JMC : The State and the Church / by Ryan and Millar

13. The Duties of the Citizen

by Rev. John A. Ryan, D.D.

THE obligation of the citizen to obey civil laws does not exhaust his duties to the State. So important is the State and its functions that it gives rise to a special kind of justice. This is called by the moral theologians legal justice, and it is commonly defined as that virtue which inclines the citizen to render to the community what is due it for the common good.{1} This means not only obedience to the laws, but all those actions, political and social, which are necessary for the common welfare. Legal justice binds both the ruler and the citizen. It obliges the former to make the common welfare the object of all his official acts. It obliges the citizen and the public official alike to comply with the laws, and to give due consideration to the needs of the State in all their actions and relationships.

The particular duties imposed upon public officials by the virtue of legal justice, can be stated summarily in a few paragraphs. The general obligation of promoting the social good implies, obviously, that the executives, the judge, the lawmaker, are bound to prefer that end to their private advantage. The man who regards public office as an opportunity for private gain, except incidentally and as a necessary consequence of faithful public service, is false to his trust and violates legal justice. To accept a bribe for aid in the enactment of a bad law, for negligent or oppressive administration of the law, or for unjust judicial conduct, is an evident moral wrong. To obtain some advantage on the occasion of proper official actions, for example, through some form of "graft," is likewise a violation of legal justice. Such conduct is generally forbidden by the civil law; at any rate, it renders right judgment and adequate performance of official duties extremely difficult. Public officials are not justified in exposing themselves to such a grave temptation. What is true of their own private advantage applies likewise to that of their friends. In their enactment and administration of the law, they may not extend favors of any sort to any in dividual or class of individuals. The common good must be preferred to the good of individuals, and all individuals must be treated with exact justice.

Public officials are not only bound to refrain from promoting the interests of individuals at the expense of the common good, and to avoid favoritism toward certain individuals, but also to extend rigorous and proportionate justice to all social classes. This means that no class should be favored to the detriment of the general welfare, and that no class should receive less than its due proportion of public protection and assistance. For example, it is wrong to permit an industrial group to exploit the national resources, such as coal mines and timber, in such a way that present or future generations will suffer unnecessary hardship. It is wrong to give certain industrial interests the benefit of a public subsidy or a protective tariff, the effect of which is to impose extortionate costs upon the great body of the consumers. The possession of unregulated monopoly power is likewise a cause of injury to the public welfare which will not be tolerated by public officials who habitually fulfill their public obligations.

On the other hand, every social class has a just claim against the State and its officials for that measure of governmental protection and assistance which is necessary to provide the conditions of right and reasonable life. Today this principle receives its chief application in the weaker economic classes. As Pope Leo XIII observed: "The richer classes have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; whereas, those who are badly off have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And it is for this reason that wage earners, who are undoubtedly among the weak and necessitous, should be specially cared for and protected by the government."{2} Therefore, legislators are morally bound to provide for minimum decent standards of life and labor. This means legislation to prevent child labor, an excessively long working day, oppressive conditions in work places, unduly low wages, and the subjection of the workers to an inhumane insecurity as regards unemployment, sickness, accidents, invalidity, and old age. Public officials are likewise under obligation to promote in due measure the prosperity of industrial enterprise, to levy taxes in proportion to ability and sacrifice, and in general to deal with all classes according to their actual needs and deserts, not according to some doctrinaire theory of laissez-faire or of opposition to class legislation. In the words of Pope Leo XIII: "Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice -- with that justice which is called by the schoolmen distributive -- towards each and every class alike."{3}

One of the primary duties of public officials is to possess an adequate knowledge of what constitutes the common welfare, and of the means by which it is best promoted. This obligation is disregarded by a large proportion of those who seek public office. Men who are otherwise conscientious assume that good will and right motives are a sufficient equipment for public service. When we consider the enormously extended functions of the modern State, the numerous and profound ways in which its activities affect the welfare of all the people, and the consequent complexity of legislating and governing wisely, we see that this notion is utterly mistaken. Only in local governments and subordinate official positions is it true that common honesty plus common sense suffice for those who are charged with the duty of caring for the public welfare. In all the more important legislative and executive officers, a considerable amount of special and specific knowledge is essential to an adequate discharge of official obligations.

