PROPOSITION XLVIII.
If the question as to the Individuation of material Substance be considered metaphysically, it is true to say that fundamentally and remotely Matter as such, proximately Matter conceived as potentially disposed, is the extrinsic genetic principle by which the Form is individuated, and, consequently, the chief intrinsic genetic principle by which the entire substantial Composite is individuated.
PROLEGOMENON.
There are two ways in which the phrases, material part and formal part, or Matter and Form, may be metaphysically applied to Substances in every way complete. The words, In every way, have been advisedly inserted. For, according to the Philosophy of the School, after a Substance is complete and individual in all the essentials of its nature, so that it is, as a Nature, incommunicable to any other Nature, it requires, and according to the natural order receives, a substantial Mode by which it is rendered complete in Substantiality, that is, by which it is made its own master and absolutely incommunicable to any other Subsistent entity. This Mode is generically called Subsistence; and, in rational substances, has received the specific name of Personality. To illustrate this distinction by an example borrowed from supernatural Theology: -- The human nature in Christ, according to Catholic teaching, is a complete and individual Substance; consequently, as a Nature, It is incapable of substantial multiplication. But Its Personality was miraculously arrested, and Itself united to the Divine Personality of the Word, which supplied in infinite excess the place of the missing Mode. Substance, then, on all sides complete, may be metaphysically considered in two ways. We may, first of all, consider the Subsistence or Supposit (for so it is called) as a sort of material part, potential, indeterminate; assuming the Specific Nature for the formal part, actual, completing, and determining the Subsistence or Supposit. For, that something subsists, is very indeterminate; till we get to know what that Something precisely and essentially is. But, again, it is possible in the contemplation of Substance to consider Form and Matter metaphysically after another order. For the metaphysical Science deals with Essences; and in created Essences there is a material and a formal part, which respectively correspond to what logicians call the proximate Genus and Specific Difference. Thus, in Man, metaphysically considered, the material part, which is indeterminate, and potential because determinable, is Animal; the formal part, because metaphysically actuating, determining, completing, is Rational; which exactly corresponds with the physical division of Body and Soul, as united in the Composite, Man. Now, the Angelic Doctor sometimes considers the question of Individuation from the former point of view; sometimes, more or less, from the other. But this makes a considerable difference in the metaphysical estimate of Individuation, as will be at once seen. In entering upon the inquiry, then, touching the doctrine of St. Thomas as regards the individuation of material Substance, we will start with an instance of his treatment of the question under the former point of view, in order that we may clear the way for the consideration of his second method of treatment; since it is here we shall find the proof of the position maintained in the present Thesis.
Discussing the question whether God and Deity (or the Nature of God) are one and the same, he observes, 'In Entities which are composed of Matter and Form, there is a necessary distinction between the Nature or Essence and the Supposit; because the Essence or Nature comprehends within itself those elements only, which enter into the specific definition. Thus, Humanity comprehends in itself whatever enters into the definition of Man; and Humanity stands for that by which Man is man. But individual Matter, with all the Accidents which individuate it' (i.e. to human sense, as he explains himself elsewhere), 'does not enter into the specific definition. For this flesh and these bones, whiteness or blackness, or the like, do not enter into the definition of man. Wherefore, this flesh and these bones, and the Accidents that designate this individual Matter, are not contained in the idea of Humanity; but, nevertheless, they are included in a man. Hence, that which is a man, has in it a something which Humanity has not. For this reason, a man and Humanity are not altogether one and the same thing. Humanity represents the formal part of man; because the elements which constitute the definition are, as it were, a Form, in relation to individuating Matter. But, in those beings which are not composed of Matter and Form, wherein the Individuation is not the result of individual Matter, i.e. of this Matter, but the Forms are individuated of themselves, the Forms are themselves subsisting Supposits; consequently, in them there is no difference between Supposit and Nature.'{1} This passage stands in need of some little explanation. St. Thomas is here contrasting the specific or essential nature with the Subsistence, or Suppositality, which determinates that Nature in the concrete; in other words (to adopt his own example), he is investigating the metaphysical distinction between Humanity and Man. It is worth notice, in passing, that Subsistence includes and presupposes Individuality. Humanity expresses the essential Nature; Man expresses that human Nature, as existing in a person. Now, in the case of pure Forms, which are complete Substances, the Subsistence follows at once and independently of all union with something external to itself; but, in the case of Forms which are imperfect Substances and are transcendentally related to Matter, there is something real included in the Subsistence which is not included in the Specific Nature. What is that something? Recur once more to the example of St. Thomas. Humanity is the essential Nature of man, and is expressed by the definition, reasonalble animality, or, in the concrete, A reasonable soul informing a body. But an individual, subsisting man is expressed by the quasi-definition, This reasonable soul informing this reasonable body, and absolutely incommunicable, as such, to any other. This last clause the Angelic Doctor neglects as irrelevant to his purpose, since here both classes of Forms are agreed; and he limits himself