170. Ownership is the right to dispose of property at will, and to exclude others from its use. By property, we mean the external material goods of the earth, which men can divide amongst themselves.
ARTICLE I. VALIDITY OF TITLES TO OWNERSHIP.
171. Thesis XV. We have a right to own property.
Explanation. The ownership here spoken of is not absolute: it is dependent on God.
Proof. We have a right to live, indeed we are bound by duty to our Creator to preserve our lives; hence we have a natural right to the means necessary to preserve life. But the ownership of property, i. e., the holding, using, and disposing at will of material goods to the exclusion of other men, is a necessary means for the preservation of life. Therefore, we have a right to own property.
172. Thesis XVI. We have the right to increase or lay up property.
Proof 1. Our right to life not only exists for the present hour or day, but it also extends into the future; hence we have the right to the ordinary means for prolonging our lives by providing betimes for future wants, such as sickness, old age, or the dependence upon us of other persons. Now, this implies a right to increase our property beyond present needs. Therefore, we have a right to increase or lay up property.
Proof 2. All men, considered specifically, or according to their common nature, are equal; therefore, no one is bound either to labor for another or to surrender the results of his labor without just compensation. Yet this a man would be forced to do, unless rights to property were lasting; because, if a claim to property had been established, and that claim could not continue, the labor which the claimant had expended in obtaining or developing the property would pass without compensation to another man.
173. The principles explained in the preceding paragraphs apply to landed property just as well as to other material goods of a less stable character. Yet the right of private individuals to own land has been, of late years especially, vigorously denied, as unjust and opposed to the natural law. This doctrine, or land theory, has had for its most prominent champion in our own country Mr. Henry George, who declares (Progress and Poverty, B. VI., C. II.) that private ownership in land is the chief source "of the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth apparent in modern civilization." He finds only one remedy: "We must make land common property." His reasonings are as ingenious as his claim is bold and his language forcible; but they are full of sophistry. He begins by granting that if the remedy is a true one it must be consistent with justice. But he fails in his earnest attempt to prove this for his land theory. In striving to establish the justice of his claim, he does not hold the teaching of the Communists that any kind of private property is unlawful. On the contrary, he refutes this teaching with much ability and force. "What constitutes," he asks (B. VII., C. I.), "the rightful basis of property? What is it that enables a man to justly say of a thing, 'It is mine'? From what springs the sentiment which acknowledges his exclusive right as against all the world? Is it not primarily the right of a man to himself, to the use of his own powers, to the enjoyment of the fruits of his own exertions? Is it not this individual right which springs from and is testified to by the natural facts of individual organization -- the fact that each particular pair of hands obey a particular brain and are related to a particular stomach; the fact that each man is a definite, coherent, and independent whole -- which alone justifies individual ownership? As a man belongs to himself, so his labor when put in concrete form belongs to him.
"And for this reason, that which a man makes or produces is his own, as against the world -- to enjoy or to destroy, to use, to exchange, or to give. No one else can rightfully claim it, and his exclusive right to it involves no wrong to anyone else. Thus there is to everything produced by human exertion a clear and indisputable title to exclusive possession and enjoyment, which is perfectly consistent with justice, as it descended from the original producer in whom it vested by natural law. The pen with which I am writing is justly mine. No other human being can rightfully lay claim to it, for in me is the title of the producer who made it. It has become mine because transferred to me by the stationer, to whom it was transferred by the importer, who obtained the exclusive right to it by transfer from the manufacturer, in whom by the same process of purchase vested the rights of those who dug the material from the ground and shaped it into a pen. Thus my exclusive right of ownership in the pen springs from the natural right of the individual to the use of his own faculties."
