3. Everything that is predicated of several things synonymously, is either genus species, differentia, accidens, or proprium. But nothing is predicated of God as genus, as has been shown (Chap. XXV); and in like manner neither as differentia; nor again as species, which is made up of genus and differentia; nor can any accident attach to Him, as has been shown (Chap. XXIII); and thus nothing is predicated of God either as accident or as proprium, for proprium is of the class of accidents. The result is that nothing is predicated synonymously of God and other beings.
6. Whatever is predicated of things so as to imply that one thing precedes and the other is consequent and dependent on the former, is certainly not predicated synonymously. Now nothing is predicated of God and of other beings as though they stood in the same rank, but it is implied that one precedes, and the other is consequent and dependent. Of God all predicates are predicated essentially. He is called 'being' to denote that He is essence itself; and 'good,' to denote that He is goodness itself. But of other beings predications are made to denote participation. Thus Socrates is called 'a man,' not that he is humanity itself, but one having humanity. It is impossible therefore for any predicate to be applied synonymously and in the same sense to God and other beings.
1.31 : That the Plurality of Divine Names is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of the Divine Being predicated of God and of other Beings
1.33 : That it is not at all true that the application of common P
redicates to God and to Creatures involves nothing beyond a mere Identity of Name