The subject may be treated under the following headings: I. Thomism in general, from the thirteenth century down to the nineteenth; II. The Thomistic School; III. Neo-Thomism and the revival of Scholasticism.
(b) The essences of things do not depend on the free will of God, but on His intellect, and ultimately on His essence, which is immutable. The natural law, being derived from the eternal law, depends on the mind of God, ultimately on the essence of God; hence it is intrinsically immutable. Some actions are forbidden by God because they are bad: they are not bad simply because He forbids them [see Zigliara, "Sum. phil." (3 vols., Paris, 1889), ccx, xi, II, M. 23, 24, 25].
(c) The will moves the intellect quoad exercitium, i.e. in its actual operation: the intellect moves the will quoad specificationem, i.e. by presenting objects to it: nil volitum nisi praecognitum. The beginning of all our acts is the apprehension and desire of good in general (bonum in communi). We desire happiness (bonum in communi) naturally and necessarily, not by a free deliberate act. Particular goods (bona particularia) we choose freely; and the will is a blind faculty, always following the last practical judgment of the intellect (Zigliara, 51).
(d) The senses and the intellect are passive, i.e. recipient, faculties; they do not create, but receive (i.e. perceive) their objects (St. Thomas, I, Q. lxxviii, a. 3; Q. lxxix, a. 2; Zigliara, 26, 27). If this principle is borne in mind there is no reason for Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". On the other hand those faculties are not like wax, or the sensitive plate used by photog raphers, in the sense that they are inert and receive impressions unconsciously. The will controls the exercise of the faculties, and the process of acquiring knowledge is a vital process: the moving cause is always within the living agent.
(e) The Peripatetic axiom: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu" (Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses), is admitted; but St. Thomas modifies it by saying: first, that, once the sense objects have been perceived, the intellect ascends to the knowledge of higher things, even of God; and, secondly, that the soul knows its own existence by itself (i.e. by its own act), although it knows its own nature only by refiection on its acts. Knowledge begins by sense perception, but the range of the intellect is far beyond that of the senses. In the soul as soon as it begins to act are found the first principles (prima principia) of all knowledge, not in the form of an objective illumination, but in the form of a subjective inclination to admit them on account of their evidence. As soon as they are proposed we see that they are true; there is no more reason for doubting them than there is for denying the existence of the sun when we see it shining (see Zigliara, op. cit., pp. 32-42).
(f) The direct and primary object of the intellect is the universal, which is prepared and presented to the passive intellect (intellectus possibilis) by the active intellect (intellectus agens) which illuminates the phantasmata, or mental images, received through the senses, and divests them of all individuating conditions. This is called abstracting the universal idea from the phantasmata, but the term must not be taken in a matrialistic sense. Abstraction is not a transferring of something from one place to another; the illumination causes all material and individuating conditions to disappear, then the universal alone shines out and is perceived by the vital action of the intellect (Q. lxxxiv, a. 4; Q. lxxxv, a. 1, ad lum, 3um, 4um). The process throughout is so vital, and so far elevated above material conditions and modes of action, that the nature of the acts and of the objects apprehended proves the soul to be immaterial and spiritual.
(g) The soul, by its very nature, is immortal. Not only is it true that God will not annihilate the soul, but from its very nature it will always continue to exist, there being in it no principle of disintegration (Zigliara, p. 9). Hence human reason can prove the incorruptibility (i.e. immortality) of the soul.
(h) The existence of God is not known by an innate idea, it cannot be proved by arguments a priori or a simultaneo; but it can be demonstrated by a posteriori arguments. Ontologism was never taught by St. Thomas or by Thomists (see Lepidi, "Exam. phil. theol. de ontologismo", Louvain, 1874, c. 19; Zigliara, Theses I, VIII).
(i) There are no human (i.e. deliberate) acts indifferent in individuo.
(b) The metaphysical essence of God consists, according to some Thomists, in the intelligere actualissimum, i.e. fulness of pure intellection, according to others in the perfection of aseitas, i.e. in dependent existence (Zigliara, Th. VIII, IX).
(c) The happiness of heaven, formally and in the ultimate analysis, consists in the vision, not in the fruition, of God.
