It is not possible to indicate any particular year when the scholastic period began. We may say that the patristic period closed with the death of St. Bernard, the last of the Fathers, in the year 1153. Many of the characteristics of scholasticism, however, and especially the application of philosophy to the exposition and defense of theology are conspicuous in the works of many of the Fathers. In their work, too, of systematizing theology the schoolmen had many predecessors among the Fathers, and especially St. John Damascene and St. Isidore of Seville. Nor is the common assertion that the Fathers favored Platonism while the scholastics adopted Aristotelianism quite warranted by facts. Clement of Alexandria especially, and other Fathers as well, were eclectic as philosophers, and borrowed what they thought was true from any and every source. Still we may for practical purposes say that scholasticism began in the twelfth century. Then it was that the growth and development of theology began afresh. It had been interrupted for seven hundred years by the necessity of civilizing the barbarians who had broken up the Roman Empire and settled in its territories. From this time moral theology has come down to us in two distinct channels. Peter Lombard may be looked upon as the fountain-head of the first stream, and St. Raymund of Pennafort of the second.
Peter Lombard wrote his work on the Sentences between the years 1145 and 1150. He therein treats of the whole of theology, both dogmatic and moral. He wished to counteract the rationalizing tendencies which as a pupil of Abelard he had noticed in the schools of Paris. To the various and erroneous views which the spirit of rationalism had introduced, Peter opposed the traditional doctrine handed down in the writings of the Fathers. After much consideration, as he tells us, he found a guiding principle for the distribution and ordering of the subject-matter of theology in a sentence of St. Augustine. Christian revelation, contained in the Holy Scriptures, has for its subject-matter either things or signs. Under signs come the sacraments, and things are either such as we have fruition of, or such as we use, or such as we both use and enjoy by fruition. Under the first head comes God, one in nature and three in person. Under the second come all created things, the angels, man, his end, fall, and redeeming grace. Under the third, the incarnation, faith, hope, charity, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Ten Commandments. The whole matter of theology is thus systematically arranged in four Books. Each Book is divided into Distinctions, devoted to some special point on which the traditional doctrine is laid down by quoting appropriate extracts (Sententiae) from the works of the Fathers. Apparent or real differences of opinion are noted and as far as possible reconciled with each other. Although Hugo of St. Victor, Robert Pullen, and other theologians had previously composed similar books of Sentences, yet the work of Peter Lombard soon eclipsed them all in the welcome that it received. It remained the recognized textbook of theology until the end of the sixteenth century, when its place was taken by the "Summa" of St. Thomas. Nearly all the great scholastics wrote Commentaries on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard, developing, illustrating, defending, and sometimes correcting the doctrine which they found there, especially from the speculative point of view. In these Commentaries and in the Summas of scholastic theology we have a most abundant and valuable source of the speculative side of Christian ethics.
To meet the more practical and concrete needs of the confessor, St. Raymund of Pennafort composed his "Summa de Poenitentia et Matrimonio," about the year 1235. He, also, merely collected and systematized the abundant material which had been left by his predecessors. He had no more intention of introducing changes into the traditional doctrines of Christianity than had Peter Lombard. But as his aim was not speculative but practical, he drew his material especially from Gratian's "Decretum," from the decisions of Popes and the councils of the Church, as well as from the Fathers. The work "De Poenitentia" is divided into three Books. In the first Book sins against God are treated of, in the second sins against one's neighbor, and in the third irregularities, dispensations, purgations, sentences, penances, and remissions. Each Book is divided into Titles, which contain an orderly and logical exposition of some particular subject. Thus in the first title on Simony, the sin is defined, the origin of the name is explained, the different kinds of simony are indicated, with the penalties incurred and the dispensations which may be obtained. Then follows a discussion of doubtful questions and cases. Finally some rules of law on the matter are laid down and explained.
