PROPOSITION XXI.

Possible Essence Is absolutely immutable and eternal; not in itself formally, but fundamentally and logically in another.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition it is asserted that possible Essence is neither immutable nor eternal in itself formally; which admits of easy proof. For, that which in itself is nothing, can claim to itself neither immutability nor eternity, nor any other real attribute whatsoever. But possible Essence, in itself formally considered, is nothing; because it includes in its concept the formal exclusion of its existence.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER is to the effect, that possible Essence, considered as fundamentally in another, is immutable and eternal; which is proved in this wise. The imitability of the Divine Nature in such or such a definite grade, and the omnipotent Will of God, which can all things not in themselves contradictory, are together the adequate foundation, as has been already shown, of merely possible Essence, -- the One giving to it its internal, the Other its external, possibility. But the imitability of the Divine Nature in such a grade, and the omnipotent Will of God, are alike immutable and eternal. Therefore, possible Essence, considered fundamentally in another, is immutable and eternal.

The Minor needs declaration as touching both its members. The imitability then of the Divine Nature is absolutely immutable and eternal, because the Divine Nature is Itself so. For, as It contains those grades of imitability wholly in Itself; the eternity and immutability of the One is the eternity and immutability of the others. Thus, for instance, if God is spiritual Substance, He can never cease from being spiritual Substance; and, consequently, if He is ever imitable as spiritual Substance, He will eternally and unchangeably be imitable as spiritual Substance.

Again, His omnipotent Will is eternal and immutable, not in Its termination outside Himself really and effectively, because there It is infinitely free; but in Its Omnipotence as It is in Itself. In other words, in the production and conservation of the creature, the Divine Will, though entitatively immutable and eternal, is mutable and temporal in Its term; otherwise, all actual creatures would be immutable and eternal. How these two are reconcileable, will be discussed elsewhere. Meanwhile, it is enough to notify the fact. But, when that Will is simply considered in the infinity of Its range, apart from actual termination outside Itself, It is eternal and immutable on all sides. Now, the one only foundation of external possibility is the power of God to do whatsoever He pleases, provided it be do-able, i.e. provided the thing does not involve a self-contradiction. But the power of God to do whatsoever is do-able, is eternal and immutable; althbugh the actual production of the thing is not so.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER of this Proposition asserts that possible Essence considered logically in another, is immutable and eternal; which is thus shown.

The Divine Idea, representing all possible Essences, is eternal and immutable, not oniy subjectively as the Divine Act, (for It is evident enough that under this point of view It is eternal and immutable), but also objectively, or terminatively. It is necessary here to interpose for one moment, in order to avoid all possibility of confusion. There are two objects of the Divine Wisdom or Science; to wit, the primary Object which is God Himself, and the secondary object which He sees in Himself. When, then, it is said, that the Divine Idea is objectively or terminatively eternal and unchanging, it is to the secondary object that the expression refers. Having premised thus much, the Major may be thrown into a somewhat different and more explicit form; as thus. The Divine Idea, representing each and all possible Essences, represents them as eternally and immutably capable of existing as such and such Essences, constituted by such and such characteristic notes, and no other.

But Possible Essence, considered conceptually in another, is really no other than the Divine Idea objectively regarded in this manner.

Therefore, Possible Essence, considered conceptually in another, is immutable and eternal.

The Major of this syllogism is proved in such wise. The concept of any secondary object entirely founded in the concept of another primary object, which is itself absolutely immutable, and bears an immutable relation or habitude to that same secondary object, is immutable as representative of its secondary object, or in other words, represents that object as absolutely immutable.

But the Divine Idea, representing possible Essences as Its secondary object, is founded on the primary Idea of the Divine Nature as imitable; and, (if extrinsic possibility be included), of the Creative Will of God, Which are both immutable and eternal, not only in Themselves absolutely, but also respectively in Their relation or habitude to Their term, (so to say), or the secondary objects of the Divine Cognition. Therefore &c.

The last part of the above Minor may need further declaration; not touchiug the Imitability of the Divine Nature, which has been already fully considered and does not present any grave difficulty, but for what regards the Creative Will. This point, too, has been touched upon before; but because of its importance it may be well to recur to it, if only to establish what has been said before, by throwing it into a more scientific form.

Wherefore: an absolutely immutable and eternal power, which is considered antecedently to all or any real relations of any beings to itself, is eternal and immutable also respectively to those beings, or in other words, extrinsically.

But the Creative Will of God, as the foundation of external Possibility, is considered antecedently to all or any real relations of any beings to Itself. Therefore, It is eternal and immutable also extrinsically.