to the Haecceity which is introduced into the definition of the Supposit. He contends, then, tbat in the second class, (viz., of imperfect Forms), the Haecceity and, consequently, the Supposit, are determined by the Matter, as itself determining the Form. And this is the reason why he does not allude (in his example) to the Haecceity of the soul; though elsewhere in a parallel passage he introduces it. These are his words: 'Since it is of the definition of the Species, Man, that he should be composed of soul and body, the (individual) determination of the body and soul is outside of the definition of the Species; and, accordingly, it is accidental to man, as man, that he should be constituted with this soul and this body. But it essentially belongs to this man, whose definition, if definition were possible, would express his constitution with this soul and this body; just as it is of the definition of man in general, that he should be constituted of soul and body.'{2} There is one difficulty which remains to be solved touching the former passage. St. Thomas therein contrasts Humanity with Man, and declares that, in the objective concept of this latter, are included 'this flesh and these bones and the accidents that designate this individual matter.' But it would seem as though he ought rather to have said, this man; because these constituents or notes of individuation do not belong to man in general, but to an individual man. And yet it will be found, on further reflection, that St. Thomas is right. For man is the concrete of Humanity; that is, he is the specific nature considered as subsisting. But Subsistence necessarily includes Individuality and Incommunicability. If so, then Man is equivalent to this man; and it can never in any sense become a Universal. Yet common sense and experience combine to assure us that Man means all men, not any man in particular. This is undeniable. But it must be remembered that Haecceity itself may be universalized; and, in fact, it has been so used in the preceding member of the sentence. So likewise can This flesh, These bones, This whiteness; for each man and all men have this flesh and these bones, and a vast number of men have this whiteness; though it may be worth remarking that in the judgment, 'All men have this flesh and these bones,' the demonstrative pronoun is denotative of Species, and is equivalent to saying, All men have individuality of flesh and bones; whereas in the judgment, James has this flesh and these bones, the pronoun has a reduplicatively individual meaning. It follows from these two senses of the pronoun, that the judgment first adduced, 'Man has this flesh and these bones,' may be either true or false, according to the way in which the pronoun is understood. That man has individuality of body, is true; that all men have the same individual body, is false. Accordingly, the Angelic Doctor adopts the statement in the first passage from the Summa, and rejects it in the second from Quodlibet. The Proposition before us consists of two parts or members, which shall be proved separately.
I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER it is asserted, that fundamentally and remotely Matter, as such, may be said to be the extrinsic genetic prin ciple by which the Form is individuated, and, consequently, the chief intrinsic principle by which the whole substantial Composite is in dividuated. It is said, Matter as such, to exclude any conceived dispositions or determinations of Matter, whether actual or virtual, from without. It is said, fundamentally and remotely, because Primordial Matter of itself is undetermined and indifferent, (as has been said), to any particular Form. Matter is declared to be the extrinsic principle to the Form, because it is no part of the latter's Essence; intrinsic, relatively to the composite Substance, because it is an essential constituent of the latter. This first member is subdivided into two parts; the one referring to the substantial Form, the other to the entire Composite.
i. Metaphysically speaking, it may be truly said that Matter, as such, is fundamentally and remotely the extrinsic principle by which the substantial Form is individuated. For Individuality formally consists, as has been seen, in a negation of communicability to others, according to that respect in which it is one and undivided in itself. So long, therefore, as an Entity is in such manner communicable, it is not individual; and that which takes away from a given Entity its communicability, is the principle of its Individuation. Now, imperfect or material Forms are in themselves essentially communicable; because it is in their nature to inform something else, which thereupon becomes the Subject of their information. Therefore they cannot but be communicable as Forms, by virtue of their Quiddity; consequently, in metaphysical consideration, they of themselves cannot be individual, but common. They are antecedently as ready to inform one lump of Matter as another, supposing the conditions and dispositions the same. But no sooner is any one of them united to the particular Matter which it actuates, than at once it is rendered incommunicable; because no material Form, as such, can actuate more than one material Entity. Therefore, it is by the Matter that it is fundamentally and remotely rendered incommunicable, and thus receives its individuation.
Otherwise; metaphysically speaking, that must fundamentally and remotely be the principle of Individuation for imperfect or incomplete Forms, which is the first Subject. For the first Subject is the substratum, so to say, of everything else. It is itself incommunicable; otherwise, it would not be the first Subject. Therefore, with it all communicability must stop. To illustrate what is meant by an example: -- The quality which causes the sensation of Redness in the soul inheres in Quantity, and may be said to receive from Quantity its proximate determination; for colour is only perceptible in extension. But Quantity is not the fundamental principle in the determination of Redness; because itself is communicable, and is determined by the Subject which it informs. And so the analysis proceeds, till the mind arrives at that first Subject which is communicable to nothing else. But this is Primordial Matter, as such. Therefore, it will be the remote and fundamental principle of Individuation.
