PROPOSITION V.
Real Being, in its most universal aeceptation, is not generic or univocal; but analogous according to the analogy of attribution of the second class.
That Being is a whole, and a whole of infinite potentiality, must have been made sufficiently apparent during the course of these previous discussions. An idea which embraces the Infinite together with the Finite can admit of no beyond in the extension of its universality. Everything that is real is included under it. But it is of the highest importance, in the interests of a science which has this Transcendental for its adequate object, that the true nature of its potential universality, or distributiveness, should be accurately ascertained; for -- not to allude to other advantages -- such knowledge is absolutely necessary to a scientific acquaintance with those primary determinations which the Metaphysical Science embraces within the periphery of its subject-matter.
Now, it cannot be doubted that Being, as a formal concept, must be representative of one only Form, either composite or simple, as the case may be. Otherwise, it would be difficult to vindicate its own unity; which is determined by the unity of the object represented by it. Therefore Being, as an objective concept also, must be one. So much was established in the third Proposition. But the difficulty at once arises touching the possibility of any such unity. For it would seem inconceivable that any Form could be discoverable, which should equally embrace the Infinite and Finite. Moreover, it is all but universally admitted by philosophers, that Being, as a potential or relative whole, is not univocal. But it cannot be equivocal; for, besides that equivocation presupposes plurality and diversity of forms, its unity is only verbal, and as a consequence equivocals cannot become an object of science properly so called. Nothing remains, then, but that the unity which is claimed for the concept of Being should be a unity of analogy. But, if so, the third Proposition must be abandoned; since all unity of Form in such hypothesis would disappear, at least as soon as it is referred to the analogates which it comprises. These analogates, however, are in the instance of Being, its primary determinations; consequently, either the Metaphysical Science ceases to be one, or it must be limited to the simple consideration of Being and its three attributes as coincident with the chief analogate. For Analogy is either of proportion or of attribution. In analogy of proportion there are absolutely two Forms; and the only discoverable unity between them consists in a certain similarity between these two Forms, which can be represented by a sort of Geometrical proportion. Hence they are called analogates of proportion. In analogy of attribution there is but one Form indeed; but that Form is only intrinsic in the principal analogate and, therefore, properly belongs to it alone; while it is predicable of the secondary analogates by extrinsic denomination merely, and by reason of their connection with the Form as inherent in the principal analogate.{1} But, if Being is to be understood as an analogate of this kind; then, considered under its primary determinations, it appertains only to chief, and is a mere denominative as applied to the rest. These latter could hardly, therefore, be included in its real, objective unity. Such was the third and remaining difficulty, which still awaits its solution.
It will be well, for the sake of greater precision, to follow the order of discussion as suggested in the enunciation of the thesis.
I. The exposition of the preceding Proposition has already prepared the way for the verification of the FIRST POSITION here maintained, viz, that Being is not a Generic whole. For it is indivisible any real Difference; since whatever mode may be introduced for purpose of determining it, that mode is either Being or nothing. But it belongs to the essential nature of a Difference, that its form should be extraneous to the form which it divides. Yet Genus is a logical whole, which admits of division by a real Difference, and is thereby contracted to some subordinate species. Moreover, in the constitution of its species, Genus plays a subordinate part; for -- to speak metaphysically -- it constitutes the material element only, while the Difference constitutes the formal. But if a Metaphysical division (supposing it to be possible) were instituted of any of the determinations or contractions of Being, Being would not limit itself to the quasi-material part alone; it would claim the whole, seeing that outside of Being there is nothing. To put this argument in form: --
That universal, which is common to many diverse species, not only in so far as they exhibit one and the same essential characteristics, but likewise as specifically constituted by those opposite notes which distinguish them from each other, cannot be Generic.
But Being, in its most universal acceptation, is such a universal; and, therefore, cannot be Generic.
II. Being cannot be a univocal whole. For it is the peculiar property of a univocal, that the form which it exhibits should be equally predicated of all and each of its subordinates; in other words, that the form represented should be predicable as absolutely and indifferently of one as of the other. But it is impossible that such should be the case in the instance of a form which includes the Infinite with the Finite, Substance with Accident, and so on. For Being in the Finite has a necessary and essential dependence on Being in the Infinite; and Being in Accident has an essential relation of dependence on Being in Substance. Wherefore: That universal which is not equally and independently predicable of each and all its inferior determinations, is not univocal.
