PROPOSITION XIV.

Beings are internally possible, forasmuch as they are contained logically and eminently in God; externally possible, forasmuch as they are contained potentially in Him.

It must not be forgotten, that the object of the present analysis has been throughout, to discover the ultimate objective basis of the concept of mere possibility, independently of our manner of conceiving it, or even of the proximate and formal foundation for our conceiving this or that possible Essence in particular. It is perfectly plain to common sense, that a man may form a judgment as to this or that being possible, without making the slightest reference, direct or indirect, in his own mind to either the Divine Nature or the Divine Omnipotence. But this is quite beside the present question, which is, as has been said before, to discover the real ultimate foundation (if there be one) for the concept of merely possible Being, so far as that concept is positive and real. Evidently, therefore, the investigation is not limited to any one kind or class of possibles. It embraces all possibility and, as a consequence, all those beings which, though actual now, were once upon a time possibles, or, if not in time (supposing the philosophical possibility of a creation coeval with God in His eternity), at least antecedently to their actuation in order of nature. This, perhaps, needs further explanation. Even though it be admitted, then, with the Angelic Doctor, that God might have willed, had it so pleased Him, to create His Universe from all eternity; yet, since this would not diminish one iota the absolute dependence of the creature on its Creator's Will; by the very order of that dependence there would have been a possibility, known to God, -- antecedent, not in time but in nature, to the creature's actuation. In a word, all created things were merely possible by the very dependence of their nature, as considered in themselves, prior in order of nature to the act of the Divine Free Will that determined their existence. If it were not possible that they should not have been; it would never be possible that they should at any time cease to be.

I. And now, for THE FIRST of the two positions which compose the present Proposition.

The inquiry naturally commences with internal possibility. It has been seen in preceding Theses, that the concept of Essence internally possible, so far as that concept is real and positive, necessarily includes the idea of some real existence, in which is at once contained the prototypal idea of that Essence and the real object which that idea represents. Furthermore, that object, as included in such existence and in some sort one with it, must, at least equivalently, contain the essential notes by which possible being is supposed to be constituted; otherwise, there would be no sufficient correspondence between the prototype and its antitype. For, evidently, the prototypal idea is wholly determined by its object.

Now, the existence, which is the necessary and sufficient basis of internal possibility, must exclude from its own nature all possibility; otherwise, it could not be that ultimate real basis which is the object of the present inquiry. The reason is obvious. For, if it should include possibility in itself the question would return as to the foundation of its possibility; so that it could not be the final basis of possibility.

But there is only one Being, viz. the Infinite, that excludes from His own Nature all possibility, properly so called. Hence it follows that God, and God alone, can be that ultimate basis whose discovery has been the one purpose of the present analysis. And, if He be that basis, then in Him is the prototypal idea; and, in such case also, He must be the Object of that Idea, that is, He must include in His own Nature, at least equivalently, all those essential notes which are conceived as together constituting, in each and every case, possible Being.

But, in the enunciation of the Thesis it is not said, that possible Essence is included equivalently, but eminently, in God. It will be necessary, therefore, in order sufficiently to understand the difference between these two adverbs in their relation to the matter in hand, that something should be stated touching the formation of these Prototypal Ideas in God, according to the imperfect notions which our limited intelligence can hope to form on such a subject. The allusion to it here, however, must be necessarily brief; because it is a question which will require long and profound investigation in a more appropriate place. The Infinite Mind, contemplating from all eternity His own infinitely perfect Essence, conceives it as partially imitable in infinite degrees of order and excellence outside Himself should He so will it. His Essence is infinite Reality; so that no reality is, or can be, outside Himself, which has not its equivalent in infinite excess within Himself. He cannot, it is true, contain those possible or actual essences outside Himself formally in Himself; because they are imperfect in their very nature, and imperfection cannot even near The infinitely Perfect. They are imperfect in their very nature; because they are limited, and limit is imperfection. Besides, in many of the lower degrees of that possible imitability of Himself, the essential constituents (as in the case of material being) are in their absolute nature, so to speak, imperfect, -- not wholly and on all sides imperfect, otherwise they could not be beings; but still, beings with essentially imperfect constituents. To take an example: Matter is Being, -- Substance. But that which formally distinguishes it from higher beings and substances is its imperfection; such imperfection as composition of parts, capability of division, extension or existence of part outside part, necessarily involve. It cannot therefore be formally in God; but, like all the higher orders of possible or actual being, is in God eminently; that is, the Infinite is to Himself in infinite excess all the pure reality and perfection which is anywhere discoverable in any creature. It is all His, because He has given it; and no one gives that which is not his own. He contains it all eminently and in infinite excess; because all perfection in whatever grade, separate in the orders of creation and often separated within the limit of one essence, are all His in one infinitely simple Act, which is His Life, His Being, -- which is, in a word (for all these are, objectively, one and the same), GOD. Thus then, for what regards internal possibility, the science of God is the Prototypal Idea, or Prototypal Ideas, which are the fundamental basis of internal possibility; the Divine Essence or Nature, containing eminently all possible notes of all possible being, is the infinite Object of those Prototypal Ideas. And all are One.

