iii. The last objection that has been brought against the style of the Scholastic Doctors is, that it is dry and impoverished. In order to meet this accusation satisfactorily, it will be necessary to invoke the aid of a general principle which, in the abstract, (if I do not mistake), will be universally admitted; whatever differences of opinion there may be, touching its application to this or that particular instance. It cannot be doubted, that the style of an author should be accommodated to the nature of the subject matter. It would be as ridiculous to write a treatise on Mathematics in the glittering periods of Macaulay, as to compose a cookery-book in elegiacs. Similarly, it would fare ill with the brilliant contributions of Ruskin to Esthetics, if they were transformed into Scholastic phrase; just as the Summa of St. Thomas would not be recognised in the magniloquent periods of Dr. Johnson, In the pursuit of theological or philosophical truth, our labours must be directed by pure reason. There is no room here for imagination or the feelings. Within such a sphere these are dangerous, treacherous, companions. Seeing, therefore, that the process of thought is purely scientific and subject to the strict laws of demonstration; it is impossible that the style should be otherwise than dry. Nay more; it is impossible that it should be otherwise than impoverished, that is, that it should not exclude all ornament or any words that are not necessary exponents of the thought. In the same sense, one might accuse Euclid, or Newton, or Carpenter, or Ganot, or Max Müller, of adopting a dry and impoverished style in the composition of their respective Works; and with as little reason. I think, on the contrary, that, if our modern writers on philosophical subjects would consent to conform somewhat more nearly to Scholastic terseness and logical precision, it would be better for their readers and for those interests of truth which we must suppose them to have at heart. We might be presented as a consequence, with less of rhetoric, less of fanciful illustration, less warmth of advocacy, less of unmeasured declamation against opposite Schools of thought; but we should be saved much needless repetition, slipshod discoursing, decretorial assertions unsupported by even an effort at demonstration, and from many patent paralogisms. Scientific knowledge of truth can only be gained by severe process of Demonstration; whereas views, half-formed ideas, inconsistencies of thought, are wont to lie hidden under that loosely copious and unmethodized style of composition which seems to find favour at present.

If, however, by this accusation against Scholastic diction it is intended to insinuate, that there is any poverty of thought in the writings of such Doctors as St. Thomas; I must give to the assertion an unqualified contradiction. The reader will have full opportunity, while perusing these volumes, of judging for himself, whether the charge has any element of truth in it; for he will be confronted with a multitude of passages, selected from nearly every one of the works of the Angelic Doctor, and the original of each passage will, as a rule, be given in the notes. The real fact is, that every Article, every paragraph, is overcharged with deep thought. There are many passages which can be comprehended only after the hard study of hours; but, once comprehended, they amply repay one for the labour. In order, however, to be capable of deriving profit from such study, the mind must he properly disposed for the work.

Such are the accusations that have been brought against the general style of the Scholastic writings. I shall now proceed to pass in review the principal animadversions which have been made upon the subject-matter selected by the Schoolmen and their method of treatment.

Hobbes complains that the Doctors of the School 'converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, or in questions of abstruse philosophy.' Now, is there any, -- if so, how much, of truth in this complaint? It does not admit of doubt, that, when the author of the Leviathan speaks of matters incomprehensible, he is referring to the dogmas of the Christian Faith and of the grave questions to which these latter have given rise. This is not the place to enter upon an elaborate examination into the justice of such a charge; nevertheless, I cannot wholly pass by it, without rendering myself obnoxious to the charge of evading that which I could not meet. I admit, then, at once, that the mysteries of the Christian Faith are, for the most part, incomprehensible in this sense, viz. that they surpass the natural, unaided, powers of human reason; so that the intellect of man could never have reached them without the aid of a Divine Revelation. I further acknowledge that, after those mysteries have been Divinely revealed, they are still incomprehensible by the mind of man. But I stoutly maintain that they are not inapprehensible by the mind of man. Furthermore, though they are above human reason, after the manner just explained, as every Christian would willingly admit; they are not contrary to reason. It is impossible that they should be, on the supposition that they are true. Again: though human reason could not have discovered them; yet, when once they have been revealed, it can discover a wondrous analogy between them and the truths of the natural order, which greatly adds to the reasonable motives for their credibility. Once more: it is within the province of human reason to exhibit the relation of dogma to dogma, and in this way to evolve the objective unity of the Faith, as well as to render a multitude of truths explicit, which had previously been implicitly contained in the revealed Creed. Such a result is affected by process of pure Demonstration; which differs from natural Demonstration only in this, that, in the former, the premisses are taken from a Divine Revelation. By the employment of reason in the three ways here mentioned, the Science of Supernatural Theology has been constructed. Such was the great work which circumstances, into which it is not necessary now to enter, imposed upon the Doctors of the School.

Looking, then, at the whole question in this light, it is surely more than an amphibology to assert, that the Schoolmen conversed in questions of matters incomprehensible. But it would seem that they are not guilty of this offence alone; for they have likewise conversed in questions of abstruse philosophy. Doubtless they have; and wherein the blame? Is it because they ventured upon questions of philosophy? If so, why are they to be singled out for special reprobation? They followed in the wake of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Zeno, Pythagoras, (to omit a crowd of other names); and they have been followed by Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Wolff, Kant and those Germans of the critical School who succeeded him, by Sir William Hamilton, and others of our own day. The world of letters has never been without its schools of philosophy, since the commencement of civilization. Once give to man the occasion of studious leisure; and you will try in vain to hinder him from seeking for an answer to such questions as, What is the Soul? What is Thought? What is Will? What is Existence? What, the primary constitution of material substance? and the like.

It cannot, then, be, that Hobbes quarrels with the Scholastic Doctors, because they dealt with questions of philosophy. So the ground of complaint must be restricted to the fact, that the questions, which the said Doctors have treated, are abstruse. Yet, is it possible that he could have meant this? Are there any metaphysical questions which are not abstruse? Moreover, abstruseness is no special property of Metaphysics. Most mathematicians, I will venture to say, would admit, that the Quaternions of Hamilton and the Elliptic Functions of Jacobi are sufficiently abstruse, even for those who are ordinarily grounded in the mathematical science. Hence; we are justified in concluding, that this second Article in Hobbes' indictment has no significance or value.