ARTICLE II. Individual Unity.

There are three forms of Unity which are discoverable in real Being; to wit, Singular or Individual, Formal, Universal Unity. Of these the first is co-extensive with all Being, either as existing or as immediately capable of existence; the second is co-extensive with all finite Being, while the third is in no wise co-extensive even with finite Being. These will form respectively, in the order just given, the subject of this and the two succeeding Articles. The present inquiry, therefore, will be exclusively confined to Individual Unity.

Individual, is a simple determination of Transcendental, Unity. It, therefore, expresses in its formal concept indivision and, as a consequent of such indivision in itself, division from every other Being whatsoever. So far, nothing has been stated, which in any way distinguishes it from Transcendental Unity. But there must be an additional element, by virtue of which the latter is determined to Singular Unity. What is it?

Let it be remembered, that Transcendental Unity includes in its formal concept Being itself; for here will be discovered the first traces of the determination sought for. All real Being is either existing or capable of existence; yet it need not be considered as such, or, at all events, not in its proximate determination to existence. Now, individual Being either exists, or is immediately capable of existence. Just as it is, without any mediate change or modification of what sort soever, it could exist in nature. The notion is so simple in itself, that it is most clearly realized by illustration. Man, humanity, human nature, rational animal, a body informed with a soul, -- these and the like are not immediately capable of existence.

They must go through an intermediary state, so to speak, before they are producible outside their causes. No one has ever seen human nature, or man or body informed by soul, among the world of existing things. The mind cannot even conceive their immediate creation. They must become this man, this rational animal, this body informed by this soul. In such case, they are immediately createable, even if they do not already exist. This, then, is a part of the determination which is included in the concept of Individual Unity. But there is something additional in the nature of the intrinsic indivision and the division from every other, which completes the determining Mode. For these Attributes, in the instance of individual Being, include an incapacity on the part of such Being to communicate itself, such as it is, to others; so that they should be precisely and identically that which it is. Thus, Julius Caesar, as Julius Caesar is so one, that he is incapable of becoming many Julius Caesars who, as a class, are containable under him. Hence St. Thomas says, 'A Singular, for the very reason that it is a singular, is divided off from all others. Wherefore, every name that has been imposed to denote an individual, is both really and conceptually incommunicable; for a plurality of this individual cannot be conceived. Hence, no name which denotes an individual is communicable to more than that one properly speaking, but only in way of similitude; just as some one may he metaphorically called an Achilles, forasmuch as he has some one or other of the characteristics of Achilles, for instance, his bravery.'^{1} Though the Angelic Doctor, in accordance with the subject of which he is treating, directly deals with the nomenclature rather than the concept; yet he plainly includes both in the words just quoted, and notably confirms the explanation of individual Unity here given. Indeed, the usage in speech is itself an argument; for, as all are aware, words follow concepts of which they are the conventional expression; and concepts are representative of things.

This singular Unity of Being is commonly called by the School, Haecceity, -- the thisness of a thing. The name is sufficiently appropriate; since the addition of the demonstrative pronoun, from which the word is coined, invariably expresses the individuality of that nature, (whether in the concrete or abstract), to which it is prefixed. Thus, this man, is some man in particular; thus, again, this human nature, this body united to this soul, and so on. It is to be hoped, therefore, that it will not be deemed outlandish if, after the explanation given, the term is introduced into the English vocabulary.

There is one more preliminary observation which remains to be made. Individual, is opposed to Common or Universal, Unity in two ways, viz. relatively and privativety. it is relatively opposed, as a unit to its Species. But, besides this, it includes a privation of that communicability which essentially belongs to Universal Unity. For this latter is such as to be communicable to many as included under, or subject to, it. Thus, man is a some one thing which is communicable to many individuals included under that Species. Now, it is precisely this self-communicability to others as subject to it, of which Haecceity expresses the privation. Being, under that form by which it is individually one, is not communicable to others.

According to the convenient division of the subject-matter adopted by Suarez, there are three points which claim examination. First, Does this Unity belong to all existing things? Secondly, What is it precisely in itself? Thirdly, What is the foundation of this Unity in material and immaterial substances, and in accidents? Wherefore,

I. DOES INDIVIDUAL UNITY BELONG TO ALL EXISTING THINGS? IN OTHER WORDS, ARE ALL THINGS EXISTING OR IMMEDIATELY CAPABLE OF EXISTENCE, INDIVIDUALLY ONE?

{1} 'Singulare, ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus allis. Unde omne nomen impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare est incommunicabile et re et ratione. Non enim potest in apprehensionem cadere pluralitas hujus individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod individuum est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, in quantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achilles, scil. fortitudinem.' 1ae xiii, 9, c.