PROPOSITION XLVI.

Every material Substance, whether complete or incomplete, is the intrinsic constitutive principle of its Individuation by its own actual and proper Entity.

This Proposition, though it needs declaration and, perhaps, confirmation, in its special application to particular kinds of Substance, does not seem, when accepted in its universal bearings, to stand in need of proof; for its truth has been already established by a process of exhaustion. Every other way of accounting for the Individuation of material Substance has been discussed and rejected. It only remains, therefore, either that the principle enunciated here is the true one, or that there is no discoverable principle at all. It may he permitted, accordingly, to descend at once to a consideration of the respective kinds of Substance, in order to establish the truth of this Proposition in each special case.

I. To begin with elementary or Primordial Matter, which is incomplete Substance and, from its nature, is the first to claim attention: -- it is one in itself, without need of extrinsic addition.

It is well, however, to remark at the outset, that Primordial Matter is not here regarded in itself absolutely (for as such, by reason of its entitative imperfection, it hardly merits notice), but relatively, i.e. in its place as an actual substantial component of the substantial composite. In other words, it is affirmed that the Matter in any given actual Substance is, by and of itself; one and individual.

This assertion is commended by the testimony of physical experience. For the Matter, which is under this Form of wood, is numerically distinct from the Matter which is under this Form of a sprat. So, again, it is generally acknowledged, that the Matter, which was under the Form of this chrysalis, is numerically the same as that which is now under the Form of this moth or this butterfly. These examples, and innumerable others of a like nature, effectually show, that (a) Matter does not receive Individuation from its substantial Form; for the latter may be changed, as happens in all substantial transformations, while the Matter remains individually the the same. Indeed, it must be so; otherwise, there would be no transformations whatever, but only transubstantiations, which nobody has yet been able to discover in mere natural operations. They show also that (b) Matter does not receive individuation from its Quantity. For, according to the one opinion which supposes Quantity to inform immediately the entire Composite, the same Matter is subject to a change of Quantity with its change of Form. Moreover, according to the same opinion, Matter receives its Form previously, in order of nature, to its being informed by Quantity; therefore, it has already bceome, by its Act, a complete individual Substance. And, indeed, whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which Quantity informs its Subject, it must ever remain true that individual Substance is Being absolutely in itself; whereas, if it should receive its individuation from Quantity, it would be Being by Accident. Again: Accident presupposes the constitution of its Subject and, therefore, its Individuation. Once more: The individual Difference is not really distinct from the actual nature which it constitutes; but it would be so, if Substance, even though incomplete, could receive its Haecceity from Quantity. These same arguments, for the most part, apply with even greater cogency to any other Accidents, or accidental dispositions, of Matter. Consequently, Matter is individuated by its own Entity.

This conclusion is, however, confronted by what looks like a serious difficulty. For, it is universally admitted in the Schools, that Primordial Matter is purely potential, -- a mere Receptivity; consequently, it stands to reason that it should be individuated by its Act or Form. Such an objection would be forcible enough; if Primordial Matter were a pure objective Potentiality, similar to that of merely possible Being. But it is in fact a subjective Potentiality; and, consequently, has its own imperfect Entity and Existence and, therefore, its own Individuation, though always with a transcendental and necessary relation to its Act or Form. Who, save one who holds that material Substance is itself a mere congeries of sensible Accidents, could be found willing to maintain that, if the body of a living man were stripped of its Quantity and other Accidents, the substantial matter would have no Haecceity, or Individuation, apart from that of the informing soul? And such a one, if he should chance to exist, will find no place for himself or his opinions in this work.

