328. Mutual Relations of Theology and Philosophy. -- While Scotus is faithful to fundamental principles concerning those relations (268), he develops and amplifies those principles in a sense profoundly at variance with the views of St. Thomas. In the first place Scotus lays extreme emphasis on the distinction between philosophy and theology. Not merely in their formal objects, but also in their material objects, do the two sciences differ: theology, is exclusively concerned with supernatural data: while, on the other hand, whatever human reason can discover by the play of its own natural forces belongs to the domain of philosophy proper. Moreover, theology is neither a science of affection (St. Bonaventure) nor of speculation (St. Thomas), but a science of conduct, of morals,^{1} a practical science. Those new theories deserve the notice of the historian; they are symptomatic. Yet, the doctrine of Scotus has nothing in common with the Averroïstic theory of the two truths (339); for, if he lessens the harmony between the two sciences, Scotus, in the second place, proclaims the subordination of philosophy to theology. Indeed his deep conviction about the inferiority of philosophy makes him avoid even the possibility of a conflict between the two sciences. He is excessive in his misgivings about the unaided, natural power of the understanding, and retrenches perhaps unduly the scope of its investigations. He would have reason simply veil its face before mystery, with a docile and reverential silence. Nothing could be more remote from such an attitude than any suggestion of revolt; for, reason, in the third place, recognizes that nothing could be possibly more conformable to reason (rationabilius) than faith in the word of God.

{1} In L. Sentent., Prol., p. 4, n. 42.