(d) The Divine attributes are distinguished from the Divine nature and from each other by a virtual distinction, i.e. by a distinctio rationis cum fundamento a parte rei. The distinctio actualis formalis of Scotus is rejected.
(e) In attempting to explain the mystery of the Trinity -- in as far as man can conceive it -- the relations must be considered perfectiones simpliciter simplices, i.e. excluding all imperfection. The Holy Ghost would not be distinct from the Son if He did not proceed from the Son as well as from the Father.
(f) The angels, being pure spirits, are not, properly speaking, in any place; they are said to be in the place, or in the places, where they exercise their activity (Summa, I, Q. lii, a. 1). Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an angel passing from place to place; but if an angel wishes to exercise its activity first in Japan and afterwards in America, it can do so in two instants (of angelic time), and need not pass through the intervening space (Q. liii). St. Thomas does not discuss the question "How many angels can dance on the point of a needle?" He reminds us that we must not think of angels as if they were corporeal, and that, for an angel, it makes no difference whether the sphere of his activity be the point of a needle or a continent (Q. lii, a.2). Many angels cannot be said to be in the same place at the same time, for this would mean that whilst one angel is producing an effect others could be producing the same effect at the same time. There can be but one angel in the same place at the same time (Q. lii, a. 3). The knowledge of the angels comes through ideas (species) infused by God (QQ. lv, a.2, lvii, a.2, lviii, a.7). They do not naturally know future contingents, the secrets of souls, or the mysteries of grace (Q. lvii, aa. 3, 45). The angels choose either good or evil instantly, and with full knowledge; hence their judgment is naturally final and irrevocable (Q. lxiv, a. 2).
(g) Man was created in the state of sanctifying grace. Grace was not due to his nature, but God granted it to him from the beginning (I, Q. xcv, a. 1). So great was the per fection of man in the state of original justice, and so perfect the subjection of his lower faculties to the higher, that his first sin could not have been a venia] sin (1- 11, Q. lxxxix, a. 3).
(h) It is more probable that the Incarnation would not have taken place had man not sinned (III, Q. i, a. 3). In Christ there were three kinds of knowledge: the scientia beata, i.e. the knowledge of things in the Divine Essence; the scientia infusa, i.e. the knowledge of things through infused ideas (species), and the scientia acquisita, i.e. acquired or experimental knowledge, which was nothing more than the actual experience of things which he already knew. On this last point St. Thomas, in the "Summa" (Q. ix, a. 4), explicitly retracts an opinion which he had once held (III Sent., d. 14, Q. iii, a. 3).
(i) All sacraments of the New Law, including confirmation and extreme unction, were instituted immediately by Christ. Circumcision was a sacrament of the Old Law and conferred grace which removed the stain of original sin. The children of Jews or of other unbelievers may not be baptized without the consent of their parents (III, Q. lxviii, a. 10; 11-Il, Q. x, a. 12; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1481). Contrition, confession, and satisfaction are the proximate matter (materia proxima) of the Sacrament of Penance. Thomists hold, against the Scotists, that when Transubstantiation takes place in the Mass the Body of Christ is not made present per modum adduclionis, i.e. is not brought to the altar, but they do not agree in selecting the term which should be used to express this action (cf. Billuart, "De Euchar.", Diss. i, a. 7). Cardinal Billot holds ("Dc cccl. sacr.", Rome, 1900, Th. XI, "Dc euchar.", p. 379) that the best, and the only possible, explanation is the one given by St. Thomas himself: Christ becomes present by transubstantiation, i.e. by the conversion of the substance of bread into the substance of His body (III, Q. lxxv, a. 4; Sent., d. XI, Q. i, a. 1, q. 1). After the consecration the accidents (accidentia) of the bread and wine are preserved by Almighty God without a subject (Q. lxxxvii, a. 1). It was on this question that the doctors of Paris sought enlightenment from St. Thomas (see Vaughan, "Life and Labours of St. Thomas", London, 1872, II, p. 544). The earlier Thomists, following St. Thomas (Suppl., Q. xxxvii, a. 2), taught that the sub-diaconate and the four minor orders were partial sacraments. Some recent Thomists -- e. g., Billot (op. cit., p. 282) and Tanquerey (De ordine, n. 16) -- defend this opinion as more probable and more in conformity with the definitions of the councils. The giving of the chalice with wine and of the paten with bread Thomists generally held to be an essential part of ordination to the priesthood. Some, however, taught that the imposition of hands was at least necessary. On the question of divorce under the Mosaic Law the disciples of St. Thomas, like the saint himself (Suppl., Q. lxvii, a. 3), wavered, some holding that a dispensation was granted, others teaching that divorce was merely tolerated in order to avoid greater evils.