Such substantially are the arguments of St. Thomas. 'It is in the nature of an Individual,' he remarks, 'that it cannot be in a plurality of Subjects. And this happens in two ways; first, because it is not of the nature of the Individual to be in any Subject. Thus separate, immaterial Forms, subsisting of themselves, are likewise of themselves individual. The other way is, because a substantial or accidental Form is naturally in some one Subject, but not in more than one; as this whiteness which is in this body. . . . Matter, therefore, is the principle of Individuation for all inhering Forms. For, since Forms of this kind have for their part a natural disposition to be in some Entity, as in a Subject; from the fact that any one of them is received in Matter which inheres in nothing else, the Form itself, so existing, cannot be in anything else.'{3} So, again, elsewhere at greater length: 'In the case of Forms which have been received in Matter, it is found that there is one Species in many Supposits. But this is not a consequence of Matter, conceived anyhow; for Matter, as actually existing in material things, partakes of the nature of the different Species; but it arises from the reception of the Form in Matter, considered in its character of first Subject. For, since First Substance, known by the name of Individual, is the Subject or the partial Subject of any given Species; that which claims the character of first Subject is cause of the Individuation and division of the Species in Supposits or individual Subsistences. Now, the first Subject is that one which can be received in no other. Therefore it is, that separate Forms, precisely because they can be received in no other, possess the nature of a first Subject and are, consequently, individuated of themselves. And, since there is in them only Form; Form is in them, after the manner of a Form. Wherefore, since in them Supposit and Form are one and the same thing, and they are individuated of themselves by reason of their possessing the nature of a first Subject; when the individual subsistences are multiplied, the Form in them is multiplied absolutely in its character of Form, and not by anything else; because separate Forms are not received in anything else. All such multiplication, however, multiplies the Species; and, consequently, in their case, there are as many Species as there are individuals. But, in other Forms, where the multiplication of the Form arises from its reception in something else which stands in the relation to it of first Subject, and not according to its character of Form, the same Species takes up its abode in different Supposits. Now, that which receives (the Form) is Matter, not understood anyhow, or in its generic signification, as has been said, (since in this way, it is considered as a Species belonging to natural Philosophy), but as bearing the nature of First Subject; whereas its determination consists in its existing under fixed dimensions, which cause it to be demonstrable to sense in space and time. For this division of the Form, then, no indeterminate dimension in the Matter is required. For Matter is the principle of Individuation in its character of first Subject, (as we have said), and in this way only. For, so long as anything remains which is capable of further reception, that Ultimate is not reached which, in its nature, is received in nothing. Now, if there were undetermined dimensions, these would naturally be in Matter as in their Subject. But Matter, together with its three dimensions, is not the first Subject; but Matter, of itself, and in its own nature. And, considered in this light, it has nothing of the nature of a Species; which it assumes according to the way in which the intellect conceives it, whose it is to perceive the determination, or essential constituents, of a Species. When, then, a Form is received in Matter, with all its dimensions intellectually circumscribed; it becomes an Entity existing in the Category of Substance, and an Ultimate having the complete nature of an Individual in Substance.'{4} These concluding observations of the Angelic Doctor are not easy of comprehension; and it will not be amiss, therefore, to offer a short explanation of them, which will serve by way of introduction to the second Member of the Proposition before us. There are three ways in which Matter may be regarded. There is, first of all, simple Primordial Matter, which, though it cannot naturally exist save in Act, i.e. under some Form, has a distinct Entity of its own, is indivisible, indestructible, and wholly indifferent to the reception of any particular Form. Then there is Matter, actuated by its Form, which constitutes, with it, one individual subsisting Substance. Now, both these ways of regarding Matter are eminently real; because they represent it, either as it really is in itself, or as it really exists in the order of Nature. But there is a third way of regarding it, which, formally considered, is purely conceptual, and will be more easily understood by recurring to the representation of Matter, as it really exists, (actuated by its Form), in the realm of visible things. There it is always found to be circumscribed by a definite quantity, whose limits give to it its shape. That quantity, furthermore, is itself determined by certain qualitative Forms, such as colour, warmth, hardness, and the like. But Quantity is the primary distinguishing accidental Form of Matter; because it gives to it capability of division, and so, of mutual distinction, that is, distinction of one portion of Matter from another. Now, the intellect can abstract from the determinations of Quantity by qualities, as it actually does in Geometry; and it can also abstract from the dimensions of the Quantity itself, so as to leave them indeterminate. This also is of frequent occurrence in the Geometrical science; where a circle, for instance, is conceived whose radius is as yet undetermined, or where a line is conceived as indefinitely prolonged. In like manner, the intellect can act with regard to material substances. It can, first of all, abstract the body from its animating principle, and then it can abstract from the organized body itself its definite dimensions, and consider it merely as a body of such a kind of figure and dimension; and, so abstracting and generalizing, can divide matter into distinct Species, of such kind as are to be found in books of Botany and Zoology. Thus, Matter may be conceived as specifically determined to the form and organization of a human body, for instance; without determining whether it be that of a child, a youth, or man, much less of this child or man individually. In such way, Matter is conceived as disposed and distinguished by indeterminate dimensions -- a formally logical concept; since no such Entity exists, or can exist, in Nature.
ii. From what has gone before, it is obvious that MATTER, AS SUCH, is fundamentally and remotely THE CHIEF INTRINSIC PRINCIPLE BY WHICH THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE IS INDIVIDUATED, IF THE QUESTION IS METAPHYSICALLY CONSIDERED. For the material Composite, substantially complete, consists essentially, (as has been already remarked), of three things, to wit, the Form, the Matter, and the substantial Union between the two; and the Haecceity of the Composite is constituted by the Haecceities of these three constituent parts. That, therefore, will be the chief principle of individuation in the composite Substance, which chiefly contributes to the constitution of these partial Haecceities. But Matter is, metaphysically speaking, individual; because it is first Subject and can, therefore, be communicated to nothing else. It is the extrinsic principle, as has been declared, of the individuation of the Form;. and, as a consequence, it is likewise genetically the principle of individuation to the substantial Mode which results from the actuation of this Matter by this Form, and is physically identical with the latter. Lastly, it is plain that Matter, if a principle at all, is a principle intrinsic to the Composite which it helps to constitute.
