PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Haecceity adds to the formal, or specific, and undetermined Nature, as considered in the Individual, something conceptually distinct from it, belonging to the same Category with it, and entering into the Metaphysical composition of the Individual, as an individuating Difference, which contracts the Species and constitutes the Singular.

THE FIRST PART, OR MEMBER, OF THIS PROPOSITION is a simple Corollary from the two preceding Theses. For, in the former, it has been shown that Haecceity adds something real to the specific and undetermined Nature; and, in the latter, it has been proved that Haecceity does not add anything which is really distinct from that same specific Nature, as actually existing in the Individual. Yet, in the Individual alone it really is, or can be. Consequently, there is a distinction; yet not a real distinction, though a real foundation for the distinction. But this is what Metaphysicians call a conceptual distinction, or distinction of reason, founded in reality; of which elsewhere.

THE SECOND MEMBER, which declares that the Haecceity belongs to the same Category as the Specific Nature, is likewise a mere Corollary from the doctrine already established. For, if there is no real distinction between the Haecceity and the specific nature in the Individual; it will follow that the Haecceity must be of the same kind as the Nature to which it belongs. Consequently, if the Nature be in the Category of Substance, the Haecceity must be in the same Category of Substance; if in the species of spiritual Substance, so in like manner the Haecceity; if the Nature be a Quantity, the Haecceity will be Quantitative; if a Quality, Qualitative; and so on.

THE THIRD MEMBER, in which it is said that Haecceity enters into the Metaphysical composition of the Individual, is thus declared.

There is no physical composition, as is plain, between the individualized Specific Nature and its Haecceity or Individuation; first of all, because this would involve a real distinction between the two, which has been already disproved; then, in the next place, because Haecceity is predicated of the Individual in a way which is incompatible with physical composition. For, if there were physical composition, Haecceity would physically form a part of the Individual. Now, no physical part is predicable of its whole. No one, for instance, would dream of affirming that Peter is his nose, or This geranium is its root. But Haecceity is predicated of the Individual, as expressive of its whole Essence. Therefore, it cannot be a physical part and, consequently, there is no physical composition. But neither is there mere logical composition, which denotes an unmotived or foundationless union of concepts; because it has been shown that Haecceity does add something real to the concept of the specific nature, -- which reality is the fonndation of a conceptual distinction. But to admit this, is to admit, in other words, a Metaphysical composition, -- to say nothing of the fact, that there is no other kind of composition left; while a composition of some sort there undoubtedly is.

THE FOURTH MEMBER, which asserts that Haecceity enters into such composition as an individuating difference, is easily shown.

For Haecceity, by itself, does not claim a direct place in any Category. If This is conceived, the question, This what? must be first answered, before the This can be classified. In like manner, Material, could not be reduced to its proper Category; till it has been settled whether the material Entity is a Substance or an Accident, and what sort of Accident. It follows thence, that Haecceity enters into the Metaphysical composition of the Individual, as a sort of difference, after a manner similar to Material in Material Substance.

THE FIFTH MEMBER of the Thesis asserts, that this individuating Difference contracts the Species and constitutes the Singular.

This part of the Enunciation only stands in need of further declaration; for it is self-evident and, therefore, defies demonstration. In any given individual Being, then, there are, (as we have bad occasion to remark before), certain notes similar to notes in other individuals of the same class; which together constitute the Essence or, speaking logically, the Species of that, and other like, individuals. The concept which embraces these notes and these notes only, is a common concept and, virtually at least, a universal; because it is predicable of each and all the individuals, possible as well as actual, included within its periphery. But there are also, as has been said, other notes in the same individual, which are, certainly collectively, proper to him, and not communicable to another. These are indicative of the Haecceity of that individual; and, therefore, the concept of these contracts the Species by determining it to one individual of the class, and so constitutes the Singular. Thus, -- Who was a Corsican and Emperor of the French at the beginning of this century, dying an exile in St. Helena, -- added to Rational Animal, determines the species man to the individual Napoleon, and excludes every other.

DIFFICULTY.

It would seem to follow from the doctrine established in the preceding Theses and, more particularly, in the last, that there is an infinite Process in the objective concepts touching this subject matter, which, nevertbeless, is universally rejected as inadmissible. The Antecedent is thus proved. The Individual is said to add to the specific Nature something conceptually distinct from it; because it agrees with other individuals in its specific Nature, and differs from them in its individuality. But then, precisely the same distinction is applicable to the Haecceity itself. For it, too, has its notes of similarity with other Haecceities, as well as its distinctive notes which add something conceptually distinct from the common Haecceity. Wherefore, the question comes back again touching the foundation of this last addition; and so it goes on indefinitely.

ANSWER. The Antecedent is denied; although the proof with the exception of the last clause, viz. And so it goes on indefinitely, is willingly granted. An explanation will be embodied in the two following observations

a. The human mind, when it conceives the Individual as composed of its specific Nature and its Haecceity, conceives of this latter as a perfectly simple and irresolvable Difference, which constitutes the Singular; because it conceives of it simply as a Difference, not as included under some ulterior generalization. Similarly, when the mind conceives of Rational, as a specific Difference determining Animal, it does not represent that Difference to itself as composed of other Differences; but accepts it as immediately and simply distinguishing this species of animals from every other.

b. If it be further urged that, at least in mental analysis, this infinite Process must be admitted; the answer will still be in the negative. For, though it cannot but be admitted that there is this quasi-specific Haecceity, possible as a term of thought and founded to a certain extent in reality, yet such a universal assumes the characteristics of a Transcendental; so that the individual Haecceity is not a perfectly distinct concept, but rather the same concept, only more express and. determined. Wherefore, as Substance does not add anything extraneous to Being, and does not determine it by anything adventitious to it, so that Substance should be resolvable into two distinct elements of which Being should be the material part; in like manner, individual Haecceity, or the Haecceity of this Being, adds nothing to the quasi-specific or undetermined Haecceity which is adventitious to it, and is, consequently, irresolvable into prior and more simple elements.