JMC : The Metaphysics of the School / by Thomas Harper, S.J.

Chapter II. The Differentia.

It has been already remarked that each science is differentiated by its formal object. The material object is not unfrequently common to many sciences; whereas the formal object, i.e. the real form, or, if you will, the point of view under which the former is considered, serves to distinguisb essentially one science from another. Thus, for instance, man is the material object common to Ethics proper, Oeconomics, Politics, Medicine, and Anatomy, -- not to mention others, such as Ethnography and Ethnology. But in the first three he is considered as a free agent under direction of a moral law; in the fourth, as a living body or animal subject to disease; in the last, as an organized structure. The first three, again, are distinguished from each other, in that Ethics proper regards the free agency of man in relation to the moral law as affecting himself individually; Oeconomics, as affecting his relation to the social order; lastly, Politics as affecting his relation to the state. Hence it is evident that it were vain to seek for the Differentia, or Difference, of Metaphysics in its material object; the more so that this latter includes within itself all possible reality. In mooting, then, the question touching the differentia of Metaphysics, we are in truth instituting an inquiry into its formal object. Wherefore,


The formal object of Metaphysics is real Being, as such, and the primary determinations of real Being, formally contained within the limits of Metaphysical abstraction.

This Proposition contains two members, which shall he taken in their order.

I. As to THE FIRST MEMBER, wherein it is asserted that real Being, as such, is the formal object of Metaphysical Science, it may be safely said that the verdict of the School is all but unanimous in its favour. It is the teaching of Aristotle, who describes Metaphysics to be 'a science which contemplates Being, as such, and its immediate attributes.'{1} The Angelic Doctor distinguishes Metaphysics from all the other speculative sciences, in that the former considers the nature of Being absolutely, while the latter treat of Being under some determining form.{2} The same doctrine is maintained by Albert the Great, Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, Avicenna and others, together with the later Scholastics and, in particular, Suarez, who, adducing the authority of the afore-named Doctors, subjoins that it is the opinion of 'nearly all the other authors.'{3}

Moreover, it stands to reason that such should he the case. For the first or highest science must necessarily contemplate first principles and first causes. Now, every principle and every cause is principle and cause of some nature hence it follows that the highest and most general causes and principles will be causes and principles of the highest and widest nature, which is no other than Being. But, if Metaphysics, as the first science, inquires into the causes and principles of Being, Being must be its formal object.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of this Thesis, which affirms that the primary determinations of Being formally contained within the limits of Metaphysical abstraction are included in the formal object of this science, is easy of proof so long as we confine ourselves to the simple question of fact; but when we proceed to inquire into the reasons for, and limits of, this extension of the object, the investigation is not without its difficulties. Moreover, sundry terms in the enunciation require preliminary explanation; otherwise, instead of facilitating progress, as they are intended to do, they will only create fresh impediments. Accordingly, the following Prolegomena are here set down.


What is meant by determinations of Being? Determinations of Being amount to what would be divisions of Being, if Being were capable of logical division. Cannot, then, Being be divided? Certainly not; neither it nor any other of the Transcendentals. The reason is as follows: -- A logical Whole is resolvable into its subordinate species by a differentia. Thus, for example, if you want to divide animal, you introduce the Difference, rational, which by Dichotomy (the sole purely logical division), resolves the Genus, animal, into its two subordinate species, viz, rational and irrational (not rational) animals. Thus much is assumed as a Lemma from Logic. (Now, it is a canon of Philosophy, that the Genus cannot enter into the essential nature of the Difference) Thus, by way of illustration, animal is not an essential constituent of rational; for angels are rational{4} and acts are rational, yet neither angels nor acts are animals. But it is impossible to discover a supposed Differentia for Being, (and the same may be said for the other Transcendentals), in which Being itself is not essentially included. Take, for instance, the two groups of material and immaterial things. A material thing is something, and something is Being; otherwise it is nothing. The same observation plainly applies with equal force to things immaterial. You can never escape from Being within the sphere of reality: yet Being cannot be its own divisor. Nevertheless, Being admits of what may be called classifications; and these quasi classifications are called its determinations. But why? Because one and the same object is more clearly defined, or rather determined, by the representative presence of additional notes or determining forms. This may perhaps be more easily understood by an illustration. We will suppose that a man is viewing an object through a telescope. He has not as yet got the right focus, and the object presents itself as a dark something.