So much for the nature and elements of the obligation resting upon public officials. The scope of their obligation is identical with the province of the State. This has been described in preceding chapters on the State's end and functions. All of these functions, intellectual, moral, religious, political, civic, and economic, public officials are morally bound to perform in accordance with the principles of strict justice and proportionate justice.

The statement is frequently made in the United States that public officials are merely public servants. It is incorrect. They are, indeed, the servants of the people, but they are also something more. Inasmuch as their function is that of public service, they may properly be regarded as public servants; inasmuch as their position gives them the authority to enact laws which are morally binding on the people, they are not servants but masters. Their character as public servants does not depend upon the fact that they are elected by the people; for hereditary kings are likewise bound to serve the common welfare. In a republic the members of legislatures may in a special sense be regarded as servants of the people, whenever they are instructed by the electors to carry out certain political policies. Their promise to pursue this course creates a particular responsibility to the people, and renders their position analogous to that of servants or agents. Nevertheless, they are masters and rulers when they enact the legislation necessary to carry out the policies to which they have committed themselves.

The first duty of the citizen is obedience to law. It extends to the ordinances of every jurisdiction in which the citizen finds himself, national, State, and municipal. The basis, nature, and limits of this duty have been described in the preceding chapter.

A second duty is that of respect for public authority, and this means both public officials and their enactments. Of course, this duty can be exaggerated, but in our day and country the opposite perversion is much more frequent. Through false inferences drawn from the principles of democracy, men are inclined to minimize, or even to reject entirely, this obligation. Conscious that elected officials are human beings of the same clay as himself, and dependent upon him for an elevation that it only temporary, the citizen easily assumes that to show them respect is undemocratic and unworthy. The Century Dictionary, defines respect as, "the feeling of esteem, regard, or consideration excited by the contemplation of personal worth, dignity, or power; also a similar feeling excited by corresponding attributes in things." While public officials are sometimes lacking in personal worth and dignity, they are always the possessors and custodians of political power, which of its nature demands esteem and consideration. Were this attitude habitually taken by the citizens, the problem of securing law observance, would be greatly simplified. The man who refuses respect to civil authority because he fears that it would demean or degrade him, exhibits the slave mind and temper; for he has not sufficient confidence in his own worth to feel that he can afford to give honor where honor is due, or to recognize any kind of superiority. Such a man is not only a bad citizen but a detriment to any social group.

Closely connected with obedience is the duty of loyalty. In essence loyalty means faithfulness and constancy in allegiance and service. To the idea of obedience, which may be quite formal, mechanical, and even reluctant, it adds the notions of intensity, emotion, spontaneity, and constancy. The genuinely loyal citizen is always ready and eager, not only to obey the laws, but to support and maintain the political institutions of his country. If the citizen merely refrains from seditious or treasonable conduct his loyalty is negative and imperfect. Whether positive or negative, loyalty always implies a certain habitual spirit and attitude toward laws and institutions. It habitually recognizes that a presumption exists in favor of organic and statutory enactments and principles. The loyal citizen is always disposed to give his government and his political institutions "the benefit of the doubt," and to withhold obedience or support only when the doubt is converted into moral certainty that the laws or the government are in the wrong. In a word, the habitual attitude of the loyal citizen is that of sympathetic faith, not that of criticality and distrust.

The participation of the United States in the great war made the subject of loyalty lively and very practical. As might have been expected, the discussion gave ignorant, prejudiced, and selfish men the opportunity to exploit perverted notions of loyalty. During and since the war, various groups and organizations endeavored with considerable success to fasten the stigma of disloyalty upon many of their fellow citizens who were guilty of neither treason nor sedition. The conception of loyalty to the Constitution became perverted into the doctrine that any attempt to change the Constitution, even by legitimate means, is disloyal. Not only the method but the Scope of loyalty was distorted. The demand was impudently and blatantly made that all citizens should show loyalty not only to our political and legal institutions, but also to our industrial institutions, specifically to the existing positions and relations of capital and labor. Any theory or movement which aimed at essentially modifying the industrial system or diminishing the power of capital, whether through Socialism, Guildism, or co-operative enterprise, was denounced as seditious and un-American. It is significant that both these forms of exaggeration were, in the main, committed by the same persons. They denounced any effort to change the Constitution because they dislike changes which would facilitate industrial reforms and social justice; they strove to place industrial institutions on the same plane of authority as political institutions because they wished to perpetuate economic injustice. In short, the perversions and exaggerations of the notion and duty of loyalty were mainly determined by sordid economic motives.

