PROPOSITION XI.

In the concept of Essence intrinsically possible is included the idea of an existence, in which that Essence is at least equivalently contained.

It must be borne in mind that, throughout the series of these positions the whole question turns, not on any partial or inadequate or simply proximate basis of reality in the concept of merely possible Essence, but of its entire, adequate, and ultimate basis; furthermore, that the concept which is subjected to this analysis is not so much the formal concept, as the objective concept of which the former is representative.

Now, it has been proved in the preceding Thesis, that a merely possible Essence, together with its essential constitutives or distinctive notes, must be ideally present to that existence which is sufficient basis of its possibility; that is, in other words, that such existence must have an idea of that Essence according to its essential constitution. But whence the idea? An idea, as all know, is representative of some object, by which it was determined in its genesis. An idea unrepresentative, objectively undetermined, is a contradiction in terms. The idea, then, which, as has been already seen, is necessarily present in that existence which is the sufficient basis for the concept of possible Essence, must be representative, must be objectively determined. But if this existence is, in and by itself adequately sufficient basis for the concept of possibility, that idea cannot be determined by anything outside of the existence that claims it; otherwise, the said existence would not be a sufficient but only partial basis, since the object of its idea would come to it from without. Therefore, that existence must somehow, and as regards something of its own, be sufficient object of its own idea. Yet, that idea is not logical, but real. For, by it the compatibility or incompatibility of the notes which constitute the supposed possible Essence is discerned and determined. It consequently follows, that there must be something real in the aforesaid existence which is object of the typal idea. But, if that reality is formal object of the typal idea; it must be equivalent to the idea which represents it. If, then, the idea is representative of the possible Essence as constituted by such and such notes; the existence in question must contain in itself a reality which is equivalent to that possible Essence, or to the essential notes by which it is constituted.