PROPOSITION IX.

The concept of merely possible Essence, in so far as it is positive and real, implies the concept of some existing Being, that is not that Essence, but in some sort precontains it and its existence.

THE FIRST PART of this position is nothing but a Corollary from the preceding Proposition. For, if the concept of Possible Essence, in so far as it is positive and real, is the concept of some existing Being, it stands to reason that it cannot formally and numerically be the merely possible Essence itself; since this latter necessarily does not exist, for the simple reason that it is merely possible.

THE 5ECOND PART demands somewhat more elaborate treatment. It is a common proverb in the School, Nemo dat quod non habet, -- 'No one gives what he has not to give.' Thus, dogs may give by transmission the canine essence, because they have it themselves; but they cannot give the feline, for the reason that they have it not to give. In like manner, vegetable substances can give coal, because they precontain its constituents in themselves; but carbon cannot give vegetable life, because it is not in its line. So, fire can give heat to water; but water cannot give heat to fire. Hence another proverb also common in the Schools, Nemo potest supra se ipsum, -- 'No one can do what is beyond his own nature.' The measure, therefore, of unassisted power. and, consequently, of causality, (which is a definite kind of power,) is the essence or nature of that Being to whom the power or causality belongs. The same rule applies to external possibility. The existence of any possible essence must in some way be precontained in that existing Being which is the real basis of its possibility. If, therefore, the essence and existence of the possible entity were not in some way or other precontained in such existing Being, this latter could not conceivably be the real basis of the possibility of the former; because there would be no sufficient reason for the possibility. Let an example serve by way of illustration. It shall be the idea of a possible apple. If any one should venture to assert, that in a swan could be found a sufficient reason for conceiving the possibility of the apple, he would probably be suspected of lunacy. But why? The answer is ready. There is nothing like an apple or the rudiments of an apple in the swan; and, consequently, a swan has not the power to produce an apple. But, if an apple-tree should be named, the suggestion would at once meet with the assent of all. Again, why? Because the apple-tree does precontain the apple eminently in itself and, besides, has the natural power of producing it.

The above illustration suggests a caution which it may be well to give at this stage of the present analysis; because it has its special bearing on the question of internal possibility. Do not suppose that, in the entity which is the real basis of possibility, the merely possible essence must necessarily be precontained formally and actually; it suffices that it should pre-exist there virtually, eminently, or ideally. Thus, an acorn is sufficient reason and secondary cause of the oak; because the latter is virtually precontained in the former. So, the soul of man can vivify and develope the body which it informs; because vegetable and animal life, or the principles of growth and sensation, are eminently contained in the spiritual substance of the soul. Thus, lastly, the carpenter is sufficient proximate reason for the form and proportion of his table or chair; because the form and proportion were conceptually precontained in his intellect. If it were otherwise, no Being could be sufficient reason for the internal possibility of an essence which was not on an exact level with its own. In the instance of the carpenter it has been advisedly said, 'a sufficient proximate reason;' for it is evident, that the idea itself in the mind of the carpenter requires, and presupposes, a sufficient reason for its determination. And this holds good in all parallel instances.