The theory, however, proves too much. If the principle were true that right to ownership can be established only by transforming labor, man could own nothing, for he can produce nothing without material to work upon. The iron or gold of which the pen is made is not produced by man; hence, in the very first instance, appropriation by occupation must be admitted as a true title to the raw material. Mr. George is, therefore, entirely mistaken when he goes on to say: "There can be to the ownership of anything no rightful title which is not derived from the title of the producer." In his elaborate development of this false proposition, on which his theory of the injustice of private ownership in land chiefly rests, the same fallacy is ever recurring, namely, the confusion of production with any exercise of the human faculties. The explorer does not produce the desert land which he discovers; and yet he acquires a clear title to it on Mr. George's own principle that he exerts his faculties in its acquisition. Mr. George's theory is, therefore, unsound; he totally fails to prove the injustice of private ownership in land. His attacks on land owners are not justified, and are consequently unwise. For, as he himself says: "That alone is wise which is just, that alone is enduring which is right."
174. Thesis XVIII. Mere first occupancy is by itself a valid title to ownership.
Explanation. Occupation consists in taking possession of something that does not belong to another person, and that can be an object of ownership. This means of acquiring ownership can be employed at present to only a very limited extent, since land and nearly all movable property belong to individuals, or companies, or governments.
Proof. The principle that a man is entitled to possess what he first occupies, provided it be the property of no other person, is universally admitted as a dictate of common sense. The only thing opposed to it is the doctrine of Communism, that all goods are by nature positively common to all men. But this doctrine is absurd, for a man would be thereby made slavishly dependent upon all other men, without whose permission he could not justly appropriate anything for his personal use. The child or the man, savage or civilized, that catches a wild fowl or fish, that finds a valuable stone belonging to no one, that gathers wild fruit, will justly claim ownership as a right by priority of possession. There is no reason why this principle should apply to movable goods only and not to land as well, provided he who finds a piece of land ownerless marks it by some external sign as his property, thus indicating his intention of keeping it and of excluding all others from the possession of it.
175. In modern times occupancy of a new land is effected by some state or government, which thus becomes the first owner. Next, individuals acquire possession by complying with certain conditions determined by the civil power. In this country, lands are held in virtue of original grants made either by the United States directly, or by other governments that controlled tracts which afterward came under the jurisdiction of the United States. These latter grants were confirmed later on by the present government. Once the conditions placed by the civil power are complied with by the occupants, their rights are fixed, and both justice and the common good demand that they be kept inviolable. The Constitution of the United States provides that no private property shall be taken for public uses without just compensation. In this, the Constitution only enunciates the natural right of private owners; and therefore no amendment of the Constitution could ever confer upon the government the right freely to confiscate the land.
176. Yet a state might hold landed property in common, as was done to some extent among the Irish clans, and later on in the French Colony of Louisiana. But, as a rule, it is far more expedient to encourage private industry by allotting portions of the land to private persons, or permitting them to take possession according to certain formalities that the State will determine for the common good. Nearly all nations have, in their early history, acted on these principles; and thus the division of land by occupancy, yet with public sanction and according to public regulations, is said to have been made jure gentium. This term does not mean international law, but the law of the nations in this sense, that it is the prevalent legislation of all nations in accordance with the exigencies of natural rights.
177. The state retains two restrictions on private ownership, founded on the requirements of the common good: 1. The right of taxation, that is, the imposition of a burden proportionate to the protection bestowed, and not any tax at will; for justice requires a proportion between what is given and what is received. 2. The right of eminent domain, i. e., the right of taking private property for public uses when necessary, with compensation made to the owners.
178. Thesis XIX. A grant of unoccupied land, made by civil society to private parties, on proper conditions, founds a just claim to ownership.
Proof 1. Society can make such laws as promote its end -- the general welfare of the community -- provided it does not violate any prior rights. But such assignments, or grants, made on proper conditions, contribute to the general welfare and violate no prior rights. For such a measure promotes enterprise, industry, and public spirit, without which a high degree of civilization would be difficult, if not impossible.
Proof 2. A State can dispose of its property for the common good. This it does by allotting lands as a reward to soldiers who have fought for their country, or for the purpose of encouraging settlers to clear and improve the ground, or as an inducement to corporations to make roads, build bridges and other public works, and thus open up the country to trade and travel.
179. Thesis XX. Communism and Socialism are unjust and injurious.
Explanation. Communism denies the right of private ownership and declares that all property is by nature positively common. Socialism demands that all productive property shall be given over to the State, which would thus become sole proprietor of land, manufactories, railroads, etc., and sole distributor of the compensation due to every individual member of the commonwealth for his labor. Now we maintain that Communism and Socialism, if introduced as general systems in the present order of things, would be unjust and injurious.