Before passing on to the second Member, it will be necessary to consider an objection, which Suarez brings, to the foundation on which all the arguments, alleged in favour of this first Member of the Thesis, are built. For he denies that 'Matter is incommunicable to inferiors;' since Matter, as such, by virtue of its specific nature, is communicable to many inferiors, which can be Subjects of which it can be predicated by way of attribution (kath' hupokeimenon, as the Philosopher calls it), 'though not by way of inhesion,' (en hupokeimenô). But Suarez must surely have forgotten, that the Angelic Doctor precisely denies, in the passage last quoted, that which the former assumes; viz, that Primordial Matter, as it is in itself, can be looked upon in the light of a Species. For it is wholly one and indifferent, till it is considered as disposed in some way or other by accidents; and then a new element is introduced out of a foreign Category. St. Thomas would almost seem to have forestalled, as he has certainly answered, the difficulty. For he says that Matter can be considered as a Species, only as physically constituting, for its part, different material Substances; and, as such, it is not the subject of Metaphysics, but of natural philosophy, i.e. of physics scientifically treated (philosophicae speciei). If it is considered, on the other hand, as disposed by Quantity, it is not pure subjective receptivity, nor is it the first Subject; because, as St. Thomas says, the dimensions are inhering in the Matter, and these must be eliminated, before you can arrive at the first Subject. For the same reason, it must be denied that Primordial Matter, metaphysically considered in its own essential Entity, can be predicated of inferiors; though it evidently can be so predicated, if considered physically as body, which is the primordial determination of Matter. The proof of this is the fact. Could any one allow that a human body, for instance, is Primordial Matter?
II. THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition affirms, that Matter, considered as potentially disposed, is PROXIMATELY the extrinsic genetic principle by which the Form is individuated and, consequently, the chief intrinsic principle by which the entire substantial Composite is individuated.
It will not be necessary here to divide the Member into its parts; as the arguments are substantially the same. The present portion of the Thesis, therefore, will need declaration, perhaps, rather than proof. For it is natural to ask, first of all, why this disposition of Matter is introduced at all, in order that it may become the proximate principle; then, of what sort this disposition is, by what means it is effected; and, lastly, how this said disposition is compatible with the mutual relations of Matter with the substantial Form, and with accidental Forms. These questions shall be considered separately.
i. Why is it necessary to introduce this disposition of Primordial Matter at all, in order to justify us in considering Matter, as metaphysically the proximate genetic principle of Individuation? The answer is twofold; or rather, has two phases. First of all, Primordial Matter, as being a pure subjective receptivity, is essentially one, undetermined, indifferent. It is ready, as one may say, for anything. And it needs to be roused out of its state of indifference, in order to become a principle of distinction and of individuation; otherwise, in its own nature it would be a principle of universal identity, rather than of distinction. Then, again, the old proverb has it, that no one gives that which he has not to give. Now, Matter, purely such, has a sort of Haecceity of its own, but, like its Entity, of the most imperfect kind. It is the Haecceity of an indifferent universal, so to speak; and could not, as such, become proximately a principle of individuation and distinction to individually distinct Forms and substantial Composites. How could that pure receptibility which, prior in order of nature to its actuation, was the same for this stone, this geranium, this cat, and for William, be of itself the proximate principle of individuation to these four? Moreover, the Form in no case could be evolved from the potentiality of the Matter; unless this latter were previously disposed and ordered for its reception. Hence, the natural necessity for generation in those living substances, wherein the organization of the Matter is more complex.
ii. The next question that confronts us is, What is the nature of this disposition of Matter, which is presupposed before its actuation by the substantial Form? It must be disposition by some Accident; for there is nothing else, supposeable, left. Yet Accidents, according to the teaching of the Peripatetic Philosophy, follow the constitution of the substantial Composite which is their Subject and, in consequence, follow the actuation of the Matter by its Form; how, then, can they precede it? This difficulty leads on at once to the third question. It will, therefore, be only necessary to remark here that this argument demands the exclusion of anything like determined Accidents; because Accidents are primarily determined by the Form. This, however, does not hinder the intellect from conceiving the Matter as disposed by indeterminate dimensions, i.e. by simple quantity undetermined by any qualities, and undetermined in its limits. For the first Form, speaking metaphysically, which Matter receives, is the bodily Form, i.e. Matter under its three dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness; and it is necessary that Matter should be body, before it can receive a material Form, and such a kind of body, before it can receive such a Form. But these dimensions may be considered as individually indeterminate; just as, in conceiving the body of a man, we need not include in the concept, whether it is four, five, or six feet in height, so much or so much round the girth, and so forth.
