PROPOSITION XLII.

Matter, as potentially determined to, and proximately disposed for, the reception of such or such definite Quantity, cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation in material substances.

PROLEGOMENON I.

According to the hypothesis which is here combated, Primordial Matter, which is intended for the reception of a definite material Form, is predisposed by the action of the agent or efficient cause; so that the receptibility should accommodate itself, so to speak, to its after determination by such a definite Quantity.

This facultative determination is effected, previously to the generation or production of the Substance, and gives that distinctive Haecceity to the Matter, which separates it off from the rest of Primordial Matter.

PROLEGOMENON II.

By Quantity is here meant physical Quantity, i.e. qualitatively determined and disposed; not bare Mathematical Quantity, as it may be called. A brief explanation must anticipate the doctrine which will be explained, more at length, in the Books on the Categories. According to the Philosophy of the School, then, Quantity is the sole Accident which immediately inheres in material substance. The rest inhere immediately in Quantity, mediately , i.e. through Quantity, in the Substance. Of these the principal is Quality, which includes colour, heat, cold, softness, hardness, sweetness, bitterness, smoothness, roughness, and such like. These, therefore, determine Quantity, as Quantity determines Substance. In both cases, as is plain, the determination is accidental. As Substance is antecedently receptive of any quantity; it is indefinitely quantificable, and is purely potential in regard of Quantity, till it is actuated by this definite quantity which gives to it its quantifleative Unity. So, in like manner, Quantity itself is purely potential in regard of softness or hardness, or of this degree of hardness, till it is actuated by a definite Quality. But, physically considered, Quantity no more exists without its Qualities, than material Substance exists without its Quantity.

PROLEGOMENON III.

This opinion obviously supposes, that Matter is not actually affected by the quantitative and qualitative accidents, antecedently to the introduction of the substantial Form; but only that it receives a disposition that way, by which this subjective receptivity is contracted in a certain direction.

THE PRESENT PROPOSITION IS PROVED by the three following arguments

I. According to the hypothesis in question, Primordial Matter looks primarily to its Form, and consequently to its Quantity, which it receives in virtue of its actuation by the substantial Form; because the Matter is not actually quantified, till after the constitution of the complete substantial composite. Therefore, its potertiality or receptivity is determined to this substantial Form, previous to its being determined to this Quantity. It is so far, therefore, itself individuated, by potential determination to its Form; the substantial Form or Act is plainly enough individuated, because the matter is predisposed for the reception of this Form and no other; consequently, the substantial composite of Matter and Form is individual, prior to its information by its Quantity. Therefore, the Haecceity of the Substance cannot depend on the supposed potential determination of the Matter; for such potential determination must follow the nature of the substantial Act.

II. Primordial Matter is equally indifferent of itself to one accidental Form as to another, and to any disposition one way or the other; precisely as it is indifferent to the reception of one particular substantial Form more than of another. If, therefore, its potentiality is to be disposed in some particular direction; that must be done by actuation of one kind or another, which necessarily supposes an entity superadded to it. Neither can it be urged against this evident conclusion, that, as the will is in first Act, as it is called, when it is moved towards some particular good, before it makes that free election which constitutes its second and consummate Act; so Matter in its first Act may be disposed towards that definite, qualified, Quantity which constitutes its second or complete Act. For, though this distinction of Acts is verified in an active and spontaneous potentiality which is the faculty of a living Substance; it is impossible to conceive it in a purely passive potentiality or, in other words, in a mere receptivity which is all to itself. Primordial Matter is, therefore, either indifferent to any and every Form; or it is determined by actuation of some sort. But, in the present hypothesis, in the instant of substantial generation before receiving its natural Form, it is undetermined by any accident or entity super added to it; so that it remains, up to that moment, in its native indetermination. Consequently, it cannot be so determined, as to become the constitutive principle of Individuation in the substantial Composite.

III. Matter, in this hypothesis, is absolutely and primarily disposed and determined to the reception of this Form; and, by reason of this Form, to the determined accidents which the Form a carries along with it, so to speak, in its train. Therefore, in the order of nature, the Form, which is the dominant principle of Haecceity in material Substance, does not receive its Haecceity from these accidents, nor by virtue of any relation that it bears to them; consequently, Matter, even if determined to the reception of such definite accidents, could afford no reasonable basis for the Haecceity of material Substance.

NOTE.

There is a difficulty, suggested by these two latter arguments, which may possibly be an occasion of perplexity to the student. The last argument implies, that Primordial Matter can be determined to the reception of a particular Form, and thus awakened, as it were, from its universal indifference, antecedently, in order of nature at least, to its actuation by that Form. But, if this be so, according to the preceding argument it must be done by the actuation of some supervening entity, which must be accidental; because there is no room for anything substantial. But, again, the accidents are said to be posterior to the actuation of Matter by its substantial Form; therefore, they must be excluded as preparatives of the Matter. It will suffice for the present to say, by way of removing the difficulty, that the disposition of the Matter would not determine its Haecceity; and that the same constituent may be metaphysically regarded, now as prior, now as posterior, according to its diversity of relation to the other constituents of the same whole. The particular explanation must be reserved for that part of the work, which will treat ex professo of the Material and Formal Causes.