PROPOSITION VII.

The positive concept of merely possible Being is partly real, partly logical.

I. To begin with the proof of THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition, viz, that the positive concept of merely possible Being is partly real. It is plain that a concept which either directly or indirectly exhibits real Being, must be in part real itself; for the formal is determined in its nature by the objective concept. But what does the mind in fact represent to itself, when it conceives anything as really possible? Does it not represent that entity, ideally constituted with its essential characteristics, as really capable of being produced into the external world and of taking its place among existing things? If it were really to exist, its internal constitution would be real in every sense of the word. So then, it is now real as an objective concept; because it is impossible that it should be a mere creation of the intellect. For, if it were; then it would follow, that everything which a man might conceive in his intellect could exist. The existence of an evil God would be a possibility; the existence of Second Intentions, of negations and privations, of collective ideas, would be possible. Besides, nothing is made out of nothing, logical Being is made out of logical Being, reality out of reality. If, therefore, that possible essence is conceivable as real and as really existing, its constitutives must be somehow real; in other words, it must have a real basis. So again, if that possible essence is conceivably existent, and the conception of its capability for existence is not a simple toy of the intellect; the idea of possible existence must necessarily include within itself the idea of some real power capable of producing it in the order of existing things. Otherwise, it would be idle to talk of its existence as a real possibility; for there would be no more reason for attributing possible existence to it outside the mind, than there would be for attributing possible existence outside the mind to a hypothetical syllogism.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the enunciation, viz, that the positive concept of merely possible Being is partly logical, requires no laboured proof; if one only bears in mind the nature of a logical concept. For a logical concept is one, whose formal object cannot exist outside of the objective representation in the mind. Now, a being which is capable of existing, (taking the phrase reduplicatively, i.e. in so far only as it is capable), cannot possibly exist outside of its objective representation in the mind. It is true that the being which is capable of existing, may afterwards exist de facto; but then it exists at the cost of losing its capability, as such. It is no longer merely capable; because it is. So long as it is merely capable of existing, it neither is nor can be anything real. Mere aptitude for existence cannot of itself exist. This is what was intended by 'taking the phrase reduplicatively.'

As the present investigation turns on the ontological basis and objective reality of this concept of mere possibility; once more, the logical element in the positive concept of merely possible Being may be dismissed. Wherefore,