These corruptions of a noble sentiment and doctrine do not merit a formal refutation. Loyalty to political institutions does not exclude the desire or the effort to modify or even to abolish them by orderly and reasonable processes. Loyalty to the State, to one's country, to the public weal, does not include belief in, love of, or defence of existing private institutions, industrial or other. The loyalty which is incumbent upon the citizen, as citizen, concerns only political institutions and relations. The organized attempt to make it apply to the economic order, is one of the most extraordinary and brazen performances in the history of human selfishness. It was possible only in the vitiated atmosphere of war, and in the abnormal psychology of the years immediately following.

In his excellent brochure on Christian Citizenship, the Rev. Thomas Wright declares that obedience, respect, and loyalty are the constituent elements of patriotism.{4} Probably this is as satisfactory as any other analysis of the vague, though apparently elementary sentiment that we call patriotism. The good citizen loves to be acclaimed a patriot, and the orator finds patriotism one of the most appealing and popular subjects. Nevertheless it is very elusive. To the average man it means love of country, but what does love of country mean? Not, merely love of green fields, lofty mountains and winding rivers; not always love of existing political institutions. In time of actual or threatened war, the idea of patriotism is very simple. It means support and defence of one's country against armed attack.

In time of peace, the phrase "love of country," means many things to many minds. The object of the love may be the physical characteristics of the country, or its economic and social opportunities, or its government, or its political ideals, or its history, or some combination of these entities. As commonly used, the term patriotism has almost always an international connotation. It appeals to the national consciousness. It brings before the mind the facts of national individuality separateness, distinctness of interests. It lays stress upon the welfare of one's own country against the welfare of other countries. Too often it takes the form of boasting, jingoism, contempt of foreign nations, and identifies the national welfare with national power, imperialism and agression. The average citizen frequently confuses patriotism with national jealousy and provincialism. He does not regularly think of it as having anything to do with internal affairs.

Adequate and rational patriotism should be quite as active in peace as in war, and it should extend to every matter that affects the common good. If patriotism is love of country its only rational and concrete meaning is love of the people who inhabit the country and compose the State, in other Words, love of one's fellow citizens. Therefore its ultimate object is the same as that of the State, namely the common good. In time of peace the common good is much more dependent upon domestic legislation and administration than upon foreign policies. The true patriot realizes this and strives to promote the common good in all his political activities. The man who participates in political corruption, or uses his political position or influence for the undue advantage of any social group or for the oppression of any social class, is not a patriot, no matter how loudly he may acclaim the glories of his country, or how truculently he may proclaim his willingness to fight foreigners.

Taking up now the more specific duties of the citizen, we find that they may be conveniently grouped under two heads: Those which are elementary and which exist under all forms of government; those which are complex and have place only in a State that possesses representative institutions. The most important of the specific elementary duties are concerned with taxation and military service.

According to Catholic teaching, statutes imposing taxes bind in conscience. The general reason is the same as that which attaches moral obligation to other civil laws. That is the common welfare. Since government cannot maintain itself nor perform its functions without revenues, and since it has no other means of obtaining them than taxation, the citizens are morally bound to provide the necessary revenues in this manner. Moreover, the obligation is not merely one of legal justice, that justice which requires citizens to promote the common good, but also of strict justice, that justice which requires restitution to be made when it is violated.{5} If the citizens fail to pay taxes they sometimes inflict injury upon the State, injury which can be measured in terms of money and repaired by payments of money. When the evasion does not produce such injury, owing to the fact that the authorities increase the tax rate, or devise other and more effective forms of taxation, the obligation of making restitution will have a different object. The real beneficiaries of restitution will then be those citizens who have acted conscientiously and paid the full measure of taxes levied upon them.

