373. Kinds of Composition in Contingent Being. -- William of Ockam admits composition of matter and form (286); but he denies the distinction between the universal and the individual. Not only is "the individual .. . the true substance, while the universal gets its characteristic, independent form from the action of the intellect" (287), but furthermore, the universal has no reality at all outside us, for it does not exist in any shape or form in Nature. This extreme thesis, directed as it is against the common essences of Duns Scotus (nullo modo est res extra animam quodcumque universale^{1}), also strikes St. Thomas's theory of similar essences (nullum universale est extra animam existens realiter in substantiis individuis, nec est de substantia vel esse earum ^{2}). The problem of individuation has therefore of course no sense in metaphysics. So too he denies all distinction between essence and existence (essentia et existentia idem omnino significant). The universal is in fact entirely banished from metaphysics and transported into psychology and logic.^{3} We shall understand his system better when we see his treatment of the psychological aspect of the Universals question.

{1} Quodl., v., q. 12.

{2} Expos. Aurea, Praedicab., Proem.

{3} "Et ideo non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurium" (Log., L. i., c. 14).