iii. But now comes the third important question, How is this account of the predisposition of Matter to be reconciled with facts and with the order of relation between Matter, its substantial Form, and the supervening Accidents? As this discussion will recur in the Book on Causes, where it must be treated ex professo; it will be briefly expedited here. It must ever be borne in mind, that we are in Metaphysics, not in Physics. Physically, Matter never is, never can be, without its Form. All generation is preceded by corruption; and the Form of the corrupted Substance makes way for the Form of the new, or generated, Substance. In like manner, the Accidental the Forms are always physically present in Matter; though most, if the not all of them, change with a change of substantial Form. Even the in the beginning, substantial and accidental Forms, -- not all, of course, but some, -- were concreated with the Matter. When, however, the subject is considered metaphysically, we look only to the Essences of things. But after all, it may be said, the Metaphysical science must be founded in reality, and must not go against the plain dictates of common sense; else, it will be of little or no worth. Yet, how is it possible that the same Accidents should at once presuppose, and be presupposed to, the Form? Let it suffice for the present to say, that the same thing may be at once prior, and posterior, to another, from different points of view. In the present instance, there is no priority of time; but there is a priority then, of nature, and a priority of order. Having thus cleared the ground, it is time to set before the reader the teaching of St. Thomas on this head; and the quotations will be so ordered, as to give a consecutive summary of his doctrine. The first disposition of Matter is Quantity; because division and indivision in Matter follow upon it, and, as a consequence, unity and multitude, which are the primary consequents of Being and are, on this account, dispositions of Matter, as a whole, not of this or that particular Matter only.' Quantity is, therefore, the primary principle of distinction in Matter. Accordingly 'it does not essentially include the concept of sensible Matter, though it does that of intelligible Matter,'{5} which is the formal object of the Mathematical Science. Again: 'Matter, subjected to dimensions, is the principle of numeric distinction, in all those cases where there is found more than one individual of a species; for such do not differ in Form."{6} Here it will be well to insert a passage, though it suggests a serious difficulty, and involves a seeming discrepancy in the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. 'As every Form,' he says, 'is for its own part universal; so, the Transcendental relation of Matter to Form induces only a universal cognition of the latter. But, considered in this way, Matter is not the principle of individuation; but only as it is itself regarded as individual, i.e, as Matter determined, existing under definite dimensions. For hence arises the individuation of the Form.'{7} It must be observed that St. Thomas, in the Article from which this quotation has been made, is discussing the question whether the human intellect can gain a knowledge of material individual things; and he, accordingly, treats it with reference to sensible perception, in harmony with the next Proposition. But the passage has been introduced here; because, in it, the Angelic Doctor distinctly affirms, that Matter cannot be the proximate principle of the Individuation of the Form, unless it should have been previously individuated itself in some way. The reason he gives is, that the referribility of Matter, as such, is universal; including accordingly every Form, and not any one in particular. To proceed: 'Matter, from which its Form is conceptually abstracted is twofold; viz, intelligible and sensible Matter. And I call intelligible Matter, such as is regarded simply according. to the essence of its continuity; sensible Matter, such as it is in the natural order' (or physical world). 'Now, each can be taken in two ways; as determined, or as indeterminate. It is called determined, when considered under the determination of such or such dimensions; indeterminate, when considered apart from any determination of dimensions.'{8} Here is given the meaning of materia signata, according to the mind of St. Thomas.
In the above citations the following points have been made clear. Matter must, in some way or other, be disposed or determined, in order to become the principle by which the form is individuated. Now, the first disposition, or determination, of Matter is the result of Quantity, which gives to it unity and distinction. But Quantity, and Matter as informed by Quantity, may be considered in two ways. For Quantity may be taken simply for extrinsic extension or the continuous, while the intellect makes abstraction of all the Qualities by which it is physically determined; this is how it is treated in Geometry. Matter, considered as under the information of this abstract Quantity, is called intelligible Matter. On the other hand, Quantity may be taken for what it is actually in nature with its qualifying determinations; and the Matter, informed by Quantity so understood, is called sensible Matter, or Matter as perceptible by the senses. Finally, both intelligible and sensible Matter can be considered as determined or indeterminate; -- determinate, when the Quantity is conceived, as it always really is, under definite measure and limits; indeterminate, when it is conceived without definite measure and limits. Such is a summary of exordial principles, as they may be called. Next follow two passages, in which he professedly attacks the question at present under consideration. The first is taken from a little tract On the principle of Individuation, in which he says: 'It should be understood, then, that the individual, as revealed to human thought, is constituted in a twofold order. For, (1) the individual, in things sensible, is absolutely the Ultimate in the Category of Substance. . . . The nature of a material Form, (because it cannot by itself be this Something specifically complete, whose Being is alone incommunicable), is capable, as regards its nature, of being communicated; and is incommunicable, by virtue solely of its being a Supposit, which is something specifically complete. But this is not the case with every Form. Therefore, so far as regards its essential nature, it is communicable. Now, its communication consists in its being received in others. . . . And it is received in Matter, because it is a material Form. Whence it is plain, that it essentially retains its unity of nature, when communicated; and that it is rendered incommunicable by its reception in Matter. For, owing to its being received in Matter, it becomes individual, that is, incommunicable, and the primary foundation in the Category of Substance; as being the adequate or complete Subject of all else which can be predicated of it. Now, in the order of generation, the incomplete is always prior to the complete; though, in the order of perfectedness, it is just the reverse. That, then, which in order of generation is the first Subject of all and incomplete, which is predicated of nothing belonging to that Category, viz. Matter, is the first principle of incommunicability of Being, which is proper to the Individual. (2) There is something else, by which the nature of the Individual is verified according to human cognition, viz, its determination to certain portions of time and space; because it is its property to be substantially existing Hic et nunc. And this determination is due to it, by virtue of its determined Quantity. And it is in this way, that Matter, under determined Quantity, is the principle of Individuation. For Matter alone is the principle of Individuation; in so far as, in it, are verified the requirements for being the first Subject in the Category of Substance. But this principle cannot possibly be discovered, save under the conditions of Body and Quantity. For this reason, determined Quantity is said to be the principle of Individuation. Not that it in any way causes its Subject, which is first Substance; but it is the inseparable concomitant of the latter, and determines it in space and time.'