The work of St. Raymund was the first of those innumerable handbooks written for the training and use of the confessor especially from the practical and casuistical point of view. Although in the treatment of the different titles the work of St. Raymund leaves little to be desired, yet it lacks something in orderly arrangement and in completeness. These defects were soon made good by others. A Friar Minor, of Asti, in the north of Italy, composed the "Summa Astensis" in the year 1317, In the Roman edition of 1728 it fills two volumes folio, and in its aim, in the matter which it contains, and in the method of treatment, it differs little from the handbooks of moral theology which are published at the present day. The matter is divided into eight Books. The first Book treats of divine and human law and contains the doctrine of the Ten Commandments. The second treats of virtues and vices, beginning with several titles devoted to human acts, voluntary and involuntary actions, to expounding in what the goodness or malice of actions consists, and merit. The cardinal and theological virtues and the sins opposed to them are explained in detail. The third Book contains the doctrine on contracts and last wills; the fourth that on the sacraments in general, and on Baptism, Confirmation, and the Holy Eucharist. The treatise on Penance and Extreme Unction in the fifth Book contains also the doctrine on prayer, fasting, almsdeeds, restitution, and indulgences. That on Orders in the sixth Book treats also of churches and sacred vestments, ecclesiastical burial, parishes, prebends, tithes, of the various grades of the clergy and of religious and their obligations. Censures and ecclesiastical penalties occupy the seventh, and Matrimony the eighth Book.
The dogmatic treatment of moral theology reached its high-water mark in the second part of the "Summa" of St. Thomas of Aquin. That marvelous production of genius has never been surpassed or even equaled as an exposition of the general principles of Christian ethics. Neither has the casuistic treatment of morals in general made much progress since the thirteenth century. Of course there have been numerous changes in discipline during the last six centuries, and these require to be noted in new moral treatises as they occur. There have also been some changes in theological opinion. As an illustration of such a change we may instance that concerning the use by superiors of knowledge gained from confession. St. Thomas and scholastic theologians commonly held that a superior who knew from confession of a dangerous occasion of sin to one of his subjects might use his authority to remove his subject out of the danger, provided that thereby he violated no principle of justice nor made known to others the sin which had been confessed to him. This opinion is now quite obsolete and it has been virtually condemned by the Holy See.{1} But in spite of some such changes in detail, the general assertion remains true that moral theology to-day is substantially what it was in the thirteenth or at the beginning of the fourteenth century. There is, however, one important exception to this general statement. That exception is due to the express formulation at the end of the sixteenth century of the doctrine of probabilism.
We must, however, be on our guard against exaggerating the importance of probabilism and confounding it with moral theology in general. After all, probabilism is only concerned with the solution of doubtful questions. There is an immense body of moral doctrine which is certain and where probabilism or other similar theory of morals does not enter. There are also, it must be confessed, many doubtful questions, especially connected with the application of general rules to particular cases, and it is in the solution of these doubtful and disputed questions that probabilism is concerned. All Catholic divines state or take for granted the doctrine that it is sinful to act with a doubtful conscience, without making up one's mind that the action which is contemplated is morally right. This is the teaching of Holy Scripture: "All that is not of faith," i.e. done with the conscientious conviction that it is right, "is sin," says St. Paul.{2} But if this be so, what are we to do in doubtful matters, where perhaps divines themselves disagree, and some teach that an action is right, while others assert that it is wrong? In such cases we can only act, according to the doctrine of St. Paul, if we are able to make up our mind that the action is lawful and honest. How can this be done?