II. The substantial Form is individually one by its own Entity.

First of all, it is obvious that no Accidents can possibly be the intrinsic individuating principle of the substantial Form; for the latter belongs to the Category of Substance, whereas the former belong to other Categories. Then, again, the Substantial Form is either simply and entirely prior, in order of nature, to the Accidents, and is their determining cause; or, if it prerequires some in the Matter which it informs, it is only as conditions or dispositions, necessary for the due preparation of the Matter as proximately receptive of itself. Neither can Matter be the intrinsic individuating principle of the substantial Form, because it is not an intrinsic principle of the Entity of the latter; for, as has been remarked before, that which is the principle of a thing's Entity is, likewise, the principle of its Individuation. Furthermore, it is known to physical science, that, as a fact, the same Form, preserving throughout its individuality, successively informs perfectly new and distinct Matter. It is said that gradually, by nutrition on the one hand and waste on the other, the human body is wholly changed, as regards its material elements, within a more or less definite term of years; yet, the Haecceity of the informing soul remains one and the same. The same science supplies us with another confirmatory fact. For, in nutrition, there is a comparative indifference to the particular Matter which is to serve for food. It may be under the form of milk, or of bread, meat, water, vegetables of various kinds, and the like. Now, if the Form were individuated by the Matter, one would have anticipated somewhat of preference in the selection, which would naturally extend itself not only to the different Species, but to different individuals under the same Species. It is a question debated by the Doctors of the School, whether these arguments can be applied with equal justice to those substantial Forms which absolutely depend for their Being on Matter, and are evolved from its potentiality. We may pass by the lower forms of animal life, such as that of worms, polypi, and others of a like nature; and limit our attention, for the sake of clearness, to those higher and more perfect animals that have distant abumbrations, or rather imitations, of intelligence and will. Now, it is maintained by many, (and the Author begs leave to include himself among the number), that the souls of these brutes are simple, unextended, indivisible Forms. If this opinion be the true one; it is generally admitted, that the aforesaid arguments apply with equal cogency to their case as to the case of man. But, according to another opinion which Suarez declares to be commonly entertained and possibly the more probable, (ut communis et fortasse probabilior er tenet opinio), the substantial Forms of these animals are extended and is divisible. Now, the relative merits of these two opinions need not occupy us here. The great point which affects the present question he is this: Supposing the second opinion to be the true one, are the arguments just brought forward rendered inapplicable thereby to those animals? Suarez decides that they are thereby rendered inapplicable, for the reason that 'These Forms so inform this individual Matter, that they are entirely determined to the information of it, and cannot naturally inform any other Matter numerically distinct, since they cannot be separated from it either at once or by degrees.'^{1} But, with the greatest deference to this illustrious Doctor, his reasoning does not seem conclusive; and the conclusion involves difficulties of no ordinary gravity. It is plain, that the fact of these Forms depending for their Existence on Matter, may be eliminated from the discussion; because Suarez admits that the said arguments would hold good, if these bestial Forms were indivisible and, consequently, unextended. Now, extension and divisibility are the effects of Quantity; for Matter in itself is not formally extended or divisible. Therefore, the sole reason why these arguments would be invalid in the case of such Forms, is this: the Form is unalterably determined to the Matter which it first actuated; and is so determined, because, equally with the Matter, it is informed by a definite Quantity and definite dimensions. But, suppose that the definite Quantity and definite dimensions are preserved, What then? Yet it is, to say the least, a common opinion, that the same Quantity which was in the corrupted, remains in the generated, Substance. In such case, even though the Form were extended and potentially divisible, it must remain actually one, for so long as the Quantity remains undivided. Why, then, could not Matter go and come, now in one part of the continuous, now in another; while the Form preserves its unity of Individuation? It may be objected, that the Matter lost divides and diminishes the extended Form. True, it divides the Form in this sense, that its extension is transferred from the desinent to the accruing Matter; but there is no actual division. For the wasted Matter receives another Form; and the partial Form that once was there, retires into the potentiality of the Matter; but the residuary Form, in the remanent original Matter, extends itself over, and informs, the newly added. But this activity of the primitive Form does not postulate a change in its Haecceity, any more than if it were unextended and indivisible. It is further urged that the form is actually divisible; as can be seen in the case of worms. But the induction, in the first place, is not sure; for it may be that the divided part, being proximately disposed, may evolve a new substantial Form. And if, in the instance of the Annelids and other lower forms of life, the possibility of division in the Form he admitted; it does not follow that, in higher forms of life, similar division should be possible. Rather, the analogy of the natural order would incline to a contrary conclusion; for there are probably grades in Forms, as there are grades in material organization. But this solution supposes the Form to be actually indivisible, which is contrary to the hypothesis of Suarez. Accordingly, another answer may be given, In the instance alluded to and in similar ones, there is a division of the Quantity, which entirely changes the conditions of the problem; for, in the arguments whose validity is here maintained, the Quantity is supposed to remain virtually the same.