{9} St. Thomas in this passage offers two principles, as it were, of Individuation. Primordial Matter, considered in its character of first Subject, is the one; determined Quantity, or Body, i.e. Matter under the conditions of determined Quantity, is the other. There are two remarks worth making, which severally apply to these alleged principles. The first is this. St. Thomas himself tells us that Primordial Matter is the principle of Individuation in order of generation; but that, in the perfectly constituted order, i.e. when the substantial Composite exists complete in itself, the same cannot be said. Consequently, he is not considering the question from the same point of view as Suarez; on the contrary, it will be seen that when he does refer to the point touching the physical constitution of Haecceity, he is of one mind with the Jesuit Doctor. The other remark is this. According to St. Thomas, Quantity, or Matter determined by Quantity, is only a Principle in this sense, that it reveals Individuality to sensible perception. In plainer words, men can only distinguish one individual from another by their visible differences; and those visible differences are made apparent to us by the defined Quantity with its definite Qualities. For Matter and Form are wholly impervious to sense. Accordingly, St. Thomas sums up his doctrine on this head in the following words which immediately succeed the quotation just made. 'Therefore, that which comes under the cognizance of the particular reason' (a special faculty, similar to the estimative power in animals, only of a much higher order, by which man is enabled to apprehend individual material natures), 'is individual, by means of the nature of Matter; but that which comes under the cognizance of the external senses, is individual by Quantity.'{10} The one looks to the Essence, and belongs to Metaphysics; the other looks to sensible perception, and belongs to Ideology, In the former case, therefore, St. Thomas confirms the first member of the present Proposition; in the latter, he vindicates the truth of the Proposition immediately to follow. But what, then, of this second Member which is now under discussion? He does not say a word about it in this Opusculum; but he does in another place, which is now submitted to the reader as follows. 'As Matter and Form are the constituents of Genus and Species; so, this Matter and this Form are, of the Individual. Hence, as diversity of Matter or Form, absolutely considered, causes a diversity in Genus and Species; in like manner, this Matter and this Form cause a diversity in number.' Here St. Thomas evidently admits, that the Haecceity of the substantial Composite is physically constituted by the partial Haecceity of the Matter and the Form. 'Now, no Form, as such, is this Form in its own right. (I say, as such, on account of the rational soul, which after a sort is This Something in its own right, but not in its quality of Form.) Accordingly, the intellect has a natural tendency to assign to many, any Form whatsoever which can possibly be received in anything, either as in Matter or as in a Subject. Now, this is opposed to the essential nature of that which is individual. Hence, Form becomes individual by virtue of its reception in Matter. But since Matter, considered in itself, is indefinite; it cannot be, that it should individuate Form received in it, save so far as it is itself capable of distinction. For Form is not individuated in Matter; unless it is received in this or that matter, distinct and determined in place and time. But Matter is incapable of division, save through Quantity; and, accordingly, the Philosopher says, in the first Book of his Physics, that if you subtract Quantity, Matter is indivisible. Hence, Matter becomes individual and definite by being under dimensions. Now, these dimensions may be considered in two ways. First, they may be regarded as under limits, by which I mean, their being terminated by limits of measure and shape; and, under this point of view, they find a place, in the Category of Quantity, as perfected Entities, and cannot be the principle of Individuation. For, since such limit of dimensions may be subject to frequent change in the same individual; it would follow, that the individual would not continue always the same. Secondly, they may be considered according to the essential nature of dimensions merely, apart from any such determination, although they can never really exist without some determination; just as the nature of colour cannot exist, without its being determinately white, black, &c. In this wise, they find a place in the Category, of Quantity, as something that is imperfect. Now, by virtue of these indeterminate dimensions, Matter becomes individual and definite; and thus, individuates Form. It is after such sort, that numene diversity in the same Species is caused by Matter'{11} In this passage, the Angelic Doctor establishes at once, and elucidates in his own consummate way, the second Member of our Proposition. For he remarks most justly, that Matter cannot be understood as individuating Form, while itself remains in its primitive indifference to any given Form in particular. It must be in a proximate disposition for the reception of this Form rather than another; otherwise, there is no sufficient reason for its actuation in such or such a direction. But, in order to be thus proximately disposed, it must itself be potentially individuated, i.e. distinguishable from all other portions of Matter. Now, the primary principle of divisibility and, consequently, of distinction, in Matter, is its Quantity. Therefore, Primordial Matter must be considered as somehow or other pre-informed by Quantity; before it can he accepted as principle of Individuation for the Form by which it is subsequently actuated. But it is impossible to regard such Quantity as determined in measure and figure. For its determination in measure and figure supposes the substantial Composite to be already constituted; since this determination depends upon, and follows after, the actuation of the Form. Therefore, the Quantity must be considered, prior to the introduction of the Form, as indeterminate. All that is essentially required is, that Matter should somehow be corporal. This is precisely what St. Thomas asserts in the same Article. These are his words: 'The dimensions, determined by their proper limits, which are founded in the Subject already completed' (because actuated by its substantial Form), 'are themselves in some sort of a way individuated by the Matter, which is in turn individuated by its indeterminate dimensions, preconceived to be in the Matter.'{12}
Nothing can be plainer than that St. Thomas is, throughout, considering the whole question from a Metaphysical point of view. All his expressions are clearly indicative of the fact. Besides those which have been already signalized in other passages, the two quotations from his Commentary on Boetius afford ample evidence of this. For he tells us categorically, that indeterminate dimensions have no physical existence. They are in this respect like colour, which cannot physically exist, save under the form of such or such a determined colour. And, when he refers to the physical constitution of the material Substance, he asserts that the Haecceity of the whole Substance is composed of this Matter and this Form; which is identical with the doctrine of Suarez. Moreover, in the words last quoted, he speaks of indeterminate dimensions as 'preconceived,' not pre-existing in the Matter.{13}
NOTE.