Let us suppose that a tax rate of one and one-half per cent Will yield sufficient revenue for a city if all the citizens contribute their proportionate share. Through various devices very many of them evade a considerable part of their obligation. In so far as the deficit is not made up through an increase in the tax rate, an injury is done the public welfare. If the rate is raised sufficiently to bring in all the necessary revenues, the conscientious taxpayers contribute more than their proper share, and, therefore, suffer injustice at the hands of the dishonest. If the evasions are so great as to require that the rate be raised to two per cent, it means that the honest citizens are paying one-third more than their fair quota. They pay one-third more than they would have to pay if all were as honest as they. The injustice done them by the evasive action of their fellow citizens is obvious. Hence follows the obligation of restitution.

These are the general principles. Their application, however, is not entirely simple, owing to the complexity and injustice of our tax system, and the very large proportion of persons who habitually understate their taxable property. The principal form of taxation, at least in local and State jurisdictions, is what is known as the general property tax. Not only does this directly violate the ethical principle of taxation in proportion to ability to pay, as determined by comparative sacrifices, but it is apportioned and administered most inequitably, and it is evaded in wholesale fashion, In the words of Professor Seligman, "the general property tax, as actually administered, is beyond doubt one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world."{6} In these circumstances, the conscientious citizen cannot be required to do more than pay that proportion of the full amount which is paid by the majority. If the prevailing understatement of taxable property amounts to twenty-five per cent, the citizen who pays on more than three-fourths of his goods contributes more than his share.{7} The general rule of action may properly be applied to other kinds of taxes where evasion is considerable and notorious. Of course, the conscientious citizen will not take advantage of it until he is morally certain of the facts.

It is sometimes asserted that certain tax laws are purely penal, obliging the citizen only to submit to the penalty in case his evasion is detected. From the discussion in the last chapter, it seems fairly clear that this theory must be applied with great caution, and that the tax laws which fall under it are exceptional. Tariff duties are the taxes most commonly adduced. Probably the laws prescribing these are purely penal, not only because of the common popular conviction, but because they are saturated with economic and ethical inequalities.

As a rule, the citizen is not bound to pay taxes until the amount due from him has been defined by the fiscal authorities. When he is legally required to furnish a statement of his property, he is obliged by legal justice to comply. Is he obliged to volunteer such information? For example, is a person morally bound to inform the authorities that his income is sufficiently large to subject him to the income tax? If he does not give this spontaneous information he will escape. The income tax law requires the citizens to make such a statement, and penalizes them for failure to do so when their evasion of the tax has been detected. It seems clear, therefore, that the citizen is bound by legal justice to provide a statement of his taxable property, not only in response to an official requisition, but sometimes in the absence of such a requisition.

Another elementary obligation of the citizen is that of military service, when required by a law of conscription. The object of such a law is of the greatest importance to the public weal. As a rule, the obligation is gravely binding in conscience. Hence all fraudulent methods of escaping its operation are a violation of legal justice.

The second class of duties incumbent on the citizen results from his electoral functions. In a republic, legislation and administration depend finally upon the intelligence and morality of the voters. They have it in their power to make the government a good one or a bad one. Whether the common good will be promoted or injured, depends upon the kind of laws enacted and the manner in which they are administered; but the character of the laws and the administration is primarily determined by the way in which the citizens discharge their function of choosing legislators and administrators. Therefore, this function is of the gravest importance and the obligation which it imposes is likewise grave.

It must be admitted that the importance and gravity of this obligation is frequently ignored by Catholics, as well as by other citizens. Writing of Great Britain, the Rev. Thomas Wright declares: "There are large numbers of Catholics in this land with but little appreciation of the strong interrelation which exists between true citizenship and Christianity. . . . Many excuses, it must be owned, may be alleged in extenuation of the apathy of Catholics toward their civic obligations in these lands. Time, however, has undermined the substance of these apologetic pleas. Catholics are now able to appeal to no sufficient cause why they should stand aloof from public affairs, or why, participating in them, they need indiscriminately follow the policies of parties without thought or test of their moral justification."{8}

These observations may be applied in full measure to the Catholics of the United States. Like their coreligionists of Great Britain, they can show historical conditions to extenuate, if not to justify, their neglect of political obligations. Very many, if not the majority, of them are persons, or the descendants of persons, who came from countries whose governments treated Catholics unfairly and allowed them very little participation in public affairs. As a consequence, a large proportion of American Catholics have been, until quite recently, possessed of what has been happily characterized as "the psychology of persecution." They have looked upon government with a certain measure of distrust, and, therefore, have been predisposed to ignore or to minimize their electoral responsibility. Many of them have easily and complacently accepted the cynical judgment that "politics is a rotten business," and have either held aloof or permitted their political influence to be utilized by special and unworthy interests.