That is all that he can make out of it. As he gradually adjusts the glass to his eyesight, it begins to assume a more definite shape, till at last the hull, masts, ropes, sails of the ship are each dis tinetly visible, and he can even read the name of the vessel on the stern: nevertheless, it was the same object from first to last. No . . real addition has been made to it; but it has become more determined in proportion as the observer neared the proper focus. In like manner, James, for instance, may be conceived by the mind as a being, as a substance, as an animal, as a man, and as this particular man with all his individual characteristics. Yet all the way through, there is no division of the object, which is identical at every stage; but there are degrees of determination, or, in other words, of a finite representation. Analogously we can determine Being'; but it is impossible to divide it. For whatever seems to be added to Being must be Being, and is therefore already contained implicitly in the dividend. Thus Substance is Being, determined to such a mode of Being by the note of self-support, or, in other words, of freedom from essential inhesiveness in another.


It is stated in the enunciation of the Thesis that the determinations of Being, included in the formal object of Metaphysics, are primary. Now by the word primary must not be understood exclusively the immediate determinations of Being, i.e. those determinations between which and Being no mediate determination is discoverable. For instance, Substance is an immediate determination of Being, but Quantity is mediate; because, between the latter and Being, Accident intervenes, which is more determinate than the one and less determinate than the other. By the primary determinations, therefore, are to be understood such as are of wider periphery and have a more direct relation to the essences of things in general, as distinguished from those more contracted and particular determinations which constitute the special object of one or other of the subordinate sciences.


These determinations of Being are admitted to a place in the object of Metaphysics only in so far as they are contained within the limits of Metaphysical abstraction. The question, therefore, naturally occurs; What is it precisely that is meant by Metaphysical abstraction? The answer to the question will enable us to fix, more definitely than has been as yet attempted, the limit to such primary determinations of Being as are alone admissible in the formal object of this science. The primitive objects of human cognition are sensible, material, individual things. Thus much is assumed as a Lemma from the Ideology of the School; for it would be obviously out of place to discuss the matter here. The human intellect in scientific operation proceeds to work on this material, and by repeated processes of abstraction and generalization arrives progressively at three different stages. It begins by getting rid of individuality, or, as it is called in the Schools, the haecceity (the thisness) of a thing, on its road to laws. It proceeds to abstract from the qualitative modes of matter, i.e. from sensile matter, as it has been called, regarding matter only under its quantitative forms or laws, i.e. intelligible matter. Finally, it abstracts from matter altogether, and cognizes the immaterial and purely intelligible. The first constitutes the limits of physical, the second those of mathematical, the last those of Metaphysical abstraction: hence Metaphysics excludes all that is material and sensile, as such, from the sphere of its formal object. Not that it altogether abjures the consideration of material things; but, in contemplating them, it fixes itself only upon that which is common to them with immaterial and spiritual Being, abstracting from their materiality and subjection to the senses. As the Angelic Doctor puts it with his accustomed clearness, -- 'Being and substance are said to be separated from matter and motion, not becanse it is of their essence to be without matter and motion, as it would be of the essence of an ass to be without reason; but because it is not of their essence to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion, just as animal abstracts from rational, albeit some animals are rational.'{5}


Every whole may be regarded either absolutely or relatively, in other words, either as an actual or as a potential Whole, In the former case it simply represents an objective form, as it is absolutely in itself and separated by precision of abstraction from any subject or subjects in which it may be found, or, if concrete, at least an absolute and undetermined supposit. Thus, when we say that Philosophy is the love of Wisdom, we have present to the mind a certain real objective form, as it is absolutely in its own nature; and though, as a fact, it exists only in the intellect of man, yet the mind abstracts from such inhesion and subject of inhesion, and represents Philosophy in its own quiddity, independent of its concrete existence. But in the judgment, Philosophy is either speculative or practical, the mind has made a further step. It has not only objectivized its concept by a total abstraction from the Subject but it considers the form represented by such concept as potential, distributive, i.e. as referable to the inferiors included within the sphere of its extension. The former is a Metaphysical; the latter, a Logical Whole.

