other, as in "purchase and sale," "rent and hire." A contract is commutative when each of the contractants makes an engagement which is considered an equivalent for what he receives, as in purchase and sale; it is aleatory when the equivalent consists in the mutual chance of gain or loss owing to some uncertain event; of this the "lottery" is an instance. A contract is gratuitous when one of the parties confers some advantage on another without requiring a corresponding recompense, as a "simple promise;" it is onerous when each of the contractants assumes an obligation.
A consensual contract is one that is perfected by the mere consent of the parties; a real contract requires in addition the delivering over of something, as a "deposit." A principal contract is one that exists independently of any prior contract; an accessory contract is one made to assure the fulfilment of a prior contract, without which it could not have been made, as a "mortgage."
A contract is solemn or not solemn according as it is or is not subject to certain particular forms. An explicit or formal contract is one wherein the parties state their obligations in precise terms; an implicit or virtual contract is one in which from purely voluntary action of one party there results an obligation to a third party, and sometimes a reciprocal obligation of the first and second parties; when, for instance, one person receives the money or goods of another he is virtually bound to deliver them to the owner.
49. The obligation arising from a contract ceases: (1) When the engagement made has been fulfilled; (2) When he in whose favor the contract was made consents, if the contract is unilateral, or if the contract is bilateral, when both parties consent; (3) When the object of contract becomes impossible; (4) When one of the contractants does not fulfil the stipulated conditions. -- The obligation of a bilateral contract ceases on the consent thereto of the parties, unless the contract be indissoluble either in itself or by the law. If the impossibility that nullifies a contract originates in the will of one of the contractants, he is bound to make a proportionate compensation to the other party.
A loan is "an onerous contract whereby one party so transfers something of his to another, that it immediately becomes the receiver's with the obligation of afterwards giving back the same, not numerically, but in kind and quality" (Zigliara). It immediately becomes the borrower's, because it is consumed in its use, and it must be returned in kind, because otherwise the contract would be, for example, "purchase and sale."
The grounds on which the demanding of interest is lawful are four: the loss of the lender in loaning the money; the profit that he might make by retaining the money, and which he foregoes by making a loan; the risk to which he exposes himself of not having the sum repaid; and the benefits thereby accruing to commerce and to society in general; hence the State should fix a legal rate of interest. Yet it is unlawful not only to demand a rate of interest higher than that fixed by civil law, but even to demand any interest at all in virtue only of the money loaned. For as the use of the thing is here not really distinct from the thing itself, were the lender of the money to require in addition to the repayment of the principal the payment of a sum for its mere use, he would virtually sell the same thing twice.
"Usury is properly interpreted to be the attempt to draw profit and increment without labor, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify" (Leo X., in Fifth Council of Vatican, 1515).
{1}De Phil. Mor. Prael., p. 140.
{2} Cf. Russo, pp. 144, 145.
{3} Although brutes as being irrational creatures have no rights, yet man is forbidden, says St. Thomas, to exercise cruelty upon tbem, both because such action disposes him to act similarly to his fellowmen, and because it opposes the order and end established by God in treating brutes.
{4} Wealth is here taken to include "all useful things that can be appropriated and exchanged." Its sources are God's bounty and man's labor. It is natural if it supplies man's natural wants; as do food, clothing, and lodging. It is artificial if it is merely an invention of human skill to facilitate interchange of commodities; as, for instance, money.
{5} Dominion over a person is called jurisdiction. Russo (§ 209) distinguishes between the right to property, which he defines as "a general moral power by which man is made capable of acquiring dominion, the matter of it being indeterminate" and tbe right of property, "the moral power of disposing of any determinate thing to the exclusion of others." The former right springs from nature the latter is founded in some contingent fact.
{6} Sum. Th., i-ii, q. 66, a. 2.
{7} § 74.
{8} Century Dictionary.
{9} Cf. authorities cited in Hill's Moral Philosophy, pp. 239-246.
{10} Devas, Political Economy, p. 478. Ibid., p. 893.
{11} Devas, p. 483.
{12} Encyclical Letter on the Condition of Labor.
{13} Encyclical Letter on the Condition of Labor.
{14} In extreme need one may take as much of another's goods as is necessary to sustain life; for God, who is the Supreme Lord of the earth and all it contains, has commanded man to preserve his life. But the following conditions should be present (1) The need should be absolutely or relatively extreme; (2) There should be at hand no other means of satisfying it; (8) Only so much should he taken as is really necessary; (4) He from whom it is taken should not thereby be placed in the same need. Cf. Liberator, Institutiones Philosophicae, vol. iii., p. 179.
{15} Zigliara.