II. THE SECOND POSITION in the present Thesis is, that God is the ultimate real basis of external possibility; inasmuch as things possible are contained within the infinite Power of Him Who is the First Efficient Cause. The argument in proof of this position is the same as before. No other Cause could be the ultimate basis; because any secondary cause carries along with it its own possibility, and presupposes, consequently, its own efficient cause as prior to itself. Moreover, every secondary efficient cause is either limited to a certain definite order of possible being, if it be a univocal cause, or, at least, to a determined sphere of possible being, if it be an equivocal cause; whereas the present search is for an efficient cause which may embrace the whole sphere of the Possible. Once more: everything is intrinsically possible, which does not involve self-contradiction; and intrinsic possibility is positively measured, as has been seen, by the imitability of the Divine Nature, which admits of a practically infinite number of grades, of orders, and of diversities within those grades and orders. Now, nothing but an Infinite Power could conceivably suffice for a real basis of the external possibility of this endless variety of Being. Therefore, it is God, and God only, Who can satisfy the demand. From the doctrine developed in the above chain of Propositions two Corollaries are deducible, which are of some importance.

COROLLARY I.

Every real essence either exists itself, or exists implicitly in its exemplar, proximate as well as remote, and in its efficient, cause. Accordingly, speaking of things according to our way of conceiving, it may be said, that all real essence exists either formally, or at least virtually, eminently, typally.

COROLLARY II.

No real essence that is merely possible, exists formally. For, those beings or entities are said to exist formally, which exist in their own proper Form. But the existence of a thing in its own proper Form, is existence absolutely such, which is formally excluded from the concept of the purely Possible.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It has been objected against the doctrine just exposed, that it is Pantheistic. For we have been told that all finite Being, i.e. all Being that is not God, is included under the category of Possibles. But then, on the other hand, it has been maintained, that all which is real in possible Being is either the Divine Nature, the Divine Idea, or the Divine Omnipotence, which are, each and all, God Himself. Hence it follows that there is nothing real but God; or, which is the same thing, that God is everything. But this is sheer Pantheism.

ANSWER. This objection would be undoubtedly well founded, if it had been asserted that Possibles formally considered, (i.e. considered in their proper and essential notes by which they would be constituted, were they to exist), were really the Divine Nature, the Divine Idea, or the Divine Omnipotence. But to assert that Possibles logically considered, are the Divine Ideas, -- fundamentally considered, are the Divine Essence, -- potentially or causally considered, are the Divine Omnipotence, is not Pantheistic. On the contrary, the last member, forasmuch as it links on the doctrine of Possibles to causal Efficiency, is openly opposed to Pantheism. For a Pantheistic evolution excludes the possibility of real effective causation.

II. Against this answer it is urged that Possibles, logically considered, cannot be the Divine Idea; neither can they, fundamentally considered, be the Divine Nature or Essence. Therefore, such a solution only raises a fresh difficulty.

ANSWER. There is an equivocation lurking in the Antecedent. If it be meant that the concept of Possibles, as it exists in our mind, i.e. formally considered, is not logically the Divine Idea nor fundamentally the Divine Nature, the truth of the Antecedent is patent; for, under such a point of view, the concept is logically a form or act of our mind; fundamentally, either notes of existing things, or intuitions of the understanding. If, however, it should be intended that, independently of our manner of conceiving and, as it were, objectively, possibles are not logically the Divine Idea, and fundamentally the Divine Essence, the assertion is erroneous.

III. In face of this distinction it is further urged that, even independently of our manner of conceiving Possibles, they cannot logically be identified with the Divine Ideas nor fundamentally with the Divine Essence; because neither the Divine Ideas nor the Divine Essence can admit of possibility, whereas possibles are possibles, in whatever way they are considered.

ANSWER. Here, again, there is need of a distinction. If it be meant that the Divine Ideas or the Divine Essence cannot be merely possible, or admit of possibility, in their own Being. i.e. as the Divine Idea and as the Divine Essence, the assertion is willingly granted; but if it is meant that the Divine Idea cannot be logically possible, i.e. cannot be representative of possible Being, the statement is not true. Similarly, if it be declared impossible that the Divine Nature should be fundamentally possible, i.e. should be the object determining the Divine Intellect, in the manner already explained, to the representation of possible beings, the declaration is gratuitous and false. So much for the Major. But the Minor likewise must not be allowed to pass without a distinction. For, albeit possibles are possibles formally, since in such sort they are negative, logical, subjective concepts; yet possibles are not possibles fundamentally and in their Exemplar. On the contrary, considered in such wise, they necessarily exist.

IV. The argument of the last, or fourteenth, Proposition has a fatal flaw in it. For it is based on the supposition, that all created Being is included in the category of Possibles. But this cannot be admitted; for it involves a patent contradiction, as will appear thus. To presuppose the possibility of anything, it is plainly necessary that its essence should be presupposed; otherwise, from the nature of the case, it would be equally indifferent to possibility or impossibility. But creation does not presuppose the essence of the thing about to be created. On the contrary, the idea of creation formally excludes it. Therefore, created things could not have been possible before their creation.