Proof. The fundamental principle of Communism is false, namely, that by nature all goods were intended for mankind to be positively common, so that no one could justly appropriate to himself anything beyond immediate pressing wants, without the consent of the other members of the community. The absurdity of this view is manifest from the unnatural dependence in which man would be thereby placed. Another false principle made use of by both systems is the absolute and entire equality of all men, In the abstract and before the law, all men are said to be equal; but in the concrete, no two men are exactly equal. No two men have equal powers of body and mind, equal abilities for government or trade, the same tastes and dispositions, even the same rational wants.
Both systems would begin by depriving men of the fruit of past labors; both would confiscate the earnings of one man for the benefit of others without compensation, thus violating a great natural right. Moreover, it is impossible for either system, judged on economic grounds, to last, or to attain even a fraction of the fanciful plenty so freely promised by its advocates. The latter seem to base their calculations on the utopian dream, that, in the new Communistic or Socialistic Republic, men shall lose their selfishness and be free from their passions, and will freely practise heroic self-denial and self-forgetfulness; that, in other words, men shall be transformed into angels. Yet these same leaders generally ignore ot repudiate religion, the wellspring of self-sacrifice, and aim at sweeping away the rights of Church and family.
ARTICLE II. VIOLATIONS OF OWNERSHIP.
180. The violation of the right of ownership, if committed secretly, is called theft; it is called robbery, if the act is done openly and with physical force. Such violations disturb the balance of equality which justice demands for all the members of the community. The balance cannot be properly restored except by the restitution of the property unjustly acquired. What was stolen continues to belong to the one from whom it was taken, and must be given back to him. Res clamat ad dominum, "property calls for its owner," is an important axiom of jurisprudence. Even if the owner cannot be found, it is not fair that the thief should retain what he has stolen: fraus sua nemini patrocinari debet, "no one should reap any benefit from his fraud." He must part with his ill-gotten goods, disposing of them as he may presume the owner would direct, if he could be consulted; for instance, by giving them or their value to the poor.
181. If damage has been done willfully to the property of another, reparation of the damage must be made before equality can be restored. This duty rests, in the first place, upon the chief perpetrator of the damage; and, secondarily, upon those who have voluntarily aided him, physically or morally, to inflict the injury. Such aid or co-operation may be given in various ways, viz.: by taking part in the material action; by command, advice, consent; by sheltering or concealing; by sharing in ill-gotten gains; and even by not warning, not preventing, or not making the guilty known when one is, in justice, bound to do so.
ARTICLE III. VARIOUS MODES OF ACQUIRING PROPERTY.
182. The chief modes of acquiring property are the following:
1. First occupancy: that is, taking possession of any material object that is really without an owner. (No. 174.) Domestic animals, even when they have strayed far from their owner, remain his property; but wild animals, though captured and tamed, if once they have regained their native liberty, are considered as belonging to no one till captured again, when they become the property of their new captor.
2. The finding of lost articles. These have an owner to whom they must be returned, if he can be discovered with reasonable effort. If, however, the owner cannot be discovered, the articles become the property of the finder. When hidden treasures of great value are found in civilized lands, their ownership or apportionment is settled according to existing laws that have been enacted for such cases. The goods of those who die intestate, and without natural heirs, are to be disposed of as the laws direct.
3. Accession is a title to new property that is added to my former possessions, either naturally, e. g., by birth, as with the young of cattle, or by alluvion, as by deposits of soil on a river bank; or accidentally, or even designedly, as when another plants or builds on my grounds, or in other ways improves my property. In these instances, disputed claims may arise which the civil law is to decide.
4. Prescription is a title to ownership of property based on the fact that it has been held in quiet and bona fide possession for the space of time appointed by the law. This supposes: 1. That the property is such as can be lawfully acquired by a private person. 2. That the person in possession has honestly considered it all along as his property. 3. That he has remained in undisputed and uninterrupted possession during the required time.