It has been further asserted, that the conclusion of Suarez involves difficulties of the gravest character. For, it is perfectly certain that the horse, the dog, the parrot, the elephant, and other like animals, are subject to the same laws of waste, and of restoration by nutrition, as man. If, therefore, their substantial Form is so indissolubly wedded to its original Matter, that a change of the latter involves a change of the Form, and the loss of the former the loss of the latter; it would follow that the Individuation of these animals is in a perpetual flux, and that at every successive moment of the life of, we will say, the dog Carlo, one animal has disappeared, and another stepped into its place. Thus, animals would be generated without generation; and there is nothing to hinder the horse of yesterday from being the mare of to-morrow. Then, too, it is difficult to see how such animals, with their Forms extended and potentially divisible, should have that common or general sense which receives, and collates into one, the perceptions of the separate senses; or how they can have that estimative power (vis aestimativa), which is capable of sensible reflection and of forming a sort of sensible universal. Lastly, such a conclusion would oblige us to treat as a mere illusion, the idea of training or habituating animals, of trusting to their dispositions, or even of relying on their points and proportion; since there is no reason for expecting that these properties of the original would descend to the successors, but rather the reverse; since neither the Matter nor the Form are the same. These are some of the difficulties which arise out of the conclusion of Suarez. If some of them, or all, bear hard upon the opinion, that these bestial Forms are extended and divisible in themselves; so much the worse for the opinion in question.

III. The intrinsic principle, constitutive of Individuation in substantial Modes, is their own Entity. Modes, -- to repeat what has been already said, -- differ from Accidents, in that actual inhesion, and not aptitudinal merely, is of their Essence. There is also another point of difference betweeu the two; that Modes have a sort of Transcendental nature of their own, since they are to be found in the Category of Substance, as well as in the rest; whereas Accident is divided off from Substance. A substantial Mode is one which affects Substance as Substance. That there are such Modes and that they are real Entities, no one can doubt. Thus, for instance, the union of my soul to my body is a real, individual Entity, distinct from my body and distinct from my soul. If it were not so, the existence of the soul and the existence of the body, even though the two were separate, would of itself constitute their union; which is patently absurd. But, if it be real, one, individual; it must have its individual Difference by which the union of my soul and my body is distinguished from that of everybody else's. But, if it have an individual Difference; it must have likewise an intrinsic constitutive principle of Haecceity. That principle is affirmed to be its own Entity.