(2) In created beings there is a real distinction between the essentia (essence) and the existentia (existence); between the essentia and the subsistentia; between the real relation and its foundation; between the soul and its faculties; between the several faculties. There can be no medium between a distinctio realis and a distinctio rationis, or conceptual distinction; hence the distinctio formalis a parte rei of Scotus cannot be admitted. For Thomistic doctrines on free will, God's knowledge, etc., see below.
(2) All moral virtues, the acquired as well as the infused, in their perfect state, are interconneted.
(3) According to Billuart (De pecc., diss. vii, a. 6), it has been a matter of controversy between Thomists whether the malice of a mortal sin is absolutely infinite.
(4) In choosing a medium between Rigorism and Laxism, the Thomistic school has been Antiprobabilistic and generally has adopted Probabiliorism. Some defended Equiprobabilism, or Probabilism cum cornpensatione. Medina and St. Antoninus are claimed by the Probabilists.
(5) Thomistic theologians generally, whilst they defended the infallibility of the Roman pontiff, denied that the pope had the power to dissolve a matrimonium ratum or to dispense from a solemn vow made to God. When it was urged that some popes had granted such favours, they cited other pontiffs who declared that they could not grant them (cf. Billuart, "De matrim.", Diss. v, a. 2), and said, with Dominic Soto, "Factum pontificium non facit articulum fidei" (The action of a pope does not constitute an article of faith, in 4 dist., 27, Q. i, a. 4). Thomists of to-day are of a different mind, owing to the practice of the Church.
(6) The hypostatic union, without any additional grace, rendered Christ impeccable. The Word was hypostatically united to the blood of Christ and remained united to it, even during the interval between His death and resurrection (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 718). During that same interval the Body of Christ had a transitory form, called forma cadaverica (Zigliara, P. 16, 17, IV).
(7) The sacraments of the New Law cause grace not only as instrumental moral causes, but by a mode of causality which should be called instrumental and physical. In the attrition required in the Sacrament of Penance there should be at least a beginning of the love of God; sorrow for sin springing solely from the fear of hell will not suffice.
(8) Many theologians of the Thomistic School, especially before the
Council of Trent, opposed the doctrine of Mary's Immaculate Conception,
claiming that in this they were following St. Thomas. This, however,
has not been the opinion either of the entire school or of the
Dominican Order as a body. Father Rouard de Card, in his book "L'ordre
des freres precheurs et l'Immaculée Conception "(Brussels, 1864),
called attention to the fact that ten thousand professors of the order
defended Mary's great privilege. At the Council of Trent twenty-five
Dominican bishops signed a petition for the definition of the dogma.
Thousands of Dominicans, in taking degrees at the University of Paris,
solemnly pledged themselves to defend the Immaculate Conception (see
(9) The Thomistic School is distinguished from other schools of
theology chiefly by its doctrines on the difficult questions relating
to God's action on the free will of man, God's foreknowledge, grace,
and predestination. In the articles on these subjects will be found an
exposition of the different theories advanced by the different schools
in their effort to explain these mysteries, for such they are in
reality. As to the value of these theories the following points should
be borne in mind:
(a) No theory has as yet been proposed which avoids all difficulties
and solves all doubts;
(b) on the main and most difficult of these questions some who are at
times listed as Molinists -- notably Bellarmine, Suárez, Francis
de Lugo, and, in our own days, Cardinal Billot ("De deo uno et trino",
Rome, 1902, Th. XXXII) -- agree with the Thomists in defending
predestination ante praevisa merita. Bossuet, after a long study
of the question of physical premotion, adapted the Thomistic opinion
("Du libre arbitre", c. viii).