The common good demands that claims to property reaching back beyond a reasonable period should be disregarded, in order that ownership may be settled on a solid basis.
ARTICLE IV. THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY CONTRACT.
183. Ownership has been defined (No. 170) to be the right to dispose at will of material, external goods. Now, the right to dispose of an object at will involves the right to transfer it to another person. This act of transfer begins in the owner's will, is continued in the expression to the other party of this act of his will, and is completed by the latter's acceptance of the offer. This consent, externally manifested, of the two parties concerned, agreeing to the transfer of rights, is called a contract.
184. A contract is gratuitous, or one-sided, if only one party gives up a right to ownership, the other party accepting the proffered benefit without any cost to himself. This is the case in free gifts amongst the living or in the behests of the dying. In either instance, the equality implied in natural justice requires the person benefited to make the compensation of gratitude to the donor.
185. A man has a right, derived not from civil legislation but from the natural law, to dispose of his property by his last will Yet he cannot do it in such a manner as to violate the rights and just claims of others. Hence, the father of a family has no right to alienate his entire property in favor of externs, if in so doing he should leave his wife and children destitute. If he dies without making a will, they have a right, founded on the natural law, to inherit his property. The share that each member of the family shall receive is usually determined by existing civil laws.
186. Inviolability is due to last wills, not only by reason of the right which the testator has to dispose of his property, but also on account of the common good of society. Few men would care to exert themselves beyond the efforts necessary for present needs, if they could not dispose of the property acquired by their toil for the benefit, after their death, of those who are nearest and dearest to them, or of objects and institutions the success and continuity of which they had greatly at heart during life.
187. All contracts in which both parties assume an obligation, or in which both yield some right for the benefit received, are called onerous. The rights thus exchanged or transferred need not be those of ownership; yet, of whatever kind they may be, the principle of equality between what is given and what is received determines the justice of the transaction. This principle, however, is not to be too strictly interpreted. If, for example, I take a fancy to an article of little intrinsic value in the possession of another and induce him to let me have it at a high price, the bargain is just. Though materially no equality exists between the price and the thing purchased, still there may be an equality formally between what I pay and the value that, of my own free choice, I set on the article. But this supposes that the excess of the price is assented to freely on my part. If another takes advantage of my special need and forces me to pay more than the commodity is worth, he does me an injustice, and the contract is unjust.
188. To be valid or binding, every contract, whether it be gratuitous or onerous, must be attended with the following conditions:
1. The contracting parties must be competent persons -- i. e., in the full possession of reason; hence, infants, insane and intoxicated persons are not competent; minors are legally incompetent -- i. e., their contracts are usually not recognized as valid before the law.
2. The matter of the contract must be appropriate -- i. e., the rights transferred must be really capable of transference, and must belong to those who exchange them. Hence, no one can validly bargain to do a thing that he has no right to do.
3. Proper form must be observed. Both civil and ecclesiastical authority may, each in its own province, appoint certain forms, the non-observance of which renders some contracts null and void. The natural form essential to every contract is the true, full and mutual consent of the contracting parties. This supposes that both have a sufficient knowledge of what they are agreeing to. Hence, if one of the parties seriously misunderstands the contract, he is not bound to stand by it. Contracts made by minors can frequently be rescinded or annulled by their parents or guardians, because minors are supposed to act with insufficient knowledge.
ARTICLE V. THE WAGES OF LABORERS.
189. The relations between laborers and their employers ought to be such as to conduce to the benefit of both parties. This cannot be the case unless full justice be done on each side. It is therefore of great importance to understand in this matter the golden mean between the exactions of grinding capitalists and the unreasonable demands of Communists and Socialists.
By wages, we understand the compensation agreed upon by the workman and his employer for the former's services to the latter. We shall first consider such an agreement merely as an onerous contract, money or its equivalent being exchanged for work. Each party has a right to that which he gives in exchange; and if the compensation is proportionate to the services rendered, the contract is just. The services thus contracted for cannot be of use to the employer, as productive property, except in their results. Accordingly, whatever profit he can derive by the combination and direction of such labor above that which the wageearners themselves could have won by their individual exertions is his gain; whatever he loses thereby is his loss. They have no part in the management; consequently, it would be unreasonable for the laborers to claim, in addition to the stipulated compensation, the right to divide with their employer the profits of his management.