In order to obviate a possible difficulty, the attention of the reader is invited to a seeming contradiction. At the commencement of the third inquiry regarding the foundation of Haecceity, it was stated that we were not in search 'of any extrinsic principle or principles of Individuation;' yet, in the present Thesis, its 'extrinsic genetic principle' forms a prominent part of the Enunciation. Let it suffice to say, that, in the former phrase, extrinsic means outside the entire composite; in the latter, outside one of the components, though intrinsic as regards the entire composite.
{1} 'In rebus compositis ex materia et forma necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum; quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei. Sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis. His enim homo est homo; et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scil. quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam non cadit in definitione speciei. Non enim cadunt in definitionem hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliqua hujusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam non concluduntur in humanitate; et tamen in eo quod est homo includuntur. Unde id quod est homo habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas; sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia habent se formaliter respectu materiae individuantis. In his vero quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualem, id est, per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura.' 1ae iii, 3, c.
{2} 'Cum enim de ratione speciei humanae sit, quod componatur ex anima et corpore; determinatio corporis et animae est praeter rationem speciei; et accidit homini in quantum est homo, quod sit ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore. Sed convenit per se huic homini, de cujus ratione esset, si defineretur, quod esset ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore; sicut de ratione hominis communis est, quod sit ex anima et corpore.' Quol. ii, a. 4, ad 1m
{3} 'Est enim de ratione individui, quod non possit in pluribus esse: quod quidem contingit dupliciter; Uno modo, quia non est natum esse in aliquo. Et hoc modo formae immateriales separatae per se subsistentes, sunt etiam per seipsas individuae. Alio modo ex eo quod forma substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus; sicut haec albedo quae est in hoc corpore. Quantum igitur ad primum' (this refers to an earlier division in his answer) 'materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus. Quia, cum hujusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subjecto; ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia quae non est in alio, idea nec forma ipsa sic existens potest in alio esse.' 3ae lxxvii, 2, c.
{4} 'In formis in materia receptis, una species reperitur in multis suppositis. Sed hoc non est a natura materiae qualitercumque acceptae, cum materia sit de natura specierum in rebus materialibus. Sed hoc est, per receptionem formae in materia, secundum quod est subjectum primum. Cum enim subjectum in aliqua specie, seu aliqua pars subjectiva, sit prima substantia quae individuum dicitur, illud quod tenet rationem primi subjecti est causa individuationis et divisionis speciei in suppositis. Primum autem subjectum est quod in alia recipi non potest. Et idea formae separatae, eo ipso quod in alio recipi non possunt, habent rationem primi subjecti. Et idea seipsis individuantur. Et cum in ipsis non sit nisi forma, est in eis forma secundum rationem formae. Et ideo cum in eis sit idem suppositum et forma, ex quo se ipsis individuantur, in quantum habent rationem primi subjecti, ad multiplicationem suppositorum, multiplicatur in eis forma secundum rationem formae secundum se, et non per aliud, quia non recipiuntur in alia. Omnis autem talis multiplicatio multiplicat speciem; et ideo in eis tot sunt species, quot sunt individua. In allis vera formis ubi est multitudo formae per receptionem in alia quod habet rationem primi subjecti et non secundum rationem formae, manet eadem species in diversis suppositis. Hoc autem recipiens est materia, non qualitercumque accepta, ut dictum est, cum ipsa sit de intellectu philosophicae speciei; sed secundum quod habet rationem primi subjecti. Et signatio ejus est esse sub certis dimensionibus, quae faciunt esse hic et nunc ad sensum demonstrabile. Ad hanc ergo divisionem formae non requiritur in materia dimensio aliqua interminata. Materia enim est principium individuationis ut est primum subjectum, ut dictum est, et solum sic; quamdiu enim manet aliquid ulterius receptibile, non invenitur ultimum quod in nullo natum est recipi. Si autem sint dimensiones interminatae, necessaria erunt in materia ut in subjecto. Materia autem cum tribus dimensionibus non est primum subjectum, sed secundum se et in natura sua; per quem modum non pertinet ad naturam speciei, sed praut est in acceptione intellectus, cujus est determinationem seu intentionem speciei percipere. Cum ergo forma recipitur in materia, circumscriptis omnibus per intellectum dimensionibus, fit aliquid existens in genere substantiae et ultimum completam habens rationem individui in substantia.' Opusc. XXXII (aliter XX VIII), De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis, C. 3, v. m. Cf. Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De principio Individuationis, p. m.
{5} 'Prima dispositio materiae est quantitas; quia secundum ipsam attenditur divisio ejus at indivisio, et ita unitas et multitudo, quae sunt primo consequentia ens; et propter hoc sunt dispositiones totius materiae, non hujus aut illius tantum. . . . Ideo non claudat materiam sensibilem in ratione sna, qnamvis clandat materiam intelligibilem.' In 4 Sentt. d. xii, Q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, c.
{6} 'Materia, dimensionibus subjecta, est principium distinctionis numeralis in his in quibus inveniuntur multa individua unius speciei; hujusmodi enim non differunt secundum formam.' De Molo, Q. xvi, a. x, ad 18m.