(c) Thomists do not claim to be able to explain, except by a general
reference to God's omnipotence, how man remains free under the action
of God, which they consider necessary in order to preserve and explain
the universality of God's causality and the independent certainty of
His foreknowledge. No man can explain, except by a reference to God's
infinite power, how the world was created out of nothing, yet we do not
on this account deny creation, for we know that it must be admitted. In
like manner the main question put to Thomists in this controversy
should be not "How will you explain man's liberty?" but "What are your
reasons for claiming so much for God's action?" If the reasons assigned
are insufficient, then one great difficulty is removed, but there
remains to be solved the problem of God's foreknowledge of man's free
acts. If they are valid, then we must accept them with their necessary
consequences and humbly confess our inability fully to explain how
wisdom "reacheth . . . from end to end mightily, and ordereth all
things sweetly" (Wis., viii, 1).
(d) Most important of all, it must be clearly understood and remembered
that the Thomistic system on predestination neither saves fewer nor
sends to perdition more souls than any other system held by Catholic
theologians. In regard to the number of the elect there is no unanimity
on either side; this is not the question in dispute between the
Molinists and the Thomists. The discussions, too often animated and
needlessly sharp, turned on this point: How does it happen that,
although God sincerely desires the salvation of all men, some are to be
saved, and must thank God for whatever merits they may have amassed,
whilst others will be lost, and will know that they themselves, and not
God, are to be blamed? -- The facts in the case are admitted by all
Catholic theologians. The Thomists, appealing to the authority of St.
Augustine and St. Thomas, defend a system which follows the admitted
facts to their logical conclusions. The elect are saved by the grace of
God, which operates on their wills efficaciously and infallibly without
detriment to their liberty; and since God sincerely desires the
salvation of all men, He is prepared to grant that same grace to
others, if they do not, by a free act, render themselves unworthy of
it. The faculty of placing obstacles to Divine grace is the unhappy
faculty of sinning; and the existence of moral evil in the world is a
problem to be solved by all, not by the Thomists alone. The fundamental
difficulties in this mysterious question are the existence of evil and
the non-salvation of some, be they few or be they many, under the rule
of an omnipotent, all-wise, and all-merciful God, and they miss the
point of the controversy who suppose that these difficulties exist only
for the Thomists. The truth is known to lie somewhere between Calvinism
and Jansenism on the one hand, and Semipelagianism on the other. The
efforts made by theologians and the various explanations offered by
Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, and Congruists show how difficult of
solution are the questions involved. Perhaps we shall never know, in
this world, how a just and merciful God provides in some special manner
for the elect and yet sincerely loves all men. The celebrated
Congregatio de Auxiliis (q.v.) did not forever put an end to the
controversies, and the question is not yet settled.
Thirteenth Century. -- Thomas de Cantimpré (1270); Hugh
of St. Cher (1263); Vincent of Bauvais (1264); St. Raymond de Pennafort
(1275); Peter of Tarentaise (Pope Innocent V -- 1276); Giles de
Lassines (1278); Reginald de Piperno (1279); William de Moerbeka
(1286); Raymond Marti (1286); Bernard de Trilia (1292); Bernard of
Hotun, Bishop of Dublin (1298); Theodoric of Apoldia (1299); Thomas
Sutton (1300).
Fourteenth Century. -- Peter of Auvergne (1301); Nicholas Boccasini,
Benedict XI (1304); Godfrey of Fontaines (1304); Walter of Winterburn
(1305); AEgidius Colonna (Aigidius Romanus), O.S.A (1243-1316); William
of Paris (1314); Gerard of Bologna, Carmelite (1317); four biographers,
viz Peter Calo (1310); William de Tocco (1324); Bartolommeo of Lucca
(1327); Bernard Guidonis* (1331); Dante (1321); Natalis Hervieus (1323);
Petrus de Palude (Paludanusi -- 1342); Thomas Bradwardin, Archbishop of
Canterbury (1349); Robert Holkott (1349); John Tauler (1361); Bl. Henry
Suso (1365); Thomas of Strasburg, O.S.A. (1357); Jacobus Passavante
(1357); Nicholas Roselli (1362); Durandus of Aurillac (1382), sometimes
called Durandulus, because he wrote against Durandus a S. Portiano*,
who was first a Thomist, afterwards an independent writer, attacking
many of St. Thomas's doctrines; John Bromyard (1390); Nicholas Eymeric
(1399).