And now we may securely proceed to the declaration of this second part of the Proposition. That Metaphysics does not limit itself to the sole consideration of Being and its attributes, is a patent fact. For there is not a single work, which professedly treats of Metaphysical science, that does not deal with questions touching the nature of Substance, Accident, Necessity, Contingency, Infinity, the Simple, the Composite, and the like. Yet all and each of these overleap the boundaries of simple Being, considered absolutely and abstractedly as such. The only difficulty is to determine, at what precise point the introduction of these all but endless subordinate determinations of Being into the formal object of our science is to stop. Shall it be allowed to continue till the whole chain is exhausted? Does Metaphysics profess to deal with the proper and specific nature, causes, energies, of each and every grade of Being? If so, it is no longer a particular, but it is the universal science; and all the other sciences and disciplines become mere chapters or pages in its Encyclopaedia. This concentration of knowledge, however, is a practical impossibility in the actual order. The question, then, returns, What determinations of Being are legitimately admitted by Metaphysics within the sphere of its subject-matter, and what are excluded? Is it possible to draw the line with sufficient accuracy? The following is the answer. This, the First Science, acknowledges those determinations of Being alone which are either formally contained within, or essentially connected with, its own particular abstraction. To put it in another way: Metaphysics includes all real entities within the range of its material object; yet it does not investigate the special natures of each in particular, but only those forms or modifications in each, which are either positively or negatively immaterial. It may be necessary to repeat here the meaning of these two expressions. By positively immaterial forms are meant those which, by virtue of their own nature and as existing in the concrete, are wholly separate from matter; while negatively immaterial forms are such as, though material in the concrete, or as they actually exist in their Subject, are nevertheless purified from all material conditions by the abstracting faculty of the mind, and only represent those notes which they share in common with immaterial beings. Thus, Substance in an Angel is a positively immaterial form; but Substance in a stone or tree is a negatively immaterial form. It is by the aforesaid way of abstraction only, that Body becomes intelligible; for as the Angelic Doctor teaches, 'The form of corporeity itself becomes intelligible by virtue of its separation from matter.'{6} By a similar abstraction even primordial matter is transformed into a sort of object of cognition, as an imperfect quiddity or nature. In fact, it is impossible to form a concept of what kind soever, unless the object has been freed from its individualizing conditions. To borrow the words of St. Thomas, 'Since things outside the mind are material and particular, and since everything whatever is intelligible in proportion to its separability from matter; it is manifest that an entity, so far as it is in particular matter, is unintelligible, save by abstraction from individualizing conditions. For a stone cannot be conceived, unless it be abstracted by the intellect from individuation and time and other like things.'{7} So much, at all events, of abstraction and of consequent universality of cognition, is necessary for whatsoever science or Discipline. As, then, sensible and material things are not intelligible in the concrete, but become so by process of intellectual abstraction which frees them from their existing individuality, and as things are the more intelligible in proportion to their remoteness from matter; it follows, that the Supreme Science will occupy itself exclusively with those forms or determinations of Being which are entirely immaterial and, consequently, of wider universality. Furthermore, as spiritual Being is the highest and noblest form of the immaterial and is of the same nature with the Soul which is the Subject of all science, and as perfectness of cognition principally depends upon a natural similarity and, as it were, sympathy, between object and subject, according to the well-known axiom that 'everything that is received is received according to the nature (or measure) of the receiver;' it follows that spiritual Being, so far as it is discernible by the mind of man, will form the principal object of Metaphysics amongst the determinations of Being.

From the above exposition certain practical conclusions are deducible, which will serve to solve the problem proposed at the beginning.

1. The Metaphysical science does not concern itself with the lower and more specific forms of material things, as such. Their consideration is proper to Physics.

2. Neither does it contemplate those necessary laws of Space and Time, or of continuous and discrete Quantity, to which the visible Universe is subject; for these are the proper object of Mathematics.

3. It does not investigate the special nature, constitutives, causes, energies, of the material world or of man, AS SUCH. These are reserved for Cosmology and Anthropology.

4. But it considers the quiddities or essences of all beings in their more general relation to each other by similarity of determining forms.{8}

5. It is conversant only with the essences of things, not with their concrete existence; and in this it is principally distinguishable from Cosmology and Anthropology. Nevertheless it treats of Existence itself; yet not as a fact, but as an essence that demands scientific determination.