{7} Sicut autem omnis forma, quantum est de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universali. Sic autem considerata, materia non est individuationis principium, sed secundum quod consideratur materia in singulari, quae est materia signata sub determinatis dimensionibus existens; ex hac enim forma individuatur.' De Veritate, Q. x, a. 5, c, init.
{8} 'Duplex est materia a qua fit abstractio; scil. materia intelligibilis et sensibilis, ut patet in 7 Metaph.; et dico intelligibilem, ut quae consideratur in natura con tinui; sensibilem autem sicut materia naturalis. Utraque autem dupliciter accipitur; scil. ut signata, et ut non signata. Et dicitur signata, secundum quod consideratur ex- cum determinatione dimensionum harum soil. vel iflarum; non signata autem, quae sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur.' De Veritate, Q. ii, a. 6, ad 1m.
{9} 'Sciendum est ergo quod individuum apud nos in duobus consistit. Est enim individuum in sensibilibus ipsum ultimum in genera substantiae . . . . Natura enim formae materialis, cum ipsa non possit esse hoc aliquid completum in specie, cujus solum esse est incommunicabile, est communicabilis quantum est de ratione sua; sed est incommunicabilis solum ratione suppositi, quod est aliquid completum in specie, quod cuilibet formae non convenit, ut dictum est. Ideo quantum est da ratione sua, communicabilis est, ut dictum est. Communicatio autem sua est, ut dictum est, per hoc quod recipitur in aliis. . . . Sua autem receptio est in mataria, quia ipsa materialis ast. Ex quo patat quod da natura sna sibi ralinquitur unitas rationis in communicatione sua, et quod redditur incommunicabilis per receptionem suam in materia. Ex quo enim recipitur in materia, efficitur individuum, quod est incommunicabile, et primum fundamantum in genera substantiae, ut completum aliorum de se praedicabilium subjectum. In via autam generationis semper incompletum est prius completo, licet in via perfectionis sit totum e contrario. Illud ergo quod est primum subjectum omnium in via generationis et incompletum, quod de nullo illius generis praedicatur, materia scil. necessario erit primum principium esse incommunicabilis, quod est proprium individui. Aliud est in quo salvatur ratio individui apud nos, determinatio scil. ejus ad certas particulas temporis et loci, quia proprium est esse sibi hic et nune. Et haec determinatio debetur sibi ratione quantitatis determinatae. Et ideo materia sub quantitate determinata est principium individuationis; materia enim sola est principium individuationis, quoad illud in quo salvatur ratio primi in genere substantiae; quod tamen impossibile est reperiri sine corpore et quantitate. Et ideo quantitas determinata dicitur principium individuationis; non quod aliquo modo causet subjectum suum quod est prima substantia, sed concomitatur eam inseparabiliter, et determinat eam ad hic et nunc.' Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De Principio Individuationis, p. m.
{10} 'Illud ergo quod cadit sub ratione particulari, est hoc aliquid per naturam materiae; quod autem cadat sub sensu exteriori, est per quantitatem.' Ibidem.
{11} 'Sicut partes generis at speciei sunt materia et forma; ita individui sunt haec materia et haec forma. Unde sicut diversitatem in genera vel specie facit diversitas materiae vel formae absoluta; ita diversitatem in numero facit haec forma et haec materia. Nulla autem forma, in quantum hujusmodi, est haec ex seipsa. Dico autem, in quantum hujusmodi, propter animam rationalem, quae quodammodo est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum forma. Intellectus vero quamlibet formam quam possibile est recipi in aliquo, sicut in materia vel sicut in subjecto, natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem ejus quod est hoc aliquid. Unde forma fit haec per hoc quod recipitur in materia. Sed cum materia, in se considerata, sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam in se receptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hac materia vel illa distincta et determinata ad hic at nunc. Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi par quantitatem; unde Philosophus dicit I. Physic. quod, submota quantitate, remanet substantia indivisibilis. Et ideo materia efficitur haec et signata, secundum quod est sub dimensionibus. Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum earum terminationem. Et dico eas terminari secundum terminatam mensuram et figuram; et sic ut entia perfecta collocantur in genera quantitatis; et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia, cum talis dimensionum terminatio varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret idem numero semper. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantom; quamvis nunquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint: sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi at nigri; et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis efficitur haec materia signata; et sic individuat formam. Et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie.' Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Lib. Boetii de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. 2, c.
{12} 'Ipsae dimensiones terminatae quae fundantur in subjecto jam completo, individuantur quodammodo ex materia individuata per dimensiones interminatas praeintellectas in materia.' Opusc. LX (alter LXIII), in Lib. Boetii de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. 2, ad 3m.
{13} The form of such expressions is the more noticeable, because St. Thomas is so guarded and concise in his style. There is another remarkable passage, which is here subjoined. In it the Angelic Doctor clearly distinguishes between the physical and metaphysical view of the question. 'Those things which differ numerically in the Category of Substance, not only differ in their accidents, but likewise in the Form and Matter. If we ask, however, why this form differs from that; there is no other reason than because it is in a different determined Matter. Nor can any other reason be found, why this Matter is divided from that, except Quantity. Therefore, Matter, subject to dimension, is conceived to be the principle of this diversity:' ('Illa quae differunt numero in genere substantiae, non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Sed si quaeratur, quare haec forma differt ab illa, non erit alia ratio nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Nec invenitur alia ratio quare haec materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subjecta dimensioni intelligitur esse principium hujus diversitatis'). Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Lib. Boetii de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. 2, ad 4m.