Of God and His Creatures
Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their
Separation from the Body
THE end is in matters of desire like the first principles of
demonstration in the abstract sciences. These principles are naturally
known, and any error concerning them could come only from a perversion
of nature [verging on idiotcy]: hence a man could not be moved from a
true understanding of such principles to a false one, or from a false
to a true, except through some change in his nature. It is impossible
for those who go wrong over first principles to be brought right by
other and more certain principles; or for any one to be beguiled from a
true understanding of such principles by other principles more
plausible. So it is in regard of the last end. Every one has a natural
desire of the last end; and the possession of a rational nature,
generically as such, carries with it a craving for happiness: but the
desire of happiness and the last end in this or that shape and aspect
comes from a special disposition of nature: hence the Philosopher says
that as the individual is himself, so does the end appear to him.* If then the frame of mind under which one
desires a thing as his last end is fixed and immovable, the will of
such a person is unchangeably fixed in the desire of that end. But
these frames of mind, prompting such desires, can be removed from us so
long as the soul is united with the body. Sometimes it is an impulse of
passion that prompts us to desire a thing as our last end: but the
impulse of passion quickly passes away, and with it is removed the
desire of that end. In other cases the frame of mind, provocative of
such desire, amounts to a habit; and that frame of mind is not so
easily got rid of, and the desire of an end thence ensuing is
consequently stronger and more lasting: yet even a habit is removable
in this life. We have seen then that so long as the frame of mind
lasts, which prompts us to desire a thing as our last end, the desire
of that particular end is irremovable, because the last end, or
whatever be taken for such, is desired above all things else; and no
other object of greater desire can ever call us away from the desire of
that which we take for our last end. Now the soul is in a changeable
state so long as it is united with the body, but not after it is parted
from the body.* Separated therefore from the
body, the soul will be no longer apt to advance to any new end, but
must rest for ever in the end already attained. The will then will be
immovable in its desire of what it has taken for its last end. But on
the last end depends all the goodness or wickedness of the will.
Whatever good things one wills in view of a good end, he does well to
will them,* as he does ill to will anything
in view of an evil end. Thus the will of the departed soul is not
changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from one
object of volition to another, its attitude to the last end remaining
constant.
Nor is such fixedness of will inconsistent with free will. The act of
free will is to choose, and choice is of means to the end, not of the
last end.* As then there is nothing
inconsistent with free choice in our will being immovably fixed in the
desire of happiness and general abhorrence of misery, so neither will
our faculty of free choice be set aside by our will being resistlessly
carried to one definite object as its last end.* As at present our common nature is immovably
fixed in the desire of happiness in general, so hereafter by one
special frame of mind we shall be fixed in the desire of this or that
particular object as constituting our last end.
*
Nor is it to be thought that when souls resume their bodies at the
resurrection, they lose the unchangeableness of their will, for in the
resurrection bodies will be organised to suit the requirements of the
soul (Chapp. LXXXVI, LXXXIX): souls then will not be changed by
re-entering their bodies, but will remain permanently what they were.
4.94 : Of the Immutability of the Will of Souls detained in Purgatory
4.96 : Of the Last judgement