Fifteenth Century. -- Manuel Calecas (1410); St. Vincent Ferrer
(1415); Bl. John Dominici (1419); John Gerson*, chancellor of the
University of Paris (1429); Luis of Valladolid (1436); Raymond Sabunde
(1437); John Nieder (1437); Capreolus (1444), called the "Prince of
Thomists"; John de Montenegro (1445); Fra Angelico (1455); St.
Antoninus (1459); Nicholas of Cusa*, of the Brothers of the Common Life
(1464); John of Torquemada (de Turrecrematai, 1468); Bessarion,
Basilian (1472); Alanus de Rupe (1475); John Faber (1477); Petrus Niger
(1471); Peter of Bergamo (1482); Jerome Savonarola (1498).
Sixteenth Century. -- Felix Faber (1502); Vincent Bandelli
(1506); John Tetzel (1519); Diego de Deza (1523); Sylvester Mazzolini
(1523); Francesco Silvestro di Ferrara (1528); Thomas de Vio Cajetan
(1534) (commentaries by these two are published in the Leonine edition
of the works of St. Thomas); Conrad Koellin (1536); Chrysostom Javelli
(1538); Santes Pagnino (1541); Francisco de Vitoria (1546); Franc.
Romseus (1552); Ambrosius Catherinus* (Lancelot Politi, 1553); St.
Ignatius of Loyola (1556) enjoined devotion to St. Thomas; Matthew Ory
(1557); Dominic Soto (1560); Melehior Cano (1560); Ambrose Pelargus
(1561); Peter Soto (1563); Sixtus of Siena (1569); John Faber (1570);
St. Pius V (1572); Bartholomew Medina (1581); Vincent Justiniani
(1582); Maldonatus* (Juan Maldonado, 1583); St. Charles Borromeo*
(1584); Salmerón* (1585); Ven. Louis of Granada (1588);
Bartholomew of Braga (1590); Toletus* (1596); Bl. Peter Canisius*
(1597); Thomas Stapleton*, Doctor of Louvain (1598); Fonseca (1599);
Molina* (1600).
Seventeenth Century. -- Valentia* (1603); Domingo Baflez (1604);
Vásquez* (1604); Bart. Ledesma (1604); Sánchez* (1610);
Baronius * (1607); Capponi a Porrecta (1614); Aur. Menochio * (1615);
Petr. Ledesma (1616); Suárez* (1617); Du Perron, a converted
Calvinist, cardinal (1618); Bellarmine* (1621); St. Francis de Sales*
(1622); Hieronymus Medices (1622); Lessius* (1623); Becanus* (1624);
Malvenda (1628); Thomas de Lemos (1629); Alvarez; Laymann* (1635);
Joann. Wiggers*, doctor of Louvain (1639); Gravina (1643); John of St.
Thomas (1644); Serra (1647); Ripalda*, S.J. (1648); Sylvius (Du Bois),
doctor of Douai (1649); Petavius* (1652); Goar (1625); Steph.
Menochio*, S.J. (1655); Franc. Pignatelli* (1656); De Lugo* (1660);
Bollandus* (1665); Jammy (1665); Vallgornera (1665); Labbe* (1667);
Pallavicini* (1667); Busenbaum* (1668); Nicolni* (1673); Contenson
(1674); Jac. Pignatelli* (1675); Passerini* (1677); Gonet (1681);
Bancel (1685); Thomassin* (1695); Goudin (1695); Sfrondati* (1696);
Quetif (1698); Rocaberti (1699); Casanate (1700). To this period belong
the Carmelite Salmanticenses, authors of the "Cursus
theologicus" (1631-72).