But Being cannot be equally and independently predicated of its subject determinations; and, consequently, is not univocal.
III. Being, in its universal acceptation, is an analogous Whole.
This position naturally follows from the two preceding. For, since Being cannot be equivocal, it must either be univocal or analogous. But it has already been proved that it is not univocal. It remains, then, that it should be analogous.
But, for the sake of further elucidation, let the proposition be submitted to independent proof. In whatsoever case it happens that a Whole is predicated of its subject-contents severally, so that it is primarily and principally referred to one of those subordinates and only secondarily and subordinately to the rest; that Whole is analogous. Such a Whole is Being. For, considered in its determination to the Infinite, it enjoys a super-excellence of perfection such, that there is an infinite principality and wholly comprehensive reality in it; whereas, determined to the Finite, it seems almost to lose itself in its intrinsic imperfection and diversity of characteristics. Moreover, in the former, it is absolute, independent, unlimited; in the latter, it is transcendentally relative, dependent on, and limited by the Infinite. Observing due proportion, a similar inequality exists in the relation which Being bears, so to speak, to Substance and Accident.
it is evident, therefore, that Being is analogous in some way or other.
IV. Being is an analogous Whole according to analogy of attribution of the second class.
Though there is this infinite diversity between Infinite and finite Being; yet is there a distinct similarity and agreement between them, which is a sufficient foundation to the human intellect for conceiving a form which shall include them both in common. Nor is it to be supposed that this form or essence is a purely logical concept; since it corresponds with a reality truly present in both extremes and, therefore, as an objective concept it can and does exist outside the objective representation of the intellect, although it is, if one may say so, as confused and indeterminate as is the formal concept from which it receives its denomination. The language of mankind has universally consecrated such phrases as The Divine Essence, The Essence of finite beings, The Essential nature of man; in which and similar phrases there is evidently an element mmon to all, viz. Essence, Essential nature, and the like, while there is also a determining mode. Consequently, the general consent of men recognises Essence as form in some sort common to God and His creatures. Moreover, when Essence is conceived and predicated of the finite, erybody understands by it something that is really intrinsic in ch entities; and not a mere extrinsic denomination, borrowed m Essence as belonging to the Infinite Supreme. But this sence has very different bearings and characteristics, when dermined to the Infinite, from what it has, when determined to e finite, In the former it is absolute, independent, in its own ht, as it were; in the latter it is intrinsically dependent on the finite Essence, relative to it. The Divine Essence is, because it must be, and is wholly unchanged by the position of those finite entities which issue forth from the fulness of Its omnipotence whereas finite essence must be, only because it is, and depends for its form, existence, continuance, on that Prototypal Essence which is the sufficient Reason and efficient Cause of its entire being. Thus then in form
That Universal, which is apprehended as apt to represent several analogates according to a common Form proper and intrinsic to each, although that Form in the principal analogate is essentially absolute, while in the secondary analogates it is essentially relative to, and dependent upon, the Form in the principal analogate, is an analogous Whole according to the analogy of attribution of the second class.
But Being, in its most universal acceptation, is such a universal; and, therefore, is an analogous Whole according to attribution of the second class.
The doctrine here exposed is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. For, in one place, he lays it down that 'The nature of Entity (or Being) is of one Form in all things according to analogy;'{2} where he evidently takes it for granted that this one Form is intrinsic in each of the analogates. Elsewhere he says that 'All univocals are reduced to one first, which is not univocal but analogous. And that first is Being.'{3}
NOTE I.