ANSWER. Here, again, there is need of a distinction which, nevertheless, is obvious enough. It may freely be granted, that the presupposition of possibility carries along with it the presupposition of the logical Essence; but, as to real Essence, there is need of a subdistinction. That the presupposition of Possibility involves the presupposition of the real Essence fundamentally and eminently, is true; but, that it presupposes the real Essence of the Possible already formally existing, is false. To explain these distinctions: In order that created things may be truly considered as mere Possibles antecedently to the act of creation, it is necessary to suppose that the Essence of those things had, prior to their creation, a logical existence in some pattern idea, and a real existence fundamentally in some existing nature which contains, eminently in itself, the constitutive notes of the Being about to be created. And all this is verified in fact; as has been already evinced. But to maintain, that the Essence of tbe Possible must formally exist in order to be conceived possible, is a manifest absurdity. As well might it be said, that a mechanic could not conceive a new machine as possible, and so invent it, till it had been made; or an artist conceive a possible picture, till it was already painted.

V. According to the theory developed above, the reality in the concept of Possibles altogether depends upon God. But this is contradicted by the universal testimony of experience. For, if there be such an unconditioned dependence as is pretended, it would be impossible to think Possibility without thinking God. But all know that such is far from being the case. On the contrary, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, when we judge anything to be possible or impossible, the idea of God neither directly nor indirectly enters into the mind.

ANSWER. In answer to this difficulty, it is necessary to bear in mind that, as has been clearly stated at the outset, the inquiry in this chapter was directed to the discovery of the ultimate basis upon which whatever is real in the concept of Possibility rests. Such a discovery is not the result of vulgar, but of philosophic, thought.

Neither is it necessary to the existence of an objective dependence, however absolute it may be, that it should always be explicitly present to the subjective consciousness. Thus, for instance, the truth of every Judgment entirely depends on the fundamental principle of contradiction; yet, who would venture to say that it manifests itself explicitly to the mind in every act of judging?

Though, therefore, it must be allowed that the idea of some possible Being may constantly be formed, without an explicit consciousness of the dependence of that idea of possibility upon God; yet, that dependence is always implicitly in the idea, and can be exhibited by scientific analysis.

VI. There is another difficulty which opposes itself to the doctrine proposed. For one thing cannot be said to depend in its essential nature upon another, if the latter presupposes the former. Now, it has been asserted that the internal possibility of things essentially depends upon the Divine Idea. Yet, -- to speak after the manner of human intelligence, -- the Divine Idea necessarily presupposes the internal possibility of Possibles; otherwise, there would be no sufficient reason for Its determination.

ANSWER. Here, more than ever, there is need of distinction. For, albeit it is most true that, if one thing presupposes another, that other cannot be said to depend on the former in the order, or after that particular mode, according to which it is presupposed; yet it is equally true that what is presupposed in one way, may itself presuppose in another, and consequently admit of legitimate dependence. To come to the point: if the Divine idea presupposes the essence of the Possible formally constituted in its own proper existence, the objection is invincible. But then, the supposition itself is absurd. If, however, -- and it cannot be denied, -- the Divine Idea presupposes only the virtual constitution of the possible Essence, (which is nothing more nor less than the constitutive notes of that possible Essence eminently contained in the Divine Nature); then it must be said, though the virtual constitution of possible Essence, as virtual, does not depend on the Divine Idea -- for how could the Divine Nature depend upon the Divine Idea, seeing that the Two are infinitely one? -- yet, that the formal realization of that Essence within its own definite limits, does depend on the Divine Idea. For the Divine Intelligence conceives the Divine Nature as imitable in such or such a definite grade and within such and such limits; and, so conceiving, forms to Itself the Prototypal Idea in each given case.

VII. But, it is once more urged, this reply does not exhaust the difficulty. For it is undeniable that every idea presupposes its formal object. Now, the formal object of the Divine Idea, as representative of any possible essence, is not the Divine Nature, but such and such notes constitutive of a given possible Being. Wherefore, the internal possibility of Possibles cannot depend on the Divine Idea, seeing that it is the object of that Idea.

ANSWER. In reply it is to be observed, that every idea presupposes its primary object; not, however, necessarily the secondary object which is virtually or eminently contained in the former. But the internal possibility of things is not the primary object of the Divine Intelligence; for that is the Divine Nature itself. Internal possibility is virtually included in this latter and, as a secondary object, need not be presupposed.

This reply will be more clearly understood, when the Nature of the Divine Knowledge is considered ex professo. Now, however, it may be illustrated by an example drawn from ordinary life. Take the case of a painter, who has purposed to paint an historic picture. He must begin with his idea, which shall guide his pencil and his brush. But whence can he get his idea? Not from the existing picture evidently. He gathers the notes or characteristic constituents of his design from existing objects, -- from models, say, from nature, from existing buildings. These are presupposed; and, in them together, the idea is virtually contained. But the picture itself entirely depends upon the typal idea, such as it may be, in the mind of the artist.