Eighteenth Century. -- Guerinois (1703); Bossuet, Bp. of Meaux;
Norisins, O.S.A. (1704); Diana (1705); Thyrsus González* (1705);
Massoulié (1706); Du hamel* (1706); Wigandt (1708); Piny (1709);
Lacroix* (1714); Carrieres* (1717); Natalis Alexander (1724); Echard
(1724); Tourney*, doctor of the Sorbonne (1729); Livarius de Meyer*
(1730); Benedict XIII* (1730); Graveson (1733); Th. du Jardin (1733);
Hyacintha Serry (1738); Duplessis d'Argentré* (1740); Gotti (1742);
Drouin* (1742); Antoine* (1743); Lallemant* (1748); Milante* (1749);
Preingue (1752); Concina (1759); Billuart (1757); Benedict XIV* (1758);
Cuiliati (1759); Orsi (1761); Charlevoix* (1761); Reuter* (1762);
Baumgartner* (1764); Berti* (1766); Patuzzi (1769); De Rubeis (1775);
Touron (1775); Thomas de Burgo (1776); Gener* (1781); Roselli (1783);
St. Aiphonsus Liguori (1787); Mamachi (1792); Richard (1794).
Nineteenth Century. -- In this century there are few names to be
recorded outside of those who were connected with the Thomistic revival
either as the forerunners, the promoters, or the writers of the
NeoScholastic period.
. . .
For rise and progress of Thomism see works referred to in the first
part of this article. . . . PERRIER, Revival of Schol. Philosophy (New
York, 1909) (the bibliography, pp. 249 to 337, is excellent and the
most availahle for English readers). Publications on Thomism in
general and on the doctrines of the Thomistic school have heen
multiplied so rapidly since 1879 that volumes would he required for a
complete list. . . .
-- D.J. Kennedy
III. Neo-Thomism and the Revival of Scolasticism.
When the world in the first part of the nineteenth century began to
enjoy a period of peace and rest after the disturbances caused by the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, closer attention was given
to ecclesiastical studies and Scholasticism was revived. This movement
eventually caused a revival of Thomism, because the great master and
model proposed by Leo XIII in the encyclicai "AEterni Patris" (4 Aug.,
1879) was St. Thomas Aquinas. . . . The Thomistic doctrine had
received strong support from the older universities. Among these the
Encyclical "AEterni Patris" mentions Paris, Salamanca, Alcalá
Douai, Toulouse, Louvain, Padua, Bologna, Naples, and Coimbra as "the
homes of human wisdom where Thomas reigned supreme, and the minds of
all, teachers as well as taught, rested in wonderful harmony under the
shield and authority of the Angelic Doctor". In the universities
established by the Dominicans at Lima (1551) and Manila (1645) St.
Thomas always held sway. The same is true of the Minerva school at Rome
(1255), which ranked as a university from the year 1580, and is now the
international Collegio Angelico. Coming down to our own times and the
results of the Encyclical, which gave a new impetus to the study of St.
Thomas's works, the most important centres of activity are Rome,
Louvain, Fribourg (Switzerland), and Washington. At Louvain the chair
of Thomistic philosophy, established in 1880, became, in 1889-90, the
"Institut supérieur de philosophie" or "Ecole St. Thomas
d'Aquin," where Professor Mercier, now Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin,
ably and wisely directed the new Thomistic movement (see De Wulf,
"Scholasticism Old and New", tr. Coffey, New York, 1907, append., p.
261; "Irish Ecel. Record", Jan. 1906). The theological department of
the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, established in 1889, has been
entrusted to the Dominicans. By the publication of the "Revue thomiste"
the professors of that university have contributed greatly to a new
knowledge and appreciation of St. Thomas. The Constitution of the
Catholic University of America at Washington enjoins special veneration
for St. Thomas; the School of Sacred Sciences must follow his
leadership ("Const. Cath. Univ. Amer.", Rome, 1889, pp. 38, 43). The
University of Ottawa and Laval University are the centres of Thomism in
Canada. The appreciation of St. Thomas in our days, in Europe and in
America, is well set forth in Perrier's excellent "Revival of
Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century" (New York, 1909).IV. Eminent Thomists.
After the middle of the fourteenth century the vast majority of
philosophical and theological writers either wrote commentaries on the
works of St. Thomas or based their teachings on his writings. It is
impossible, therefore, to give here a complete list of the Thomists:
only the more important names can be given. Unless otherwise noted, the
authors belonged to the Order of St. Dominic. Those marked (*) were
devoted to Thomism in general, but were not of the Thomistic School. A
more complete list will be found in the works cited at the end of this
article.