PROPOSITION XXIV.
Being, as such, cannot have any true positive Attributes really distinct from itself.
So much is willingly granted to the objection which has served for an introduction to this and the following Propositions. It is obvious, that there cannot possibly be any real Attribute of Being, into which Being does not essentially enter; consequently, it cannot be really distinct from Being.
Such is unequivocally the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. For instance, in discussing this subject ex professo, he says, 'There is a distinction of reason between the True and Being, in that there is something essentially contained in the notion of the True which is not essentially contained in the notion of Being; not however in such wise, as that there should be anything essentially contained in the notion of Being which is not essentially contained in the notion of the True. Neither do they differ essentially, nor are they distinguished from each other by opposite Differences.'{1} Here St. Thomas plainly declares, that there is no real distinction between Being and the True, which is one of the Attributes of Being; but only a distinction of reason. He further asserts, that the True essentially includes Being; but that the idea of Being, as such, does not essentially include the True. Whence it may be gathered, that the True is a certain determination of Being, not by any contraction of its periphery of extension, but by a determination of its significate. Accordingly, he adds, yet more clearly, immediately afterwards, 'The True is not of wider periphery than Being'{2} in reply to the objection that the True includes No thing, as, for instance, in negative judgments. Again, with still greater distinctness, in answer to the first of the contrary arguments: 'It is not nugatory to speak of true Being; because there is something expressed by the word True, which is not expressed by the word Being, not because they really differ."{3} Again, in discussing the same question as to the identity of Being with the Good, another of its Attributes, he says, 'Since Being is said absolutely, but the Good adds, over and above, the referribility of a final cause, the mere Essence of the thing, absolutely considered, is sufficient for pronouncing it by reason of such Essence Being; but it is not sufficient for pronouncing it, because of that Essence as such, Good."{4} Hence, 'by reason of the aforesaid referribility it comes to pass that the Good is said, according to a distinction of reason, to determine or inform Being,"{5} in the way already mentioned. Yet it does not inform or determine Being by the way of real additions, for, although the Good expresses a certain referribility' (or habitude), viz. 'that of a final cause; nevertheless that referribility belongs to every possible being, and does not add any reality to Being.'{6} Finally, in order to make it quite clear that he does not take the Good for a real Property of Being, but excludes the assumption in the sense in which it is excluded by the present Proposition; he adds elsewhere, 'The Risible, albeit it is logically convertible with Man, nevertheless adds, over and above Man, a sort of extraneous nature, which is something really added to the Essence of man.' Thus he introduces a real specific Property by way of contrast, and then adds, 'But in such wise nothing can be added to Being.'{7}
These extracts will suffice to show that, according to the Angelic Doctor, Being has no true positive Attributes really distinct from itself. All the Attributes, save one, which the Philosophy of the School is wont to predicate of Being, have had judgment passed upon them in the above quotations; and, lest Unity should perchance be deemed the solitary exception, it will not be amiss to forestall the discussion concerning its nature by the following quotation from St. Thomas: 'The One adds nothing real to Being, but simply the negation of division. For the One means nothing else but undivided Being. . . Hence it is manifest that the being of everything whatsoever, holds together by its indivision; whence it is that everything, in the same manner as it preserves its being, so preserves its unity.'{8}
{1} 'Verum et ens differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis; non autem ita quod aliquid sit in ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri; nec per essentiam differunt, nec differentiis oppositis invicem distinguuntur.' De Veritate, Q. I, a. I, ad 6m.
{2} 'Verum non est in plus quam ens.' De Veritate, Q. I, a. I, ad 7m.
{3} 'Ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, quia aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis; non propter quod re differant.' Ibid. contra, ad 1m.
{4} 'Cum ens dicatur absolute, bonum autem superaddat habitudinem causae finalis; ipsa essentia rei absolute considerata sufficit ad hoc quod per earn dicatur aliquid ens, non autem ad hoc quod per eam dicatur aliquid bonum.' De Verit. Q. xxi, a. I. ad 1m.
{5} 'Ex habitudine praedicta contingit quod secundum rationem dicatur ens determinare vel informare.' Ibid. ad 7m.
{6} 'Quamvis bonum dicat aliquam specialem habitudinem, scil. finis; tamen ista habitudo competit cuilibet enti; nec ponit aliquid secundum rem in ente.' Ibid. ad 9m.
{7} 'Risibile, quamvis convertatur cum homine, tamen addit aliquam naturam extraneam super hominem, quae est praeter essentiam hominis; sic autem nihil potest addi super ens.' Ibid. ad 10m.
{8} 'Unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem divisionis. Unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. . . . Unde manifestum est quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est, quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.' 1ae xi, I, c.