The Catholic teaching on the duty of exercising the voting franchise, as stated in the authoritative manuals of moral theology, may be summed up as follows:{9}

The obligation of taking part in the election of candidates for civil offices, is an obligation of legal justice. The citizens are bound to promote the common good in all reasonable ways. The franchise enables them to further or to hinder the common weal greatly and fundamentally, inasmuch as the quality of the government depends upon the kind of officials they elect. Not only questions of politics, but social, industrial, educational, moral and religious subjects are regulated by legislative bodies and administered by executives. Therefore, the matter is of grave importance, and the obligation of the citizen to participate in the election and to support fit candidates is correspondingly grave. According to Tanquerey, the elector cannot free himself from this obligation by any slight cause or reason, such as, going hunting, or criticism by his neighbors. The excusing cause needs to be of a grave nature, such as loss of one's means of livelihood. A slight cause will relieve the citizen from the obligation of voting only when he is morally certain that he cannot affect the immediate result. Even then, he ought to take part in the election to show good example, and to hasten the day when the cause which he supports will command a majority of the voters.{10}

Just as the official is obliged to refrain from promoting the interests of individuals as against the common good, so the elector is morally bound to cast his vote for the common welfare, intead of for the benefit of private persons or groups. This principle is very often forgotten by well-meaning citizens; for example, by giving their political support to a friend, or to a member of their own race or religion, when he has not the required moral or intellectual equipment, or when he is the upholder of socially harmful policies. Too often in such situations the honest citizen salves his conscience with the excuse that the opposing candidate "is just as bad." Were this the fact one might legitimately determine one's choice on the basis of personal friendship, or racial or religious affiliation, or other extrinsic considerations; but the general fact is that voters who adopt this course do not take adequate care to find out whether the candidate of the opposition is in reality "just as bad." They too easily decide the question on the basis of their inclinations and predilections.

Closely connected with this unjustifiable practice is that of ignoring principles and policies in the exercise of the franchise. "Vote for a good man, regardless of party," is a plausible but essentially inadequate political rule. A distinction should be drawn between legislative offices and those which are merely administrative. In choosing a city treasurer or a county auditor, the only pertinent qualifications are honesty, intellectual capacity and technical equipment. There is involved no question of legislative policy. When the office to be filled is that of Governor of a State, President of the United States, member of a State legislature, or congressman, other qualifications are essential in addition to those just mentioned. The "good man" may have some very harmful views concerning political and industrial policies. He may sincerely favor national imperialism and jingoism, or legislation to promote the undue aggrandizement of one social class or the oppression of another social class. Obviously the citizen does not fulfil his duty of promoting the common good when he votes for a "good man" of this sort. Sometimes the common welfare will suffer less through the election of a man whose political policies are right but whose moral or intellectual equipment is deficient, than through the elevation of a "good man" who gives his adhesion to wrong policies.

It is sometimes said that the good man in other relations of life is always the best kind of a citizen. This statement is only a half truth. The unqualified propagation and acceptance of it is a serious obstacle to the improvement of citizenship. Fidelity to one's duties as husband, father, son, brother, neighbor, employer, employee, buyer, seller, debtor, creditor, professional man, and client, -- does, indeed, contribute very greatly toward the common welfare. Actions performed under the direction of the domestic and social virtues necessarily promote individual and social happiness, just as the opposite actions are an injury to the commonwealth. Nevertheless, these virtues are not a complete equipment for all the duties of citizenship. They do not of themselves provide the citizen with that specific knowledge which he requires as a voter, nor with that civic consciousness which is essential to good citizenship. Just as an honest employer may treat his employees unjustly because he is unacquainted with those moral principles which apply specifically to industrial relations, or because he has an insufficient knowledge of the living conditions and needs of the workers, so the virtuous citizen may fail in his duties to the State because he does not realize the importance of this particular responsibility, or because he lacks the specific political knowledge which would enable him to exercise his suffrage for the best interests of the commonwealth. In this category are the man who does not realize how fundamentally good government depends upon the electors, the man who lazily assumes that politics is necessarily corrupt, and the man who thinks it sufficient to vote for good men, without any reference to the helpfulness or harmfulness of their political principles and policies.