6. It primarily investigates the Transcendentals, i.e. those Realities which not only permeate, but transcend, or go beyond, the Aristotelian Categories. These are Being and its three Attributes.

7. It specially contemplates, so far as the weakness of the human mind will allow, the nature and properties of pure Forms, or, in other words, of spiritual substances. The Angelic Doctor is our authority for this assertion. 'For though it is the office of a Metaphysician,' he observes, 'to treat of all realities, in so far as they are included in the notion of Being, nevertheless it behoves him in an especial manner to treat of separated' (i.e. from matter) 'and spiritual entities; because in them is preserved with greater perfectness the idea of Being, which is the object of Metaphysical research; as also because their special and particular nature is hidden from us, and therefore there can be no special science which considers them.'{9}

8. It principally treats of Him Who is infinite Being, infinite Spirit, First Cause. For this reason Aristotle calls it the Divine Science, as we have seen.


I. The object of Metaphysics ought not to be limited to real Being, but should be extended to all Being, logical as well as real. The reason for this opinion is gathered from the declarations just made. For we are told that the object of the highest science will be the highest or most universal concept. But Being, as inclusive of the logical and real, is wider in its periphery than only real Being by itself. Therefore the former, and not the latter, is the proper object of Metaphysics. This argument is further confirmed by reference to the nature of logical entities. Some of them are mere forms of thought or, as they have been termed, Second Intentions. Now, as to these, though it is true that Logic investigates their special nature, divisions, interconnection; yet the fact remains that in themselves they are real entities and, as such, claim a place in the object of Metaphysics. There are other logical entities, again, which go by the name of entities or creations of the mind, (entia rationis). They are easily to be distinguished from Second Intentions, for that they are to a certain extent representative of real beings; but they are not real concepts, either because these real objects, which are many, are represented as one by a purely logical synthesis, or because the representation of the real object is indirect and material, while the formal representation is logical. A heap of stones or a mass of sea-weed is an instance of the former; the second class comprises all negative and privative ideas. But there is no science which expressly deals with these entities of the mind; consequently, if they are excluded from the sphere of Metaphysics, they will be entirely neglected.

ANSWER. As to the principal argument it suffices to say, that such a generalization of real and logical Being under a higher universal is impossible. True it is that the word, Being, is in use without the modifying addition of adjectives, real or logical. But when it is so employed, all the world understands it to mean real Being; so that a man would excite general astonishment who should formally predicate Being of a syllogism or hypothetical judgment. Whenever it may be found necessary to apply the word to logical Forms, a modifying epithet is added, such as logical beings, beings or entities of the mind. The fact is, that there is no form common to real and logical Being; so that there is nothing which can be predicated univocally of both. Is there, then, any analogy between the two, which may suffice in some way to reduce them under one common concept? Certainly not; for, in order to this, it would be necessary that they should be Analogates of attribution, which presuppose a real Form somehow common to the two; whereas in the present case the only analogy that offers itself; is an analogy of proportion.{10} In other words, there is nothing truly common to logical and real entities respectively; though there is that in the former which bears some proportion of resemblance to the other. And now to proceed to the first member of the confirmatory argument; Second Intentions, or pure forms of thought, may be considered either objectively as logical forms or subjectively as psychical facts. As the former, they constitute the object of Logic; as the latter, they formally belong to Psychology or Ideology, but are included materially, forasmuch as they are real entities, in the object of Metaphysics. In order to afford a clear and satisfactory answer to the second member of the same argument, it will be necessary to take the two classes of these entities of the mind separately. A collective concept may be regarded either materially or formally. Materially, it is representative of real entities, each one of which accordingly is included of necessity under real Being. Formally, it is a synthesis of these many into one. The former is real, the latter logical. The synthesis, then, as being a logical entity, belongs to Logic or Ideology; the material reality which it presupposes, viz., diversity and multitude in Being, are subjects of Metaphysical inquiry. Negative and privative concepts may likewise be considered either formally or materially. Formally, they are concepts of a negation and, therefore, logical; materially, i.e. as representative of a real entity which is removed by the formal negation, they are, indirectly, objectively real, and this their indirect object finds its due place within the sphere of real Being. Thus, to take an instance, Irrational is either a negative or privative attribute according to the nature of the subject which it is supposed to modify. it is purely negative, when applied to a stone or plant; privative, when applied to a man or a course of action, because in these last cases reason ought to be there, but is not. Now this concept, Irrational, is formally a negation of reason and consequently purely logical, because negations have neither essence nor objective existence. Materially, however, and indirectly it is real; because it represents that reason which it removes by negation from the subject. Care must be taken in this place not to confound words bearing a negative form with negative or privative concepts; for there is no necessary equivalence between them. The reason of this is, that the negation of an imperfection (which latter is itself a negation), may be the expression of a positive perfection; just as two negatives make an affirmative. Thus, Immateriality, Infinity, Unchangeableness, lmpassible, Indestructible, and the like, are negative grammatically; yet notionally they are directly representative of simple perfections. Nevertheless, even in this class of quasi negative attributes, if we look exclusively to the form of the concept or the mode of representation, and not to the object represented, it must be owned that it is likewise logical.