Before proceeding to the discussion of Possibles, which will form the subject of the next chapter, it will be necessary to consider somewhat more precisely the nature of Essence. For, as Being in its nominative acceptation is equivalent to Essence, it may truly be said that Metaphysics is the science of Essences. It is well to remind the reader once more, that Being or Essence, which constitutes the object of Metaphysics, does not exclude, as neither does it include, existence. It prescinds from existence altogether. But this explanation gives birth to a difficulty which must be removed out of the way at once, before going further. For it might seem at first sight as though Being in its nominative, and Being in its participial signification, -- in other words, Essence and Existence, or more properly, That which has Essence, and That which exists, -express two distinct concepts, or two distinct modes of Being, which logically divide some one common concept. Therefore, the ultimate universal has not yet been attained. Such an assumption, however, would be erroneous; because it supposes that Being in its nominative acceptation positively prescinds from existence, whereas it only does so negatively. These two significations do not exhibit two distinct modes or ways of Being; but are one concept of more or less abstractive precision. The case is exactly parallel with that of Genus to its species. There is no concept common to these two, save Genus itself as the Undetermined in the Determinate. Suarez illustrates this truth by a very apt example. In Ethical Science it is not unusual to meet with the word, Dsposition; which may mean either, in general, any quality disposing the will to elicit moral acts of a particular kind with facility, or such quality as merely inchoate and imperfect. In the former case it is a Genus, including within its limits habit and disposition specifically so called. In the latter case, it represents a determined species. Yet no one would say that these two grades of Disposition are in such contra-position as to constitute two distinct concepts which could become opposite members of a higher universal. The one is, in fact, nothing but a more determinate representation of the other.
This established, the question recurs, What is this Essence after all, of which so much has been said? Can anything like a definite notion of it be given? Essence is that Form by which Being is Being (esse, ens, essentia); and real Essence is that Form by which the intellect conceives real Being to be constituted; so that Being is apprehended as the Quod, Essence as the Quo. So far, so good; but these in themselves are mere words, and it is of the highest importance to know what is meant, first of all, by Essence, then again, by Real.
Anything like a definition of Essence is impossible; for, as a Transcendental, it has no material and formal parts, -- in logical
phrase, it can have no Genus and Difference. It can only, therefore, be explained or described either according to the relation it bears to its properties and effects; or in order of cognition. Conssidered in its relation to its properties and effects, the Essence a thing is the foremost, fundamental, intrinsic principle of all the properties and actions, or operations, which naturally belong it; in other words, its nature. It is that which, by virtue of the act of being, is understood to be primarily in anything, -- that which makes it to be fundamentally what it is, -- that which intrinsically constitutes it in its own special order. Measured by its relation to thought, it may be described as that which is expressed by the Definition.
There is precisely the same difficulty in regard of the word, Real. Definition is impossible. Nevertheless the term may be described positively as well as negatively. Negatively, a real Essence may be said to be that Essence which includes no self-contradiction, or is not a mere creation of the intellect. Positively, it may be described either posteriori or priori. A posteriori, real Essence is the principle or root of real operations. A priori, it may he explained as an Essence that can be produced by God and made actual. Hence it may be represented as Essence which of its own nature is fitted for being or existing. Such is the teaching of Suarez; and it has been adopted from him almost word for word .{4}
NOTE II.
The following is a summary of the doctrine which has been exposed in this chapter
i. Being has two significations, according as it is taken nominatively or participially. In the former sense, it stands for Essence; in the latter, for existing Essence. These two are 'not contradistinct concepts, but one and the same objective concept under more or less determination. The former includes the latter in the same sort of a way as a Genus includes its Species; therefore the two are not reducible under a common and more universal concept.
ii. Being, in its nominative use, is the proper and adequate object of Metaphysics.
iii. Being, thus rendered, is one in its formal and one, therefore, in its objective concept.
iv. Hence is derived the unity of Metaphysics as a science.
v. This unity in the concept of Being is neither generic, nor univocal, but analogous.
vi. The analogy assignable to the concept of Being, as a potential or relative universal, is not an analogy of proportion, nor of the first class of attribution, in which the Form is intrinsic only in the principal analogate; but of the second class of attribution, wherein the Form is intrinsic in all the analogates.
vii. The objective concept of Being prescinds negatively from all its subordinate determinations; as a confused representation prescinds from a more distinct.
viii. Consequently, the contraction of Being to its subordinate determinations is not effected by any extraneous and differential addition; but merely by means of a greater intrinsic determinateness in the concept, which projects the mode of being, and so contracts its logical extension.
{1} See note to Difficulty I, under the Second Proposition.
{2} 2 Sentt. d. I, a. I in c.
{3} 1ae, iii, 5, ad 1m.
{4} Metaphysica, disp. II, § 4, nn. 6, 7.