Before the close of the sixteenth century, when Bartholomew à Medina published his "Exposition" on St. Thomas, there was no commonly recognized method for forming one's conscience in doubtful matters. The "Summa Astensis" devotes the last title of the second Book to the subject of "Perplexities of Conscience." The author distinguishes perplexities of law from perplexities of fact. The former, he says, occur when there are two apparently contrary opinions about the lawfulness of an action, the latter when a man believes that in avoiding one sin he must perforce commit another. He has much to say about perplexities of fact, but about perplexities of law, which alone concern us here, he simply observes that they can be removed in whatever state a man may be, but he does not tell us how this may be done. He refers indeed to Alexander of Hales, who wrote before St. Raymund of Pennafort, and who in the article of his "Summa" devoted to the subject of "Conscience" tells us that a perplexity of law is to be removed by the unction of the Holy Spirit, who teaches concerning all things.{3} St. Raymund gives a more satisfactory rule and says shortly that a perplexity arising from a difference among Doctors is to be solved by reducing the contrary opinions to agreement, for there is no real but only apparent contradiction in law. This puts us on the right track; it tells us that for the solution of doubtful cases the theologians of the time followed the ordinary rules of legal interpretation, the chief among which was the rule of law which guided Gratian in the composition of the "Decretum" and Peter Lombard in his work on the Sentences, and which the Roman lawyers had expressed by saying that it is meet to make one law agree with another -- Conveniens est jura juribus concordare.{4}
Although this was the chief rule of law to be followed when authorities differed, it was by no means the only one. Later authors, such as Angelus de Clavasio (1480), Sylvester Prierias (1516), and Navarrus (1560) give lists of the different rules of law to be applied to the solution of doubtful cases in different circumstances. We may take them from Navarrus, as they are substantially the same in all the authorities of the time. When there are different opinions among Doctors, says Navarrus in effect, that opinion should be preferred which is confirmed by custom, or grounded on a text of law, or which rests on an invincible argument. If none of these rules serves, then the common opinion should be followed, and that may be called a common opinion which six or seven approved authors adopt, though there may be fifty others who blindly follow each other like sheep against it, for weight and not number is mainly to be considered in such questions. If that rule does not suit the case, then the opinion should be chosen which is backed by more numerous authorities and reasons; then that which is more lenient, or which favors marriage, a last will and testament, liberty, a private individual against the State, the validity of an act, or the defendant in an action at law. If in none of these ways one opinion is better than the other, then that should be adopted which the greater number of theologians follow if the matter belong to theology, or canonists if it belong to canon law, or civilians if it belong to civil law. To these rules Navarrus adds the note that in the forum of conscience it is sufficient to choose as true the opinion of a man of virtue and learning.{5}
Sylvester Prierias tells us that all were agreed that when Doctors differed, a man might follow the opinion of one Doctor even though he was drawn to follow him by affection without subtle investigation into the grounds on which his opinion rested.
While the Fathers of the Church, such as Gregory Nazianzen, and the schoolmen with St. Thomas solved particular cases of doubt in favor of liberty by applying the rule of probabilism that a doubtful law cannot impose a certain obligation, yet up to the time of Medina it was commonly held that in doubtful cases a man was bound to follow the opinion which seemed to him the better grounded or the more probable. The Dominican Bartholomew Medina (1577) was the first to show that if it were a queslion of obligation, not of mere counsel, this was illogical. The more probable opinion may be the safer and better opinion, but we are not usually bound to take the safer or better way; we are at least allowed to take that which is good and safe. And a probable opinion is safe, for good and wise men see no sin nor danger of sin in it, else it would not be probable. So that a probable opinion may be followed even by one who knows and holds that the contrary opinion is more probable.
By these and other arguments Medina put probabilism on a firm basis, and the doctrine was at once received on all hands. It was the logical deduction from principles which all admitted, and so theologians of all schools accepted it at once, though some of them do not seem at first to have realized its far-reaching consequences. Dr. Hall, who published his work "De Quinquepartita Conscientia" in 1598, accepted and defended the new principle, but he placed it side by side with the older methods of forming one's conscience which he copied from Navarrus. Of these methods he remarks that they are so many different ways of forming a probable opinion. He did not fully realize, as it seems, that the new principle was universal, and rendered the use of the old rules to a great extent unnecessary in the forum of conscience. The same may be said of Azor, who published the first volume of his "Institutiones Morales" in the year 1600. Other theologians, however, such as Vasquez, Suarez, Salon, Laymann, soon realized the significance of the new method, and proceeded to explain, develop, and on certain points to limit its application. It was seen that it can only be applied where the sole question is whether an act is sinful or not; it may not be applied where an end must be attained and may not be placed in jeopardy, or where the validity of an act is in question, or where there is question of the certain right of another.
{1} Supra, p. 232.
{2} Rom. xiv. 23.
{3} Summa, ii, q. 120.
{4} L. unica, C., de inofficiosis dotibus.
{5} Manuale confessariorum, c. 27, n. 288.