II. It is further objected that the present Proposition, as interpreted by the subsequent declaration, is not self-consistent. For to Metaphysics has been assigned the highest place among the sciences, and it has been admitted that God is its principal object; yet at the same time it is enounced that Being is the adequate object. But these respective assertions are scarcely compatible. For, seeing that Metaphysics is Queen among the sciences, it postulates the noblest of objects; indeed, it is a point which is accepted in the declaration as a sort of first principle. Yet God, the Infinite and infinitely Perfect, must necessarily be a nobler Object when considered exclusively in Himself than when included under a transcendental concept which embraces indifferently the Infinite and the finite. For whatever is gained by the latter in extension, is more than counterbalanced by its defect of comprehension; and Metaphysics does not ambition for its objects the widest universal as such, but only, because, in the cognition of the finite, the more universal the concept, the deeper and more lofty is the truth which it represents. Nor can it be urged in reply, that God is beyond the capacity of unassisted human thought; because it stands confessed that He is the principal Object of this science. Hence it is prone to conclude that God, not Being, is the adequate Object of Metaphysics. For that science which has God for its adequate Object, considers Him immediately as He is in His own Nature; whereas the science which includes Him together with all other entities within the periphery of its object, does not contemplate Him as He is in Himself but puts before itself some vague and general idea or form of being, which is common to the Infinite and finite. Finally, such an abstract concept of Being as is here supposed, would seem to be impossible; since it is difficult to imagine any common form or abstraction which should include in one the Infinite and the finite.

ANSWER. It must be admitted that, if an intuitive knowledge of the Divine Nature could be naturally attained by man, the objection would hold good. But such is not the case. On the contrary, Metaphysics, since it proceeds by the simple light of unassisted reason, is compelled to content itself with those imperfect ideas concerning God, which it can gather from His partial manifestation of Himself in His works. Therefore, in the actual order of human cognition, it can be, that real and true concepts of Being and of certain determinations of Being, (such as Substance, Intellect, Will, Spiritual Being), should be found to embrace the Infinite and finite, and even to exhibit a more intimate proportion and agreement between God and His creature than is occasionally discoverable between one creature and another. For though, between the essential Nature of God as It is in its own infinite Perfection and even the noblest of His creatures, there is an immeasurable distance, not to be bridged over by any effort of human thought; yet there is no such chasm between that which we can know of God from His works by reason, and the perfections of the creature. It must not, however, be imagined that this possibility to human science of reducing the Infinite and finite under one common concept and denomination of Being and of sundry determinations of Being, supposes on the part of such conceived Form or determination any priority of nature in regard of the Infinite; however it may postulate a logical or conceptional priority. Far from this, it will appear, in the course of our Metaphysical investigations, that these determinations and Forms are without exception so absolutely and pre-eminently attributes of God, as to exclude the possibility of their being univocally predicated of God and the creature; though they are predicable according to analogy of attribution of the second class.

III. It is urged that Substance, not real Being, is the adequate object of Metaphysics; and for this reason. Every science, regarded subjectively, is a habit of demonstration; and all demonstration proves the Attribute or Passion of the Subject by means of the immediate and proper causes of both. Accordingly, the Attribute, as such, cannot enter into the object of any science. Now, Being is either Substance or Accident, and includes both. But Accident is the Attribute of Substance; and ought not, therefore, be included in the object of Metaphysics.