Their mutual relations -- we are not speaking of co-operative associations -- are not those of partnership; else the losses, as well as the profits, would have to be shared in common.
190. How shall we determine the proper amount of wages to be paid to each laborer? The answer to this question is not easy, especially for particular cases. The following principles, however, are of general application:
1. To preserve the balance of equality, which ought to exist in every onerous contract, between what is given and what is received in return, a laborer who, by superior skill or industry, renders more valuable service than others, is entitled to higher wages.
2. The laborer who is called upon to expend unusual exertion, by performing more painful or more protracted toil, by exposing life or limb or health to more than ordinary danger, by devoting an uncommonly long time to the task of preparing and qualifying himself for his position, is entitled to a compensation exceeding the ordinary wages.
3. The chief difficulty is encountered in fixing the amount of wages for ordinary service. This must be the standard or basis of wages. For other kinds of service there ought to be higher pay; but what shall we give for ordinary service? Labor, many answer, is like merchandise, and its owner, the laborer, is entitled to that only which his labor will bring in the market; and hence, whatever he agrees to accept, even though forced by stress of need or competition to sell his toil for a pittance, that is the proper amount. Now, this view is erroneous and unjust. Labor is not common merchandise; it is the wear and tear of life in rational beings, every one of whom has an inalienable right to his life -- not the life of a beast of burden, but the life of a man. Hence, he has the right to all that is necessary to maintain human life, not only in his own person, but also in those who are naturally dependent upon him for the means of subsistence. The wages, therefore, which an employer is bound in justice to pay to the man that labors for his interest as faithfully as a human being can be fairly expected to labor, ought to be sufficient to support the workman and his wife and children with decency and reasonable comfort. This is the minimum quantity of wages.{1}
191. Can wage-earners justly form organizations to protect themselves against exacting capitalists? -- in other words, are labor unions lawful? A right to an end implies a right to the means necessary to attain that end, if such means do not violate the rights of others. Now, laborers have a right to fair wages; therefore, they have a right to the just means necessary to obtain fair wages. But organized association on the part of workingmen is often necessary; it is often the only means of securing fair wages from overreaching employers Such association does injustice to no one. Therefore, workingmen can, with justice, have recourse to labor unions as a means of self-protection.
Are strikes illicit? Men have a right to refuse working for unfair wages. Their places may be taken by others, and the latter cannot justly be prevented from doing so, except by moral suasion. Of course, employers also have a right to form unions, in order to protect themselves against unreasonable demands of their employees.
192. If the common good is injured by the general stoppage of work attendant on strikes and lock-outs, the most proper remedy is to be sought in the intercession and arbitration of fair-minded and disinterested persons. On general principles, it is not desirable that the government should meddle with peaceful disputes of citizens, as long as private means are at hand for bringing about a good understanding. Boards of arbitration are usually the best agency for restoring health and vigor to the whole industrial system.{2}
Yet no general or lasting cure can be effected, except by animating the members of both classes with the spirit of justice and mutual love. Now, this cannot be secured without a sound education, which itself implies the doctrines of the true religion.
{1} "The labor of the working-man is not only his personal attribute, but it is necessary; and this makes all the difference: the preservation of life is the bounden duty of each and all, and to fail therein is a crime. It follows that each has a right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure it in no other way than by work and wages. Let it be granted, then, that, as a rule, workmen and employer should make free agreements, and, In particular, should freely agree as to wages; nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, viz., that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If, through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or a contractor will give him no better, be is the victim of force and injustice." -- Pope Leo XIII., Encyclical on Labor, 1891.
{2} "In these and similar questions, however, such as, for example, the hours of labor in different trades, the sanitary precautions to be observed in factories, workshops, etc., in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the state, especially as circumstances, times and localities differ so widely, it is advisable that recourse be had to societies or boards, . . . or to some other method of safeguarding the interests of wage-earners, the state to be asked for approval and protection." -- Leo XIII., Encyclical on Labor.