PROPOSITION XIX.

Possible Essence, logically regarded as it is in the Divine Intellect, is distinguished from existing Essence either really or by a real negative distinction, in accordance with a twofold aspect under which the Divine Idea may be considered.

The Divine Idea or Reason, which is representative of Possible Essence, may be regarded in two ways, according to a twofold representation which It may be said to embody. For It may be considered as something subjectively real and existing; and under this point of view It is no other than the Divine Idea, representing with infinite perfectness the nature of that Possible Essence as it would exist, should it seem good to the Divine Will to create it. Or, on the other hand, It may be considered as something purely conceptual; that is, as the formal term of the Divine Idea; and under this point of view It is nothing real formally, but, after a manner, corresponds with the formal concept of the merely Possible in the human understanding. To put it more clearly: -- the Divine Idea in the given case may be taken either for the Exemplar Idea, as representative of the Divine Nature in such a definite grade of imitability; or for the Divine concept of a possible Being, not as yet existing. If, then, the Divine Idea of possible Essence be regarded in the former way, It is on all sides God, and is, therefore, really distinguished from the creature; if in the latter way, it is as evidently distinguished from actual Essence by a real negative distinction.