In a word, the good man is not a good citizen unless he possesses the specific knowledge essential to good citizenship. This comprises adequate perception of the citizen's power and responsibility, and a reasonable degree of acquaintance with political institutions, personages, and policies. The good citizen recognizes all these obligations and makes reasonable and continuous efforts to fulfil them. Such a man, and only such a man, possesses an adequate civic consciousness. Worth quoting are the following extracts from a letter addressed to his people, in the year 1921, by the late Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris: "In the joint letter which they recently addressed to the French Catholics, the bishops of France said: 'It is a duty of conscience for all citizens honored with the right of suffrage to vote honestly and wisely with the sole aim of benefiting the country. The citizen is subject to the divine law as is the Christian. Of our votes, as of all our actions, God will demand an account. The duty of voting is so much the more binding upon conscience because on its good or evil exercise depend the gravest interests of the country and of religion.'

"It is your duty to vote. To neglect to do so would be a culpable abdication of duty on your part. It is your duty to vote honestly; that is to say, for men worthy of your esteem and trust. It is your duty to vote wisely; that is to say, in such a way as not to waste your votes. It would be better to cast them for candidates who, although not giving complete satisfaction to all our legitimate demands, would lead us to expect from them a line of conduct useful to the country, rather than to keep your votes for others whose program would indeed be more perfect, but whose almost certain defeat might open the door to the enemies of religion and of the social order."

Tanquerey points out that, in order to be able to vote rightly and intelligently, in order to possess the specific knowledge requisite for this purpose, upright citizens should organize and participate in political associations.{11} This is obvious. Men unite in trade unions, manufacturers' associations, chambers of commerce, and professional societies of various kinds for the promotion of their economic interests. Hundreds of thousands of good men, thus occupationally organized, fail to see the necessity of organizing politically for the protection of their civic interests and the effective performance of their duties to the commonwealth. The conduct of political organizations they leave to professional politicans who are usually in the service of selfish private interests. When the inactive citizens see the evil results of this arrangement, they attempt to justify their aloofness by the reflection that politics is essentially corrupt. This lazy pessimism is not warranted by anything inherent in political affairs. It represents a vain attempt to evade moral responsibility. If politics is rotten, a large part of the responsibility rests upon well meaning but indolent citizens.

In view of the fundamental and immense importance to the State of the voting function, and since the electors are in a practical sense the primary political authority, it would seem that the electoral duties of the citizens are not merely duties of legal justice. It would seem that, like the obligations of public officials they also fall under the head of strict or commutative justice. A group of legislators inflict injury upon the community by a bad law, thereby violating strict justice: Are not the citizens who elected them guilty of the same kind of injustice, in so far as they foresaw this possibility? The difference between their offence and that of the legislators seems to be one of degree, not one of kind.

Among the electoral duties of the citizen is that of becoming a candidate for public office in some circumstances. Of course, this applies only to that small minority who are competent. In certain situations, says Noldin, an upright Catholic is bound by grave obligation to become a candidate for an administrative or legislative office; that is, when his election is certain, when he is able to avert grave evils from the community, when he can accept the office without grave inconvenience to himself, and when no other equally competent candidate is available.{12} In as much as the issues involved in such a situation are of much graver consequence than those dependent upon the ballot of the private citizen, the man who refuses to become a candidate for office will need a much graver reason to excuse him than will the citizen who merely neglects to vote.

{1} Cf. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Justitia, pp. 39-49.

{2} Encyclical, On the Condition of Labor.

{3} Encyclical, On the Condition of Labor.

{4} P. 61. The subject of patriotism is presented from two different viewpoints by Archbishop Ireland and Archbishop Spalding in the productions reprinted in this volume.

{5} Cf. Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, pp. 460-463.

{6} Essays in Taxation, p. 61.

{7} Cf. Tanquerey, De Justitia, no. 597.

{8} Christian Citizenship, pp. 17, 18.

{9} Cf. Tanquerey, De Justitia, pp. 475-477; Noldin, De Praeceptis, pp. 336-339.

{10} Tanquerey loc. cit.

{11} Loc. cit.

{12} Loc. cit.

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