ANSWER. As will be seen in the next Book, there is a real objective concept of Being which is common to Substance and Accident. If so Substance is included under Being. Unless, therefore, Being were its object, Metaphysics would not be the Supreme Science. And though it must be allowed that Accident is the property of Substance and is essentially ordered towards its information; yet it is equally true that it is not only this. For it has a proper entity or essence of its own, and, as such, is justly included in the object of this science.

IV. It is, lastly, argued that real Being, as such, cannot be the proper and adequate object of the noblest natural science. For the idea of Being is of all ideas the most vague, imperfect, and confused. But an object of this description is unworthy of any science; how much more, then, of the highest and most noble.

ANSWER. It is undoubted that the primitive and direct idea of Being, such as children form of it, is that which has been described in the objection. But the same can in no wise be predicated of the reflex and philosophical concept of Being. On the contrary, it will be seen that it contains within itself every perfection, absorbs into itself all that is intelligible, and reduces to unity the multiplicity of finite truths'.{11}

{1} Metaph. L. IV (aliter III), c. I.

{2} In 2 Sentt. d. iii, Q. 3, a. 2, in c.

{3} 'Et reliqui fere scriptores.' Metaph. Disp. I, sect. 1, n. 26.

{4} Rational is here used in its generic meaning as equivalent to endowed with reaoon or intellect.

{5} 'Ens et substantia dicuntur esse separata a materia et motu, non propter hoc quod de ratione eorum sit esse sine materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse; sed propter hoc quia de ratione eorum non est in materia et motu esse, quamvis quandoque sint in materia et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a rationali, quamvis aliquod animal sit rationale.' Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Boet. de Trinit. Q. 5, a. 4, ad 5m.

{6} 'Cum ipsa forma corporeitatis sit intelligibilis per separationem a materia.' In 1 Sentt. Dist. viii, Q. 5, a. 2, c, init.

{7} 'Cum res sint materiales et particulares extra animam, et unumquodque sit intelligibile secundum quod est a materia separabile, manifestum est quod res secundum quod est in materia particulari intelligi non pQtest, nisi abstrahatur ab omnibus conditionibus individuantibus; lapis enim non potest intelligi, nisi per intellectum abstrahatur ab hoc, et nunc, et aliis hujusmodi.' Opusc. LVI, (aliter L, Tract. 2o), init.

{8} 'Metaphysicus considerat etiam de singulis entibus, non secundum proprias rationes per quas sunt tale vel tale ens; sed secundum quod participant communem entis rationem; et sic etiam pertinet ad ejus considerationem materia et motus.' Opusc. LX (alier LXIII), Q. 5, a. 4 ad 6m.

{9} 'Licet enim Metaphysici sit de omnibus agere sub ratione entis; praecipue tamen ad ipsum pertinet tractare de rebus separatis; tum quia perfectior ratio entis in eis salvatur, quam Metaphysicus quaerit; tum quia in particulari eorum natura occulta est, unde non potest de eis scientia particularis esse.' Opusc. XLII, (aliter XXXIX), co. 6.

{10} There are three kinds of analogy according to the Ideology of the School: (i) that of proportion, which intercedes between analogates (i.e. the subjects of analogy), whose determining Forms, as expressed by the analogy, are absolutely distinct and diverse, yet bear a sort of geometrical proportion to each other; as for instance, the idea of foot as applied to a man and to a mountain. (ii) There is the analogy of attribution of the first class, which exists between analogates whose denominating Form is the same, but the said Form is intrinsic only in the principal analogate, extrinsic to the rest. Thus, to take an example, healthy is attributed to man, to the pulse, food, and bodily exercise; but in man alone is the form of health intrinsic, while in the rest it is a mere extrinsic denomination derived from the relation of these latter to the form of health in man. (iii) Lastly, there are analogates of attribution of the second class, whose determining Form is not only the same in all (which is common to analogy of attribution of whatever kind), but also intrinsic in each; nevertheless, in the principal analogate it is absolute and independent, whereas in the secondary analogates it connotes a necessary relation to, and dependence upon, the Form as determining the principal analogate. Of this last kind are all concepts which cover the Infinite and the finite, the concept of Being as referred to substance and accident, &c.

{11} 'Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi; secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent.' 1ae iv, 2, inc. Cf. ibidem, ad 3m.

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