This assertion is, first of all, proved by those general principles which have been already evoked in the course of these discussions. For every Being is one by its own Entity; and, by virtue of its Unity, is individually distinct from all other. Besides, the individual Unity of simple or incomposite Being is, like its Entity, constituted by itself; by itself, therefore, it is distinguished from all other. It is proved, in the second place, by excluding every other possible principle of Individuation. It has been already virtually shown that substantial Modes cannot be individuated by any Accident; for substantial Modes, like the Matter and the Form, are in the Category of Substance, and, consequently, cannot be intrinsically constituted by anything that is outside of their own Category. But neither can they be individuated by this Matter and this Form, (to continue the illustration from the union of imperfect substances). For, although, from the nature of the case, this individual Mode cannot be in any other Form by reason of its real, entitative, identity with its own Form, and although it cannot be produced or preserved in any other than this Matter, because of its adequate termination to such Matter, (though even here some exception may be made, by reason of those material changes in living substances already alluded to); yet there are no sufficient grounds for concluding that, if the union between this soul and this body were dissolved, the same two could not be again united by another substantial Mode. Indeed, arguing from analogy, the supposition seems highly probable. For, in the instance of Accidental Modes, the distinction is verified. Take the case of a man sitting down on a chair in a certain position; and then suppose the same man some time afterwards to sit down in the same chair in identically the same position, which is surely neither impossible nor even improbable. It could not naturally be, that these two accidental Modes should be entitatively one and the same. So then, it is possible that two accidental Modes, numerically distinct, may be successively in the same Form relatively to the same Matter. Hence, it is reasonably concluded; that the Haecceity of the Form and Matter cannot be the intrinsic principle constitutive of the Individuation of substantial Modes.

IV. Complete composite Substances are individuated by their own composite Entity, that is, by their individual Matter as united to their individual substantial Form. The truth of this last assertion is virtually included, as no one can fail to see, in the three preceding. It needs, therefore, no further proof; though it requires a little development. The Haecceity of complete composite Substance includes within itself three partial Haecceities, to wit, that of the Form, that of the Matter, and that of the substantial Mode, or the union of the two former. But these three do not equally enter into the composition of complete substantial Individuation, or rather into the Individuation of complete composite Substance. For the Individuation follows the Entity of a thing. But the Matter and Form are alone the essential principles constitutive of such a Composite; while the substantial Mode may be looked upon in the light of a necessary condition, or as the causality, of Matter and Form, rather than as a constituent principle. For the same reason, the Haecceity of the Form holds a higher place than that of the Matter in the composite Haecceity of the complete Substance. For the individual Matter is only, so to speak, inchoative, and of itself is not more inchoative of this than of any other Substance; whereas the individual Form perfects and determines the Substance, and is the chief principle of ts its Being. THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS TOUCHING THIS QUESTION.

Hitherto, the present discussion has been limited to an inquiry into the intrinsic principle, physically constitutive of Individuation in material Substance. We have been looking at a material Substance, physically constituted outside its causes; we have resolved it into its essential elements; and we have determined what is the intrinsic physical principle of Haecceity in each of the constituents, and then in the Composite itself as a whole. But is there no other way of looking at the question? May it not be possible to regard it metaphysically and, likewise, conceptually? And, if it be possible; is it not antecedently next to certain, that the answers to the question, regarded from this triple point of view, will not be identical? If the subject has to be treated metaphysically, all relation to Existence is excluded. The inquiry turns solely on the Essence of things. If, on the other hand, it is investigated conceptually, i.e. in its relation to the genesis of human concepts, the principle constitutive of Individuality in material Substances will be that Entity or those Entities which generate the concept of the Individual, as Individual, in the human mind. St. Thomas has dealt with the question in both these ways last mentioned; Suarez has treated it, as has been already pointed out, only in the first way. One would be led to suppose, from their method of treatment, that the later philosophers of the School had imagined St. Thomas to be discussing the question from the same point of view as themselves. Hence, all the difficulties about determined Matter (materia signata), which have haunted them from first to last. Hence, more especially, their difficulty touching his doctrine concerning pure Intelligences, each of which he regards as a species in himself and, consequently, denies that in their case any multiplication of individuals under one and the same species is, de potentia ordinata, possible. Yet, it would appear, on closer inspection, that the respective teachings of the Angelic Doctor and of the Jesuit Philosopher are in complete harmony, (unless, perhaps, an exception is to be made as regards the last mentioned point); certainly, there is no small amount of intrinsic evidence that such is the case.

It is this conviction which has, in great measure, suggested the following Propositions; though it cannot be denied, that the desire of introducing the reader to a more intimate acquaintance with St. Thomas has contributed not a little to their appearance.

{1} Metaph. Disp. v. S., b, n. 9.